Japanese Studies, Vol. 26, No. 2, September 2006 Suicide, Boycotts and Embracing Tagore: The Japanese Popular Response to the 1924 US Immigration Exclusion Law NANCY STALKER, University of Texas at Austin In June 1924 popular protests over the US Immigration Exclusion Law erupted throughout Japan as individuals and groups mobilized to express their anger and resentment in a brief but potent wave of anti-Americanism. This paper traces several forms of popular protests and examines the reasons behind anti-American hysteria. I place the protests within the larger ‘dispute culture’ that arose under pre-war imperial democracy and identify how specific individuals and groups, especially the media, encouraged popular protest in order to further their own self-interests. On 31 May 1924 at around 5.30 a.m., a servant of former Finance Minister Inoue Junnosuke discovered the disemboweled corpse of a middle-aged man propped against a tree stump in the garden. Alongside the body were three letters: one was addressed to the American Ambassador Cyrus Woods, another to ‘the People of America,’ the third to ‘My fellow Japanese countrymen.’ The letters held no clue as to the man’s identity, but he was attired in traditional black kimono and pleated hakama trousers and carried a silver pocket watch. He had committed ritual suicide (seppuku or hara-kiri), using a small dagger to slice open his abdomen and a razor to slit his neck.1 The letter, written in English and addressed to Ambassador Woods read: I hereby entreat by my death his Excellency Cyrus E. Woods, American Ambassador, who well understands Japan and has great sympathy for the Japanese people, to convey my request as follows: That a law shall be enacted to remove the exclusion clause from the new immigration bill . . . I greatly regret that your country . . . enacted the Japanese exclusion clause in complete disregard of humanity . . . I am a Japanese. We are now humiliated by your country in the eyes of the world without any justification . . . I prefer death rather than to feel resentment. After my death I will ask the reconsideration by the people of your country through Jesus Christ and pray for the greater happiness of your people. At the same time, I pray God for the removal of the injurious anti-Japanese clause from the immigration bill, which has subjected the Japanese to great insult and humiliation. A Nameless Subject of the Japanese Empire2 1 Tokyo nichinichi shimbun (hereafter TNN), 1 June 1924, in Taishō nyūsū jiten (hereafter TNJ); New York Times (hereafter NYT), 1 June 1924. There are discrepancies in the accounts. TNN mentions three letters while NYT notes only two. TNN provides a detailed description of the Japanese-style clothing worn by the individual; the Times, reporting to the US, described his clothing as ‘a foreign style suit.’ 2 NYT, 1 June 1924. The two remaining letters were not published. ISSN 1037-1397 print=ISSN 1469-9338 online/06=020153-18 # 2006 Japanese Studies Association of Australia DOI: 10.1080=10371390600883552 154 Nancy Stalker The victim had intended to commit his act in Ambassador Woods’s garden, but mistakenly chose Inoue’s home instead.3 The occasion for this poignant plea, as indicated in the letter, was the recent passage of a new US immigration law. The system favored northern Europeans, providing large quotas to ‘Nordics’ with smaller allowances for Eastern and Southern Europeans. Immigration from Asia was prohibited entirely by a clause that would not admit ‘any alien ineligible to citizenship,’ a status which applied pointedly to the Japanese as the Chinese had been excluded since 1882. The new law vitiated the so-called ‘Gentleman’s Agreement’ of 1908, a set of diplomatic negotiations under which the Japanese government agreed to refrain from issuing passports to laborers bound for the continental US. The US government, in turn, agreed to permit the entry of Japanese students, merchants, diplomats and the families of Japanese residents in the US. Since the 1919 rejection of the Racial Equality clause proposed by Japan for the Versailles Peace Treaty, public resentment over racial discrimination by western nations, particularly the US, had escalated as popular knowledge about the world outside Japan’s borders had grown. Although the new 1924 law continued to exempt ‘desirable’ immigrants and would not substantively affect the numbers of Japanese allowed in the US, some Japanese viewed it as a deep racial insult; a ‘gratuitous affront’ which amounted to a declaration of war between the yellow and white races.4 Izumi Hirobe has chronicled the Japanese official reaction to the passage of the law and the efforts of US groups, especially missionaries and businessmen, to allow a token quota of Japanese immigrants.5 Hirobe characterizes the official response as a ‘split attitude’ in which the Foreign Ministry, cautious about aggravating anti-Japanese feeling in the US, avoided addressing the issue directly. Instead it pursued quiet protest through diplomatic channels. Nevertheless, Ministry officials and internal publications privately expressed outrage. Hirobe briefly addresses the Japanese popular response, but focuses on American efforts to ameliorate the affront to the Japanese. Some forms of Japanese public protest had been underway since the Senate passage of the bill in late April. It was generally subdued in tone, consisting largely of high-minded, civilized telegrams to the US Senate and President Coolidge from a variety of middle-class citizens’ groups. But following the suicide of the man dubbed the ‘unknown patriot’ (mumei kokushi) popular protest galvanized in different forms and took on an angry, anti-American tone. Ritual suicide was a dramatic act that effectively stirred public emotions. Officially denounced as a ‘retrograde custom,’ it nevertheless held deep meaning for the Japanese public who had historically considered many who committed seppuku national heroes. Celebrated instances, such as the 47 ronin in 1703, were associated with loyalty and moral justice. The suicide of Russo-Japanese War hero General Nogi Maresuke in 1912, following the death of the Meiji emperor, was memorialized in popular drama, fiction and even textbooks. Yet with Nogi’s act of junshi, following one’s lord into death, there was no action that people might undertake to express their support. Not so with the ‘unknown patriot,’ whose death sparked mild protest into a blaze of activity. Like other Japanese protest movements in the early twentieth century, however, the tide of active protest ebbed rapidly, likely due to the state’s ability to pressure the media under 3 TNN in TNJ, 1 June 1924. For a more detailed discussion of the Gentleman’s Agreement and the 1924 Law, see Ichioka, The Issei, Ch. 7; Chuman, Bamboo People, 90–103. In Japanese, see Suzuki, ‘1850-1920 nendai ni okeru Amerika no tōyō imin haiseki’; Yoshida, Kokujoku. 5 Hirobe, Japanese Pride, American Prejudice. 4 Response to the 1924 US Immigration Exclusion Law 155 the 1909 Newspaper Law.6 By mid-July little activity was reported in the dailies. Yet in June 1924, the exclusion law and related suicide became a ‘mnemonic site’ in the construction of a beleaguered Japanese international identity in the 1920s. Takashi Fujitani defines these sites as ‘material vehicles of meaning’ that help construct national identity or serve as ‘symbolic markers for commemorations of present national accomplishments and the possibilities of the future.’7 In his analysis, mnemonic sites are state-sponsored events, such as imperial pageants and national rituals. These ceremonies ‘evoked feelings of love and respect for the emperor, pride in being Japanese, and a sense of communion with other Japanese.’8 Thus, such sites were ‘positive’ in the affirmative feelings and sense of shared national identity they invoked. Yet, such a sense of shared identity can also be invoked through ‘negative’ sites such as Hiroshima and Auschwitz, to name two powerful examples. Negative sites, often marked by the tragic loss of human life, are, in many ways, even more effective in generating popular solidarity and resolve. Furthermore, they are not necessarily creations of the state. Negative sites are often memorials or commemorative ceremonies sponsored by private groups or individuals. In June 1924, the numerous anti-American rallies and activities that captured public attention did not enjoy official sponsorship. Instead different arms of the bureaucracy and establishment publicly condemned such actions, trying to reassure Americans of continued goodwill. This paper examines the reasons behind anti-American hysteria, tracing several different forms of popular protest that erupted after the passage of the exclusion law and the suicide of the ‘unknown patriot.’ Individuals from many strata of society mobilized in different forms, expressing their resentment and rage in a brief wave of anti-American hysteria during the month of June 1924. I argue that these protests constituted another aspect of the ‘imperial democracy’ of the pre-war years described by Andrew Gordon. Gordon chronicles the rise of an urban ‘dispute culture’ from the 1910s to 1930s, focusing on the way in which workers and urban crowds engaged in movements designed to assert their role as ‘participants in local and national communities.’9 The popular protests following the exclusion law demonstrate that urban crowds also had aspirations as participants in the international community, seeking respect and equal treatment from other nations. I further argue that the public’s emotional vulnerability provided an opportunity for disparate groups and individuals to exploit the antiAmerican mood to suit their own needs: right-wing and Pan-Asian organizations found new supporters, Christian groups gained greater independence, businesses advocated boycotts of US goods and individuals from Uchimura Kanzō to Rabindranath Tagore found sympathetic new audiences for their views. And throughout the month, newspapers, which reached mass circulation in the early 1920s, fanned the flames of public anger and resentment, creating sensationalistic front-page stories that undoubtedly sold more copy than reportage on the milquetoast resolutions of citizens’ groups. Early Temperance The Japanese press had closely followed the immigration issue since mid-March 1924, but the general mood was optimistic. The mainstream press portrayed America as a 6 Under the 1909 Newspaper law (shimbunshi hō), the Home Ministry had the authority to prohibit sales of newspapers. See Kasza, The State and Mass Media in Japan. 7 Fujitani, Splendid Monarchy, 11. 8 Ibid., 15. 9 Gordon, Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan, 3. 156 Nancy Stalker democratic and humanitarian nation committed to internationalist ideals and high moral principles. Critiques tended to center not on the US, but on the Japanese government’s failure to obtain favorable immigration policies or appropriate international stature abroad.10 The issue began to dominate front-page headlines in April, when the bill passed in the US House of Representatives by a margin of 322 to 71.11 Still, the press continued to predict that it would be killed in the Senate or vetoed by the President.12 Around this time, Ambassador Hanihara Masanao’s famous ‘grave consequences’ letter was introduced to the US Senate. The letter protested the impending legislation predicting ‘the grave consequences which the enactment of the measure . . . would inevitably bring upon the otherwise happy and mutually advantageous relations between our two countries.’13 Senator Henry Cabot Lodge interpreted the letter as a ‘veiled threat’ against the US. He asserted that no nation had the right to interfere in domestic policy and called for the immediate passage of the immigration bill. The Senate concurred, and approved the measure on 15 April by an overwhelming majority. The Japanese, hoping for Senate reversal of the House action, were caught by surprise and the level of coverage on this issue suddenly shot up in late April when over 80 editorials appeared in major metropolitan newspapers.14 Criticism of the Hanihara blunder was extensive.15 Editorial writers encouraged the public to become involved in this issue of national honor, urging that ‘every friendly effort’ be made to induce US reconsideration. Headlines naively reassured readers that ‘Coolidge would avoid an affront to Japan.’16 Citizens were urged to express their protests through issuing resolutions and seeking presidential veto via telegrams. Meetings were organized by a wide variety of groups throughout the nation and colonial empire—newspaper publishers, patriotic societies, women’s associations, religious, educational, or social associations.17 Their rhetoric was hopeful and oriented toward gaining American sympathy rather than stirring up the feelings of the Japanese public. Mounting Fervor The moderation and restraint of early protests were swept away by the tragedy of the ‘unknown patriot’ in late May. There can be no denying that after 1 June the public response intensified, became more emotional and became clearly anti-American. Copycat suicides, massive rallies, and hotheaded rhetoric followed closely on the heels of his death. By mid-June, newspapers reported, ‘anti-American sentiment is now sweeping over the country like wildfire.’18 Four more suicides in emulation of the ‘unknown patriot’ followed in rapid succession, though none received the fanfare of the initial tragedy. On 3 June, two young men threw themselves in front of trains. Among the ‘mangled remains’ of a student from Choshi was 10 Markela, ‘Japanese attitudes toward the United States Immigration Act of 1924’, 47–50. Japan Times and Mail (hereafter JTM), 14 April 1924. 12 JTM, 17 April 1924. 13 For more on the Senate debate, see Daniels, Coming to America, 99–105; Chuman, Bamboo People, 95–101; Markela, ‘Japanese attitudes’, 76–82. 14 Markela, ‘Japanese attitudes’, 82. 15 JTM, 19 April 1924. 16 JTM, 21 & 26 April 1924. 17 Markela, ‘Japanese attitudes’, 126–130. 18 Osaka Mainichi (hereafter OM), 17 June 1924. 11 Response to the 1924 US Immigration Exclusion Law 157 a scrap of paper reading, ‘Buy absolutely no American goods.’ The second victim, Kojirō Miura, 24, of Hamamatsu, left a note stating ‘I lay down my life when the country is agitated over the American exclusion question, praying peace for the fatherland. My seventy million compatriots must not laugh at my death.’19 The third death occurred in Odawara.20 The fourth suicide occurred at the Toyama Military School, where a 25-year-old hanged himself after swallowing rat poison. A letter in his pocket addressed to Ambassador Woods urged him to work on ‘untangling of the anti-Japanese question’ that had resulted in ‘racial insult.’21 As the media sensationalistically reported the incidents, the furor and commotion mounted. Four thousand placards were placed throughout Tokyo inviting people to attend a 5 June rally to be held at Ryōgoku stadium. The rally was sponsored by a newly formed organization calling itself the Anti-American Citizens’ Convention (Taibei kokumin taikai), supported by notorious right-wing activists Uchida Ryōhei and Toyama Mitsuru. The signs listed 365 sponsors, including leading members of the House of Representatives and influential journalists. One of the event’s advertised purposes was to plan a ‘grand national funeral’ for the ‘unknown patriot.’22 By the opening of the rally at 1 p.m. the stadium was filled to its capacity, 35,000. Youth groups from neighboring prefectures had waited at the site for several hours. Over 18 new protest groups spawned by the exclusion issue were in attendance, along with representatives from each political party.23 The following resolution, decidedly more heated than the earlier telegrams to President Coolidge, was adopted to a chorus of banzais: American anti-Japanese actions are increasingly reaching the extremes of high-handedness, encouraging the calamity of racial hatred. Truly ignoring international justice and trampling on the honor of the empire is an unforgivable slight upon the Japanese people. We demand that America preserve the prestige of our empire, based upon the principles of justice and urge America to reconsider.24 Plans to commemorate the ‘unknown patriot’ continued. The rally resolved to hold a national funeral and condolence ceremony at the Aoyama Fairgrounds on 8 June. The funeral would bestow a Buddhist posthumous name for the still unidentified national hero.25 Uchida and Toyama were appointed heads of an executive action committee of 50 individuals that would plan speeches and rallies throughout Tokyo, form antiAmerican leagues in each neighborhood and organize a national oratorical campaign to arouse anti-American public opinion. The infectious mood spread rapidly through Tokyo. Posters calling for the rejection of American-made goods were posted at every major street corner. Even the Tokyo City Medical Association recommended refusal of treatment to any American who dared remain in Tokyo.26 Throughout the commotion, the memory of the ‘unknown patriot’ represented a rallying point, a mnemonic site, for anti-American actions. Postcards 19 JTM, 4 June 1924. NYT, 5 June 1924. 21 JTM & NYT, 5 June 1924. 22 JTM, 5 June 1924. 23 TNN in TNJ, 6 June 1924. 24 Ibid. 25 Yorozu, 7 June 1924, in Shimbun shūroku Taishō shi (hereafter SST). 26 Yorozu, 8 June 1924 in SST. 20 158 Nancy Stalker depicting his gravesite selling for 20 sen were ‘flying off the shelves’ (tobu yō ni urete iru) at the numerous anti-American rallies being held in every region of Japan.27 The most scandalous, albeit overblown, incident occurred at the upmarket Imperial Hotel in Tokyo. On the night of 7 June, 35 members of the Taikōsha and Tesshinkai young men’s patriotic societies, ‘indignant at the frivolity and heedlessness’ of western dancing ‘while the nation is facing one of the greatest crises of its history’ barged into a society dance, brandished swords and distributed handbills stating ‘Punish Tyrannical America.’28 The incident received tabloid-style coverage in the press. As a result, other hotels frequented by westerners, such as the Oriental Hotel in Kobe, prohibited Japanese men and women from attending dances to prevent the occurrence of similar incidents.29 The young men’s associations also visited large Tokyo department stores, including Mitsukoshi, Matsuzakaya and Takashimaya, distributing hundreds of thousands of handbills urging people to ‘cast aside extravagance and consume more homemade products.’30 On 8 June, Taikōsha president Shimizu Kōnosuke addressed a large congregation of the Ginza Christian Church, expressing widely felt frustration at the lack of adequate response by the establishment. We are not agitating for an unnecessary anti-American movement. We simply cannot remain silent and lie back supinely when our national leaders are doing nothing while the dignity of our nation is being dragged in the mud.31 The Boycott of US Goods and Movies Boycotts of US goods and movies in reaction to the discriminatory legislation generated an even higher degree of anti-American action among the public. A wide variety of groups and individuals spearheaded boycott campaigns, including housewives, students, and young men’s patriotic associations. A group of 50 geisha in the city of Ninomiya declared that they would abstain from using American cosmetics.32 The press praised the efforts of housewives who publicly rejected US-made toiletries and hair-styling products and who distributed leaflets urging other Japanese consumers to do the same. Newspapers exaggeratedly likened their efforts to women in the French Revolution, the matriarchs of ancient Rome, even Joan of Arc.33 During May, three women’s associations in Tokyo passed resolutions urging women not to buy US made toiletries.34 Yet it was not until June, in the wake of the memorials commemorating the ‘unknown patriot,’ that the consumer goods boycott gained national momentum. As handbills and street corner signs proliferated, extensive media coverage soon followed. Under a front page banner headline proclaiming ‘Made in USA mark unpopular,’ the Osaka Mainichi reported a 30% decline in demand for Americanmade canned goods and a 20% decline in demand for US toilet articles, specifically tooth powders, talcum and face powders, soap and ‘Pompeiian cream’ in June.35 27 TNN, 2 July 1924 in TNJ. OM, 10 June 1924. 29 OM, 15 June 1924. 30 OM, 10 June 1924. 31 Ibid. 32 Japan Weekly Chronicle (hereafter JWC), 19 June 1924, in Markela, ‘Japanese attitudes’, 187. 33 TNN, 15 & 16 June. 34 OM, 31 May 1924. 35 OM, 10 June 1924. 28 Response to the 1924 US Immigration Exclusion Law 159 Merchants voluntarily replaced their stocks of American cameras and films with German-made articles and predicted declining demand for American phonographs, records, toys and woolen goods.36 Some stores not only boycotted US goods, but turned away American customers with signs, in English, such as this: American Ladies and Gentlemen: It must be rather unpleasant for you to make purchases at a store of a people whom your national legislative body has excluded. We, too, do not feel pleasant. Before making any purchase here, please work for the revision of the anti-Japanese law.37 Beginning in mid-June, advertisements confirm manufacturers’ awareness of negative sentiment towards American goods. Advertisements for Japanese alternatives to western toilet articles, including Lion toothpaste and Jin-Tan medicinal tooth powders became more prominent than in previous months.38 Some ads explicitly stressed the Japanese or non-American origin of their products in bold print: Gold Star was ‘JAPAN-made Butter;’ Ovaltine was markedly ‘Manufactured in Switzerland.’39 Students joined the boycotts, refusing to buy American neckties, shirts, underwear, stationery and dry goods. Shopkeepers near Keio University reported that students would inquire as to the country of origin before making purchases and ‘positively will not buy any American article.’40 By late June, boycotts spread widely in the Kansai region and the majority of shops and departments stores in Kyoto had also posted signs stating ‘No American goods here.’41 The importation of US-made toilet articles, like Colgate toothpaste and Pompeiian face cream, had further dropped to around 50%.42 Boycott campaigns against phonograph records from Victor and Columbia were underway. In alarm, a group of merchants formed the Nichibei kyōwakai, an association intended to ‘mitigate the widespread ill-feeling towards America and American goods among the Japanese public.’43 Not only businessmen, but also bureaucrats expressed their displeasure at the boycotts. Agriculture and Commerce Minister Takahashi Korekiyo lamented that such ‘regrettable’ protests were a ‘favorite trick of the Chinese and we should not imitate it.’44 Yet the general public seemed to have no qualms in adopting this relatively simple technique. Another boycott occurred in the Japanese motion picture industry. Movies were big business in Japan. Thirty private corporations were involved in the manufacture, distribution and exhibition of films at 850 movie halls, over 120 in the Tokyo vicinity alone.45 By the early 1920s, American studios represented 65% of film footage shown in Japan. Domestic manufactures comprised 29% of the market.46 Within one week of the suicide, newspapers noted the sudden drop in popularity of American movies, while Japanese films enjoyed a ‘roaring trade.’47 Sensing an opportunity to 36 OM, 12 June 1924. Ibid. 38 OM, 13 & 20 June 1924. 39 OM, 12 & 20 June 1924. 40 OM, 27 June 1924. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid. 43 OM, 29 June 1924. 44 OM, 21 June 1924. 45 Japan Yearbook, 1924–1925 volume (hereafter JY), 380. 46 Ibid. 47 OM, 4 June 1924. 37 160 Nancy Stalker improve market share, on 9 June a coalition of movie industry interests led by the Nikkatsu and Shōchiku studios, announced a resolution not to buy, rent or show American films beginning 1 July, the date that exclusion would take effect.48 Reservist and youth groups who had already formed an ‘Alliance for Avoidance of American Films’ (Beikoku eiga miru bekarazu dōmei), which posted guards at theater entrances to intimidate potential patrons, greeted the announcement enthusiastically.49 The embargo of American movies would create a sizable hole in the industry’s offerings to viewers, which the studios proposed to fill with European films, a mainstay in the early days of Japanese cinema. Despite the popularity of American films, the boycott quickly spread to movie houses in the Kansai region. Benshi, the performers who translated foreign dialogue and provided running commentary to foreign films, vowed to withhold their services.50 Theater owners and managers recognized that financial losses would probably result from their actions, but were determined to participate in the boycott ‘for the sake of the country.’51 Some moviegoers also strongly supported the boycott. In a letter to the editor, a writer with the pseudonym Momotaro, the folk hero who defended the country by defeating the demons of the West, lambasted American films as a ‘a grave menace to the well being of the nation, touching . . . the very foundations of the thoughts and sentiments of the people.’52 To Momotaro, movies were a ‘weapon’ with which the US wielded unwelcome influence over the Japanese public mind. He expressed disgust over the ‘dominance of American films everywhere that give us nausea with their sameness, their curious mixture of the religious with the frivolous, their “popular” movie stars, their cowboys, their impossible “million dollar” productions.’53 The US film industry quickly attempted to counter the threat presented to its position in the Japanese market. On 12 June, representatives of Paramount, United Artists and Fox studios held a conference and charged that Japanese movie production was insufficient to meet demand. They predicted the boycott would result in the closure of many theaters and the loss of thousands of jobs.54 They also smugly reminded the Japanese that the loss of their business would ‘hardly be felt at our Head office’ and that, in any case, Japanese studios would have to continue to buy film stock and other necessary raw materials from the US.55 After the US embassy lodged an official protest with the Japanese government, the Home Ministry pressured the industry to capitulate and the boycott waned.56 Charges that the film industry had used the immigration issue for its own self-interest also diminished public support. Their motivation may have been partially patriotic, but film directors and studios had also taken advantage of public anti-American sentiment to attempt to improve their market position. It must be assumed, however, that the consumers who boycotted products and movies, were sincerely expressing their anger over the American 48 Jiji shinpō, 9 June 1924 in SST. Ibid. 50 JWC, 19 June 1924, in Markela, ‘Japanese attitudes’, 186. 51 OM, 11 June 1924. 52 OM, 24 June 1924. 53 Ibid. 54 OM, 12 June 1924. 55 Ibid. 56 Markela, ‘Japanese attitudes’, 189–197. 49 Response to the 1924 US Immigration Exclusion Law 161 slight to Japan’s international reputation. Their efforts were greatly aided by the media, which prominently publicized boycott targets and tactics. The Apostasy of Christian Leaders Anti-Americanism also soon became apparent among Japanese Christian groups. Christian leaders, among the most stalwart pro-Americans in Japan, began to question their association with American missionaries and their alliances with American mission boards. While some groups, including the Episcopalian, Presbyterian and Methodist denominations, had achieved administrative independence from their boards, all continued to receive some form of funding from America.57 Japanese church councils debated what actions might be taken and through the course of June, proposals became increasingly secessionist. During the first few weeks of June, members of Japanese missions, such as The Japan Mission of the American Board, an inter-denominational council of Japanese Christian missionaries, issued calm resolutions ‘deploring’ or ‘denouncing’ the exclusion clause and calling for meetings to debate further actions.58 By the latter part of month, however, activity became more heated. Students at Kansai Gakuin, a Methodist university, demanded the ouster of American missionary teachers.59 Other regionally based youth groups passed resolutions demanding the withdrawal of American missionaries from their districts.60 While some Tokyo churches tried to sever all connections with their American mission boards, Osaka churches, considered more conservative, also decided to move for independence from American financial aid. Several famous Japanese Christians began to openly criticize American Christianity for its profligacy and discriminatory attitudes. Kagawa Toyohiko (1888– 1960), acclaimed for his work in the slums of Kobe, supported the ousting of US missionaries, charging that they led luxurious lives and were wasteful in the tasks of evangelical work. He claimed that despite the predominance of Americans among foreign missionaries, they accounted for less than a third of the estimated 10,000 annual Christian converts. Yet nearly half of the seven million yen spent by US missionaries was expended on their elite lifestyles, more than the amounts spent for evangelizing and schools combined.61 Uchimura Kanzō (1861 –1930), a Christian leader who gained notoriety for his refusal to bow to the Imperial Rescript on Education, was even dubbed a ‘champion of the Hate-America movement.’62 Known for his distinct anti-institutional bent, he disclaimed allegiance to any particular Christian sect, claiming instead to serve only the two J’s—Japan and Jesus. Uchimura had been deeply ambivalent about America for decades. During his four years at Amherst College, he frequently experienced discrimination, and he later recorded these incidents in his first book How I Became a Christian. Prior to his arrival 57 OM, 18 & 29 June 1924. For discussion of secessionist activities by Japanese-American churches, see Hayashi, For the Sake of our Japanese Brethren. 58 OM, 11 & 13 June 1924. 59 OM, 22 June 1924. 60 OM, 1 June 1924. 61 OM, 24 June 1924. 62 Moore (ed.), Culture and Religion in Japanese-American, 35. Uchimura founded the Mukyōkai (no church) movement, which rejected clergy, church buildings and formal membership, consisting instead of study groups who met in private homes or rented halls. Mukyōkai drew many intellectuals who had withdrawn from American Christian churches. 162 Nancy Stalker in the US, Uchimura had held an ideal of a ‘Christian America’ as a Holy Land that was ‘lofty, religious Puritanic’ but found the existence of crime, greed, and racism in America a terrible disillusionment.63 As a member of the ‘yellow race,’ he was enraged by the exclusion of Chinese immigrants, yet himself bristled when he was confused with lowly ‘coolies from Canton.’ Uchimura further raged against materialistic American society as morally and spiritually bankrupt and characterized by penitentiaries and poorhouses. The exclusion law provided a receptive new audience for his vehement antiAmericanism. In a letter to the Tokyo nichinichi newspaper on 2 June, Uchimura heatedly declared he was ‘glad of exclusion.’ Whatever material benefit the Japanese may have derived from Americans, they have lost more spiritually. It is a fact patent to all that the reason for the Japan of today being a slave to materialistic lust can be traced to the evil influence of Americans. The Christianity of Americans is, in the majority of cases, shallow to the extreme. It is materialistic and partisan. It differs entirely in its fundamental spirit from that of Christ.64 He followed up his initial diatribe with a widely publicized letter to the Kokumin shimbun, in which he charged that American ‘mad and thoughtless’ actions had resulted in an actual ‘grave consequence’ for America—the loss of its true friend, Japan.65 Later that year, Uchimura published ‘A Dialogue between Christian America and Heathen Japan’, in which an arrogant America acknowledges, ‘That I kicked you and give you an insult,’ yet counsels patience: ‘Only be . . . meek, quiet and show yourself to be a great nation. That is the best way to win the praise of the world.’ Japan retorts, ‘I see. But I cannot understand why you label me as “an undesirable heathen” while you advise me to behave as Christian. Is it not more reasonable for you to repent in ashes and sackcloth for the evil you have done?’ America impatiently replies, ‘Do you not see the possible disaster to your trade and finance, if you do not care my advice? Why stick to your Bushido nonsense and endanger your very existence?’ Japan, bewildered, concludes, ‘What course to take, I do not know. Only this one thing seems to be evident: You are a Christian in name and heathen in deed, and I am just the opposite.’66 Prior to the heightening of public emotions over the exclusion law, Japanese Christians were among the most pro-American segments of society, beholden to the US for inspiration, administrative support and financial subsidy. Yet in June 1924, swept up into the mood of anti-Americanism, Japanese Christian leaders rejected and criticized their American mentors and loudly voiced long-held grievances. Their apostasy had longterm consequences—in the decades that followed and through the post-war era, denominational growth stagnated, while an increasing number of ‘native’ Christian groups with Uchimura-style nationalist inclinations emerged.67 Media Spotlight on American Racism Clearly the media, especially newspapers, played a key role in informing the public about anti-American activity, inciting even more hatred and protest. Following the passage of 63 Ibid., 37. TNN, 2 June 1924; OM, 4 June 1924. 65 Uchimura, The Complete Works of Kanzo Uchimura, 168–169. 66 Ibid., 170–173. 67 Mullins, Christianity Made in Japan. 64 Response to the 1924 US Immigration Exclusion Law 163 the law and the death of the unknown patriot, they exacerbated public resentment by featuring stories on discriminatory incidents targeting Japanese immigrants in the US. Of course, racially motivated violence was nothing new to the immigrant communities abroad who regularly faced physical hostility, such as arson, destruction of property and mob violence, not to mention the demeaning everyday slurs that characterized their daily interactions with whites, well-meaning and otherwise.68 Immigrants had long become accustomed to the idea that their yellow race marked them as inferior in the minds of white Americans. What was new, in Japan, was front-page newspaper coverage of such incidents, which a few months earlier would have been swept under the national rug as humiliating affronts to common laborers that should not be spoken of. In June, editors suddenly found violence committed against immigrants newsworthy, but ignored the long, painful history of anti-Japanese discrimination. The sudden appearance of such news items is notable in late June, after mass rallies and boycotts heightened popular consciousness of American racism and after the response of the US government to the Japanese official protest shattered hope for any face-saving measures. Following 22 June, the day that US determination to stand by its discriminatory law was made public, brief, inflammatory stories about anti-Japanese actions in the US often made front-page headlines. On that day, three items on assaults against Japanese immigrants in California appeared on the front page of the Osaka Mainichi. Over the next few days, front-page headlines announced further abuses against immigrants: ‘Japanese defend against rowdies,’ ‘Charges of tar and feathering,’ and ‘Mutilated body of Japanese is found at bridge’ among many others. Without grounds, newspapers attributed the suicides of Japanese immigrants to the exclusion law and their murders to racial hatred alone.69 The new media focus on racism began in early June when Kiyoshi (Karl) Kawakami, a well-known writer and unofficial publicist for the Japanese Foreign Ministry, contributed a two-part article to the Osaka Mainichi entitled ‘America backslides toward medieval clannishness.’ Prior to the passage of the law, Kawakami was known for his advocacy of assimilationism, but his shift toward criticism reflected the private feelings of many Ministry officials who could not publicly voice their anger. The article implied that the Ku Klux Klan was responsible for the passage of the exclusion law and that the pervasiveness of the Klan in the US demonstrated rampant racism.70 Following Kawakami’s article, headlines in Osaka and Tokyo repeatedly invoked the Klan and its evils. In the final weeks of June, articles claimed to describe secret Klan rituals and recruitment efforts.71 On 26 June, the Tokyo nichinichi featured a questionable photograph that purported to capture American naval officers in their Klan costumes.72 The photo showed four men in white tunics emblazoned with a shield marked with a single, large ‘K.’ The hoods did not have the characteristic peak associated with the Klan. Furthermore, rather than simple holes for eyes and mouth, the faces had noses drawn in and the appearance of slight smiles, making the figures strangely reminiscent of prehistoric haniwa statuettes. The press was clearly willing to manufacture stories or photographs that fed anti-American hysteria in order to sell more papers. 68 See the catalogue of racist and discriminatory incidents reported by immigrants in Ito, Issei. OM, 23 June 1924. 70 OM, 1 June 1924. For more on Kawakami’s role as a Japanese publicist, see Ichioka, 190–191. 71 See Osaka Asahi, 22 June 1924 in Shimbun shūsei Taishō hennen shi (hereafter THS); TNN, 25 June 1924 in THS. 72 TNN, 26 June 1924 in THS. 69 164 Nancy Stalker In reaction to the increased coverage of anti-Japanese incidents in America, Tokutomi Kenjirō, a Christian novelist and brother of influential publisher Tokutomi Sohō, radically proposed recalling all immigrants to Japan. Kenjirō suggested dispatching ‘all Japan’s available warships and merchant vessels . . . (to) bring every one of the 100,000 odd Japanese immigrants back home.’73 A positive response to his proposal, printed in the Osaka Mainichi noted that the farming skills of returnees, including raising oranges, lemons and chickens, would enable Japan to reduce reliance on food imports. Bringing back the laborers would also provide retaliation, dealing ‘a blow to our agitating friends in California’ who would lose a cheap and productive source of labor.74 Tokutomi’s new stance was a complete about-face from an earlier position strongly advocating that Japanese immigrants aim to assimilate and settle in America ‘for life’ instead of returning home after accumulating some savings.75 Like Uchimura, he was an individual who originally held the US in great esteem and worked towards emulating western norms. The exclusion law and its fallout had turned both bitterly against their former idol. Rabindranath Tagore and the Quickening of Popular Pan-Asianism Coincident with the outburst of anti-American feeling, renowned Indian poetphilosopher Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941) arrived in Japan. During his visit in the agitated atmosphere of June 1924 Tagore delivered public speeches that praised eastern spiritual transcendence over western aggression and materialism. This message provided a timely salve for the wounded pride of the Japanese and the press enthusiastically followed Tagore’s movements in detail. Daily reports and excerpts of his lectures were often front-page news. The July 1924 issue of the popular journal Kaizō featured Tagore’s poetry and reproduced one of his speeches, in which he credits Japanese art historian Okakura Tenshin (1862–1913) with first teaching him that ‘there was such a thing as an Asiatic mind.’76 Tagore, one of modern India’s most influential and popular figures, gained international renown in 1913 as the first Asian to win the Nobel Prize for literature. Although he is often viewed as an apostle of universal brotherhood and world peace, he reified conceptions of a divided East and West and was highly critical of western materialism, which he believed hindered the development of the moral and spiritual aspects of man’s ‘higher nature.’77 It was not Tagore’s first trip to Japan. In 1916, fulfilling a promise to his friend Okakura, he visited Japan en-route to a coast-to-coast lecture tour in the US. Upon his arrival in Kobe, he was warmly received by a wide variety of individuals and groups, from official Welcoming Committees to local Indian merchants and Buddhist priests. The initial enthusiasm, however, quickly cooled as his ideas became more apparent. At a Tokyo Imperial University lecture entitled ‘The Message of India to Japan,’ Tagore brooded that the political, mechanical and commercial nature of European modern industrial civilization threatened to betray the Japanese soul and to devour Asia’s 73 OM, 21 June 1924. OM, 28 June 1924. 75 Ibid. 76 ‘Toshi to Denen’, Kaizō, July 1924, 96. For details of Okakura’s activities in India, see Hay, Asian Ideas of East and West, 35–44. 77 Tagore, Nationalism, 141–143. Tagore’s anti-western stance seems somewhat at odds with his background, from a Calcutta family who amassed their initial fortune as revenue collectors for the East India Company. See Hay, 14–35. 74 Response to the 1924 US Immigration Exclusion Law 165 fundamentally spiritual civilization.78 In later speeches during the trip, he condemned nationalism and denounced Japan’s imitation of western imperialist tactics in Asia. He noted that the West had felt no respect towards Japan until her victories in the Sinoand Russo-Japanese wars, that is, until ‘she proved that the bloodhounds of Satan are not only bred in the kennels of Europe but can also be domesticated in Japan and fed on man’s miseries.’79 He warned that ‘nations who sedulously cultivate moral blindness as the cult of patriotism will end their existence in a sudden and violent death.’80 It should come as no surprise that the media, intellectuals and officials, proud of Japan’s rapid modernization, did not welcome such sentiments. Tagore was quickly isolated and branded the ‘representative of a ruined country,’ ‘an inhabitant of a pale, decaying land, where all things droop to ruin.’81 The average educated person likely held India in contempt, as a mere colony under the control of Japan’s ally, Great Britain. As Tagore criticized Japan’s modern trajectory, he lost the luster of his international fame and gained the taint of his defeated nation. The poet was angered, saddened and humiliated by his ostracism. In his work Nationalism, published the following year, he blamed the pervasive power of the Japanese state in molding popular sentiment against him, lamenting ‘the voluntary submission of the whole people’ to their government, which ‘manufactures their feelings’ and stifles their spirituality.82 He concluded that the Japanese people tolerated this ‘mental slavery’ because of their ‘nervous desire to turn themselves into a machine of power, called the Nation, and emulate other machines in their collective worldliness.’83 The bitter taste left by his initial visit did not prevent the poet from returning to Japan in June 1924 as part of a worldwide speaking tour designed to raise funds for the Visva-Bharati University, which he established in 1921.84 He had maintained deep friendships with individual Japanese and had never abandoned the idea, impressed in his mind by Okakura, that the ‘spirit of Asia was One.’ Tagore had written positively of Japan in his 1922 essay ‘East and West,’ praising Japan’s ‘ideal of perfection and human self-revelation in art, in ceremonial, in religious faith, and in customs expressing the poetry of social relationship.’85 He could not have chosen a more opportune moment to generate support for his call for ‘Asian Unity.’ His worldwide fame had continued to soar since his last disappointing visit. For the Japanese, growing western adulation of Tagore heightened his value as a sharp critic of the West. On 1 June, the very day the suicide of the ‘unknown patriot’ was first publicized, the poet’s message seemed particularly relevant and the media praised his critique of the US and call for Asian unity. Under the headline ‘For simple love of people, Tagore is in Japan again,’ Tagore is quoted as follows: ‘The Japanese are an exceedingly courteous people and possess the admirable Yamato spirit. Against the racial questions challenged by the US, the time has come for all peoples of Asia to unite.’86 In a separate article on the same day Tagore stressed that the ‘need for spiritual 78 Hay, 60, 64. Ibid., 70 80 Ibid. 81 Ibid., 78. See Hay, Ch. 3, for a thorough analysis of the response by Japanese literary and religious leaders in 1916. Hay does not report on the 1924 trip. 82 Tagore, Nationalism, 38–39. 83 Ibid. 84 Dutta and Robinson, Rabindranath Tagore, 220– 221. 85 Ibid., 205. 86 OM, 1 June 1924. 79 166 Nancy Stalker unification of Asiatic peoples has never been more acute than at this time of racial persecution at the hands of American lawmakers.’87 Over the ensuing weeks, Tagore’s addresses were advertised in large newspaper announcements and drew crowds of thousands. He seized the opportunity to exploit Japan’s current popular rage against the US to generate enthusiasm for his Pan-Asian ideals.88 On 10 June, at Tokyo Imperial University he declared ‘The insult to Japan by a certain power is undoubtedly an insult to all peoples of Asia . . . The Occidental Powers with their materialistic civilization and strong nationalism . . . are destined to stagnation before long and will come to kneel before the peaceful Oriental civilization of Nature.’89 At a public address in front of 3,000 in Osaka, he flattered Japanese egos, pleading ‘Let me earnestly hope that your beautiful island be not spoiled by the surging wages of western utilitarian vulgarity, that you keep aloof from all the defamatory influence of Mammonism! Let me hope that like your sublime Fuji Yama, your national spirit be kept free from that of empire builders and money-mongers of the present age.’90 Such pandering, a complete reversal of his 1916 views, undoubtedly made for better fundraising. The media and general public lapped up Tagore’s anti-western rhetoric. Most Japanese were loath to acknowledge that any Asian unity at that moment stemmed as much from victimization and oppression at the hands of the West as from any aspects of shared culture and religiosity in the East. In contrast with coverage of Tagore’s visit eight years earlier, there was little reminder that the great poet represented the view of ‘a defeated nation.’ Rallies, meetings and new organizations in support of anti-American, Pan-Asian unity sprung up during the course of Tagore’s visit. On 15 June, a rally of 2,000 in Kobe featured 10 Chinese, Japanese and Indian speakers who called for Pan-Asian cooperation. The most stirring speech of the evening was delivered by a Mr A.S. Bamral, an Indian resident of Kobe: Gentlemen of Asia, awake, arise, agitate, agitate and agitate against this monstrous and inhuman insult which America has heaped upon us . . . Let the spiritual powers hidden in the Great Fujiyama . . . raise and enlighten us. Let all the spiritual power lying latent in the Sacred Himalayas . . . awaken and inspire us . . . May the numberless gods of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Shintoism annihilate and destroy the Pride of Arrogant America . . . Calling Tagore the ‘Pride of the Orient,’ he went on to describe how the poet had refused to visit the Great Wall of China, a ‘symbol of isolation’ that denied the possibility of universal brotherhood. Bamral likened the US immigration law to a ‘new Great Wall’ that would bring ‘the enmity not of Japan alone of the whole of Asia’. He claimed the law would: unite the Asiatic races who will awake from their long sleep and stand erect and march forward . . . Japan will become the standard bearer of the Coloured people . . . May the frontiers of the Asiatic countries . . . prove to be invulnerable against the attacks of the White Races. May Asia surpass England, Europe and 87 Ibid. Pan-Asianism was not a homogeneous phenomenon. There were many diverse movements in Japan with different motivations and philosophical foundations. See Koschmann, ‘Asianism’s ambivalent legacy’, 81–110. 89 OM, 12 June 1924. 90 OM, 5 June 1924. 88 Response to the 1924 US Immigration Exclusion Law 167 America. May the Asiatic banner flutter over the whole world . . . May the Empire of Asia, like a sleeping tiger suddenly awakened, spring roaring into the arena of the world’s politics.91 The western media, also attentive to Tagore’s movements, bristled under such threatening rhetoric. In an editorial sarcastically entitled ‘Asiatic unity’ the New York Times criticized ‘the distinguished Bengal poet’ who ‘extended the sympathy of the people of India to the people of Japan now chafing under the “indignity” of our own exclusion bill.’ He questioned the assertion of a common cultural heritage between Japan and India, charging that Japan’s modern civilization was based not on Oriental civilization but on the ‘Occidental virtues’ of ‘military strength, aggressiveness, materialism, organization, “hustle.”’92 New Pan-Asian activists took no heed and continued to organize activities to raise public consciousness of Asian unity. In mid-June, the Women’s International Association formed a new group known as the Federation of Far Eastern Races. They planned to dispatch members to China, India and Persia in order to ‘propagandize’ Asian unity. The women elected the esteemed colonial administrator Gotō Shimpei in-absentia as president for the Japanese arm of the organization and resolved to ask Tagore and Sun Yat Sen to serve as presidents for India and China.93 Later in the month, a group of Tokyo university students formed the Students’ Great Asiatic Peace Union.94 Overseas, Japanese residents in Shanghai formed an Asia Society with support from Chinese, Filipinos and Indians.95 One large new group in Osaka, the League of Far Eastern Peoples, planned a 10,000-person parade to mark what became known as ‘National Humiliation Day’ (Kokujokubi) on 1 July, the first day the new legislation would take effect.96 National Humiliation Day and the Turning of the Tide On 1 July, numerous groups across the country planned solemn events to mark National Humiliation Day. For the first time in 50 years, all flags in Kyoto flew at half-mast. University students across the country declared a day of abstention from alcohol and ‘Dry Day parades’ were held in Tokyo, Osaka and other major cities.97 A mood of decorum and national dignity reigned over these events. Whether the general public was exhausted or had merely grown bored by protest, an editorial remarked how the people had ‘passed the stage of making noise . . . They simply remember, remember, remember how they have been insulted by Americans.’98 A minor incident on this day of mourning, however, the stealing of the US Embassy flag, acted as a final solvent of the overtly anti-American mood, providing a means for reconciliation with America. The thief, 22-year-old Okada Rihei, had entered the embassy compound, lowered the flag and run away. The hapless culprit was apprehended the next day in Osaka.99 This simple act resulted in an establishment response entirely out of proportion with the nature of the offense committed. Diet members immediately 91 OM, 17 June 1924. NYT, 12 June 1924. 93 OM, 12 June 1924. 94 JA, 26 June 1924, in Markela, ‘Japanese attitudes’, 182. 95 JA, 1 August 1924, in Markela, ‘Japanese attitudes’, 182. 96 OM, 24 June 1924. 97 OM, 1 July 1924. 98 Ibid. 99 OM, 2 July 1924. 92 168 Nancy Stalker bewailed this ‘affair of a serious nature.’ Home Minister Wakatsuki Reijirō vowed immediate investigation and retribution. An ‘urgent cabinet meeting’ was called to discuss how to deal with the emergency. Despite the US State Department’s insistence that the flag incident was no more serious than other anti-American demonstrations taking place in Japan, the media also dramatically overreacted, expressing ‘unspeakable sorrow’ for this work by a ‘crank,’ a ‘lunatic,’ a ‘stain that spoils the whole cloth.’100 In short, the thief had ruined the party; the refined and dignified comportment planned to mark the day of national dishonor. After a final article on a protest rally held on 4 July in Osaka, in which the once-again orderly crowd ‘deprecated rash actions of retaliation, such as the insult to the American flag,’ the entire set of anti-American issues—Japanese racism in America, the boycotts, the secession of Christian churches—disappeared from the newspapers overnight for unknown reasons, but likely due to pressure by the Home Ministry.101 Headlines were occupied instead by the Osaka street car strike and Japan’s chances in the upcoming Olympics. Conclusion In June 1924, waves of anti-American activity washed over Japan. Direct participation in protest movements came from many quarters of society, not only patriotic societies and young men’s reservist associations, but students, merchants, housewives, Christians, geisha, doctors, theater-owners and others rose against the humiliating injustice of American white supremacy. The protests touched hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of lives. The actions they undertook were privately sponsored and popularly supported. The state did not condone overt anti-Americanism. Indeed, the tentacles of the bureaucracy stifled popular protest at many turns—prohibiting public dancing, quashing the movie boycott and denouncing the consumer goods boycott. Izumi Hirobe argues that the exclusion law played a prominent role in the deterioration of US –Japan relations between the 1920s and 1940s and served as a ‘principal cause’ in the outbreak of hostilities in 1941.102 He describes Japanese officialdom’s ‘split attitude’—personally indignant and even advocating war with the US while outwardly calm and advocating good relations. Yet it is impossible to truly measure the extent to which resentment towards America remained a part of popular or official consciousness or to draw cause-and-effect conclusions about the outbreak of war. For some Japanese, the memory of the racial insult no doubt helped generate support for the war and for ideological constructs like the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Privately held feelings do not, however, generally account for war. Perhaps a better route for historicizing the response to exclusion is within the context of imperial democracy and Japanese popular protest in the early twentieth century. Protest had similarly erupted in a sustained and sometimes violent manner on numerous occasions, including the 1905 Hibiya Riots and the 1918 Rice Riots. In each the public protested the actions or inactions of the state bureaucracy. Organized protest was a primary forum for democratic participation in imperial Japan, providing catharsis 100 OM, 3 July 1924. Although the Home Ministry had the authority to prohibit sales of newspapers beginning in 1909, they did not readily exercise this right. Keen competition between dailies meant ignoring many bureaucratic warnings. Yet under direct pressure, most dailies would capitulate to government wishes rather than risk losing sales. See Kasza, The State and Mass Media in Japan, 1988. 102 Hirobe, Japanese Pride, 1. 101 Response to the 1924 US Immigration Exclusion Law 169 for crowds unable to express political opinions through voting, as universal manhood suffrage would not be enacted until 1925. The ‘dispute culture’ engendered by labor movements, beginning in the 1890s but intensifying around 1917, spilled into other aspects of social life.103 The Rice Riots during the summer of 1918 were the largest popular demonstrations in modern Japanese history, with over a million people protesting the high price of rice and other domestic policies. In contrast, both the 1905 and 1924 movements were about the international arena and the betrayal of popular expectations therein. The Hibiya riots occurred in response to a lenient treaty following the Russo-Japanese War, disappointing the popular hope for more territory or war booty. The 1924 protests, however, were not focused on material gain in the popular mind, but rather on the issue of international stature and respect. While most individual protestors did not focus on material gains, many of the groups and individuals who organized or supported various forms of protest stood to benefit from anti-American activity, directly or indirectly. The role of newspapers was crucial to publicizing the boycotts and sub-movements that emerged on a daily basis in June 1924. The newspapers also stood to gain from publishing the most sensationalistic stories possible, as the industry had become highly competitive. It was through newspaper reportage that the suicide of the ‘unknown patriot’ was transformed into a mnemonic site symbolizing national strength of character in the face of international humiliation. 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