COMMENTARY Demystifying Caste in Bengal Sandip Mondal Although caste is a crucial reality in West Bengal, a declining Dalit movement post partition, the neglect of caste questions by the Left Front, and the failure of forging a broader Dalit solidarity due to fragmented Dalit constituencies have led to the invisibility of caste in the politics of the state. B “ engalis have no understanding of caste,” Kancha Ilaiah Shepherd once said in an interview in Kolkata (Bhattacharya 2018). Although caste has an important role in the social and political domain of West Bengal, the Bengali bhadralok does not seem to have any understanding of the role of caste. Apart from Shepherd, several other scholars have also doubted the dominant narrative of the absence of caste in West Bengal’s politics. Ashok Mitra wrote, “there must be something odd about a state which, professedly so secular and anti-sectarian, has yet not produced a single Jagjivan Ram, Kamraj, Buta Singh or Rafi Ahmed Kidwai to hold major portfolio” (Sen 2018b). Analysing the 2009 general elections, Ashis Nandy wrote that despite a communist state government for three decades, “West Bengal is one state in India, for instance, where you cannot even dream of having a Dalit chief minister” (Sen 2018a). One of the popular discourses among the elite Bengali bhadralok is that West Bengal is “casteless” and “exceptional” compared to other states. This sense of uniqueness and departure from the rest of India forms one of the features of the Bengali identity. It is not considered civil to bring up issues related to caste in polite urban conversation as these discussions seem provocative and rude for the gentle casteless society (Chatterjee 2015). In West Bengal, Dalits comprise 23.51% of the total population, the third highest Dalit population among Indian states (Table 1). As much as 10.66% of the entire Dalit population of India lives in West Bengal, the second highest on a pan-India level (Table 1). Despite one of the largest Dalit populations in India and a significant experience of Dalit mobilisation in the late colonial period (Sen 2018b: 22), caste was never a determinant political category in the electoral realm. None of the major political parties championed the cause of any caste groups (Chandra et al 2015), and caste was never an electoral issue for the two dominant political parties, the Congress and the Left Front (Chatterjee 2012). In this context, the question arises: Does caste not matter in the current socio-economic and political landscape of West Bengal? Caste, Education and Employment A glimpse of caste-based social disparity in the socio-economic and political sphere of West Bengal can be deciphered from the India Human Development Survey. On the one hand, the Bengali gentry claim their disdain for the regressive structure of the caste system. On the other, most marriage arrangements take place on the lines of intra-caste marriages. The magnitude of intra-caste marriage is 90.6%, marginally more than the national average (Table 1). Social disparity—“the inability of an individual to participate in the basic political, economic, and social functioning of the society” (as cited in Thorat 2017)— is quite vivid in the levels of educational attainment across caste groups. A gap of 10.95% can be observed in educational attainment between upper castes and Scheduled Castes (SCs), where 78.74% of upper castes attended school compared to 67.79% of Dalits (Table 2, p 22). Among those who have attended school, 26.95% and 30.61% of SCs are educated up to the primary and secondary school, respectively (Table 2). Thereafter, a sudden drop indicates the termination of education after school education. An observable difference between SCs and upper castes exists in higher education where 10.37% population from the upper castes reached Table 1: Caste Characteristics in West Bengal Parameter Sandip Mondal (sandipmondal123456@gmail. com) is a doctoral student at the Centre for the Study of Regional Development, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Economic & Political Weekly EPW JANUARY 16, 2021 Percentage of SC population out of total population State’s SC population contributing to total SC population of India Rural SC out of total SC Women marrying men of same caste West Bengal (Percentage) 23.51 10.66 79.65 90.6 India Rank of West Bengal (Percentage) among States 16.63 76.40 90.2 3 2 7 9 Source: Census 2011 and IHDS 2012. vol lVI no 3 21 COMMENTARY graduate-level education and above, compared to 2.97% of SCs. Similarly, the distribution of government employees across social groups reflects that a sizeable proportion of government jobs is occupied by upper castes, who constitute 72.9% of the total government employees (Table 3). SCs are negligibly represented (13%) in group A government jobs, which have more emoluments and require higher education, compared to 81.39% employees from upper castes. The distribution is skewed in favour of upper castes in group D and group C jobs as well. Overall, this suggests that reservation policies were never implemented in letter and spirit. Upper castes are also the most privileged in the political terrain of West Bengal. As there is no reservation for the positions of lekhpal, gram sevak and panchayat secretary, upper castes dominate these local-level political positions (Table 4). SCs, Scheduled Tribes (STs) and Other Backward Classes (OBCs) only occupy political posts that are reserved for them, barring which they are practically absent from political constituencies. Thus, caste acts as a potent factor in determining marriage practices, public sector employment, social network formation and the political encashment of caste capital. If caste does act as the basis of social, economic and political functioning of the state, why is caste invisible in the state’s politics? Fragmentation and Party Society Caste-based political mobilisation is an important element of politics in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Maharashtra. But in West Bengal, only the Namasudra and Rajbanshi communities—not necessarily representative of the collective voice of Dalits in West Bengal—played an important role in organised politics. However, even they have limited capacity to challenge the mainstream politics of West Bengal hegemonised by the upper castes. This near invisibility of the politicisation of caste is due to a combination of factors—namely the discontinuity of the Dalit movement in post-independence West Bengal due to partition, the class politics espoused by the left movement and the inadequate address of caste issue by the long-term left regime, dismantling of other social institutions by the penetration of “party society” at the grassroots level, and the failure of forging a broader Dalit solidarity due to fragmented Dalit constituencies. Dalit assertion against caste discrimination started from the 1870s and was spearheaded by two distinct caste groups, Table 2: Level of Education across Social Groups in West Bengal Caste Groups Upper caste OBC SC ST None Attended School Primary Secondary 24.32 29.81 35.44 43.75 78.74 72.33 67.79 62.22 23.06 23.62 26.95 26.14 35.87 35.77 30.61 25.85 Higher Secondary Graduate Education Completed— Graduation and Above 6.39 5.29 4.03 2.84 7.99 4.5 2.4 1.14 10.37 5.51 2.97 1.42 Source: Calculated from IHDS-II, 2012. Table 3: Government Employees of West Bengal across Caste Groups Category Total employee Group A Group B Group C Group D Average Emolument Non-madhyamik Education SC ST OBC General 0.65 11.43 40.94 58.76 17.66 13.00 15.30 20.92 22.15 5.07 3.00 4.21 6.29 7.18 4.37 2.61 3.31 5.91 5.36 72.90 81.39 77.19 66.88 65.31 53,221 30,446 20,754 14,909 Source: Report of the staff census, Government of West Bengal, 2015. Table 4: Caste-based Representation in Political Institutions Institution Lekhpal Gram sevak Panchayat secretary Pradhan Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) Member of Parliament (MP) Source: Calculated from IHDS-II, 2012. 22 Upper Castes 51.79 45.16 73.85 35.38 50.77 69.23 Caste Group OBC SC 7.14 12.9 4.62 10.77 3.08 18.46 ST 21.43 8.93 35.48 6.45 16.92 3.08 32.31 15.38 30.77 12.31 7.69 4.62 From Reserved Seat SC/ST Women No Reservation 22.58 37.1 44.07 5.08 26.23 3.28 40.32 50.85 70.49 the Rajbanshis of North Bengal and Namasudra of erstwhile East Bengal (Bandyopadhyay 2009). But this organised Dalit movement was ruptured by the physical dispersal and displacement of a large section of SCs due to the traumatic event of the partition (Bandyopadhyay and Ray Chaudhury 2014; Chatterjee 2015). After partition, it was difficult to organise them as their estrangement from their familiar physical space led to the gradual decline of their consolidated mass base. The removal of principal political challenges through partition was a remarkable accomplishment of the upper castes, which helped them consolidate their hegemony (Chatterjee 2012). As the struggle for resettlement and rehabilitation after partition were also mobilised by the urban upper-caste leaders of the communist parties, they channelised Dalit grievances into class inequalities (Chatterjee 2012). Even the vocabulary of caste was deliberately purged from the discourse of movements for the greater interest of united struggle (Bandyopadhyay and Chaudhury 2017). After partition, the question of caste was subsumed under “partition victim” or “refugees,” which were more easily absorbed into the left-liberal ideologies under the dominant discourse of class. Class was a more relevant and legitimate category in the ideological apparatus of the left, while caste remains as part of the superstructure (Bandyopadhyay 2012). As a result of this ideological compulsion, the left never overtly supported the relevance of caste in the struggle for the downtrodden and did not consider caste as a political category in their organised electoral mobilisation (Guha 2016). As a consequence of this ideological difference, the leadership of the left parties exclusively came from the Brahmin, Kayastha and Baidya castes (Guha 2016). Another fundamental change in the politics of West Bengal with the coming of the left government was the overwhelming penetration of the party in every aspect of community life (Guha 2017), what Chatterjee (2012) calls the “party society.” As a consequence, the party acted as the fundamental institution, monopolising the autonomous functioning of every social body and community (Guha 2016). JANUARY 16, 2021 vol lVI no 3 EPW Economic & Political Weekly COMMENTARY Moreover, the dispersed and fragmented nature of Dalit constituencies were unable to challenge the hegemony of the upper-caste bhadralok (Rana 2013). The Namasudras, Rajbanshis, Bagdis, Bauris, and Pods are dispersed in terms of their spatial location, and their developmental levels are markedly different (Guha 2017). Even the Namasudras and Rajbanshis are alienated in terms of their demands—one is focused on reclaiming territorial autonomy and the other is fighting for citizenship rights, reservation and education (Rana 2013). On the other hand, the Bagdis, Bauris and Chamars follow mainstream state politics as they lack distinctive caste-based political demands and mobilisation. This fragmentation disincentivises the formation of a common front along caste lines on the basis of collective agenda. Conclusions Caste matters in the socio-economic and political landscape of West Bengal but it rarely acts as the basis for political mobilisation. As a result, upper-caste hegemony has become so strong that Dalits cannot even imagine their autonomous political existence. But that does not mean that the caste question is in decline in West Bengal. In fact, with the decline of the Left Front government and the inauguration of the Trinamool Congress-led state government in 2011, many people hoped that identity politics would emerge as the marker of local social institutions, away from the regressive “party society” of the left regime (Guha 2019). It was expected that Mamata Banerjee’s overt patronisation of caste and communal sentiment and her “post Bhadralok” style of politics would open up a new space for identity politics. But, there was no fundamental change in the political configuration of post-left West Bengal as it adopted the Left Front model of politics where party machinery dominates the functioning of social institutions. Once again, castebased identity politics, while resurgent, lost its hope for an autonomous existence in the political terrain of West Bengal. References Bandyopadhyay, Sarbani (2012): “Caste and Politics in Bengal,” Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 47, No 50, pp 71–73. Bandyopadhyay, Sekhar (2009): “Partition and the Ruptures in Dalit Identity Politics in Bengal,” Asian Studies Review, Vol 33, No 4, pp 455–67. Bandyopadhyay, S and A B Roy Chaudhury (2014): “In Search of Space: The Scheduled Caste Movement in West Bengal after Partition,” Policies and Practices, Kolkata: Mahanirban Calcutta Research Group, Vol 59, pp 1–27. — (2017): “Partition in Bengal: Re-visiting the Caste Question, 1946–47,” Studies in History, Vol 33, No 2, pp 234–61. Bhattacharya, C S (2018): “Bengalis Have No Understanding of Caste,” Telegraph, 22 September, viewed on 11 January 2021, https://www. telegraphindia.com/india/bengalis-have-nounderstanding-of-caste/cid/1669849. Chandra, U, K B Nielsen and G Heierstad (2015): “Introduction to the Politics of Caste in West Bengal,” Politics of Caste in West Bengal, London: Routledge, pp 1–22. Chatterjee, P (2012): “Historicising Caste in Bengal Politics,” Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 47, No 50, pp 69–70. — (2015): “Partition and the Mysterious Disappearance of Caste in Bengal,” Politics of Caste in West Bengal, K B Nielsen, G Heierstad and U Chandra (eds), London: Routledge, pp 83–102. Guha, A (2016): “Why Caste Politics Failed in Bengal,” Frontier, Vol 49, No 2, viewed on 11 January 2021, https://www.frontierweekly.com/ articles/vol-49/49-2/49-2-Why%20Caste%20 Politics%20Failed%20in%20Bengal.html. — (2017): “Caste and Politics in West Bengal: Traditional Limitations and Contemporary Developments,” Contemporary Voice of Dalit, Vol 9, No 1, pp 27–36. — (2019): “Is There a Second Wave of Dalit Upsurge in West Bengal?” Economic & Political Weekly [Engage], Vol 54, No 2, viewed on 11 January 2021, https://www.epw.in/engage/ article/is-there-a-second-wave-of-dalit-upsurge-in-west-bengal. Rana, K (2013): “Problems and Prospects of Dalit Emancipation in West Bengal,” Contemporary Voice of Dalit, Vol 7, No 2, pp 22–30. Sen, D (2018a): “Conclusion: ‘The Most Casteist Society in India’,” The Decline of the Caste Question: Jogendranath Mandal and the Defeat of Dalit Politics in Bengal, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp 265–78. — (2018b): “Introduction: Rethinking Castelessness in Mid-twentieth-century Bengal,” Decline of the Caste Question: Jogendranath Mandal and the Defeat of Dalit Politics in Bengal, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp 1–22. Thorat, S (2017): “Social Exclusion in the Indian Context: Theoretical Basis of Inclusive Policies,” Indian Journal of Human Development, Vol 2, No 1, pp 165–81. National Family Health Survey-4 February 8, 2020 Twenty-five Years of the NFHS: Lessons for the Future Quality of Data in NFHS-4 Compared to Earlier Rounds: An Assessment Demographic and Health Diversity in the Era of SDGs —S Irudaya Rajan —K Srinivasan, Rakesh Mishra —K S James, S Irudaya Rajan, Srinivas Goli Trends, Differentials and Determinants of Child Marriage in India: Evidences from Large-scale Surveys Frequently Asked Questions on Child Anthropometric Failures in India —Sanjay Kumar —Sunil Rajpal, Rockli Kim, Rajan Sankar, Alok Kumar, William Joe, S V Subramanian Stagnancy in the Unmet Need for Family Planning in India Intimate Partner Violence: Effects on Maternity Care and Pregnancy Outcomes in India Household Assets and Wealth Quintiles, India 2006–16: Insights on Economic Inequalities —Purushottam M Kulkarni —Srinivas Goli, Md Juel Rana, Jitendra Gouda —Udaya Shankar Mishra, William Joe For copies write to: Circulation Manager, Economic & Political Weekly, 320–322, A to Z Industrial Estate, Ganpatrao Kadam Marg, Lower Parel, Mumbai 400 013. email: circulation@epw.in Economic & Political Weekly EPW JANUARY 16, 2021 vol lVI no 3 23