ISSN 0973-5011 Vol. 15 No. 1 2022 Indian Journal of Politics and International Relations IJPAIR Indian Journal of Politics and International Relations Vol. 15 No. 1 2022 Vice Chancellor Sabu Thomas Editor C. Vinodan Associate Editors M.V. Bijulal Lirar P. Mathew A. Varghese Mary Senterla P.S. International Board of Editors Kanti Bajpai (National University of Singapore) T.V. Paul (Mcgill University) Yong-Soo Eun (Hanyang University) Harsh V. Pant (King’s College London) Shibashis Chatterjee (Jadavpur University) Prabhat Patnaik (Jawaharlal Nehru University) Francis Boyle (University of Illinois College of Law) Sabina Lautensach (University of Auckland) Neera Chandhoke (Delhi University) Rajen Harshe (South Asian University) Alexander Lautensach (University of Northern British Colombia) Jayadeva Uyangoda (University of Colombo) Valerian Rodrigues (Jawaharlal Nehru University) Editorial Office School of International Relations and Politics Mahatma Gandhi University Priyadarshini Hills P.O., Kottayam, Kerala India PIN- 686560 e-mail: vinodan.c@gmail.com Printed in India at Alen layout, Kottayam, Kerala, India Indian Journal of Politics and International Relations Vol. 15 No. 1 2022 IJPAIR ISSN 0973-5011 Contents India-China Strategic Relations in the Emerging Asian Order Dalbir Ahlawat India-China Hydroscape: Securitizing the Brahmaputra Adil Qayoom Mallah and Sanjeda Warsi 5 21 Greta Thunberg in Canada: Climate Activism, Mediated Imagery, and Public Sphere Ronie Thomas, Sony Jalarajan Raj and Adith K. Suresh 33 st Challenges in Theorizing International Relations in 21 Century: Postcolonial Methodology and Epistemology of Nationalism Dileep P. Chandran & Biju Lekshmanan 48 Corporate Social Responsibility: A Developmental Initiative in India Atul Ch. Biswas 61 U.S.A. Arms Amendment Bill-2022: Causes and Consequences A. Kumara Swamy and V. Ravi Kumar 71 Legitimation of Xenophobia in Secular India Mohammed Mazharuddin and Basavaraja G 78 New Education Policy Reproducing Hierarchies of Social Exclusion Rajesh Komath and K.S. Madhavan 85 Tragedy of Jumbos in Bamuni Hill, Assam: Interrogating Human Interventions in the Wild Life Habitats of India’s Northeastern Borderland Rengupta M and Dilip Gogoi 100 Soft Power Diplomacy of India and China in South Asia: A Special Referance to Nepal Indulekha B.S. 108 Understanding the Problematic of the International: Deconstructing the Contribution of the Neo-Trotskyist Theory of IR Sanjeev Kumar H.M. 118 Human Security and Emancipation: Examining the Link Swatilekha Bhattacharya 138 India and Global Environmental Governance: Past, Present and Future Vishnu Aravind 151 Ecotourism in Kerala: An Alternative to Mass Tourism Jenni K Alex and Beetu Sebastian 164 Livelihood Pattern and Existetial Crisis of Muthuvan Tribes in Idukki District, Kerala Jinu Joseph 172 Religion and International Relations: Role of Catholic Church in Shaping Contemporary Political and Moral Definitions Simi Joseph 181 Food Processing Industries in India: A Socio Economic Analysis Ratheesh E R Caste and Cognition: State of the Art and Reflections from CulturalHistorical Perspective in Psychology Vijith Kuniyil Constructing Social Identities of Interstate Women Labourers in Kerala Nirmalya. P QUAD: The New Strategic Alliance for India in the Post- Covid World? an Analysis Nilimpa Ghosh 190 196 212 223 India-China Strategic Relations in the Emerging Asian Order Dalbir Ahlawat Indian Journal of Politics and International Relations ISSN 0973-5011 Vol. 15 No. 1 2022 05-20 Abstract India and China while rising simultaneously as big powers, no doubt, cooperate on multi-fronts but also appear to be engulfed in the colonial-inherited border dispute. Sincere efforts have been made to delineate a Line of Actual Control (LAC) but this still remains undefined as a result has given rise to a volatile situation including face-offs, deaths and show of force. India adopted a conciliatory approach but the year 2017 proved to be a turning point, when India started to firm up its stance and indicated to China that it is more a peer competitor and will not compromise on its territory. This was not only meant for the consumption of the domestic constituency but also to demonstrate that India has the potential to standup to the Chinese hegemonic overtures thus place itself so that the regional countries having grievances with China could find India as an alternative partner to rely on. Still engaging China in trade and multilateral forums, India has been exploring several alternative strategies that include joining the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, strengthening bilateral relations with the US, emphasising on centrality of the regional institutions such as the ASEAN, and continuing its time tested friendship with Russia. India is intending to pursue these policy postures with the intent to retain its strategic autonomy while engaging with the major powers to fulfil its own ambition of a big power in the future, thus instead of zero-sum alliance system, it intends to pursue a multipolar-Asia paradigm. This chapter attempts to trace the historical antecedents, divergences and strategic competition between India and China, strategic policy options for India and its ambition to become a sub-super power in the future. Key words: ASEAN, Border Dispute, India-China Strategic Relations, Multipolar-Asia Paradigm, QUAD Joint leadership aspiration to divergence India and China existing side-by-side and rising simultaneously as big powers share millennia old civilizations where the relations between the two remained 5 Vol. 15 No. 1 2022 Indian Journal of Politics and International Relations distant but whenever interacted remained cordial, let it be the flow of Buddhism from India or the Chinese visitors to India. However, while transitioning from foreign domination to nation-state in the late 1940s, both countries taking lessons from their penury, tormented and tortuous colonial pasts adopted different developmental strategies to gain rightful place in the post-colonial world order. China under Chairman of the People’s Republic of China Mao Zedong opted for a revolutionary path to further its immediate and long-term national interests whereas India under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru opted for a democratic path. As against Mao’s realism, Nehru followed an idealist vision of universal goodwill and global peace. His vision was perceptible at the Bandung conference where he envisioned “to pursue a joint leadership with China to pave the way for the resurgence of Asia” (Ahlawat and Hughes, 2018). However, Mao’s realism and Nehru’s idealism, and divergent national interests led the two towards estrangement (Frankel, 2020). The divergence started with China’s dilution of Tibet’s autonomy and finally annexing it by force in 1950s, and placing varying claims over the border with India that led to a war in 1962 and seizure of Aksai Chin area and other territories by China. As against Nehru’s “joint leadership” of Asia, Chinese leadership casted doubt about India’s non-aligned credentials and considered Nehru as “the running dog” of Western imperialis (Brecher, 1959) Losing the war in 1962 cut Nehru’s tall stature short because he failed to take cognizance of China’s strengthening of its military force, as against his idealism. For example, when the independent India’s army chief General William Lockhart presented a defence policy draft for consideration by the government, Nehru tossed the draft away as “Rubbish! Total rubbish!….We don’t need a defence plan. Our policy is ahimsa (non-violence). We foresee no military threats. Scrap the army! The police are good enough to meet our security needs” (Palit, 1991). However, despite the low-key relations between the two countries, Beijing continued to remind New Delhi of its low stature vis-à-vis China. Rather it became customary for the Chinese leadership to “contemplate ‘teach[ing] India a lesson again’” decade after decade starting with Mao “the 1962 War (Zhou Enlai in 1971, Deng Xiaoping in 1987, Jiang Zemin in 1999, Hu Jintao in 2009 and Xi Jinping in 2017)” (Khan, 2018). Not only this, even different Chinese media outlets continued to express aspersions about India’s existence as a sovereign country while projecting India as continuing to follow the colonial master’s sinister designs to destabilise China. Therefore, time and again it repeated to teach India a lesson. On different occasions, the Chinese Communist Party outlets passed several perjury statements such as India being “a backward country full of horrific stories”, “India as a nation never really existed in history”, and it can be balkanized into 20–30 pieces. Even Wang Yi, when he was vice-foreign minister, went to the extent of branding India as “a tribal democracy whose long-term existence was far from a certainty”. 6 Furthermore, statements like, “China and India cannot really deal with each other harmoniously” as the Chinese leader Chiang Kai-Shek stated that the sky cannot have two Suns. In sum, starting with a high note in the 1950s, the relationship between the two plummeted to its lowest ebb in 1962 and remained so until 1988. Confidence building measures to ingression Notwithstanding the above quagmire, India broke ice with the visit of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to Beijing in December 1988. Within six months of this visit, the Tiananmen Square incident took place in June 1989. This led to sharp criticism and isolation of China in the international fora. Facing intense international pressure, Beijing took it wise to conciliate with India on the disputed border as it “could not afford to be saddled with a hostile neighbour to its southern frontier” (Ahlawat and Hughes, 2018). This led to signing of several bilateral agreements to resolve the border dispute. In 1993, signed an “Agreement on the maintenance of peace and tranquillity along the line of actual control in the India–China border areas” (UN, 1993). In 1996 signed a treaty on “Confidence building measures in the military field along the line of actual control in the China–India border areas”. In 2003 signed a “Declaration on principles for relations and comprehensive cooperation between India and China” (Vajpayee and Jiabao, 2003). In 2005 signed another “Agreement on the political parameters and guiding principles for the settlement of the India– China boundary question” (MEA, 2005). The ongoing confidence building measures gave way to signing of a “Memorandum of understanding for exchanges and cooperation in the field of defence” in 2006 and laid the foundation for an “annual defence dialogue” between two countries. Furthermore, an agreement signed in 2012 reinforced “respecting and abiding by the Line of Actual Control pending a resolution of the Boundary Question…maintaining and strengthening peace and tranquility… is very significant for enhancing mutual trust and security between the two countries” (MEA, 2012). These agreements not only led to confidence building measures on the border dispute but also gave boost to the bilateral trade that grew from a paltry US$265 million in 1991 to a historic high of US$95.7 billion in 2018-19, though it declined to US$87.6 billion in 2020 because of the border conflict escalation in 2020 (Krishnan, 2021). After President Xi Jinping’s holding of reign in China, he initiated a new world order with belts and roads, all emanating from China and linking different continents and to strengthen this order, it initiated several regional institutional frameworks. Against the backdrop of the expanding trade relations, India considering a revisit of the 1950s of Nehru’s vision, joined the China initiated institutional frameworks, such as Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), Asian Infrastructure Investment 7 Dalbir Ahlawat India-China Strategic Relationsin the Emerging Asian Order Vol. 15 No. 1 2022 Indian Journal of Politics and International Relations Bank (AIIB), Brazil, Russia, India, China South Africa (BRICS), Russia, India, China (RIC). However, a major objective behind creation of these frameworks was to convince India to be part of the China initiated order in Asia and isolate the US in the region. Notwithstanding the expanding trade ties, signing of several border resolution agreements and entering into institutional frameworks, there are experts who doubt the real intensions of a rising China specifically in the security and strategic domains. For example, Johnston (2007) asserts that China’s strategic culture is based, largely, on realpolitik that guides its leaders to foresee war as a central means to pursue its security and strategic interests. Similarly, Scobell (2002) argues that if China’s history is any witness, its leadership will have a predilection to use force. This reasoning would appear to be borne out from the fact that, at the beginning of 2018, President Xi Jinping called for “real combat training and firmly grasping the might to win wars . . . not to fear death” (Wang, 2018). Again, during a visit to military base in Guangdong in 2020, President Xi Jinping pressed the troops to “put all (their) minds and energy on preparing for war” (Westcott, 2020). Furthermore, in his first order in 2021 before the PLA military training started, President Xi Jinping asserted for a “full-time combat readiness” and also readiness to “act at any second” considering the circumstances China faced (Zhen, 2021). Considering the above war mongering statements by President Xi Jinping himself over the years, though not directly aimed at India, from India’s perspective reflect a gap between the text of the border conflict resolution agreements signed between the two and the spirit to implement them. As the Indian sources outline that China continues to ingress in its territory and build military grade infrastructure along the LAC. Such actions, instead of building confidence give rise to trust deficit that can be elaborated with several instances. Moreover, not finding India amenable to support its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) launched in 2013, Beijing started to pursue aggressive policy postures towards India at least on its Himalayan border to distract it from participating actively in the Indo-Pacific geo-strategic construct initiated by the US and more specifically the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), formed by Australia, India, Japan and the US. However, China denies having any hegemonic machinations to pursue its interest, rather it supports a ‘community of the shared future for mankind’, and ‘win–win cooperation’, as against Cold War alliance systems. It wants to cherish these ideals through the BRI that connects different continents and different peoples. Such policies can be double-edged, as Gokhale underpins “Beijing doesn’t aim to impoverish its potential clients”, what it wants is to align their systems and infrastructure “towards the consumption of Chinese technology and services”, and ensure that these are in “sync with China’s strategic interests and policies” (Gokhale, 8 2021). If countries, such as India, object to China initiated order they are threatened teaching a “lesson”. A flagship project of the BRI, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) passes through Pakistan Administered Kashmir (PAK), a territory claimed by India. Building of permanent infrastructure by China, a UN Security Council permanent member, adversely effected India’s claim over this territory (Ahlawat and Raymond, 2020). Therefore, India boycotted joining the BRI. Similarly, signing of an agreement with Pakistan to build Diamer Basha Dam in the disputed territory, again led India to protest strongly against construction of the dam. China has also been staking its claim over Arunachal Pradesh, a northeastern Indian state. The claim reached to an extreme when before President Hu Jintao visit to India in November 2006 to enhance bilateral relations, the Chinese ambassador to New Delhi, claimed that whole of Arunachal Pradesh was “Chinese territory” (Chaudhury, 2006). Similarly, during President Xi Jinping’s visit to India in September 2014, Chinese forces perpetrated incursion into the Indian territory (BBC, 2014). Since last few years, Chinese troops have been involved in increasing number of incursions across the LAC and the reasons for these incursions are plain to see: aside from keeping India off-balance, Beijing is forcing New Delhi to react to its actions, thus placing New Delhi on the defensive and forcing it to explain why Chinese troops should not be in those areas. The onus, in other words, is on New Delhi to prove its case for sovereignty while China uses the pretext of the undemarcated border for its anti-India policy (Ahlawat and Hughes, 2018). In addition to the LAC incursions, China has been conducting hydrographic surveys in the Exclusive Economic Zones of the littoral states, using unmanned underwater drones, deploying its nuclear-powered attack submarines in the Indian Ocean since 2013, in addition, visits to Sri Lankan and Pakistani ports aim to challenge India’s dominance in the Indian Ocean, that according to an Australian scholar “made clear that it will not allow the Indian Ocean to become India’s Ocean” (Brewster, 2014). Furthermore, providing grants, loans and construction of strategic infrastructure like roads, pipelines and ports in India’s neighbouring countries aim to diminish India’s influence in its immediate neighbourhood and isolate within its own region (Chitty et al., 2018). For strategic balancing, by supplying military weapons to Pakistan, China intends to keep Pakistan hyphened to India, to keep India engaged on its western frontier. China also intends to counterbalance India in the international fora, for example, it has made consistent efforts to block New Delhi’s membership in important international bodies like Nuclear Suppliers Group, United Nations Security Council, etc. Overall, Beijing showed limited or no sensitivity to India’s major challenges/concerns such as cross-border terrorism (Ahlawat and Thaakar, 9 Dalbir Ahlawat India-China Strategic Relationsin the Emerging Asian Order Vol. 15 No. 1 2022 Indian Journal of Politics and International Relations 2021). All these actions appear to contain India and coerce it to follow the China initiated regional order. India stands up to China India claims that China has been regularly protruding in its territory, for example Aksai Chin in 1962, Karakoram Pass in 1963, Tia Pangnak in 2008, Chabji Valley in 2008, Doom Cheley 2009, Demchok in 2012, Raki Nula in 2013. Thus facing these enervative overtures over the border, New Delhi was pushed to the point of either conceding to the Chinese coercion (to signal to other countries in the region to fall in line) or retaliate with the risk of further conflagration of tension on its 3488 km long disputed border, with the likelihood of a war. Mapping its own strengths and taking cognizance of the changing regional and global strategic dynamics, instead of cowering down to the Chinese pressure, traditionally a conciliatory India hardened its stance in 2017 when China started to construct a military-grade road in Doklam, a disputed territory between China and Bhutan, that overlooks the strategic Siliguri Corridor in India. For the first time, India let its troops cross the LAC in 2017 that led to a 73-day stiff face-off with the Chinese military. Although war threats and teaching of lessons exchanged but as against the previous appeasement policy, India remained firm on the ground, while simultaneously making offers of dialogue. Ultimately, both the armies agreed to withdraw to their respective positions. This turned out to be a benchmark in the bilateral relations when India demonstrated its mettle to not to budge under pressure. To avoid repeat of such instances in the future, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping held an informal “heart to heart summit” in Wuhan in April 2018 (Xinhua, 2018). Following on from this, they held another informal summit at Mamallapuram, India in 2019. In a sense, Modi “channelled this to his own advantage, orchestrating one-on-one summits with Xi that make it appear like China respects India as a peer…” (Hall, 2020). Notwithstanding these summits, tensions and skirmishes continued across different sectors (Lipulekh 2020, Pangong Tso 2020, etc) of the LAC. A face-off again built up in Galwan Valley where India claimed that China built bunkers in the vicinity of Finger (mountain spur) five and stopped march of Indian forces past this point, whereas previously Indian troops used to march up to Finger eight and the Chinese troops till Finger four. Since 1975 there had been no causalities on either side of the LAC, thanks to signing of confidence building agreements discussed above, however in June 2020 a fight ensued between the two armies that led to killing of twenty Indian soldiers and five Chinese soldiers, though Chinese causalities are estimated to be much higher (Dar, 2021). India claimed the attack on its forces was ‘premeditated’ with unconventional weapons. Killing of soldiers further strengthened 10 New Delhi’s stance to not to compromise on its sovereign territory as it was getting clear signals, “What makes the Galwan Valley episode different from earlier Chinese intrusions across the LAC is that… Beijing is insisting that the PLA are there to stay” (Hall, 2020). After nine rounds of commander level meetings both sides signed an agreement in February 2021 for complete troop disengagement and verification on the north and south banks of Pangong Tso. However, deep trust deficit remains as the commanders were unable to resolve the other friction points such as Hot Springs, Gogra and Demchok. Even the Chinese forces still block Indian troops at the bottleneck (Y point), and hold the strategic Depsang Plains from accessing the previous patrolling points PP10, PP11A, PP12 and PP13. Thus, still blocking the passage to India’s air base Daulat Beg Oldie (close to the Karakoram Pass) that passes through the Depsang Plains. For this, the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian held India accountable, “China always owns [sic] sovereignty over the Galwan Valley region” and if New Delhi wants to deescalate the conflict should restrain its military. Again, in January 2021, PLA’s efforts to intensify its strategic posture on the LAC led to another “minor face-off” in northern Sikkim (Gettleman et al., 2021). Furthermore, to provoke the situation, China built a village in the disputed area along the LAC that previously used to be a remote military post (Som, 2021). The above analysis indicates that both countries despite skirmishes and faceoffs have demonstrated exceptional maturity to contain and negotiate the border conflict. However, with the increasing gap between Chinese and Indian military power, forces India to rethink about its strategic options to counter-balance China’s hegemonic overtures. Strategic Options for India In the post-Cold War period, India pursued its security and strategic interests based on the doctrine of Strategic Autonomy, that is to “keep Indian decision-making insulated from external pressures” (Smith, 2020), or in other words, “exercise of choice driven purely by sovereign considerations and interest” (Talukdar, 2018). Concomitant with, and as a consequence of, Chinese postures, India for its part has charted out several strategic options. Join the QUAD India joined the QUAD in 2017 with Australia, Japan, and the US, as a common strategic platform. Thus, facing the geo-strategic challenge posed by Beijing, the QUAD supported “freedom of navigation and overflight”, “rules based order” and “maritime security” in the Indo-Pacific (Madan, 2017). Considering gravity of the 11 Dalbir Ahlawat India-China Strategic Relationsin the Emerging Asian Order Vol. 15 No. 1 2022 Indian Journal of Politics and International Relations geo-strategic challenges in the region, the QUAD progressed fast from the senior official level in 2017 to ministerial level in 2019. It was further revitalised with the visit of President Donald Trump to India in February 2020, when he openly supported the QUAD’s significance (Panda, 2020). Some doubts were casted about the Biden administration’s commitment to the QUAD but the Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken brushed these aside while attending the third ministerial level meeting in February 2021. The four foreign ministers reiterated their “commitment to upholding a rules-based international order, underpinned by respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, rule of law, transparency, freedom of navigation in the international seas and peaceful resolution of disputes” (The Hindu, 2021). While the LAC face-off still on, India for the first time officially used the term “QUAD” during deliberations of this meeting (Roy, 2021). Thus, the QUAD acts as a psychological barrier to China as it feels uncomfortable with the grouping of the four countries and fears losing control and influence in the Indo-Pacific region. No doubt, the QUAD offers a robust alternative to hedge against China but the QUAD is still in its incipient stage where all the four members differ on its nature and scope. For example, so far, the four countries are unable to issue a joint press statement. Australia and Japan are long-term US alliance partners whereas India is limited to just a partnership. India while agreeing on “a free, open, prosperous” Indo-Pacific region, diverges from others on exclusion of China. This means, India prefers inclusion of China but with the rider that Beijing should respect the international law and other set norms. No doubt, India’s maritime domain has been expanding robustly but it still remains to be an Indian Ocean specific. Moreover, it neither has any contested territories nor the capability to assert itself in the Pacific region. Since May 2020 India has been deterring China on its 3488 km long disputed border on its own, QUAD has neither been able to put pressure on China, nor able to provide active support to India. Even the border conflict did not get a mention during the third ministerial QUAD meeting in February 2021. In this regard, Hugh White aptly states, “Why should Delhi court conflict with Beijing by opposing China in East Asia simply to please Washington or Tokyo? And how sure can Delhi be that Washington or Tokyo-or Canberra-would risk their relationship with China to stand with India?” (White, 2020). Thus, if India has to deal with China on its own on its land borders, than the efficacy of the QUAD would be reduced to the maritime domain only. This way, a rising India while being part of the QUAD would like to retain autonomy and focus more on serving its own interests and not of other QUAD members. Strategic convergence with the US India’s conduct of nuclear tests in 1998 to deter China led to convergence of India-US security and strategic interests and finally signing of a Defence Framework 12 Agreement in 2005. This also opened new vistas for technology transfer and declaring India, without it signing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as “a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology” and according it the status of a de-facto nuclear weapons state, despite China’s objections (Gopal, 2016). Further, sharing the similar interests and concerns in the Indo-Pacific region both signed the “U.S.-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region” in 2015 (The White House, 2015). With China asserting its claims in the South China Sea, excessive maritime movements in the Indian Ocean, building of CPEC infrastructure in the territory claimed by India, and building pressure along the LAC, led to signing of four foundational agreements that the US signs with its military partners to share logistics, intelligence, strategic locations and other sensitive information. The evolving relationship also gave boost to the defence trade that quantum jumped from US$200 million in 2000 to over US$20 billion in 2020. In show of strength, they conduct several naval exercises at bilateral, trilateral and quadrilateral levels such as Cope India, Tiger Triumph, Vajra Prahar, and Malabar in the Indo-Pacific region. Overall, the relationship has been elevated to “Global Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” (MEA, 2020a). Declassification of a secret US national security document (U. S. Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific) (USSF, 2021) on 12 January 2021 disclosed the seriousness with which the Trump administration took India vis-à-vis China. This policy document emphasised on “A strong India, in cooperation with like-minded countries, would act as a counterbalance to China”. The document clearly enumerated that India “maintains the capacity to counter border provocations by China”, and it “remains preeminent in South Asia and takes the leading role in maintaining Indian Ocean security…”. It appears the policy postures listed above will continue as the Biden administration intends to “fully back a rapidly growing US–India partnership that enjoyed much forward movement during the Trump years…. Biden is a longtime friend of India’s who once described the US–India partnership as the defining relationship of the 21st century” (Kugelman, 2021). To overcome any uncertainties in the Indo-US relations, Biden in his maiden telephonic call assured Modi of “continuing close cooperation to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific, including support for freedom of navigation, territorial integrity, and a stronger regional architecture through the QUAD” (Biden, 2021). Notwithstanding convergence of interests against a rising China, still several major differences remain between India and the US. During the border conflict with China, Trump instead of supporting India offered to mediate. In a similar vein, US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo although offered to support India but did not elaborate the nature of support. Furthermore, the US restricts buying of advanced technology from other competitors, for example, when India placed order for the 13 Dalbir Ahlawat India-China Strategic Relationsin the Emerging Asian Order Vol. 15 No. 1 2022 Indian Journal of Politics and International Relations Russian S-400 Triumf surface to air missile, the US threatened to impose sanctions under its Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act. Align Act East policy with ASEAN As discussed above, India supports the QUAD objectives but at the same times considers it as a group of four big democracies. To build legitimacy in the region, India considers the role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as central. The complexity develops with these countries’ varying levels of relations with China. Therefore, India maintains an inclusive approach that the QUAD is not against any country but supports the common global goods, such as freedom of navigation, unimpeded commerce and peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the international law. These form the central tenets of the East Asia Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus and the Indian Ocean Rim Association. This means, India accords due consideration to the regional institutional frameworks and intends to retain centrality of the ASEAN. At the same time, India projects itself as not against China, as Modi emphasised that “Asia and the world will have a better future when India and China work together in trust and confidence, sensitive to each other’s interests” (MEA, 2018). What India expects of China is to respect sovereignty of other states and resolve the disputes amicably as per the international law. This is the core of India’s Act East policy to take the ASEAN countries on its side to counter China. Thus, India’s approach is welcomed by most of the countries in the region, many of whom are wary of Chinese expansionism and in search of viable alternatives. India, therefore, tends to be viewed as a countervailing force to China. This policy posture was visible during the Delhi Declaration after the ASEAN-India summit in 2017 to develop a common ASEAN Community Vision 2025 (MEA, 2018) and launch of a new Plan of Action (2021-25) for the “promotion of peace, stability, and prosperity in the region” (ASEAN-India Summit, 2019). Retain strategic bond with Russia India and Russia have had mutually reinforcing relationship since 1950s except for a brief interjection during Soviet Union’s transition to Russia. With Vladimir Putin in the political horizon of Russia, both countries were quick to re-identify their potential and interdependency in the defence sector. Moreover, ongoing joint defence production projects in India and an ongoing stable export market for Russia further accelerated the bilateral military-technological cooperation. In the wake of China’s rise, it became more compelling for India to acquire advanced weapon system from Russia, in the process Moscow accounted for 85% (Lalwani et al., 2021) of India’s all defence sector imports. Even despite the US threats, India signed agreement for 14 supply of five sets of S-400 missile and air defence system worth US$5.5 billion in 2018 during Putin’s visit to India (Gady, 2018). India’s defence procurement is so much embedded with the Russian military industrial complex that in a protracted conflict, Moscow could amply affect India’s military capability by simply withholding replacements and spares. This means even if India desires to de-couple Russian imports, realistically it may take decades (Narang, 2021). However, witnessing Russia’s increasing proximity to China and deepening defence ties with Pakistan, to retain its strategic autonomy, India started to diversify import of its military technology from 2016 onwards from other exporters like France, US, Israel and European countries. Commenting on the evolving aperture and India’s diversification of imports, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov lamented “India is currently an object of the Western countries’ persistent, aggressive and devious policy as they are trying to engage it in anti-China games by promoting Indo-Pacific strategies” (Lavrov, 2020). However, to assuage India’s concerns he expressed confidence at the 2020 Raisina Dialogue that India “being smart enough to understand” the Western “trap” of the Indo-Pacific will “not get into it” (Lavrov, 2020a). Conclusion Notwithstanding signing of several confidence building agreements on border security, expanding trade ties, and joining China initiated institutional frameworks, the trust deficit between India and China has been on the rise. As India’s Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar put bluntly “events of 2020 have actually put our relationship under exceptional stress”. Furthermore, India’s growing proximity with the US and ASEAN countries, opposition to the BRI and CPEC, and consolidation of control over the LAC, have made Beijing to view Delhi as a strategic competitor. At the same time, China’s design to disassociate India from the US and lure it in the Beijing initiated strategic order appears to have lost steam, therefore India deserves to be taught a lesson. India while demonstrating its firm resolve to face China on the disputed border and in the Indian Ocean intends to contest China’s hegemonic overtures with a caveat to keep the option for negotiations and future cooperation open. With widening divergence and improbability of border dispute resolution in the near future, India has been exploring other strategic options. It is inclining towards the QUAD so that the democratic countries should collectively checkmate China and pressurise it to follow a rules based order, respect freedom of navigation, and resolve the territorial disputes amicably. India is also adding wings to its Act East policy by emphasising 15 Vol. 15 No. 1 2022 Indian Journal of Politics and International Relations on centrality of the ASEAN, i.e. strengthening regional institutional frameworks and also building its own legitimacy as an alternative regional power to China. In addition, signing of four foundational security agreements with the US, acquiring de-facto nuclear status, diversifying import of military technology from different countries, retaining its reliable ties with Russia, all accumulatively place India on a strong pedestal to deter China. Thus, the onus is put on China, if it pushes India hard, India will engage with the QUAD and the US more robustly that will go against the Chinese interests, if it wants India to be on its side, it need to resolve the border dispute and consider India as a peer neighbour. India’s achievement appears that has pushed China to a tight precipice point while itself having a catalogue of options. In addition, availing membership of different institutional frameworks including China, Russia and the US, indicates that India is operating at multi-levels. While enhancing its own military capability by diversifying import of military technology from different sources, India remains immune from pressure from any one country or a group. This scenario creates a conducive environment for India that instead of engaging in a zero-sum alliance system it profers a multipolar-Asia paradigm where India could maintain its strategic autonomy and at the same time retain its independence to make decisions that serve its interests best. References Ahlawat, Dalbir and Hughes, Lindsay. (2018) “India-China Stand-off in Doklam: Aligning Realism with National Characteristics”, The Round Table, vol. 107, issue 5, p. 613. Ahlawat, Dalbir and Raymond, M Izarali. (2020). “India’s revocation of Article 370: security dilemmas and options for Pakistan”, The Round Table, vol. 109, no. 6, p. 664. Ahlawat, Dalbir and Thaakar, Kedar. 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Lalwani, Sameer., O’Donnell, Frank., Sagerstrom, Tyler. and Vasudeva, Akriti. (2021). “The Influence of Arms: Explaining the Durability of India–Russia Alignment”, The Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, 15 January, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/ 17 Dalbir Ahlawat India-China Strategic Relationsin the Emerging Asian Order Vol. 15 No. 1 2022 Indian Journal of Politics and International Relations Article/ 2473328/the-influence-of-arms-explaining-the-durability-of-indiarussiaalignment/. Lavrov, Sergey. (2020). “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks at the general meeting of the Russian International Affairs Council, Moscow, December 8”, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 8 December 2020, https://www.mid.ru/web/ guest/evropejskij-souz-es/-/asset_publisher/6OiYovt2s4Yc/ content/id/4470074?p_p_ id=101_INSTANCE_6OiYovt2s4Yc&_101_INSTANCE_6OiYovt2s4Yc_languageId=en_ GB Lavrov, Sergey. (2020a). “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Remarks and Answers to Questions at a Plenary Session of the Raisina Dialogue International Conference, New Delhi, January 15, 2020”, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 15 January 2020,https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/ cKNonkJE02Bw/ content/id/3994885?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw &_101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw_languageId=en_GB. Madan, Tanvi. (2017). “The Rise, Fall and Rebirth of the Quad,” War on the Rocks, 16 November, https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/rise-fall-rebirth-quad/ Malik, Mohan. (2017). “China and India: The roots of hostility”, The Diplomat, 12 September, http://thediplomat.com/2017/09/china-and-india-the-roots-of-hostility/ MEA. (2005). 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Ministry of External Affairs, “Joint Statement: Vision and Principles for India-U.S. Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership” (New Delhi), 25 February 2020, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateraldocuments.htm?dtl/32421/Joint_Statement_Vision_ and_Principles_for_IndiaUS_Comprehensive_Global_Strategic_Partnership. Narang, Vipin. (2021). “Russian influence on India’s military doctrines”, Journal of IndoPacific Affairs, 15 January 2021. 18 Palit, D. K. (1991) “War in High Himalaya: The Indian Army in Crisis, 1962” (London: C. Hurst & Co.), p. 20. Panda, Ankit. (2020). “Trump, in India, Hints at Revitalized ‘Quad’ Initiative,” The Diplomat, 27 February, https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/trump-in-india-hints-at-revitalizedquad-initiative/ Roy, Shubhajit. (2021). “China on mind, Quad ministers want respect for territorial integrity”, Indian Express, 19 February, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/china-on-mindquad-ministers-want-respect-for-territorial-integrity-7194897/ Scobell, A. (2020). Cult of defense, M. R. Chambers Ed., South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances (Carlisle: US Army War College), p. 329. Smith, Jeff M. (2020). “Strategic Autonomy and U.S.-Indian Relations”, War on the Rocks, 6 November,https://warontherocks.com/2020/11/strategic-autonomy-and-u-s-indianrelations/. Som, Vishnu. (2021). Exclusive: China Has Built Village In Arunachal, Show Satellite Images”, NDTV, 18 January, https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/china-has-built-village-inarunachal-pradesh-show-satellite-images-exclusive-2354154. Talukdar, Sreemoy. (2018). “Vladimir Putin in India: As Russian president arrives with S-400 deal, New Delhi’s strategic autonomy gets more skin in game”, First Post, 5 October 2018, https://www.firstpost.com/india/vladimir-putin-in-india-new-delhi-ready-to-get-moreskin-in-game-show-strategic-autonomy-not-just-moral-principle-5317641.html. The Hindu. 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(2020). “Chinese President Xi Jinping tells troops to focus on ‘preparing for war’”, CNN, 14 October, https://edition.cnn.com/2020/10/14/asia/xi-jinping-taiwanus-esper-intl-hnk/index.html 19 Dalbir Ahlawat India-China Strategic Relationsin the Emerging Asian Order Vol. 15 No. 1 2022 Indian Journal of Politics and International Relations White, Hugh. (2020). “Will India balance China in East Asia?”, China-India Brief #161 (Singapore: Centre on Asia and Globalisation, 11-23 June), https://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/ cag/publications/details/china-india-brief-161#guest Xinhua. (2018). “Indian media positive on Xi-Modi ‘heart-to-heart summit’”, Chinadaily. com.cn, 28 April 2018, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn /a/201804/28/ WS5ae472e3a3105cdcf651b348.html Zhen, Liu. (2021). “Xi Jinping orders China’s military to be ready for war ‘at any second’”, South China Morning Post, 5 January, https://www.scmp.com /news/ china/military/ article/3116436/xi-jinping-orders-chinas-military-be-ready-war-anysecond. 20 IJPAIR: Aims and Scope IJPAIR is a refereed biannual journal published by the School of International Relations and Politics, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam, Kerala. IJPAIR is committed to providing a space for the best of writings in Political Science and International Relations (IR). It publishes topical, scholarly work on significant debates in Politics and IR and on all major socioeconomic, cultural and political issues affecting India and other countries. IJPAIR seeks to uphold a pluralist perspective. Editorial policy promotes variety in subject matter and methodology. IJPAIR welcomes articles from all perspectives and on all subjects pertaining to Politics and International Relations, besides conceptual essays and policy analysis. 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