Bhupal Singh
Sitikantha Pattanaik*
The sub-prime crisis has stimulated the debate on the need for revisiting the issue as
to whether monetary policy should become more sensitive to asset price movements and
respond proactively to prevent any build up of bubbles. In the India specific context, this
paper provides empirical evidence on the relevance of a policy of no direct use of the interest
rate instrument for stabilising asset price cycles. While the asset price channel of monetary
policy transmission is clearly visible in empirical estimates, there is no evidence of monetary
policy responding to asset price developments directly. Asset price changes also do not seem
to influence the inflation path, suggesting why monetary policy may continue to refrain from
responding directly to asset price cycles. Credit market shocks, however, explain significant
part of asset price variations over medium to long-run, which though could be part of a
broader comovement of variables over the business cycle, particularly real activity, credit
flows and asset prices. Higher interest rates seem to cause contraction in output, credit
demand as well as asset prices; hence, only the impact on asset prices should not be viewed
as a good enough reason to use monetary policy for stabilising asset price cycles. Financial
stability concerns from asset price bubbles could be better addressed through micro and
macro-prudential measures, and the effectiveness of such measures could be enhanced when
implemented in a sound macroeconomic policy environment.
JEL Classification : C33, E52, G12
Keywords : Monetary Policy; Asset Prices; VAR Model.
I. Introduction
The price stability objective pursued by central banks is generally
defined in a manner that excludes asset prices. Asset price is often
viewed by central banks as another macroeconomic variable which
could potentially influence the inflation path either by impacting
inflation expectations, or through the wealth effect on aggregate demand, or by altering the cost of funds. The relationship between
monetary policy and asset prices has been conventionally analysed
through the asset price channel of monetary policy transmission,
under which asset prices respond to monetary policy changes and
thereby may impact the ultimate policy goals relating to inflation and
output. The pre-crisis mainstream view on why a central bank should
not directly aim at containing asset price inflation was premised on
certain sound arguments: (a) bubbles are hard to differentiate from
genuine bull runs and central banks have no comparative advantage
over the markets to come to any credible conclusion on the fundamental
value of assets, (b) monetary policy instruments could be ineffective
in preventing asset bubbles, particularly speculative bubbles, as the
magnitude of the increase in interest rates would have to be large
enough to be able to prick a bubble, which in turn would entail large
loss of output, and (c) central banks have no mandate on asset prices.
As a result, the pre-crisis emphasis in monetary policy strategies was
to manage the impact of asset price developments on inflation and
growth, either in a forward looking manner by anticipating the impact
on inflation outlook, or by reacting to the impact on output and
inflation after a bubble bursts.
The emerging perception after the global crisis is that central
banks can contribute to preventing the build up of asset bubbles by:
(a) avoiding credit bubbles, persistent excess liquidity conditions and
build up of leveraged positions in asset markets, and (b) using counter
cyclical prudential regulation in terms of norms for provisioning and
risk weights for capital requirement, limiting the maximum exposure
of banks to sensitive assets and prescribing margin requirements (viz.,
loan to value ratio). While the former falls in the domain of monetary
policy, the latter belongs to the purview of financial regulation. The
focus of this paper is on what monetary policy per se could do about
asset price inflation, rather than whether a central bank could use
instruments other than the interest rate to stabilise asset price cycles.
Against this background, Section II of the paper presents the academic
debate on the role of monetary policy in relation to asset prices, with
a review of literature that reflects the pre-crisis consensus view as well as the lack of consensus after the global crisis. The issue of
whether monetary policy should be assigned any role relating to asset
prices in India has been evaluated through various empirical tests in
Section III, notwithstanding data limitations in conducting empirical
research involving housing asset prices in India. Concluding
observations are outlined in Section IV.
II. Monetary Policy and Asset Prices - The Debate
Monetary policy actions could get transmitted through changes in
financial prices (e.g., interest rates, exchange rates and asset prices) and
financial quantities (e.g., money supply and credit aggregates), which in
turn may influence the ultimate goal variables, namely inflation and
output. The reverse causation may also be significant since monetary
policy actions are often based on feedbacks received from the lead
indicators of macro-financial conditions given that monetary policy has
to be forward looking due to long and variable lags.
In this expected bi-directional causality in the interactions
between monetary policy and asset prices, clarity on the role of
monetary policy with respect to asset prices becomes important. In the
first type of causation running from monetary policy action, asset
prices may change, but the objective of policy change could be to attain
the ultimate goals relating to inflation or output or both. Any asset
price changes that may take place in this process would be just
coincidental, not intentional. Once monetary policy actions intentionally
start targeting asset prices it could necessarily involve sacrifice of
growth and inflation objectives. That is because the magnitude of the
increase in interest rate would have to be large enough to effectively
pop an asset price bubble. If that happens, output could contract and
deflation fears could creep in. Thus, all the objectives of monetary
policy, i.e., not only those relating to output and inflation, but also
financial stability could get sacrificed in that process.
The second type of causation, which could be seen in terms of an
interest rate policy rule function, largely remains hypothetical, since following the pre-crisis consensus, no direct feedback from asset
prices seems to have triggered any change in policy interest rates of
any major central bank. Asset prices may only indirectly condition an
interest rate action, through the impact on output and inflation, for
which the wealth and income effects of asset price changes would
have to be significant.
After the global crisis, those who proposed a “lean against the
wind” role for monetary policy, seem to suggest a place for asset
prices directly in the interest rate policy rule function. Since credit
bubbles and excessive leverage could be the driving forces behind
asset price bubbles, either asset prices directly or credit and leverage
as lead indicators of asset prices would then have to find explicit place
in the monetary policy reaction function. This is premised on two
broad arguments: (i) Given the endogenous money supply process, in
which money and credit growth may be largely demand driven, central
banks could change the credit conditions or discourage excessive
leverage only by changing interest rates. Use of macro-prudential
measures or sector specific credit/prudential policies could attain the
goal, but these are not monetary policy measures. Hence, any role for
monetary policy should be seen only through the interest rate rule,
where interest rate would respond directly to asset price trends; (ii)
Taking a view on asset price bubble or credit bubble should not be
difficult for a central bank, since they in any case take views on
‘potential output’ and ‘threshold inflation’ for changing their policy
interest rates, and such estimates are not free of errors. Only the extent
of error in judgement could be higher for asset prices or credit bubbles,
compared to errors in estimating potential output and threshold
inflation. Moreover, if central banks can use macro-prudential
regulation, they have to take a view on the extent of misalignment in
asset prices, to be able to alter the risk weights for capital adequacy
purpose or assign specific provisioning requirements in proportion to
the extent of risk expected from exposures to asset price volatility.
Thus, the pre-crisis presumption that asset bubbles are hard to identify
might have helped central banks to avoid any use of interest rate
instrument in pursuit of asset price objective, but given the overwhelming emerging support for use of macro-prudential
regulation to promote systemic financial stability, specific views
would have to be taken by central banks on asset prices. The dominant
remaining argument against the use of interest rate instrument, then,
would have to be based on the bluntness of the instrument, which can
limit the asset prices from growing into a bubble only at the expense
of sacrificing output and inflation objectives.
Thus, for use of macro-prudential regulation, a central bank may
have to necessarily take a view on asset prices, but this assessment
need not feed into decisions on changes in policy interest rates. A
central bank empowered with the instrument of macro-prudential
regulation may start “leaning against the wind” but in pursuing this
objective, the interest rate instrument may still have no role to play.
Thus, the pre-crisis consensus may still be relevant after the global
crisis, even though convincing counter arguments have been advanced,
some of which are mentioned in the review of literature.
II.1 A Review of the Literature
Theoretical and empirical research appears divided after the
global crisis on the issue of role of monetary policy relating to asset
price developments. A rich body of literature prior to the global crisis
seemed to support the argument that a monetary policy approach,which
responds primarily to the inflation and aggregate demand outlook
rather than directly trying to prick the bubble is likely to yield better
macroeconomic outcomes (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1999;
Bernanke and Gertler, 2001; Gruen, Plumb and Stone, 2005). The precrisis
consensus reflected the famous Greenspan orthodoxy on asset
price build-up that argues that it is hard to identify bubbles ex ante and
central banks may not have better information than markets to influence
asset prices.1 Further, even if a bubble can be identified ex ante, using the interest rate is ineffective in bursting a bubble.2 Similarly, monetary
policy response to tackle an asset boom can interfere with the role of
asset prices in allocating resources, particularly if there is uncertainty
with regard to the presence and nature of a bubble. The asset bubbles
are broadly explained as asset prices rising above the level warranted
by economic fundamentals, as measured by the discounted stream of
expected future cash flows that will accrue to the owner of the asset.3
The difficulties in identifying asset price bubbles arise mainly from
two factors: first, private agents’ subjective expectations are a key
determinant of asset prices, particularly in the short run, posing
difficulties in disentangling the purely psychological component from
the objective valuation of the asset; second, asset bubbles often arise
from overreactions to news about fundamentals.4
Given the difficulties in identifying asset price bubbles, the best
course for monetary policy could be to cushion the adverse impact
once a bubble bursts (Bean, 2003; Bernanke and Gertler, 1999, 2001;
Blinder and Reis, 2005; Bordo et al., 2002, 2003; Bordo and Wheelock,
2004, Filardo, 2004; Greenspan, 2002; Roubini, 2006). For equity
prices to be a useful monetary policy indicator, a credible relationship
between changes in monetary policy and changes in equity prices as well as between changes in equity prices and changes in inflation
should be established (Saxton, 2003). Empirical investigations,
however, do not seem to offer a reliable relationship between changes
in monetary policy and equity prices. Mishkin and White (2002) argued
that most fluctuations in stock prices occur for reasons not associated
with monetary policy, but rather reflect real fundamentals or animal
spirits. The loose link between monetary policy and stock prices,
therefore, implies the limited ability of central banks to control stock
prices. Similarly, there does not seem to be a reliable positive empirical
relationship between changes in equity prices and changes in general
price levels (Filardo, 2000; Goodhart and Hofmann, 2000; Stock and
Watson, 2001; Tatom, 2002). Moreover, the consumption and
investment sensitivity to the wealth effect of equity and housing prices,
despite their growing share in the household wealth and the economy,
may be relatively weak (Gramlich, 2001; Kuttner and Mosser, 2002;
Ludvigson, Steindel and Lettau, 2002).
After the global crisis, influential opinions have supported the
need for making central banks more sensitive to asset price
developments in the conduct of their monetary policies, even though
justifications for the relevance of the pre-crisis approach also continue
to be significant. There was a “lean against the wind” perspective
even before the global crisis, which argued that central banks should
explicitly respond to perceived asset price bubbles, even if that
involves short run deviations of monetary policy from the path
conditioned by the inflation-growth objectives (Bordo and Jeane,
2002; Borio and Lowe, 2002; Cecchetti et al., 2000; Crockett, 2001;
Detken and Smets, 2004; Filardo, 2000; Roubini, 2006). It was also
observed that monetary policy could distinguish the bubble component
from the fundamental component in asset prices and that the optimal
monetary policy could react to the bubble rather than the fundamental
component of asset prices (Rudebusch, 2005).5
The pre-crisis perception of the best practice in monetary policy
framework as the one characterised by a single target (i.e., price stability) and a single instrument (i.e., short-term policy interest rate) has generally
been questioned on the ground that a less inflation-centric and more asset
price sensitive monetary policy could possibly have been more appropriate
as a crisis preventive mechanism. Even though sustained easy monetary
conditions have been highlighted as a causative factor behind asset price
bubbles, empirical estimates suggest that the stance of monetary policy
has not generally been a good leading indicator of future busts in asset
prices. It is argued that a loose monetary policy was not the main,
systematic cause of the boom and consequent bust (IMF, 2009).
One of the key arguments in the debate on the dynamics between
monetary policy and asset prices has been that monetary policy should
respond to asset prices only to the extent of their impact on growth,
employment and inflation, which are the core objectives of monetary
policy (Kohn, 2008). This requires an understanding of how asset prices
influence inflation and economic activity. Some have argued that the
impact of asset prices on aggregate demand and inflation should fall
within the domain of monetary policy. But this perspective is not new,
and was known to central banks even before the crisis. Another area
that has been argued to fall in the domain of monetary policy is the asset
price bubble that may be fuelled by excessive credit growth. The
feedback loop between credit growth and asset price growth could
potentially pose challenges to the inflation and growth objectives of
central banks. Hence, it is argued that monetary policy should respond
to asset price bubbles that are propagated by excessive credit expansion
in the economy (Blinder, 2008). Another argument is that asset price
bubbles can have serious adverse macroeconomic consequences and
therefore, it is preferable to try to eliminate the source of macroeconomic
instability directly by adopting a policy of leaning against the wind.
Since central banks are generally held responsible for financial stability
even without any explicit mandate, they should monitor asset prices
and try to prevent the emergence of bubbles (that invariably lead to
financial crashes).6 Interest rate could be an effective tool in preventing
bubbles (Orphanides, 2010; Papademos, 2009). Pavasuthipaisit (2010) even found empirical support for leaning against the wind through
direct use of the interest rate instrument.7 Strauss-Kahn (2011), on the
contrary, stressed “...in my view, it is far from obvious that such (asset
price) variables should enter the primary target (i.e., the interest rate
rule) of monetary policy”.
From a pragmatic policy perspective, however, it is still largely
ambiguous as to how monetary policy could respond to asset prices
directly, even if it is presumed that it must in some way. Trichet (2009)
noted that “…central banks should not target, nor react mechanically to
asset prices. Judgement is necessary in addressing asset price dynamics
within an overall framework geared to price stability.” Donald Kohn
(2008) viewed that “…I am not convinced that the events of the past
few years and the current crisis demonstrate that central banks should
switch to trying to check speculative activity through tighter monetary
policy whenever they perceive a bubble forming…the case for extra
action still remains questionable.” There is also a lack of political
mandate for central banks to control asset prices. With no instrument to
successfully target asset prices, by pricking a bubble, a central bank can
also create macroeconomic instability and ruin its credibility (Issing,
2009). Whether any specific mandate on asset prices for central banks
could undermine central bank independence is an issue which has not
been examined very seriously as yet, but the risk to independence
cannot be ruled out, given that there will be some interest groups that
may benefit from asset price inflation, whether genuine or speculative.
Given the inherent practical limitations of monetary policy in
dealing with asset prices, other policies that could be effective in
ensuring financial stability include regulatory policies and the fiscal
policy.8 The regulatory policy instruments to deal with asset bubbles may comprise limits on the credit exposure to real estate and stock
markets, enhancement of relative risk weights/provisioning for bank
lending, monitoring of banks’ investment in asset markets through
special purpose vehicles, counter-cyclical loan to value limits, caps on
leverage, and tighter eligibility and collateral requirements on loans for
investment in particular assets. Fiscal policy can also work as a
countercyclical tool to influence asset price movements through
countercyclical public expenditure plans and also suitable adjustment of
taxes/tax exemptions that could influence asset prices. Changes in tax
incentives to real estate sector or investments in financial instruments
such as mutual funds and equity over long-term that alters effective
return on such instruments may help in containing excessive asset price
growth. Use of transaction tax on assets where there may be excessive
speculation, including Tobin-type taxes when speculative foreign capital
inflows are perceived to lead to destabilising growth in asset prices, has
also been advocated.9 As marginal changes in interest rates cannot have
much influence on asset prices, particularly when the expected returns
on stock/housing assets significantly exceed the cost of borrowed funds,
sector specific prudential policies could be more appropriate.
III. Monetary Policy and Asset Price Dynamics in India
The empirical assessment for India focuses on the interactions
between monetary policy and housing and stock prices. Equity and
housing prices have the tendency to be procyclical in nature, as high
growth phases are generally associated with an underpricing of risk
(Barsky and DeLong, 1993). Four specific issues are examined
empirically here: (a) whether asset prices exhibit any causal influence
on the interest rates, which would then be relevant to explain whether
monetary policy has responded directly to asset prices in India; (b)
whether asset price changes significantly alter the inflation path – this
could be important to examine the relevance of an indirect role for
monetary policy, given the extent to which current asset price trends may alter the inflation outlook; (c) whether interest rate changes lead
to expected changes in stock prices alone or also give rise to changes
in output and credit demand, which would be important to examine
the potential adverse effects of a hypothetical direct use of monetary
policy to deal with asset price inflation; and (d) whether the relationship
between interest rate changes and asset prices could be ambiguous
because of the presence of other common factors which may exhibit
strong co-movement with both interest rate and asset prices.
III.1 Monetary Policy and Asset Price Cycles
With the short-term interest rate emerging as the predominant
instrument of monetary policy, the interest rate channel of transmission
has received significant research focus, even though both asset price
and exchange rate channels have become increasingly relevant. A
Granger causality analysis of movement in interest rates and changes
in stock prices in India for the period 1994:4 to 2010:6 reveals that
while interest rate movements cause changes in stock prices, the
reverse causation does not hold (Table 1). This seems to suggest that
monetary policy does not respond to stock prices, though stock prices
respond to monetary policy shocks.
The literature also highlights the possible presence of feedback
loops between asset price bubbles and excessive growth in bank
credit.10 Unlike stocks, real estate, i.e., both residential and commercial, may have a significant credit component. It is often viewed that if
asset bubbles are fuelled by expansion in bank credit, then monetary
policy should have a role to “lean against the wind”. In this case also,
credit growth may be an endogenous process, and unless a central
bank has at its disposal the authority to directly alter the flow of credit
to a specific sector, it may have to resort to the interest rate instrument.
The policy of using a macroeconomic tool such as interest rate to
address the problem specific to a sector may not be appropriate, as it
may have adverse consequences for other sectors. In India, thus, the
Reserve Bank has used in the past its sector specific prudential credit
policy measures. Hence, if credit is seen as a causative factor behind
build up of asset prices, prudential regulatory policies can limit the
credit flow and discourage banks’ excessive exposure to specific
assets/sectors. The relationship between credit cycles and asset price
cycles (in terms of movement in stock prices) in India has been
examined with a view to understand the nature of causal relationship.
Stock price cycles exhibit a synchronised movement with credit
cycles, although the lead and lag relationship between them changes
over different phases of the cycle (Chart 1). This seems to support the
view that stock price movements are correlated with credit expansion.
This empirical pattern, however, does not suggest that stock market
activities are financed by bank credit, as it could be possible that a credit boom coincides with the upswing phase of a business cycle,
which in turn drives up stock prices.
Table 1 : Causal relationship between interest rate and changes in stock prices |
Null Hypothesis |
F-Statistic |
Prob. |
Yield on 91-day TBs do not Granger cause change in stock prices |
3.51 |
0.03 |
Change in stock prices do not Granger cause yield on 91-day TBs |
1.93 |
0.15 |
Yield on 10-year government bonds do not Granger cause change in
stock prices |
3.56 |
0.03 |
Change in stock prices do not Granger cause yield on 10-year
government bonds |
0.49 |
0.61 |
|
The Granger causality test between bank credit growth and
changes in asset prices in India for the period 1996:Q1 to 2010:Q1
provides evidence of significant bi-directional causal relationship
between them, as presented in Table 2. This implies that both credit and
asset price booms reinforce each other – which is the typical feedback
loop between credit and asset prices. This two-way causation could
emanate from the fact that credit growth may directly finance purchases
of stocks (which is limited in India) or indirectly push up asset prices
by financing real estate activities, enhancing thereby the prospects of
future earnings. As the value of stocks increases, the capacity to borrow
against the shares as collateral also increases. This, however, is possible
only to a limited extent in India given the prudential regulations.
III.2 Monetary Policy and Housing Price Dynamics
Housing wealth is considered to be an important component of
the total household wealth and is regarded critical to explaining the
demand behaviour in the advanced economies during business cycles.
Realisation of the asset appreciation through refinancing of mortgage
makes the demand impact particularly strong, unlike in India where
such refinancing of mortgage is mostly absent. As supply of housing
is relatively inelastic in the short run, demand pressures may lead to
disproportionate increase in prices. Further, speculative demand in a
situation of inelastic short run supply may lead to build up of bubbles.
An important link from monetary policy to asset prices is through the
interest rate, which can influence the cost of mortgage debt and the demand for housing credit.11 The changes in interest rates also signal
possible changes in valuation of assets. Monetary policy is considered
to influence the long-term cost of borrowing, which is relevant for the
debt-financed housing demand. A tightening of interest rates may
raise the cost of borrowing for households to finance such contractual
debt and hence may lead to a decline in demand, which in turn could
lead to a downward pressure on prices.
Table 2 : Causal relationship between changes in bank credit to private sector and changes in stock prices in India |
Null Hypothesis : |
F-Statistic |
Prob. |
Changes in bank credit to private sector do not
Granger cause changes in stock prices |
5.83 |
0.003 |
Changes in stock prices do not Granger cause
changes in credit to private sector |
7.03 |
0.001 |
Given the lack of data on housing wealth in India and the absence
of a reasonable time series data even on housing prices, the house price
behaviour has to be studied using a number of proxy indicators.12 Stamp
duties and registration fees collected by the State governments could
shed some light on the house price behaviour in India because these
should move in tandem with house price.13 As evident from Chart 2, the
movement of stock prices and revenues from stamp duties and
registration fees on housing tend to follow a systematic relationship;
together they seem to suggest a broad underlying common asset price
cycle with occasional deviations across asset class. The recent cycle in
asset prices in India is evident from the inverted U-shape pattern for
the period 2003 to 2010.
|
Equity prices of the real estate firms listed in the stock exchanges
also provide some information about the price behaviour in the
housing sector. The stock prices of the realty sector attained a peak at
the end of 2007 and there was a substantial collapse following the
financial market shocks from the global financial crisis (Chart 3a).
Although the broader index of stock prices (BSE Sensex) returned
closer to the pre-crisis level, the realty stock prices tend to remain
sluggish. This recent behaviour of the realty sector stock price index
seems to lag behind the extent of increase seen in the National
Housing Bank’s Residex and RBI’s housing prices index (Chart 3b).
|
Growth in bank credit to the construction sector (proxy for real
estate) in India exhibited a clear cyclical pattern during the period
2000-01 to 2009-10 (Chart 4). Reflecting the house price boom,
growth in bank credit to the construction sector was significantly
above the overall growth of bank credit to industry. It may, however,
be mentioned that as a part of prudential regulations in India, bank
credit to sectors such as real estate and stock markets is regulated in
relation to expansion in the banks’ overall asset portfolio. Secondly,
the banks’ credit exposures to real estate and stock markets attract
higher capital requirements.14 In respect of residential housing,
however, credit is given preferential treatment in terms its classification
as a priority sector loan and lower risk weight for capital requirements.
|
Table 3 : Causal relationship between housing loans and interest rates |
Null Hypothesis |
F-Statistic |
Prob |
TB91 does not Granger cause dLBC_hsg |
3.01 |
0.06 |
dLBC_hsg does not Granger cause TB91 |
0.40 |
0.67 |
10yGsec does not Granger cause dLBC_hsg |
2.93 |
0.00 |
dLBC_hsg does not Granger cause 10yGsec |
0.48 |
0.90 |
In a situation where housing asset values tend to witness a secular
growth, banks may have an incentive to expand credit to residential
housing segment where credit risks are perceived to be relatively low
since such loans are backed by collaterals whose values are expected
to rise in future.
Another important dimension of the role of monetary policy in
affecting house prices is the impact of interest rates on the demand for
bank credit by the housing sector, which in turn, affects house prices
with a lag. The Granger causality test for the period 2002:4 to 2010:6
suggests that short-term interest rates (TB91) Granger cause changes
in bank credit to the housing sector (dLBC_hsg) (Table 3). A significant
unidirectional causality is also observed from long-term interest rates
(10yGsec) to the demand for credit to housing sector, though with
longer lags.
The Granger causality analysis between house prices for the period
2003:Q2 to 2010:Q2, proxied by housing prices for the Mumbai city
(dLHPI), stock prices (dLSENSEX_SA) and short-term interest rates
measured by the weighted average call money rates (RCALL) provides
some insights about the asset price dynamics (Table 4). Interest rate
changes seem to Granger cause changes in house prices. This finding
may be relevant from the viewpoint of effectiveness of monetary policy in influencing house prices in India.15 While asset prices may respond
to changes in interest rates, the policy interest rates would have changed
in response to assessment about the growth and inflation outlook.
Constructing a counterfactual to study the impact of monetary policy
changes on asset prices, thus, could be extremely difficult. This is
primarily the reason as to why the Reserve Bank has abstained from
using interest rate instrument with the sole aim of influencing asset
prices. Although Joshi (2006) found that housing prices in India are
much more sensitive to interest rate changes than to credit supply, the
findings were based on a relatively short sample.
Table 4 : Causal relationship between house prices, stock prices and
short-term interest rate |
Null Hypothesis : |
F-Statistic |
Prob. |
dLSENSEX_SA does not Granger cause dLHPI |
0.62 |
0.55 |
dLHPI does not Granger cause dLSENSEX_SA |
7.66 |
0.00 |
RCALL does not Granger cause dLHPI |
3.31 |
0.05 |
dLHPI does not Granger cause RCALL |
0.41 |
0.67 |
III.3 Empirical Results from SVAR Model
III.3.1 Model and Data Sources
To examine the dynamic interactions among the macroeconomic
variables and asset prices, a structural vector auto regression (SVAR)
model was estimated. The standard structural system can be considered
of the following linear and stochastic dynamic form :
|
The model has the standard assumption that real income shocks
are most exogenous and are not instantaneously affected by other
macroeconomic aggregates in the model; therefore, all coefficients in
the matrix are restricted to zero. Price behaviour is impacted by the
aggregate demand shocks contemporaneously but not by other shocks.
The monetary policy reaction function has the restriction that monetary
policy does not contemporaneously respond to output shocks. This
restriction is based on the argument that often the information on output
is available to monetary authorities with a time lag. The reaction
function, however, assumes contemporaneous reaction of monetary
policy to price changes and exchange rate movements. Exchange rate
enters the monetary policy reaction function as central bank also
attempts to minimise excessive volatility in foreign exchange market –
an emerging market phenomenon. An important dimension of the asset
price dynamics captured in this model is the feedback between bank
credit and asset prices. Credit demand is contemporaneously affected
by the real income shocks, supply shocks and monetary policy shocks.
Asset prices, measured in terms of stock market prices, are
contemporaneously affected by the fundamental as well as the nonfundamental
factors, except the exchange rate. Asset price is
contemporaneously affected by credit shocks in the model as the
underlying dynamics is that most asset price bubbles are associated
with excessive credit growth. The standard practice in the VAR
literature on monetary policy and exchange rate interaction is to place
the exchange rate last in the ordering while the exchange rate is
allowed to react simultaneously to all shocks. The exchange rate can
react instantaneously to all shocks, even though the presence of
nominal rigidities may lead to only gradual pass-through of exchange
rate shocks to macroeconomic variables. This should provide enough
restriction to identify the system, thereby allowing for the use of the
non-recursive decomposition.
The following variables were used in the model: real income
(GDP at constant prices), price level (Wholesale price index), real
interest rate (call money rates minus GDP deflator), real bank credit
(stock of non-food bank credit deflated by GDP deflator), real stock prices (BSE Sensex deflated by GDP deflator, to account for the wealth
effect arising from asset price inflation net of headline inflation), and
real exchange rate (6-currency REER index).16 The data were sourced
from the Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy of the Reserve
Bank of India. The sample used for estimation was 1996:Q2 to
20010:Q2 with seasonally adjusted data for output, goods prices, bank
credit and stock prices.
III.3.2 Empirical Estimates
The model is uniquely identified and the shocks are orthogonal
(uncorrelated). Although some variables appear to be non-stationary,
the VAR model is estimated in levels following Sims et al. (1990) who
argue that a VAR model in levels may incur some loss in estimators’
efficiency but not the consistency. The objective of estimating a VAR
model in levels is to examine the underlying relationship among
variables. The optimal lag length based on various criteria (viz., LR
test statistic, Akaike information criterion, Schwarz information
criterion and Hannan-Quinn information criterion) appeared to be
three quarters.
The estimated structural VAR model explains various channels
through which asset prices may be influenced, which are presented in
Chart 5. Aggregate demand shocks (i.e., an increase in aggregate
demand) lead to an increase in stock prices in the short run and the
impact fizzles out in the medium to long run. Favourable aggregate
demand shocks signal an improvement in the fundamentals of the
economy and raise expectations of the future earnings growth in the
stock market. An adverse supply shock that causes sudden changes in relative prices, leads to significant moderation in stock prices in the
short to medium run. The asset price channel of monetary policy is
found to be strong. A monetary policy shock causes significant
fluctuations in equity prices. Since monetary policy works with
variable lags, impulse response functions exhibit that monetary policy
tightening leads to a slow but significant moderation in stock price
changes over the medium to long run. The life cycle hypothesis of
consumption suggests that when stock prices decrease, consumers’
wealth also decreases and they spend less on consumption. Given this,
monetary policy could affect demand through the asset price channel.
|
In India, however, on an average only about 6 per cent of total financial
assets of households are held in the form of equity.
An important issue of concern to policy makers is how asset
price shocks propagate to the rest of the economy and with what lags
they impact various macroeconomic aggregates. The estimated
structural VAR model exhibits that stock price shocks affect output
with some lags over the medium-term, though with no significant long
run impact (Appendix 1). The impact on output could be through the
typical wealth effect and balance sheet channels that cause changes in
consumption and investment decisions. An adverse output shock,
which may be the result of negative shock to asset prices, triggers an
expansionary monetary policy response in terms of lower interest rate
in the short run. This corroborates the indirect role of monetary policy
relative to asset prices, i.e., through the impact on output. Asset price
shocks do not seem to have a significant direct impact on the price
level. Shocks from stock prices explain only marginal fluctuations in
the overall price level over medium to long run. This suggests no need
for even indirect monetary policy response to asset price developments,
unlike the impact observed through output.
Stock price shocks also do not seem to lead to any noticeable
changes in interest rates in the short run. It suggests that monetary
policy does not respond to asset prices. This could also be because of
the muted impact of stock price shocks on inflation. Favourable stock
price shocks tend to cause increase in the demand for bank credit with
lags over the medium-term. In fact, by the end of eight quarters, stock
price shocks explain about 10 per cent of the fluctuations in real demand
for credit. The most significant impact of stock price shocks is on the
real exchange rate, which possibly works through capital flows. Higher
stock prices change the return differentials for foreign investors, making
investment in the Indian markets more attractive, which in turn lead to
higher inflows and hence appreciation of the real exchange rate in the
short run. This effect, however, moderates over medium to long run.
The above findings suggest that though the direct impact of asset
price shocks on goods prices is not significant, they may still be of interest to the central bank from the standpoint of their impact on credit
demand, output and exchange rate. Thus, monetary policy may respond
to asset prices only indirectly, for which, however, clearer identification
of the influence of asset price changes on inflation, growth or exchange
rate would be important. Asset prices appearing to be sensitive to
monetary policy changes do not provide a strong case for deploying
monetary policy to counter asset price movements. Relying on the
asset price channel to achieve the ultimate policy goals of growth and
price stability could be too risky a proposition to be ventured. Thus,
interest rate channel should remain the prime focus of monetary policy,
even if asset prices may respond to changes in monetary policy, which
in turn may influence the ultimate goal variables that the monetary
policy aims to achieve. Asset prices as such should not become an
intermediate objective of monetary policy.
The response of stock prices to credit market shocks validates
the presumed role of credit expansion in contributing to the asset price
bubbles.17 A comparative assessment of the impulse response functions
reveals that monetary policy tightening leads to a moderation in credit
demand over the medium-term, given the usual lags in the impact of
monetary policy (Appendix 1). The tightening of policy interest rates
also impacts stock prices, as financing the leverage in the markets
turns costlier.18 The impulse responses exhibit that a positive shock to
bank credit causes significant increase in equity prices over medium
to long run. The credit market shock at the same time causes significant
variations in real output. Thus, the asset price dynamics become
complicated as the positive credit shocks lead to simultaneous increase
in both output and asset prices. From the perspective of a monetary policy response, it becomes difficult to segregate the part of asset
price increase that may be caused by improvement in fundamentals
from the one led by speculative credit flows to asset markets.
The stock market shock, measured in terms of lagged impact of
the stock prices, could reflect composite impact of backward-looking
investor behaviour, overreaction by agents to news about the
fundamentals, impact of sudden surges in portfolio inflows and the
herd behaviour/animal spirits. These shocks are most dominant in
causing fluctuations in stock prices in the short run but their impact
peters-off at a rapid pace.19 Another important channel through which
asset prices are impacted is the exchange rate channel. A positive
shock to real exchange rate, signifying the adverse external
competitiveness shock, results in significant moderation in stock
prices with a lag, consistent with lags involved in exchange rate
transmission to macroeconomic aggregates. The impact, however,
does not seem to be persistent.
The results of decomposition of fluctuations in stock prices
caused by various macroeconomic shocks are presented in Table 5.
Although the asset price shock explains the predominant part of
variations in stock prices in the short run, it is the credit demand shock
that explains the largest proportion of variations in asset prices over
the medium to long run. The aggregate demand and supply shocks
tend to have short to medium-term impact on stock prices. The
variance decomposition analysis of fluctuations in credit demand also
reveals that aggregate demand shocks explain significant variation in
real credit demand, which in turn, might be impacting on the stock
price movements given the causal relationship between bank credit
and stock prices (Appendix 2). The real exchange rate shock appears
significant over the medium to long run in explaining fluctuations in
stock prices in India. The role of exchange rate in affecting asset
prices could emanate from changes in relative attractiveness of returns on foreign capital in the stock markets in the short run due to nominal
appreciation of the rupee, and a loss of overall external competitiveness
over the medium to long run, which may adversely affect the growth
outlook and hence dampen stock prices.
Table 5 : Decomposition of fluctuations caused in stock prices |
(Per cent) |
Quarters |
Demand
shock |
Supply
shock |
Monetary
policy
shock |
Credit
market
shock |
Asset price
shock |
Exchange
rate shock |
1 |
14.1 |
0.0 |
1.1 |
0.5 |
84.3 |
0.0 |
4 |
10.4 |
26.9 |
6.4 |
2.1 |
52.4 |
1.8 |
8 |
6.1 |
13.3 |
8.4 |
18.8 |
27.0 |
26.5 |
12 |
7.3 |
13.4 |
14.9 |
21.5 |
20.6 |
22.2 |
16 |
7.4 |
14.3 |
14.1 |
23.8 |
18.4 |
22.0 |
20 |
7.7 |
15.3 |
13.6 |
24.4 |
17.8 |
21.2 |
The contributions of various shocks to asset price movements in
India could be gleaned from the historical decomposition of the
fluctuations in stock prices. It is evident from Chart 6 that booms in
stock prices since the mid-2000s were, on an average, dominated by
real credit and stock market shocks. The stock market residual shocks
capture the composite impact of a host of factors including the news
about fundamentals and sudden changes in the market sentiments
driven by foreign institutional investors as well as the unanticipated domestic shocks. Although the contribution of monetary policy shocks
during the early phase of the recent asset cycle boom appeared to be
significant, it tapered-off subsequently.
IV. Conclusion
In the post-global crisis period there has been an increasing
emphasis on the need to explore the scope of monetary policy in
responding directly to asset price developments for promoting
financial stability. This renewed interest in the role of monetary policy
in stabilising asset price cycles has compelled policy makers to have
a re-look at the pre-crisis consensus that seemed to favour a hands-off
approach to asset prices and to manage the consequences of both
booms and busts in asset price cycles. The extensive debate after the
global crisis does not seem to suggest that the pre-crisis consensus
was blatantly fallacious. Alternative instruments at the disposal of a
central bank, namely micro and macro-prudential tools, could be
superior relative to the interest rate instrument, both in terms of
effectiveness and minimising the overall costs to the economy.
Monetary policy as a macroeconomic policy tool can ensure an
environment in which prudential regulation could become somewhat
more effective.
In India, despite the limited risks from asset price cycles to
macro-financial conditions relative to the advanced economies, much
greater reference to asset prices is being made in the context of
monetary policy. The concern relating to surges in capital flows
fuelling asset prices has also provided another dimension to the debate
on the dynamics between capital flows, asset prices and monetary
policy. The Reserve Bank has used in the past both micro and macroprudential
measures to limit the risks to financial stability from asset
price cycles. It, however, has justifiably refrained from using policy
interest rates with the specific intention of influencing asset prices.
This paper provides empirical evidence to explain the appropriateness
of such an approach and highlights that the same approach may have
to continue. Expected impact of asset price trends on inflation and output, however, needs to be assessed regularly so that the scope for
indirect response of monetary policy to asset price shocks could be
integrated to the monetary policy framework. The monetary policy
itself, which already caters to multiple objectives, should not be
assigned any explicit direct role in stabilising asset prices. In this
context, any policy that aims at limiting the overall pace of credit
growth may have to be driven by developments such as either
economic overheating or persistent high inflation, but not the
perception of an asset price bubble. Similarly, if an accommodative
monetary policy stance has to be sustained for a prolonged period in
response to an economic slowdown or a recession, the fear of such a
stance leading to asset price inflation should not trigger hasty
tightening of monetary policy. For the purpose of clarity, sector
specific limits on the flow of credit to asset price sensitive sectors, or
even caps on direct and indirect exposure of the banking system to
asset price cycles should be seen purely as prudential measures, which
are different from monetary policy measures.
The empirical analysis for India exhibits that while interest rate
changes cause changes in stock prices, the reverse causality does not
hold. This seems to suggest that monetary policy in India does not
respond to asset prices, but the asset price channel of monetary policy
transmission exits. Evidence of a significant bi-directional causal
relationship between credit growth and asset price trends does not
provide any unambiguous result about the role of credit in asset price
bubbles. This is so because of the role of a common factor; i.e. strong
GDP growth coinciding with high credit growth, and the former
driving the asset prices up.
Regarding housing assets, given the absence of a reasonably
long time series data on house prices, this paper used a number of
proxy variables. The movement in stock prices and collection of
“stamp duties and registration fees” relating to housing tend to follow
a systematic relationship, indicating the possibility of a broad-based
asset price cycle. The housing credit demand in India appears to be
sensitive to interest rate movements, which though does not validate an explicit role for monetary policy in influencing housing prices.
This is because the impulse response functions reveal that monetary
policy tightening leads to a moderation in credit demand over the
medium-term, given the usual lags in the impact of monetary policy,
which in turn gives rise to lower real output. Thus, any asset price
objective attempted to be achieved through monetary policy actions
may involve sacrifice of growth. Given the possibility of an adverse
feedback loop, where falling asset prices and contraction in output
could intensify in a spiral, direct use of monetary policy must be
avoided. Moreover, asset price dynamics could be difficult to decipher
for meaningful use in the conduct of monetary policy. For example,
an increase in the flow of credit in the VAR model seems to lead to
increase in both output and asset prices. It could be, however,
particularly difficult to segregate the part of asset prices increase that
might have been caused by improvement in fundamentals from the
part led by speculative credit flows to asset markets. This ambiguity
suggests why countercyclical regulatory policies to counter asset
price bubbles could be more appropriate relative to direct use of
monetary policy.
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Appendix 2 : Decomposition of fluctuations caused in
various macroeconomic variables |
(Per cent) |
Quarters |
Demand
shock |
Supply
shock |
Monetary
policy
shock |
Credit
market
shock |
Asset price
shock |
Exchange
rate shock |
Aggregate output |
1 |
100.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
4 |
71.3 |
3.4 |
1.6 |
1.9 |
14.3 |
7.5 |
8 |
46.5 |
12.2 |
1.1 |
18.6 |
11.2 |
10.3 |
12 |
38.5 |
22.4 |
1.5 |
22.4 |
9.7 |
5.5 |
16 |
36.0 |
25.5 |
1.1 |
25.6 |
7.9 |
3.9 |
20 |
34.5 |
30.0 |
0.8 |
24.8 |
6.9 |
3.0 |
Price level |
1 |
1.2 |
98.8 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
4 |
9.5 |
81.4 |
7.7 |
0.2 |
1.1 |
0.1 |
8 |
14.8 |
72.6 |
9.0 |
1.0 |
1.3 |
1.3 |
12 |
19.2 |
66.0 |
7.9 |
2.8 |
2.4 |
1.6 |
16 |
21.3 |
62.1 |
6.4 |
5.4 |
3.0 |
1.7 |
20 |
24.1 |
57.4 |
5.4 |
8.2 |
3.4 |
1.6 |
Real short-term interest rate |
1 |
0.0 |
10.4 |
89.6 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
4 |
2.5 |
19.0 |
73.6 |
0.6 |
1.5 |
2.8 |
8 |
1.9 |
27.9 |
56.0 |
3.8 |
5.2 |
5.2 |
12 |
2.1 |
31.1 |
47.7 |
3.4 |
4.8 |
11.0 |
16 |
2.1 |
31.6 |
45.5 |
3.8 |
4.6 |
12.4 |
20 |
2.2 |
31.8 |
44.9 |
3.8 |
4.6 |
12.7 |
Real bank credit |
1 |
5.0 |
8.2 |
1.2 |
85.6 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
4 |
20.1 |
5.1 |
5.4 |
61.8 |
7.0 |
0.8 |
8 |
23.1 |
16.8 |
5.9 |
43.2 |
10.4 |
0.7 |
12 |
24.2 |
18.4 |
4.5 |
43.2 |
8.0 |
1.6 |
16 |
24.6 |
25.3 |
3.6 |
38.1 |
6.8 |
1.6 |
20 |
25.4 |
27.5 |
3.3 |
36.1 |
6.2 |
1.5 |
Real exchange rate |
1 |
0.7 |
1.8 |
3.8 |
2.0 |
14.2 |
77.5 |
4 |
0.5 |
2.3 |
4.9 |
2.2 |
19.4 |
70.7 |
8 |
1.2 |
7.3 |
3.2 |
14.4 |
11.7 |
62.2 |
12 |
2.0 |
13.4 |
7.1 |
12.8 |
10.3 |
54.5 |
16 |
1.9 |
13.7 |
7.0 |
13.3 |
10.1 |
54.1 |
20 |
2.1 |
14.1 |
6.9 |
13.6 |
10.0 |
53.3 |
* Bhupal Singh is Executive Assistant to Deputy Governor and Sitikantha Pattanaik is
Director in the Department of Economic and Policy Research, Reserve Bank of India.
The authors are grateful to an anonymous referee for useful comments and Ashok
Bathija for editorial assistance. Views presented in this paper are personal.
1 Bernanke and Gertler (2001) argued that central banks should disregard asset
prices in their policy formulation. They found little, if any, additional gains from
allowing an independent response of central bank policy to the level of asset prices.
2 Mishkin (2008) viewed that since it is difficult to identify asset price bubbles
with certainty, any monetary policy response to misidentified bubbles may hamper the
growth process.
3 Key features of asset prices that are associated with bubbles could be best
analysed in the framework of forward looking general equilibrium models with the
assumptions of rational behaviour and infinite horizons. Thus, the rational bubbles
reflect expectations of rising prices that can lead to self-fulfilling equilibrium
outcomes, with the following expectational restriction (Filardo, 2004) : EtΩt+1 = λΩt ,
λ>1. The rational asset bubble tends to develop without link to fundamentals since the
holders of speculative asset experiencing bubbles are also guided by the expectation
of persistent rise in the price of that asset. Such bubbles are identified as generating
significant persistent overvaluation or undervaluation of asset prices due to excessive
reaction to fundamentals (Froot and Obsfeld, 1991).
4 The difficulties involved are extracting information from a constellation of asset
prices, which would require disentangling risk premia from expectation component,
identifying relevant state variables that enter the asset pricing and determining the
functional form of the pricing relationship (Hordahl and Packer, 2007).
5 At the same time, it is viewed that mere escalation of asset price may be an
insufficient indicator of asset price bubbles.
6 Excessively accommodative monetary policy may not be immediately reflected
in consumer prices given the existence of nominal rigidities in the economy, and
hence may be first visible in asset price increases.
7 Pavasuthipaisit (2010) stressed that “... prior to and during the subprime mortgage
crisis of 2007, it would have been optimal for the Federal Reserve to increase the
weight of asset prices in its rate-setting decision.”
8 Importantly, in case of housing market, given the transmission lags, interest rate
increases are unlikely to be effective in the short run, therefore, special regulatory
measures could be more effective (Savoir and Bangui, 2006).
9 The literature, however, highlights that the long run effectiveness of such
transactions taxes is limited. Even in the short run, the effectiveness of such measures
could be circumvented.
10 Bank-lending channel is particularly relevant for developing and emerging
markets, given their underdeveloped financial markets where interest rates may not
move to clear markets.
11 In advanced economies such as Japan, property prices were historically
significantly responsive to real interest rate changes.
12 Housing wealth data for India are not available. On housing prices, which could
trace the changes in the housing wealth, time series data are not available. The National
Housing Bank (NHB) provides data on NHB Residential Index starting from 2008
but these data have two limitations: first, the data are available with only half-yearly
frequency and come with a significant time lag, second, the indices are provided only
for a number of major cities and an all India index is not computed. The Reserve Bank
of India has also started compiling house price index. However, the index is available
only since the second quarter of 2003 and is compiled only for Mumbai, which has
been extended to a few more cities since 2009. Thus, there is a lack of time series data
on an aggregate housing price index for India.
13 It could be argued that registration fees may not reflect the true movement in
house price as the actual market value of the house could be understated with a view
to partly avoid the stamp duties and registration fees. For empirical analysis, given
the data constraints, one could assume that the extent of under reporting of the market
value of the residential properties for registration purposes has a systematic pattern
over time and thus, could still capture the broad trends in residential property prices.
14 Risk weight on banks’ exposure to the commercial real estate and capital market
were increased from 100 per cent to 125 per cent in July 2005. Given the continued
rapid expansion in credit to the commercial real estate sector, the risk weight on
exposure to this sector was increased to 150 per cent in May 2006. The general
provisioning requirement on standard advances in specific sectors, i.e., personal
loans, loans and advances qualifying as capital market exposures, residential housing
loans beyond ` 20 lakh and commercial real estate loans was also increased from 0.4
per cent to one per cent in April 2006 and further to two per cent on January 31, 2007.
These norms were relaxed to deal with the slowdown in growth that resulted due to
the global financial crisis. In November 2010, these norms were tightened again in
response to rising asset prices.
15 Weighted average call money rates represent the best measure of the stance of
monetary policy in India as the central bank aims to guide money market interest
rate within the policy rate corridor. In the subsequent analysis call money rate has,
therefore, been taken to represent the monetary policy stance.
16 Robustness checks can be undertaken in terms of choice of variables, i. e., using a
broad based equity market index such as BSE 500 in place of the narrower benchmark
index, i.e., BSE Sensex used in the model. Data on the broader index is, however,
available only since 1999 as against data on BSE Sensex which are available for a
longer period and could be empirically modelled consistent with the quarterly GDP
data which are available since 1996. Moreover, the correlation coefficient between the
two indices for the period since 1999 at 0.99 suggests that the empirical findings may
be indifferent to the choice of equity price index.
17 Variations in bank credit are an important channel of monetary policy transmission
mechanism even for central banks that rely on interest rates to convey their policy
stance. Modulations in policy interest rates by the central bank influence credit
market conditions, which reinforce the effects of the traditional interest rate channel
of monetary transmission.
18 The impact of credit channel on asset prices can also work through changes
in market perception. As credit conditions are tightened, the perception about the
overheating of the economy may get strengthened and accordingly the stock prices
may decline.
19 We deliberately refrained from including portfolio inflows in the model to
segregate their impact from the residual shocks due to constraint of a parsimonious
model. Given the quarterly time series, introduction of additional variables in the
model could significantly undermine the efficiency of the parameters. |