Maoist Problem And National Security

After the Japanese ended their occupation in Philippines (1942) 6,000 sq miles of the richest rice growing area in Luzon, called as “Huklandia” came to be dominated by the Hukbalahap (Huks for short), a united front of Communist peasants. At the peak of their rebellion they commanded 15,000 guerrillas and 1,00,000 clandestine members.

In 1951 Ramon Magsaysay was appointed as Secretary, National Defence under American advice as Overall Commander of the army and police and development activities. He organised small combat teams (BCTs) which penetrated more effectively into Huklandia, denied food supply to insurgents, built 300 miles of new roads, dug 2,000 wells in 4 years, exchanged good officers between army and police, raised a dedicated intelligence corps, suspended habeas corpus in conflict areas, offered handsome rewards and resettled surrendered families with lands. By 1953 the number of Huks who surrendered to the government (15,866) was larger than the numbers who were captured (4,269) and killed (9,695) combined.

Tucked away in a corner was a news item in our dailies (April 10, 2013): “13 acquitted in Maoist attack case”. For the visual or print media this disappointing result was not as newsworthy as the triumphant entry of Chief Minister Narendra Modi into Kolkata. Publishing the Court verdict in one of the worst Maoist massacres at Chingawaram in Dantewada district on May 17, 2010 in which 31 persons including 15 security personnel were killed in a passenger bus would not have earned the visual media so many Television Rating Points (TRPs). Also unnoticed was that the same Dantewada judge had acquitted 10 accused in January this year in “Tadmetla” massacre in which 76 security personnel were killed on April 6, 2010. Chingawaram killing came barely 40 days after Tadmetla when private bus operators refused the Maoist order prohibiting carrying security personnel as passengers. Then came the Dhauri massacre (Narayanpur District) on June 29 in which 27 CRPF men were killed. As many as 43 witnesses turned “hostile” during Tadmetla trial indicating the level of Maoist terror in the region. A newspaper recently said that insurgents have been showing the Tadmetla attack video films in remote tribal villages “to flaunt their military power” for more recruitment. Another report (April 8) said that Naxals had trained 4 batches of 30 to 35 trainees in combat operations, military intelligence and assaults. Thus fancy solutions advocated by our “arms chair” experts, far removed from the dismal ground reality, can be of no use to thousands of our valiant CRPF jawans and local police who are fighting lone battles.

Experience in other countries

The problem is that much of this type of experience we can study was during an era when human rights bodies did not breathe down the necks of security forces as is now happening. Secondly in all other experiences, whether Hukbalahap in Philippines, Malayan, Mau Mau or Colombia, the success was achieved with unified command of security forces which in India is difficult to achieve with the present trust deficit between the centre and states who are already on the 2014 poll mode. This squabble permeates down even security professionals as we saw between the Chhattisgarh DGP and Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) which was too shameful for any comments. The third lesson we would learn from other countries is that this overall commander for security operations should also be incharge of development activities, which is unimaginable in Indian conditions. After the Japanese ended their occupation in Philippines (1942) 6,000 sq miles of the richest rice growing area in Luzon, called as “Huklandia” came to be dominated by the Hukbalahap (Huks for short), a united front of Communist peasants. At the peak of their rebellion they commanded 15,000 guerrillas and 1,00,000 clandestine members. In 1951 Ramon Magsaysay was appointed as Secretary, National Defence under American advice as Overall Commander of the army and police and development activities. He organised small combat teams (BCTs) which penetrated more effectively into Huklandia, denied food supply to insurgents, built 300 miles of new roads, dug 2,000 wells in 4 years, exchanged good officers between army and police, raised a dedicated intelligence corps,  suspended habeas corpus in conflict areas, offered handsome rewards and resettled surrendered families with lands. By 1953 the number of Huks who surrendered to the government (15,866) was larger than the numbers who were captured (4,269) and killed (9,695) combined.

The only time when some organized activity was witnessed was when Home Minister P Chidambaram (2008-12) had initiated firm measures through DG Vijay Kumar who was incharge of CRPF

The Malayan Communists (CPM-Communist Party of Malaya) also followed the Indian Maoist classical doctrine of war in three stages: Lightening attacks, “Liberated Zones” culminating in “Mobile War” by hitting high quality targets with the ambitious plan of capturing the country. They wanted disruption of economy by paralyzing rubber cultivation and mines. Malayan Peoples’ Liberation Army (MNLA) with a strength of 8,000 killed 1,865 security forces and 2,479 civilians (1948-1960). MNLA suffered 6,711 casualties, 1,289 were captured while 2,704 surrendered. However there were several dissimilarities between these two cases. Unlike Indian Maoists who indoctrinated original residents like Adivasis and villagers, CPM’s pool was the migrant Chinese labour imported by the British for rubber / palm oil plantations and tin mines from 1877. This was an advantage for the colonial administration as they could use the original residents against the Chinese. When Japan invaded Malaya in December 1944 they killed 80,000 Chinese and pushed them into forest as squatters. In 1945 Japanese were defeated and CPM started secretly planning to take over Malaya. In the beginning British also downplayed its seriousness like our former Home Ministe Shivraj Patil. They described it as “Emergency” not to upset London commercial insurance rates on which Malayan commerce and industry depended.

Do we want to eradicate the Maoist menace and bring the whole country under the rule of law? Or do we want the Colombian situation where the federal government has tacitly acknowledged FARC’s rule and ceded territory?

The administration used “Briggs Plan” and “Templer Plan” to tackle this problem. Briggs Plan was (a) denying food to insurgents provided by Chinese squatters; (b) resettling 5,00,000 squatters; (c) raising an aboriginal force “Senoi Pra’ak” to kill insurgents; (d) building landing strips and police posts in remote areas and (e) issuing National Identification and ration card system to isolate insurgents. By 1952 they had resettled 4,23,000 Chinese squatters in 410 new villages. They ceased to supply food to insurgents as they became property owners. This “resettling” was copied, albeit poorly, by Chhattisgarh government. High Commissioner Sir Gerald Templer increased police strength by 700 per cent, recruited 20,000 Home Guards with shot guns, opened schools, clinics and police stations and achieved massive village electrification. He also punished those who helped insurgents by cutting their rations, closing schools and ordering curfew. Psy War was used with great efficacy. “Information Services Department” kept Malayans informed of Communist atrocities. They replicated CPM strategy of indoctrinating villagers by jumping ahead of them. Before CPM could reach a village this staff would go and explain what the government was doing. 6 million leaflets were circulated every month to counter CPM propaganda. The most innovative scheme was using high powered loudspeakers (Stentor, Magnavox and Thunderer amplifiers on armoured vehicles with 2-3 miles range) to boom into the jungles. Mark 4 Auster aircraft and Dakotas with 4 loudspeakers 500 watts would boom into the jungles with great effect since the “Thundering” from the sky had delirious effect on villagers. Like in Philippines the British fought insurgency using a unified strategy. No martial law was proclaimed. In 1948 police deployed 12,000 men assisted by army’s 5,000 men. The total number went up to 40,000 later. Military officials were drafted into the Special Branch.

http://www.dsalert.org/maoism-and-counter-terrorism/613-maoist-problem-and-national-security

To read more click on the above link!!!

Author- V Balachandran IPS (retd)

He was a part of the 2 man “High Level Committee” appointed by government of
Maharashtra to enquire into the police performance on 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks.