Article
_
US Strategic Propensity
towards India: Nuclear
Bonding and Security
Apprehensions for Regional
Stability and Pakistan
59
NUST Journal of International
Peace & Stability
2020, Vol. III (1) Pages 59-78
njips.nust.edu.pk
Asifa Jahangir 1
Furqan Khan 2
Abstract
The Indo-US strategic bonding is shifting the security dynamics of the South Asian
balance-of-power in Indian favour. From the signing of 123 US-India Nuclear Deal to
the facilitation in becoming a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR), the US has clearly designated India as an instrumental element in the
American grand strategy of devising a ‘new world order’. As a result, India has grabbed
the opportunity of alleviating its status as a credible regional and global power. In this
regard, the US tilt towards India is significantly paving grounds for a strategic
imbalance in the South Asian region, thus creating challenges for Pakistan. Therefore,
this paper argues that the growing bonhomie between the US and India is a destabilizing
factor in the region which reinforces Pakistan’s fast falling into the Chinese orbit;
thereby cementing the old friendship into a new strategic partnership. This dynamic
certainly gives China and Pakistan an incentive to work together so as to keep the value
of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence alive. In an effort to expand the horizon on the subject,
the paper is dedicated to critically examine the existing cooperation between India and
the US while equally foreseeing the possible implications for the region in the face of
such destabilizing cooperation. More importantly, based on qualitative data, this paper
explores how Indo-US strategic partnership is directly impacting Pakistan and its
strategic partnership with China; thereby explaining how the growing relationship
between the US and India has undermined the traditional balance-of-power in the South
Asian region?
Keywords
Indo-US strategic relationship, Pak-China, South Asia, balance-of-power, Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
Asifa Jahangir holds a doctorate degree in South Asian Studies with expertise of International
Relations from the Centre for South Asian Studies, University of the Punjab, Lahore. She is the Managing
Editor to Journal of South Asian Studies published by ESci Journals Publishing.
E-mail: ajcsas2327@gmail.com
2 Furqan Khan is currently a bachelor’s student at the Department of International Relations, National
Defence University, Islamabad
1 Dr
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Introduction
The visit of the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Defence Secretary James
Mattis to New Delhi (in September 2018) achieved yet another milestone in the decade
long strategic partnership between India and the US. The signing of the long-awaited
agreement on the Communication Compatibility and Security Agreement
(COMCASA) enables India to acquire the encrypted security equipment of the US. The
agreement was a precondition for acquiring such sensitive equipment and ‘securityfocused’ communication interoperability between the US and the Indian armed forces
the agreements on sensitive military technologies and communications, understandably
underpins the deep strategic ties between India and the US (Smith, 2008). The recent
cooperation towards the Next Step for Strategic Partnership (NSSP) between the US
and India was signed in 2004. The NSSP offers a general framework of cooperation in
areas including civil nuclear and space activities and high-end trade with particular
emphasis on missile defence which will increase commerce bonding and alleviate
friendship to the next level of a strategic partnership between the two countries. More
importantly, the NSSP has been linked with the stability in Asia (Statement on the Next
Step, 2004, pp. 61-62). The close cooperation, however, has multi-faceted
consequences for the regional security architecture or what Barry Buzan has termed as
the ‘Asian Super Complex’ (see e.g., Buzan &Waever, 2003, p. 109).
The Indo-US strategic partnership is a game of balance-of-power being played
in the South Asian region. The US, being concerned with the growing influence of
China, has demanded India to engage China in the Asiatic sphere to truncate it from
challenging the hegemonic standing of the US. India on its part is trying to put up with
the US; benefiting from the acquisition of advanced military hardware as well as
perpetuating its dominance in the Indo-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Having
said that, India also tries to maintain its ‘strategic autonomy’ which is largely
undermined in Washington and hence can disappoint her in using India as part of its
Grand Strategy, that is to say, containing emerging China. Professor Ming Xia is
optimistic about the US design and response to the concerns related to the emerging
relationship between India and the US. According to him, the developments will
certainly upset China and Pakistan, however with any potential confrontations.
Furthermore, the two sides would be very careful not to create hostility, but to play the
game of balance-of-power and realignment (personal communication, July 3, 2018).
Similarly, India perceives China as an immediate threat not only because of its
disputatious history but because of the latter’s continuous assistance in building the
conventional and nuclear capabilities of Pakistan.
Apart from the Sino-US controlled diplomatic confrontation, India views
China as a key problem for its regional ascendancy. One of the opinions is that India is
working to develop its military capabilities so as to bridle the ambitious Chinese
aspirations in South Asia and the Indian Ocean. This is also because India believes in
employing Indian exceptionalism, which is no less than inspiration from the American
Exceptionalism; setting in motion the Indo-US strategic orientation in Indo-Pacific and
Indian Ocean Region (IOR). This, in large, also shows Indian reflection of Monroe
Doctrine in South Asia; claiming South Asia as an exclusive sphere of influence. All
this suggests India as a contender in the Asian ‘superstructure’ along with China
pushing for attaining the global power status which can be described as a perfect
archetypal of realpolitik in contemporary world politics. It is a matter of fact that SinoIndian competing aspirations are exploding to the global level, where the role of the US
and its relationship with India are containing China.
The US’ South Asian foreign policy, particularly for India and Pakistan, has
always been oscillating right from the time of independence. Taking sides between the
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two does not necessarily suit the US in the long-run, though Washington often exploits
the divide between New Delhi and Islamabad for her short-term benefit (Kux, 2001,
pp. 34-36). Indian policymakers are aware of India as an inevitable instrument and
potential power for the American Grand Strategy in Asia-Pacific. India also considers
her ever-increasing military power inevitable for the Americans to trust them for being
a potential partner in controlling the South and East Asian politics, including China.
However, the US chose a divided approach in maintaining relationships with Pakistan
and India in view of the broad strategic interest in the region. Jahangir quotes a
Pakistani professor, Syed Riffat Hussain while expressing his views about Chinese
response to the growing Indo-US cooperation that ‘the Chinese are very apprehensive
that India would be a future rising military power. Therefore, China would like to keep
Pakistan as a counterweight on its side to balance Indian power (2005, p. 116-117). The
US, however, remained steady in riding both horses at the same time, i.e., its policy
kept on oscillating between Pakistan and India where favouritism will scuttle the ship
of the US aspirations in the region.
The Indo-US Strategic Partnership and Civil Nuclear Deal
Background of the US Realignment with Rising India
As part of the US strategic understanding of the emerging trends in the 21st century,
the recent wave of tariff barriers on Billions US dollars’ worth Chinese products and
its hard-pressing actions in the South China Sea counts for the tactical manoeuvring of
US policy of containing China. This settles the stage for India becoming an area of
interest as a strategic partner with a shared understanding of the vital strategic
objectives in the region. This also ensures India’s long-standing desire to becoming a
regional hegemon with a due role in world politics. This, however, comes at the cost of
the regional imbalance of the critical ‘balance of power’ which is already very fragile
and is narrowed down to ‘balance of threat’ than a once balance of power in the region.
Noting the fact that India has always enjoyed a conventional superiority vis-a-vis
Pakistan, as the country acquired large-scale weapons and worked on military
modernization programs. This shows the diverging nature of Indian objectives in the
region and beyond in terms of extending its relations with the US against China in Asia.
Owing to her approach towards the immediate and, more importantly, the extended
neighbourhood, reflects at large the long-held Indian desire to become a regional and
global power. India is effectively involved in manipulating the domestic politics of
weaker regional states such as Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Maldives, and even
Afghanistan. Moreover, being the largest democracy and geographically the largest
country in the region, to have a check and balance in the region is largely viewed by
the Indian policymakers as a legitimate right, thereby showing regional posture. Here,
the US assist this change in power dynamics in South Asia in the purview of the
‘American Exceptionalism’ by establishing a special relationship with India and to
assist her in acquiring the desired status in the region and the world vis-à-vis China
(Chacka, 2013, pp. 332-333).
This also shows that Indian politicians and policy-makers have amalgamated
the Nehruvian ‘peace diplomacy’ or bilateral partnerships approach of Indian foreign
policy with the contemporary geopolitical understanding to alleviate her status as a
Global power (Gupta, 2005, p. 14). The US envisages an ‘untapped’ potential in
building a strategic partnership with her ‘natural partner’ in both strategic and economic
spheres, partly because of the largest democracy and second-largest population (soon
to be the first) in the world (Wilson, 2018). India owns the fourth position in Purchasing
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Power Parity (PPP) with an annual growth rate of more than 7%. India is second to
Saudi Arabia in the world ranking in terms of importing arms, which makes her a
strategic bulwark as well as an economic market for the US (Jabeen, 2012, pp. 75-77).
The US recognized India’s huge military, economic and diplomatic weight during the
Clinton administration and hence incentivized India to bandwagon with the US,
especially after 2001. The nuclear deal is part of this incentivization. The significance
of India as an important market is described by Tellis as (2011, pp. 40-41):
India’s rise represents a net benefit for American
interests; the growing challenges emerging in Asia
will only bring the two countries closer than ever
before. Keeping the focus on nurturing the relationship
with India — which is the grand prize for maintaining
a balance of power that favours the United States in
Asia — will thus require committed attention on the
part of American policymakers even when they might
be otherwise distracted by the necessities of engaging
other powers, including India’s competitors such as
Pakistan and China.
Therefore, the US has developed strong ties with India as an ‘indispensable
partner’ and as a counterweight to undo China’s fast-growing influence on the Asian
and South Asia spectrum (Mohapatra, 2012, p. 4). Moreover, the US also expects
Indian cooperation in dealing with challenges posed by terrorism, nation-building in
Afghanistan, efforts of non-proliferation of nuclear and other WMDs with an emphasis
on energy security (Ameer, 2019). This is important for India as they are dependent on
the US presence for the security of billion dollars investment in Afghanistan. However,
regional dynamics and orientation of the US are changing with the anticipated
agreement in Doha peace talks and the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan.
The Convergence of Interests — Indian and US Perspectives
The Indo-US strategic partnership is dictated by a plethora of strategic, economic and
political convergences. Colin L. Powell, the former US Secretary of State and former
US Ambassador to India, Robert Black, have identified the immediate and longstanding
common challenges faced by the US and India. These challenges have emerged as
‘common values and interests’ in this natural partnership. Such a set of complementary
interests has steered the two countries to establish democratic societies endorsing
tolerance, political freedom, representative government and a commitment to fight
against terror (US Embassy in India, 2004). Strategically speaking, the natural
partnership based on the similar democracy-led ideational orientation between the two
estranged democracies has evolved as a power partnership focussed on China as a
mutual threat.
While representing the Obama administration, the former Assistant Secretary
of State Asia, Nisha Desai Biswal, termed the Indo-US strategic convergence at the
‘highest point’ and equally emphasized on a need to continue bilateral engagement with
a similar world view to understand the shared objective (Indo-US ‘Strategic
Convergence’, 2017). Biswal’s words reflected well in Trump’s strategy for
Afghanistan and South Asia when, after squeezing Pakistan for the ‘do more’, he
termed India as the key economic and security partner of the US. While appreciating
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India’s ‘important contributions to the stability’ in the region, the US President also
urged India to ‘do more’ in nation-building in Afghanistan (Myer, 2017).
Though terming India’s democracy coupled with the huge military and
economic potential has advantages for the US, Nicholas Burns, who was the US Undersecretary of state for political affairs, has meticulously expressed that the rise of a
‘democratic and increasingly powerful India’ is a significant development for the broad
range of interests of United States (Burns, 2007). Such a venture for achieving shared
objectives is hardly generating any disarray, even in face of the democratically
inconsistent practices such as the citizen act under the Modi government that is critical
to the basic human rights of minorities in India.
Similarly, India perceives US policy, especially under Trump’s
administration, to be reflecting step towards its ambitious goals in the region vis-a-vis
Pakistan. For instance, India’s Former Minister for External Affairs, Sushma Swaraj,
while reacting to Trump’s strategy for Afghanistan and South Asia states that ‘Trump’s
call for Pakistan to discontinue the policy of supporting cross-border terrorism finds
resonance with us’ (India, US ask Pakistan to Act against Terror, 2018, n.d.). India
expressed similar assent when the US withheld and conditioned the aid provided to
Pakistan in the fight against terrorism what the Indians believe is being used against
their interests.
The Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal: Historical Background
Until the late 1990s, the US was esteemed to propel the principles of the nonproliferation regimes and thus responded through sanctions when Pakistan conducted
nuclear tests (in May 1998). However, As Ashon Carter argues that ‘stance is never a
policy’ and the US, despite having embargoed India and Pakistan for their nuclear tests,
deemed it necessary to change her behaviour towards emerging India. This can be
attributed to the geopolitical change that has occurred across the Asian continent
following the disintegration of the USSR in the late 1980s. The peaceful rise of China,
nuclear explosions in the sub-continent and emerging India were some of the
compelling factors that dragged the US to seek a strategic partnership in South Asia.
India’s democracy and huge economic potential attracted the US policy-makers and
thus hinted for a strategic partnership between the countries. Following a series of
strategic dialogue with India and the subsequent visits of (former) President Clinton,
the US Joint Chief of Staff General Henry Shelton along with high-level officials from
the Department of Defense (DoD) did much in easing nuclear-related sanctions on
India. The meetings of the Defence Policy Group (DPG), however, triggered a restart
in defence cooperation between India and the US (Zhang, 2005, pp. 29-31).
The strategic partnership was re-enforced by the commitments made between
the two countries during a visit of (former) President Bill Clinton in March 2001.
Emphasizing on giving freedom and practicing democratic norms as the strongest basis
for the shared destiny of peace and prosperity, President Clinton and Indian Prime
Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee agreed that the shared ideals of the two major powers
could transform our alliance into a natural partnership that will guide us towards
achieving shared endeavours (US-India Relations, 2000). Such an overwhelming
partnership was aimed to ensure long-term cooperation in shared socio-economic,
political and strategic objectives. After transforming the status of China, from a
‘constructive strategic partner’ to a ‘strategic competitor’, the Bush administration
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sought to contain the Chinese ambitions in Asia and maritime activism in the Indian
Ocean with a tier of bilateral and multilateral alliances around its periphery. This
allowed the US to take India in countering the fast-breeding Chinese designs and
growing influence on the South and South-East Asian spectrum. India seized the
opportunity and reciprocated with unconditional support in the form of airbases and
other logistics to the US military campaign in Afghanistan. She also hinted support for
the Missile Defence Plan of the Bush administration, which was acknowledged by the
US. In return, the Bush administration reciprocated by ending all nuclear-related
sanctions over India which then emerged as her new ‘strategic partner’ (Mohapatra,
2012, p. 31). India was now embedded in the US foreign policy as a required tool to
augment and translate a broad range of strategic objectives in the region and beyond.
In 2002, the US National Security Strategy Report was issued which
concluded that the US interests require ‘a relationship with India’. The report
suggested, ‘India’s potential to become one of the great democratic powers of the
twenty-first century’ as the required basis for such a strategic alignment with the
emerging South Asian power. Moreover, the US affirmed her commitment that she had
strong intention to ‘invest time and resources [into] building strong bilateral relations
with India,’ and ‘work hard to transform our relationship accordingly’ (George Bush,
President of USA: The National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States of
America of 2002, 2002, p. 10). As part of the Defence Policy Group (DPG), the duration
between 2002 and 2003 was marked with a number of high-level meetings with
considerable cooperation ranging from the scientific and technical research to the joint
military exercises. Moreover, the cooperation was aimed to alleviate the socioeconomic development and to augment the law-enforcement capacity with a productive
Track-II diplomacy (Zhang, 2005, pp. 30-31).
In 2004, the above-mentioned alignment was transformed into a robust
strategic partnership following the initiative of the ‘Next Steps in Strategic Partnership’
(NSSP). This three-pronged strategic framework (Missile Defence was added as the
fourth one) allowed India and the US to scale up their partnership in transfer of nuclear
technology, technical assistance in civilian space programs, and trade in high-end
military technology which should later include sophisticated missile defence systems
(Tasleem, 2008, p. 25).
Civil Nuclear Deal
With the NSSP sets course as a strategic framework of cooperation between India and
the US, the two countries aspired to dramatize the nuclear cooperation and signed a
comprehensive US-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement in June 2005 (Kerr, 2012:
2). The 10-year Defence Framework Agreement allowed India to escape the threedecades-long sanctions put in response to the 1974 nuclear tests (Interview ─ The
Scholar as Secretary, September/October 2015). It expanded and entrenched this
strategic alliance aimed at enlarging the Indian role in the Indian Ocean Region that
results in a renewed balance of power politics in Asia with numerous players and
competing interests. It unfolded a new era of an entrenched strategic partnership that
re-enforced India’s maritime activism in the farthest littorals of the Indian Ocean while
also re-defined in parallel the traditional balance of power in South Asia with
implications for Pakistan. This agreement as a watershed strategic framework
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materialized and was given legitimacy through the approval of the Congress on October
1, 2008 (Hosur, 2010, p. 437). Under the Civil Nuclear Deal, the following special
arrangements were made for India;
This provided the prospects for the recognition of India as a de facto
nuclear weapon state by describing her ‘responsible state with
advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire the same benefits
and advantages as other such states’ (MoGoldrick, 2005, n.d.).
India agreed to allow the inspection of her civil nuclear installations
by the International Atomic Energy Commission (IAEA). By March
2006, India pledged to put fourteen out of its total twenty-two nuclear
facilities under the safeguards of the IAEA. She promised to sign an
Additional Protocol (AP); thereby allowing a more intrusive
inspection by the IAEA.
During a visit to India, (former) President Bush acceded to an Indian
plan which would seek to separate ‘its civilian and military’ nuclear
facilities for inspection by the international watchdog, while India
will show restraint in further nuclear tests and will help the US in
implementing the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).
After taking necessary measures in the domestic laws of the US with
Congress approval and that from Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG),
the agreement allows India to import sophisticated civil nuclear
technology from the US. By the Hyde Act, Congress exempted India
from doing nuclear commerce with the US, irrespective of the fact
that India is non-signatory to the NPT and thus a non-declared nuclear
weapon State. However, such nuclear commerce will comply with
the legal obligations set by the IAEA such as the ‘dual-use’ of nuclear
technology and fuel.
The 123 Agreement of July 2007 provided an operational basis for
the commencement of nuclear trade between India and the US. This
followed a series of negotiations between India and the IAEA that
approved safeguards for the civilian nuclear facilities on a condition
that India will utilize nuclear facilities and fuel for peaceful energy
purposes and ensure non-proliferation on her part.
Finally, after intense lobbying by the US, the agreement secured
legitimacy from the NSG and granted an exceptional waiver to India
with ‘reasonable conditions’ of abiding by the export rule of nuclear
material. After NSG exempting India from nuclear test ban followed
by the Congress approval in September 2008, the agreement went
into full force after the |US President George W. Bush signed the final
draft on October 10, 2008 (Akhtar, 2008/09, pp. 5-12). As part of the
‘rebalance to Asia’ strategy, President Obama tried to take the
existing cooperation with India to new heights. The cooperation was
enhanced in economic development, global politics, military
hardware, leading to market integration, liberal democratic norms,
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capital investment and a new era of innovation in science and
technology. Such a comprehensive engagement in the form of the
strategic partnership was aimed to contain the Chinese ambitions in
the South and South-East Asia.
Repercussions for Pakistan, South Asia Region, and the World
The resulting thrust and repercussions of the Indo-US strategic partnership with special
focus on the civil nuclear deal can be analyzed with respect to Pakistan’s position, as it
is the main victim with reference to the South Asian politics and power rivalries. In
addition, it is also important to recognize the potential impacts of the afore-mentioned
arguments on the Sino-Pakistan relations which are detailed in the subsequent subsections.
i) Repercussions for Pakistan
A coherent analysis of the Indo-US nuclear deal indicates that Pakistan remains at the
receiving end of and most affected country of the close Indo-US nuclear and military
cooperation in the South Asian region (‘Implications of Indo-US Nuclear Deal
Discussed’, 2008). Pakistan, having witnessed a continuous pattern of political
instability, weak economic and financial conditions, has already been locked in a
geostrategic competition with India. She has ensured over the past seven decades that
India should not be allowed to become a regional hegemon, which in turn has forced
the country to allocate a generous amount of its GDP to defense spending.
Concurrently, the country is investing its resources in a long-term Global War on Terror
(GWoT), a war that was imposed by the US which also remains the sole architect of
India’s hegemonic orientation in the region. Nevertheless, deal-raised Pakistan’s fears
took a high-up anticipating India’s nuclear superiority after upgrading her nuclear
facilities with modern technologies and sophisticated missile systems from the US
Consequently, the balance of power is gradually becoming irrelevant because of the
discriminate nuclear cooperation between India and the US, which invariably accords
the already advantageous in conventional terms Indian military superiority over
Pakistan and by extension demonstrated US discrimination against Pakistan. This will
put an end to the scope and practice of the deterrence stability in South Asian. This is
because US support for India is matchless to the Chinese ‘inferior’ military and
financial facilitation for Pakistan. Therefore, Pakistan expressed her reservations over
the following discriminatory and counter-productive developments of the nuclear deal.
ii) Indian Separation Plan and Approval by Nuclear Supply Group
As part of a series of developments between India and the US, the then Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh and President Bush announced the Indian Separation Plan on 20th
March 2016. It was one of the controversial plans that ensured India’s right to declare
either a nuclear facility is civilian or military. This was significant because only the
civilian nuclear facilities were to be offered for inspection by the IAEA. It means that
not only it allowed India to place military facilities out of inspection but also to expand
her nuclear program for strategic use as much as she deems it necessary for inspection.
Soon after the announcement, India established multiple enrichment facilities with
eight indigenous power reactors, Fast and Prototype Fast Breeder Test Reactors
(FTBR), the three Heavy Water Plants and various strategic facilities of security
significance such as a Prototype Naval reactor. Hence, the approval of the Indian
Separation Plan from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) legitimized Indian freedom
of choice to categorize her civilian and military nuclear facilities (Squassoni, 2007).
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Dr. Shaista Tabassum, Chairperson at the Department of International Relations in the
University of Karachi has described three following nuclear benefits to India
(‘Implications of Indo-US Nuclear Deal discussed’, 2008);
First, irrespective of India’s approval to allow IAEA
inspection of its nuclear facilities, the agreement allows India
to designate which nuclear facility is civil and which is not.
Second, the existing stockpiles of nuclear fuel and military
facilities that were developed prior to the deal will be
exempted from inspection.
Third, the deal discusses only civil nuclear installations while
leaves the ambitious and unlimited nuclear weapons programs
with insufficient concern.
iii) NSG Wavier to India for Dual Use of Nuclear Material and Technology
The nuclear deal required a waiver from the Congress and the NSG. Congress granted
legitimacy to the deal for the NSG, the US forwarded a draft in consultation with New
Delhi to the NSG in August 2008. The draft sought a special exemption for India from
the NSG’s requirements of full-scope safeguards, without considering its non-signatory
nature of the NPT. After an intense debate in the 45-member body, the draft was
approved which dealt with India as a special case; thereby allowing her to use the
nuclear for civilians as well as military purposes. The NSG statement, however,
claimed that India acceded to a ‘unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing’ (Kerr, 2012).
Such a waiver rendered suicidal repercussions for the regional security and balance of
power in South Asia. Therefore, such a nuclear deal and the unprecedented waivers,
with no condition to guarantee the non-diversion of nuclear fuel, were sufficient to
encourage India for fissile material production and its use in making nuclear weapons
(Mian et al., 2006, p. 119). Pakistan, fearing the collapse of her minimum credible
deterrence (MCD) strategy, geared up her nuclear weapon program with respect to the
‘evolving high-tech warfare structures including nuclear weapon development
capacity, a delivery system in Indian defence arrangements’ (Basrur, 2008, p. 6).
Hence, Pakistan was forced to take measures to ensure strategic balance with
counter-measures to India’s technological advancement, parallel to her defensive
strategy of preserving the MCD. Professor Rasul Bakhsh Rais at the Department of
Humanities and Social Science in Lahore University of Management and Sciences
justifies Pakistan’s appropriate response and argues that ‘‘Pakistan must make the
quality of its nuclear warhead or delivery system better rather than matching Indian
nuclear strength’ (Basrur, 2008, p. 6). Moreover, the waiver also signifies a transparent
discriminatory approach towards Pakistan. Consequently, the waiver for the Dual Use
of critical nuclear material allowed India to supersede Pakistan in both conventional
and non-conventional power with dramatic consequences for the region.
iv) Boosting up Indian Military Might
Besides the aforementioned superiority and relief, India was already enjoying a credible
conventional military superiority over Pakistan. A report by the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) ranks India as the top arms importer
between 2013 and 2017; with Russia supplying 62% while the US and Israel 25% and
11% respectively (Wezeman et al., 2018, p. 8). Moreover, A. K. Antony, the then Indian
Defence Minister, expressed in 2009 that ‘70% of India’s military equipment was
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imported’ (Perlo-Freeman et al., 2010, p. 168). The deal also encouraged India to try to
implement her hostile designs in the region with resulting in aggression. During the last
decade, India has consistently conveyed ‘to prepare themselves for a nightmare
scenario: a two-front war with nuclear-armed Pakistan and China’ (Swami, 2012). Such
hostile intentions have a flared-up arms race in the region because Indian military stock
is mostly Chinese-oriented subsequent to Pakistan. This was also mentioned in the
SIPRI Yearbook of 2010 that Indian military advancement is aimed to gain ‘superiority
over China and Pakistan’ as to reduce ‘China’s threat which has always been a perennial
notion of Indian defence and foreign policy circles and in the Indian media.’
Concurrently, India is expanding her military resources through procurement
from the US, Russia, and Israel including fighter jets, missile technology, cruise
missiles development, Various SAMs and Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense System
(ABMs). Indian strategic partnership with the US is to secure three objectives: ‘the
legalization of its nuclear status, a permanent seat on the SC, and international
recognition of the Line of Control (LOC) as the border between India and Pakistan’
(Gupta, 2005, pp. 28-29). However, Barack Obama as well as the subsequent Trump
administration have categorically called for a bilateral solution of the Kashmir problem
and did not side India in obvious terms (‘President Trump Dismissive of Third-Part
Role on Kashmir’, 2018; Shaukat, 2010). However, the US did not side India but still
insisted on dealing with Kashmir as a bilateral issue, contrasting Pakistan’s perspective
of Kashmir being an international dispute. Hence, the US adamant position on Kashmir
and endorsement of India’s cause for the permanent reservation in the UN Security
Council renders intrusive implications on Pakistan’s national interests. This is because
India will have the opportunity to veto any development favoring Pakistan such as the
resolutions on Kashmir while pushing for actions that will run counter to Pakistan’s
national security interests.
Preserving India’s Strategic Autonomy ─ Pakistani Perspective
By signing this deal back in 2005, India attained an unprecedented position in the
nuclear world. She did not only open a corridor to civil nuclear cooperation with the
world but also managed to retain her principled stance on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), which the country is reluctant to become a signatory. India achieved this
unprecedented status without giving too much in return; securing her arms open in
developing nuclear weapons. This means that India was successful in securing its
‘strategic autonomy’. The deal rendered India a de facto recognition as a nuclearweapon state, irrespective of its non-signatory nature at NPT. This was the reason when
China tried to condition any such recognition to similar treatment with Pakistan (Mian
et al., 2006, p. 119).
i.) Fake Indian Energy-Related Justifications
One of the major justifications provided by the Indian and US officials about the need
for the nuclear deal is that it will address the growing energy needs of the Indian
economy. While facing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the deal, Secretary
Rice argued that ‘civil nuclear cooperation agreement with India will help meet its
rising energy needs without increasing its reliance on unstable foreign sources of oil
and gas, such as nearby Iran’ (Muhammad, 2006, p. 12). However, currently, India is
consuming 11% of energy sources such as gas, coal, oil, wind power and nuclear energy
for power generation. Out of the total 11%, nuclear power contributes only 2-3%,
which, according to the proponents of the above argument, will increase only up to
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6.5% or 8% by 2025. It means the argument is not valid, as the deal will not bring any
significant increase to the Indian power generation (ibid). Conversely, India has relied
ambitiously on nuclear commerce to augment her weapons production capability as
well as capacity. Recently, Pakistan’s foreign ministry termed India’s nuclear program
as the fastest growing and claimed to have enough fuel to produce 2600 nuclear
weapons (‘India Capable of making 2,600 Nuclear Weapons’, 2017).
Hence, the main prospect for the deal was to focus more on accelerating
India’s nuclear weapons program with little priority of power generation. Irrespective
of the fact, that the US has kept ‘the right of return if the cooperating state detonates a
nuclear explosive device or terminates or abrogates an IAEA safeguards agreement,’
(Jaspal, 2008, n.d.). However, the IAEA safeguards will still not be able to stop India
from using the advanced civil nuclear technology for critical use in weapons
production. This was because the deal allowed technology provided for civil purposes
to be transferred for military uses because as noticed that ‘a significant proportion of
India’s nuclear complex to remain outside IAEA safeguards and continues to have a
strategic function’ (Mian et al., 2006, p. 125). Thus, ‘nuclear testing by India might
enable it to wield nuclear weapons and much larger explosive power than those
currently it has and it might let India change its nuclear strategy against China or
Pakistan’ (Ferguson et al., 2006, p. 11).
ii) Repercussion for South Asian Region and the World Destabilised Strategic
Balance of South Asian leads to Arm Competition
One of the anticipated consequences of the Indo-US civil nuclear deal was that ‘if it
implemented without checking India’s potential to increase its fissile stocks and
eliminating any possibility by India of improving its nuclear weapons could lead to
arms competition in the region involving Pakistan, India, and China, thus destabilizing
the entire region and making India a global, as well as a regional military power, seems
primary aim of the US’ (Muhammad, 2006, p. 119). This is evident by advancements
made by both Pakistan and China in their respective nuclear missile programs, in
response to India’s nuclear modernizations. Since 2008, Pakistan has conducted more
than a dozen successful nuclear missile tests including Ra’ad, Babur, improved version
of Ghauri and Abdali (Pakistan Missile Chronology, 2011) and Shaheen III as well as
a MIRV capable Ababeel in January 2017 (Pakistan Conducts First Flight Test of
Ababeel, 2017).
iii) Source of Expanding Indian Role in Afghanistan
The growing nuclear cooperation between the two countries took its assent on eve of
the US invasion of Afghanistan and the ensuing Global War on Terror (GWoT) in 2001.
The drive for nuclear cooperation between India and the US started on the onset of the
Global War on Terror and the US invasion of Afghanistan. America was not only
seeking a huge market for nuclear technology but also sought an ally that could help
her in dealing with the situation in Afghanistan, especially in the nation-building and
post-war reconstruction. This is why, the deal brought the two strategic partners
together, and it also allowed the US to give India a major role in the strategically
important Afghanistan. India has gained a considerable presence in Afghanistan and is
investing billions of dollars in expanding her influence through reconstruction
andbuilding the Afghan economy. Being in the immediate neighborhood and the
associated strategic interests in Afghanistan, Pakistan has always objected to such an
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70
unnecessary role of India in the country. (Pakistan fears Indian influence in
Afghanistan, 2017). President Trump’s ‘request’ to India for a major role in
Afghanistan while announcing his strategy for Afghanistan and South Asia underscores
this ambitious design (Masood, August 22, 2017). Therefore, there are chances that the
vacuum left with the exit of the US troops from Afghanistan will be filled by India that
is growing concerned for its investment and security imperatives.
US Hybrid Role in the Canvas of South Asian Politics
The US has been playing a hybrid role in South Asia since 1947 that has ample
implications for an unending arms build-up by both Pakistan and India. The United
States relations with Pakistan are mostly transient and largely affected by the US’ close
cooperation with India and her pro-Indian stance. In the nuclear realm, the US voiced
concerns and opposed Pakistan’s nuclear program since it gained momentum in the
1980s. Despite having deep nuclear engagement with India, the US has deplored
Chinese assistance in developing Pakistan’s nuclear program. Conversely, the US has
endorsed nuclear assistance to India and even lobbied for a waiver to her non-NPT
status. Such discriminatory cooperation is aimed to give India an edge in developing
her nuclear security apparatus against China (Tasleem, 2008). However, Pakistan
continuously and appropriately responds to any nuclear development in South Asia as
she believes Pakistan’s nuclear posture is aimed to act as a credible deterrent in the
South Asian balance of power. Such a scenario has forced Pakistan and China to believe
that the increasing supply of advanced conventional and non-conventional arms to India
will indiscriminately widen the already unequal military capabilities between Pakistan
and India in addition to the economic and strategic misbalance. Another analyst says
that ‘the single superpower with very important stakes in South Asia, the US should
pursue the procedures that should contain rather than support an arms competition in
the region. The Indo-US deal is a clear sign that the US no longer will deal with India
and Pakistan as an equal competitor in South Asia and that it has at last recognized
India as the leading power in the region’ (Fani, 2009: 150). As a result of this deal and
augmented US’s cooperation, India has already been developing her sea power with an
eye on attaining credible Second Strike Capability (SSC) which will wilfully endanger
prospects for peaceful and strategically secure Indian Ocean region. India is thriving to
augment her sea-based platforms equipped with nuclear missiles. She is seeking
cooperation from Russia, the US, and other NSG member states to meet her ‘security
requirements’ in the Indian Ocean with respect to China. Back in April 2012, India
commissioned its first Nuclear Submarine, of Russian Origin, ‘‘INS Chakra-II’’ to her
naval fleet in the Indian Ocean (Kashani, 2012).
More recently on 6th November 2018, Indian Prime Minister Narender Modi
announced that India has inducted INS Arihant nuclear-powered ballistic missile
submarine and completed the ‘‘first deterrence patrol’’ in the Indian Ocean (Pandit,
November 6, 2018). This is a dangerous development that can accelerate the
nuclearization of the Indian Ocean. Pakistan has voiced concerns over the deterrence
patrol of the INS Arihant and cautioned against a ‘renewed’ arms race in the region
(Bokhari, November 12, 2009).
Moreover, the US is increasing India’s capacity by modernizing its arms and
through technology transfer coupled with a series of military exercises with Indian
military to secure sea-lanes of communications of South and Southeast Asia (Sutter,
2006, p. 48). The US and Indian navies carried out joint military drills at different
positions near the Strait of Malacca, for instance in 2002 and in September 2007 in the
Bay of Bengal while in October 2008 in the Arabian Sea known as the ‘Malabar
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Exercises’. Moreover, a joint multilateral air exercise named as ‘the Red Flag’ has held
in the US For countering insurgency, India is training US army troops since
2008(Akhtar, 2008-09, pp. 24-25). The Malabar Naval War-Game was conducted
between the Indian Navy, Japan Maritime Self-Defence Forces (JMSDF) and the US
Navy in June 2018 in the waters of Guam and Philippine Sea (Gady, 2018). The
dominating opinion exists in the analysts that the motive behind India’s acquisition of
the latest weapons and technology is to compete with China and are not merely to
defend her as is justified by India. India and the United States are also concerned about
China’s billion dollars economic and strategic plans for Gwadar Sea-port in Baluchistan
to enhance regional connectivity and can be used as a maritime chokepoint for checking
Indo-US naval manoeuvring in the Indian Ocean (Shaukat, 2010).
Apart from having dreadful consequences for regional stability, the nuclear
deal between the US and India and close strategic partnerships also render multi-faceted
consequences at the global level. Some of the major global level security concerns of
Indo-US civil nuclear deal are listed as follows;
The discriminatory nature of the deal rollbacks the decade long nonproliferation efforts under the NPT.
This deal has politicized the humanely dangerous issue of
proliferation.
This deal allows India to utilize advance nuclear technology and
access to an unlimited supply of nuclear energy without even being a
signatory to the NPT which encourages the rest of the states to
take the NPT status for granted and use nuclear fuel for dual
purposes. Countries like Iran and North Korea got a
considerable justification for their nuclear weapons production
program.
This deal also questioned the credible nature of the so-called
non-proliferation regimes such as the NSG and their nonproliferation efforts as the waiver by the NSG opened a new
window for the legitimate proliferation of nuclear technology
among the great powers.
This deal encouraged other states of the world to allow the
IAEA to inspect only the civil nuclear installations and keep
the military installations of weapons production unsafeguarded.
Way Forward: Pakistan, a Key Player for Stability of India and South
Asian Region
Pakistan has become a critical ‘peace player’ for South Asian not only for the US
regarding American-Taliban talks for the Afghanistan peace process but also for
regional stability and security as a result of its proactive role for winning the diplomatic
war following the recent Pulwama attack. The attack on the Indian forces in Indianheld Jammu and Kashmir on February 14, 2019, provided yet another test for Pakistan
to highlight its relevance in regional peace and stability in terms of proposed nuclear
war in South Asia. The uproar in Indian government and media, accusing Pakistan of
perpetrating the attack without even investigation, was tackled with due caution and
responsibility by Imran Khan’s government and Chief-of-Army Staff, Qamar Javaid
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Bajwa. Despite assurances by PM Imran Khan of acting on perpetrators, if found guilty
based on solid evidence, encouraged by its military muscles and triggered by the
domestic political compulsion, Modi’s government resorted to aggression in the form
of futile surgical strikes in Balakot (Bokhari, Frahan&Kazmin, Amy, February 26,
2019). The strikes were responded immediately the next day by Pakistan Air Force with
two of the Indian jets shot down and a pilot taken in custody. The Prime Minister Imran
Khan revitalized Pakistan’s commitment to peace during his address to Pakistani
parliament and handed the pilot over to India within 24 hours as a ‘peaceful gesture’
(Safi, Michael & Malik, Mehreen, March 1, 2019). These developments were important
since both India and Pakistan were almost inching closer for a nuclear war with possible
missile strikes in consideration (Nuclear-armed India & Pakistan, 2019). Adding to all
this, the Indo-US nuclear cooperation challenges the nuclear parity in the region which
starkly encourages the superior to strike he inferior with impunity. In March, following
tensions between the two countries, US has signed an agreement with India for building
‘six nuclear power plants’ which raises questions over either the US is desirous to see
a power balance in the region or not (the US to provide sic Nuclear Powers Subs, 2019).
While analyzing the implications of the Indo-US close strategic partnership,
the fact remains that the geostrategic position with considerable stakes in the region,
Pakistan can never be ignored as irrelevant. Especially the US, largely engaged in a
GWoT in Afghanistan, cannot side-line Pakistan and her role in the evolving
geopolitical developments in South Asia and beyond. President Barak Obama, while
responding to question during his 2010 visit to India; why Pakistan remains vital to the
US so far it has not declared Pakistan as a terrorist state?, explained that ‘Pakistan is an
enormous country. It is a strategically important country not just for the United States
but for the world. I am absolutely convinced that the country that has the biggest stake
in Pakistan’s success in India. If Pakistan is stable and prosperous that’s good because
India is on the move and it absolutely is in its interests at the time when you succeed in
incredible ways on the global economic stage. You want the distraction of your security
and instability in the region. So my hope is to trust will develop between India and
Pakistan’ (Slap on Indian, 2010).
On the contrary, Donald Trump presented his South Asian strategy in August
2017, wherein, he tried to continue the policies of the previous administration, i.e. delinking Pakistan and India, and demand of ‘do more’ for Pakistan in light of Af-Pak
strategy. Three compulsions forced Trump to revisit its relationship with Pakistan
(Kayani et al., 2018). (1)Trump has taken to u-turn in order to distance from Pakistan
as a result of rising of an unknown entity to power ─ Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) in
Pakistan subsequent to the general election of July 2018. The PTI government took a
firm stand of an equal and balanced relationship with the US along with providing
supporting hand to America for its respectable exit from Afghanistan. However, not
ready to sacrifice Pakistan’s interests anymore for others’ interests. (2) Pakistan’s
closeness with China due to China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and (3)
Pakistan’s strategic proximity with Afghanistan which is a sole option for Afghan peace
in the way of the US forces’ withdrawal from Afghan land. Ultimately, Mike Pompeo,
US Secretary of State, expressed that America wants good relations with Pakistan and
expressed the desire to strengthen cooperation in multiple areas. (Khalilzad appreciates
Pakistan's role, 2019). Additionally, Zalmay Khalilzad, United States Special
Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation so appreciated Pakistani role in the ongoing dialogue process for bringing peace and stability in the war-ravaged country of
Afghanistan. As he stated ‘What they [Pakistan] do on Afghanistan to facilitate peace
and reconciliation, which has been a burden on the relationship, that will be removed.
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Pakistan is an important country with which we want to have better relations’
(Khalilzad appreciates Pakistan's role, 2019).
Moreover, it has been argued that ‘Pakistan’s geostrategic location makes it a
frontline state in the political, economic and military-strategic contexts of regional and
international relations. It also offers challenges for Pakistan to architect its foreign
policy in accordance with the quadrilateral China-Pakistan-India-US linkage’ (Naz,
2011, p. 1). This, however, needs to be realized at a national level as well. It is up to
Pakistan’s policy-makers that how they evaluate the emerging geopolitical trends and
policy transformations and respond to these geo-political realities in a way so as to
maximize the potential benefits of the state in this highly complex anarchy of the
international system. This is evident from the relevance of Pakistan in the possible
peace settlement in Afghanistan which implies the crucial strategic importance of
Pakistan in the realm of changing regional dynamics.
Conclusion
The emerging geopolitical environment in South Asia and beyond has modified
Pakistan’s strategic outlook with a new dimension of the ‘Look East’ policy (Ansar,
2011). However, Pakistan is enjoying a multi-faceted warmer partnership and strategic
alignment of interests with China. Both the ‘Iron Brothers’ have transformed their
relationship into a comprehensive strategic partnership over the past seven decades.
Peaceful co-existence, mutual trust, alignment of interests with win-win ventures are
the significant features of Pak-China friendship. Also, such an alignment is independent
of any regional or extra-regional relationship and exhibits a mutual ground on regional
and global issues. Pakistan and China are firm to survive ‘the winds of change with
maturity and self-confidence and in keeping with the soul and spirit of their
relationship’ (Ahmad, 2006).
The Indo-US civil nuclear deal is consistent with and a ‘mirror image’ of both
US’ and India’s antagonistic China-centric approach. As part of the psychological
manipulation, the western world has long been dubbing Pakistan’s nuclear bomb as the
‘Islamic Bomb’, the western world has long been associating Pakistan’s nuclear bomb
as ‘‘Islamic bomb’’, therefore, during 21st century, both are propagating that Pakistan’s
nuclear program is insecure while increasing Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism in
region and nuclear terrorism. Nevertheless, Pakistan and China have expanded their
cooperation mainly as the result of the Indo-US civil nuclear deal that is based on
energy purposes finalized since 2008 but actually a defense-oriented deal. Pakistan and
China maintained 1986 agreement as a baseline for their nuclear energy cooperation by
signing the civil nuclear deal of 2009 and aim of providing Chasma-3 and Chasma-4
power plant by which Pakistan would overcome its severe energy problem after the
refusal of civil nuclear technology transfer to Pakistan on an equal basis as it has done
to India.
Indian and US media have portrayed Sino-Pakistan cooperation in the civil
nuclear sphere as a ‘counter’ to the Indo-US deal and equate both deals (‘World’s
Double Standards on Pakistan-China Nuclear Deal’, 2010). India and the US showed
concerns by cross-questioning about China-Pakistan civil nuclear deal of 2009.
However, both states criticized internationally when they raised the point and
demanded ‘clarification’ after the Sino-Pakistan civil nuclear deal of 2009. As
Pakistan’s stance was that India has no right to raise objections and concerns on the
agreement as India has signed a civil nuclear pact with the US, Canada is now also
exploring the possibility of civil nuclear cooperation with Japan (Bokhari, 2009).
Contrarily, the questions have been raised by China and Pakistan about the world’s
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double standards to the international community especially to the US and India.
Maleeha Lodhi, Pakistani former ambassador to the US and senior analyst argued that
‘all the fuss’ over providing Chinese nuclear power reactors to Pakistan may just be for
‘an orchestrated campaign’ against Sino-Pakistan strategic cooperation while all this
was done under full international safeguards. She stated, ‘Indian eighth civilian nuclear
deal with Canada on the sidelines of last month's G20 meeting including France, Russia
for the same kind of deals since the exemption it received from NSG in the wake of the
Indo-US nuclear accord that entered into force in 2008’ have exposed the world’s
double standards regarding non-nuclear proliferation strategy and especially Pakistan
and China altogether (Lodhi, 2010).
In the coming scenario, it is expected that continuous Indo-US strategic
engagement and using cards of the largest and most powerful democracies, their
partnership would continue to be an important factor to push China and Pakistan
together. Pakistan would help China balance its relationship with India. Pakistan would
be an important ally for China in international organizations such as the UN. This is
clearly evident by the continuous vetoing of UN resolutions backed by India and its
allies, especially the US, calling for designating Masood Azhar as a global terrorist’
(Pakistan’s Masood Azhar, 2019). Yang Jiemian, president of SIIS argues that the
Chinese want to bring a ‘new strategic framework’ wherein it could extend its strategic
partnership with Pakistan independently. Moreover, another Chinese analyst’s view is
that the continuing military competition among strategic triangle players may change
soft balancing into a hard one. Besides due to the US policy of containing China and
its competitors to US partners around the Chinese periphery, China’s top priority is to
‘maintain periphery stability and make neighbors partners’ (Akhtar, 2008/09, p. 38). In
this entire scenario, Pakistan seems the most reliable partner for China and China is
very important for Pakistan as well. For Pakistan, no other country is willing to give
nuclear weapons to Pakistan but Chinese have been giving. Both can continue to pursue
a countervailing strategy of Indo-US nuclear collaboration in the future.
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Article
_
US Strategic Propensity
towards India: Nuclear
Bonding and Security
Apprehensions for Regional
Stability and Pakistan
59
NUST Journal of International
Peace & Stability
2020, Vol. III (1) Pages 59-78
njips.nust.edu.pk
Asifa Jahangir 1
Furqan Khan 2
Abstract
The Indo-US strategic bonding is shifting the security dynamics of the South Asian
balance-of-power in Indian favour. From the signing of 123 US-India Nuclear Deal to
the facilitation in becoming a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR), the US has clearly designated India as an instrumental element in the
American grand strategy of devising a ‘new world order’. As a result, India has grabbed
the opportunity of alleviating its status as a credible regional and global power. In this
regard, the US tilt towards India is significantly paving grounds for a strategic
imbalance in the South Asian region, thus creating challenges for Pakistan. Therefore,
this paper argues that the growing bonhomie between the US and India is a destabilizing
factor in the region which reinforces Pakistan’s fast falling into the Chinese orbit;
thereby cementing the old friendship into a new strategic partnership. This dynamic
certainly gives China and Pakistan an incentive to work together so as to keep the value
of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence alive. In an effort to expand the horizon on the subject,
the paper is dedicated to critically examine the existing cooperation between India and
the US while equally foreseeing the possible implications for the region in the face of
such destabilizing cooperation. More importantly, based on qualitative data, this paper
explores how Indo-US strategic partnership is directly impacting Pakistan and its
strategic partnership with China; thereby explaining how the growing relationship
between the US and India has undermined the traditional balance-of-power in the South
Asian region?
Keywords
Indo-US strategic relationship, Pak-China, South Asia, balance-of-power, Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
Asifa Jahangir holds a doctorate degree in South Asian Studies with expertise of International
Relations from the Centre for South Asian Studies, University of the Punjab, Lahore. She is the Managing
Editor to Journal of South Asian Studies published by ESci Journals Publishing.
E-mail: ajcsas2327@gmail.com
2 Furqan Khan is currently a bachelor’s student at the Department of International Relations, National
Defence University, Islamabad
1 Dr
NUST Journal of International Peace and Stability (NJIPS) Vol. III, No.1 __
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Introduction
The visit of the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Defence Secretary James
Mattis to New Delhi (in September 2018) achieved yet another milestone in the decade
long strategic partnership between India and the US. The signing of the long-awaited
agreement on the Communication Compatibility and Security Agreement
(COMCASA) enables India to acquire the encrypted security equipment of the US. The
agreement was a precondition for acquiring such sensitive equipment and ‘securityfocused’ communication interoperability between the US and the Indian armed forces
the agreements on sensitive military technologies and communications, understandably
underpins the deep strategic ties between India and the US (Smith, 2008). The recent
cooperation towards the Next Step for Strategic Partnership (NSSP) between the US
and India was signed in 2004. The NSSP offers a general framework of cooperation in
areas including civil nuclear and space activities and high-end trade with particular
emphasis on missile defence which will increase commerce bonding and alleviate
friendship to the next level of a strategic partnership between the two countries. More
importantly, the NSSP has been linked with the stability in Asia (Statement on the Next
Step, 2004, pp. 61-62). The close cooperation, however, has multi-faceted
consequences for the regional security architecture or what Barry Buzan has termed as
the ‘Asian Super Complex’ (see e.g., Buzan &Waever, 2003, p. 109).
The Indo-US strategic partnership is a game of balance-of-power being played
in the South Asian region. The US, being concerned with the growing influence of
China, has demanded India to engage China in the Asiatic sphere to truncate it from
challenging the hegemonic standing of the US. India on its part is trying to put up with
the US; benefiting from the acquisition of advanced military hardware as well as
perpetuating its dominance in the Indo-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Having
said that, India also tries to maintain its ‘strategic autonomy’ which is largely
undermined in Washington and hence can disappoint her in using India as part of its
Grand Strategy, that is to say, containing emerging China. Professor Ming Xia is
optimistic about the US design and response to the concerns related to the emerging
relationship between India and the US. According to him, the developments will
certainly upset China and Pakistan, however with any potential confrontations.
Furthermore, the two sides would be very careful not to create hostility, but to play the
game of balance-of-power and realignment (personal communication, July 3, 2018).
Similarly, India perceives China as an immediate threat not only because of its
disputatious history but because of the latter’s continuous assistance in building the
conventional and nuclear capabilities of Pakistan.
Apart from the Sino-US controlled diplomatic confrontation, India views
China as a key problem for its regional ascendancy. One of the opinions is that India is
working to develop its military capabilities so as to bridle the ambitious Chinese
aspirations in South Asia and the Indian Ocean. This is also because India believes in
employing Indian exceptionalism, which is no less than inspiration from the American
Exceptionalism; setting in motion the Indo-US strategic orientation in Indo-Pacific and
Indian Ocean Region (IOR). This, in large, also shows Indian reflection of Monroe
Doctrine in South Asia; claiming South Asia as an exclusive sphere of influence. All
this suggests India as a contender in the Asian ‘superstructure’ along with China
pushing for attaining the global power status which can be described as a perfect
archetypal of realpolitik in contemporary world politics. It is a matter of fact that SinoIndian competing aspirations are exploding to the global level, where the role of the US
and its relationship with India are containing China.
The US’ South Asian foreign policy, particularly for India and Pakistan, has
always been oscillating right from the time of independence. Taking sides between the
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two does not necessarily suit the US in the long-run, though Washington often exploits
the divide between New Delhi and Islamabad for her short-term benefit (Kux, 2001,
pp. 34-36). Indian policymakers are aware of India as an inevitable instrument and
potential power for the American Grand Strategy in Asia-Pacific. India also considers
her ever-increasing military power inevitable for the Americans to trust them for being
a potential partner in controlling the South and East Asian politics, including China.
However, the US chose a divided approach in maintaining relationships with Pakistan
and India in view of the broad strategic interest in the region. Jahangir quotes a
Pakistani professor, Syed Riffat Hussain while expressing his views about Chinese
response to the growing Indo-US cooperation that ‘the Chinese are very apprehensive
that India would be a future rising military power. Therefore, China would like to keep
Pakistan as a counterweight on its side to balance Indian power (2005, p. 116-117). The
US, however, remained steady in riding both horses at the same time, i.e., its policy
kept on oscillating between Pakistan and India where favouritism will scuttle the ship
of the US aspirations in the region.
The Indo-US Strategic Partnership and Civil Nuclear Deal
Background of the US Realignment with Rising India
As part of the US strategic understanding of the emerging trends in the 21st century,
the recent wave of tariff barriers on Billions US dollars’ worth Chinese products and
its hard-pressing actions in the South China Sea counts for the tactical manoeuvring of
US policy of containing China. This settles the stage for India becoming an area of
interest as a strategic partner with a shared understanding of the vital strategic
objectives in the region. This also ensures India’s long-standing desire to becoming a
regional hegemon with a due role in world politics. This, however, comes at the cost of
the regional imbalance of the critical ‘balance of power’ which is already very fragile
and is narrowed down to ‘balance of threat’ than a once balance of power in the region.
Noting the fact that India has always enjoyed a conventional superiority vis-a-vis
Pakistan, as the country acquired large-scale weapons and worked on military
modernization programs. This shows the diverging nature of Indian objectives in the
region and beyond in terms of extending its relations with the US against China in Asia.
Owing to her approach towards the immediate and, more importantly, the extended
neighbourhood, reflects at large the long-held Indian desire to become a regional and
global power. India is effectively involved in manipulating the domestic politics of
weaker regional states such as Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Maldives, and even
Afghanistan. Moreover, being the largest democracy and geographically the largest
country in the region, to have a check and balance in the region is largely viewed by
the Indian policymakers as a legitimate right, thereby showing regional posture. Here,
the US assist this change in power dynamics in South Asia in the purview of the
‘American Exceptionalism’ by establishing a special relationship with India and to
assist her in acquiring the desired status in the region and the world vis-à-vis China
(Chacka, 2013, pp. 332-333).
This also shows that Indian politicians and policy-makers have amalgamated
the Nehruvian ‘peace diplomacy’ or bilateral partnerships approach of Indian foreign
policy with the contemporary geopolitical understanding to alleviate her status as a
Global power (Gupta, 2005, p. 14). The US envisages an ‘untapped’ potential in
building a strategic partnership with her ‘natural partner’ in both strategic and economic
spheres, partly because of the largest democracy and second-largest population (soon
to be the first) in the world (Wilson, 2018). India owns the fourth position in Purchasing
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Power Parity (PPP) with an annual growth rate of more than 7%. India is second to
Saudi Arabia in the world ranking in terms of importing arms, which makes her a
strategic bulwark as well as an economic market for the US (Jabeen, 2012, pp. 75-77).
The US recognized India’s huge military, economic and diplomatic weight during the
Clinton administration and hence incentivized India to bandwagon with the US,
especially after 2001. The nuclear deal is part of this incentivization. The significance
of India as an important market is described by Tellis as (2011, pp. 40-41):
India’s rise represents a net benefit for American
interests; the growing challenges emerging in Asia
will only bring the two countries closer than ever
before. Keeping the focus on nurturing the relationship
with India — which is the grand prize for maintaining
a balance of power that favours the United States in
Asia — will thus require committed attention on the
part of American policymakers even when they might
be otherwise distracted by the necessities of engaging
other powers, including India’s competitors such as
Pakistan and China.
Therefore, the US has developed strong ties with India as an ‘indispensable
partner’ and as a counterweight to undo China’s fast-growing influence on the Asian
and South Asia spectrum (Mohapatra, 2012, p. 4). Moreover, the US also expects
Indian cooperation in dealing with challenges posed by terrorism, nation-building in
Afghanistan, efforts of non-proliferation of nuclear and other WMDs with an emphasis
on energy security (Ameer, 2019). This is important for India as they are dependent on
the US presence for the security of billion dollars investment in Afghanistan. However,
regional dynamics and orientation of the US are changing with the anticipated
agreement in Doha peace talks and the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan.
The Convergence of Interests — Indian and US Perspectives
The Indo-US strategic partnership is dictated by a plethora of strategic, economic and
political convergences. Colin L. Powell, the former US Secretary of State and former
US Ambassador to India, Robert Black, have identified the immediate and longstanding
common challenges faced by the US and India. These challenges have emerged as
‘common values and interests’ in this natural partnership. Such a set of complementary
interests has steered the two countries to establish democratic societies endorsing
tolerance, political freedom, representative government and a commitment to fight
against terror (US Embassy in India, 2004). Strategically speaking, the natural
partnership based on the similar democracy-led ideational orientation between the two
estranged democracies has evolved as a power partnership focussed on China as a
mutual threat.
While representing the Obama administration, the former Assistant Secretary
of State Asia, Nisha Desai Biswal, termed the Indo-US strategic convergence at the
‘highest point’ and equally emphasized on a need to continue bilateral engagement with
a similar world view to understand the shared objective (Indo-US ‘Strategic
Convergence’, 2017). Biswal’s words reflected well in Trump’s strategy for
Afghanistan and South Asia when, after squeezing Pakistan for the ‘do more’, he
termed India as the key economic and security partner of the US. While appreciating
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India’s ‘important contributions to the stability’ in the region, the US President also
urged India to ‘do more’ in nation-building in Afghanistan (Myer, 2017).
Though terming India’s democracy coupled with the huge military and
economic potential has advantages for the US, Nicholas Burns, who was the US Undersecretary of state for political affairs, has meticulously expressed that the rise of a
‘democratic and increasingly powerful India’ is a significant development for the broad
range of interests of United States (Burns, 2007). Such a venture for achieving shared
objectives is hardly generating any disarray, even in face of the democratically
inconsistent practices such as the citizen act under the Modi government that is critical
to the basic human rights of minorities in India.
Similarly, India perceives US policy, especially under Trump’s
administration, to be reflecting step towards its ambitious goals in the region vis-a-vis
Pakistan. For instance, India’s Former Minister for External Affairs, Sushma Swaraj,
while reacting to Trump’s strategy for Afghanistan and South Asia states that ‘Trump’s
call for Pakistan to discontinue the policy of supporting cross-border terrorism finds
resonance with us’ (India, US ask Pakistan to Act against Terror, 2018, n.d.). India
expressed similar assent when the US withheld and conditioned the aid provided to
Pakistan in the fight against terrorism what the Indians believe is being used against
their interests.
The Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal: Historical Background
Until the late 1990s, the US was esteemed to propel the principles of the nonproliferation regimes and thus responded through sanctions when Pakistan conducted
nuclear tests (in May 1998). However, As Ashon Carter argues that ‘stance is never a
policy’ and the US, despite having embargoed India and Pakistan for their nuclear tests,
deemed it necessary to change her behaviour towards emerging India. This can be
attributed to the geopolitical change that has occurred across the Asian continent
following the disintegration of the USSR in the late 1980s. The peaceful rise of China,
nuclear explosions in the sub-continent and emerging India were some of the
compelling factors that dragged the US to seek a strategic partnership in South Asia.
India’s democracy and huge economic potential attracted the US policy-makers and
thus hinted for a strategic partnership between the countries. Following a series of
strategic dialogue with India and the subsequent visits of (former) President Clinton,
the US Joint Chief of Staff General Henry Shelton along with high-level officials from
the Department of Defense (DoD) did much in easing nuclear-related sanctions on
India. The meetings of the Defence Policy Group (DPG), however, triggered a restart
in defence cooperation between India and the US (Zhang, 2005, pp. 29-31).
The strategic partnership was re-enforced by the commitments made between
the two countries during a visit of (former) President Bill Clinton in March 2001.
Emphasizing on giving freedom and practicing democratic norms as the strongest basis
for the shared destiny of peace and prosperity, President Clinton and Indian Prime
Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee agreed that the shared ideals of the two major powers
could transform our alliance into a natural partnership that will guide us towards
achieving shared endeavours (US-India Relations, 2000). Such an overwhelming
partnership was aimed to ensure long-term cooperation in shared socio-economic,
political and strategic objectives. After transforming the status of China, from a
‘constructive strategic partner’ to a ‘strategic competitor’, the Bush administration
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sought to contain the Chinese ambitions in Asia and maritime activism in the Indian
Ocean with a tier of bilateral and multilateral alliances around its periphery. This
allowed the US to take India in countering the fast-breeding Chinese designs and
growing influence on the South and South-East Asian spectrum. India seized the
opportunity and reciprocated with unconditional support in the form of airbases and
other logistics to the US military campaign in Afghanistan. She also hinted support for
the Missile Defence Plan of the Bush administration, which was acknowledged by the
US. In return, the Bush administration reciprocated by ending all nuclear-related
sanctions over India which then emerged as her new ‘strategic partner’ (Mohapatra,
2012, p. 31). India was now embedded in the US foreign policy as a required tool to
augment and translate a broad range of strategic objectives in the region and beyond.
In 2002, the US National Security Strategy Report was issued which
concluded that the US interests require ‘a relationship with India’. The report
suggested, ‘India’s potential to become one of the great democratic powers of the
twenty-first century’ as the required basis for such a strategic alignment with the
emerging South Asian power. Moreover, the US affirmed her commitment that she had
strong intention to ‘invest time and resources [into] building strong bilateral relations
with India,’ and ‘work hard to transform our relationship accordingly’ (George Bush,
President of USA: The National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States of
America of 2002, 2002, p. 10). As part of the Defence Policy Group (DPG), the duration
between 2002 and 2003 was marked with a number of high-level meetings with
considerable cooperation ranging from the scientific and technical research to the joint
military exercises. Moreover, the cooperation was aimed to alleviate the socioeconomic development and to augment the law-enforcement capacity with a productive
Track-II diplomacy (Zhang, 2005, pp. 30-31).
In 2004, the above-mentioned alignment was transformed into a robust
strategic partnership following the initiative of the ‘Next Steps in Strategic Partnership’
(NSSP). This three-pronged strategic framework (Missile Defence was added as the
fourth one) allowed India and the US to scale up their partnership in transfer of nuclear
technology, technical assistance in civilian space programs, and trade in high-end
military technology which should later include sophisticated missile defence systems
(Tasleem, 2008, p. 25).
Civil Nuclear Deal
With the NSSP sets course as a strategic framework of cooperation between India and
the US, the two countries aspired to dramatize the nuclear cooperation and signed a
comprehensive US-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement in June 2005 (Kerr, 2012:
2). The 10-year Defence Framework Agreement allowed India to escape the threedecades-long sanctions put in response to the 1974 nuclear tests (Interview ─ The
Scholar as Secretary, September/October 2015). It expanded and entrenched this
strategic alliance aimed at enlarging the Indian role in the Indian Ocean Region that
results in a renewed balance of power politics in Asia with numerous players and
competing interests. It unfolded a new era of an entrenched strategic partnership that
re-enforced India’s maritime activism in the farthest littorals of the Indian Ocean while
also re-defined in parallel the traditional balance of power in South Asia with
implications for Pakistan. This agreement as a watershed strategic framework
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materialized and was given legitimacy through the approval of the Congress on October
1, 2008 (Hosur, 2010, p. 437). Under the Civil Nuclear Deal, the following special
arrangements were made for India;
This provided the prospects for the recognition of India as a de facto
nuclear weapon state by describing her ‘responsible state with
advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire the same benefits
and advantages as other such states’ (MoGoldrick, 2005, n.d.).
India agreed to allow the inspection of her civil nuclear installations
by the International Atomic Energy Commission (IAEA). By March
2006, India pledged to put fourteen out of its total twenty-two nuclear
facilities under the safeguards of the IAEA. She promised to sign an
Additional Protocol (AP); thereby allowing a more intrusive
inspection by the IAEA.
During a visit to India, (former) President Bush acceded to an Indian
plan which would seek to separate ‘its civilian and military’ nuclear
facilities for inspection by the international watchdog, while India
will show restraint in further nuclear tests and will help the US in
implementing the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).
After taking necessary measures in the domestic laws of the US with
Congress approval and that from Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG),
the agreement allows India to import sophisticated civil nuclear
technology from the US. By the Hyde Act, Congress exempted India
from doing nuclear commerce with the US, irrespective of the fact
that India is non-signatory to the NPT and thus a non-declared nuclear
weapon State. However, such nuclear commerce will comply with
the legal obligations set by the IAEA such as the ‘dual-use’ of nuclear
technology and fuel.
The 123 Agreement of July 2007 provided an operational basis for
the commencement of nuclear trade between India and the US. This
followed a series of negotiations between India and the IAEA that
approved safeguards for the civilian nuclear facilities on a condition
that India will utilize nuclear facilities and fuel for peaceful energy
purposes and ensure non-proliferation on her part.
Finally, after intense lobbying by the US, the agreement secured
legitimacy from the NSG and granted an exceptional waiver to India
with ‘reasonable conditions’ of abiding by the export rule of nuclear
material. After NSG exempting India from nuclear test ban followed
by the Congress approval in September 2008, the agreement went
into full force after the |US President George W. Bush signed the final
draft on October 10, 2008 (Akhtar, 2008/09, pp. 5-12). As part of the
‘rebalance to Asia’ strategy, President Obama tried to take the
existing cooperation with India to new heights. The cooperation was
enhanced in economic development, global politics, military
hardware, leading to market integration, liberal democratic norms,
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capital investment and a new era of innovation in science and
technology. Such a comprehensive engagement in the form of the
strategic partnership was aimed to contain the Chinese ambitions in
the South and South-East Asia.
Repercussions for Pakistan, South Asia Region, and the World
The resulting thrust and repercussions of the Indo-US strategic partnership with special
focus on the civil nuclear deal can be analyzed with respect to Pakistan’s position, as it
is the main victim with reference to the South Asian politics and power rivalries. In
addition, it is also important to recognize the potential impacts of the afore-mentioned
arguments on the Sino-Pakistan relations which are detailed in the subsequent subsections.
i) Repercussions for Pakistan
A coherent analysis of the Indo-US nuclear deal indicates that Pakistan remains at the
receiving end of and most affected country of the close Indo-US nuclear and military
cooperation in the South Asian region (‘Implications of Indo-US Nuclear Deal
Discussed’, 2008). Pakistan, having witnessed a continuous pattern of political
instability, weak economic and financial conditions, has already been locked in a
geostrategic competition with India. She has ensured over the past seven decades that
India should not be allowed to become a regional hegemon, which in turn has forced
the country to allocate a generous amount of its GDP to defense spending.
Concurrently, the country is investing its resources in a long-term Global War on Terror
(GWoT), a war that was imposed by the US which also remains the sole architect of
India’s hegemonic orientation in the region. Nevertheless, deal-raised Pakistan’s fears
took a high-up anticipating India’s nuclear superiority after upgrading her nuclear
facilities with modern technologies and sophisticated missile systems from the US
Consequently, the balance of power is gradually becoming irrelevant because of the
discriminate nuclear cooperation between India and the US, which invariably accords
the already advantageous in conventional terms Indian military superiority over
Pakistan and by extension demonstrated US discrimination against Pakistan. This will
put an end to the scope and practice of the deterrence stability in South Asian. This is
because US support for India is matchless to the Chinese ‘inferior’ military and
financial facilitation for Pakistan. Therefore, Pakistan expressed her reservations over
the following discriminatory and counter-productive developments of the nuclear deal.
ii) Indian Separation Plan and Approval by Nuclear Supply Group
As part of a series of developments between India and the US, the then Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh and President Bush announced the Indian Separation Plan on 20th
March 2016. It was one of the controversial plans that ensured India’s right to declare
either a nuclear facility is civilian or military. This was significant because only the
civilian nuclear facilities were to be offered for inspection by the IAEA. It means that
not only it allowed India to place military facilities out of inspection but also to expand
her nuclear program for strategic use as much as she deems it necessary for inspection.
Soon after the announcement, India established multiple enrichment facilities with
eight indigenous power reactors, Fast and Prototype Fast Breeder Test Reactors
(FTBR), the three Heavy Water Plants and various strategic facilities of security
significance such as a Prototype Naval reactor. Hence, the approval of the Indian
Separation Plan from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) legitimized Indian freedom
of choice to categorize her civilian and military nuclear facilities (Squassoni, 2007).
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Dr. Shaista Tabassum, Chairperson at the Department of International Relations in the
University of Karachi has described three following nuclear benefits to India
(‘Implications of Indo-US Nuclear Deal discussed’, 2008);
First, irrespective of India’s approval to allow IAEA
inspection of its nuclear facilities, the agreement allows India
to designate which nuclear facility is civil and which is not.
Second, the existing stockpiles of nuclear fuel and military
facilities that were developed prior to the deal will be
exempted from inspection.
Third, the deal discusses only civil nuclear installations while
leaves the ambitious and unlimited nuclear weapons programs
with insufficient concern.
iii) NSG Wavier to India for Dual Use of Nuclear Material and Technology
The nuclear deal required a waiver from the Congress and the NSG. Congress granted
legitimacy to the deal for the NSG, the US forwarded a draft in consultation with New
Delhi to the NSG in August 2008. The draft sought a special exemption for India from
the NSG’s requirements of full-scope safeguards, without considering its non-signatory
nature of the NPT. After an intense debate in the 45-member body, the draft was
approved which dealt with India as a special case; thereby allowing her to use the
nuclear for civilians as well as military purposes. The NSG statement, however,
claimed that India acceded to a ‘unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing’ (Kerr, 2012).
Such a waiver rendered suicidal repercussions for the regional security and balance of
power in South Asia. Therefore, such a nuclear deal and the unprecedented waivers,
with no condition to guarantee the non-diversion of nuclear fuel, were sufficient to
encourage India for fissile material production and its use in making nuclear weapons
(Mian et al., 2006, p. 119). Pakistan, fearing the collapse of her minimum credible
deterrence (MCD) strategy, geared up her nuclear weapon program with respect to the
‘evolving high-tech warfare structures including nuclear weapon development
capacity, a delivery system in Indian defence arrangements’ (Basrur, 2008, p. 6).
Hence, Pakistan was forced to take measures to ensure strategic balance with
counter-measures to India’s technological advancement, parallel to her defensive
strategy of preserving the MCD. Professor Rasul Bakhsh Rais at the Department of
Humanities and Social Science in Lahore University of Management and Sciences
justifies Pakistan’s appropriate response and argues that ‘‘Pakistan must make the
quality of its nuclear warhead or delivery system better rather than matching Indian
nuclear strength’ (Basrur, 2008, p. 6). Moreover, the waiver also signifies a transparent
discriminatory approach towards Pakistan. Consequently, the waiver for the Dual Use
of critical nuclear material allowed India to supersede Pakistan in both conventional
and non-conventional power with dramatic consequences for the region.
iv) Boosting up Indian Military Might
Besides the aforementioned superiority and relief, India was already enjoying a credible
conventional military superiority over Pakistan. A report by the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) ranks India as the top arms importer
between 2013 and 2017; with Russia supplying 62% while the US and Israel 25% and
11% respectively (Wezeman et al., 2018, p. 8). Moreover, A. K. Antony, the then Indian
Defence Minister, expressed in 2009 that ‘70% of India’s military equipment was
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imported’ (Perlo-Freeman et al., 2010, p. 168). The deal also encouraged India to try to
implement her hostile designs in the region with resulting in aggression. During the last
decade, India has consistently conveyed ‘to prepare themselves for a nightmare
scenario: a two-front war with nuclear-armed Pakistan and China’ (Swami, 2012). Such
hostile intentions have a flared-up arms race in the region because Indian military stock
is mostly Chinese-oriented subsequent to Pakistan. This was also mentioned in the
SIPRI Yearbook of 2010 that Indian military advancement is aimed to gain ‘superiority
over China and Pakistan’ as to reduce ‘China’s threat which has always been a perennial
notion of Indian defence and foreign policy circles and in the Indian media.’
Concurrently, India is expanding her military resources through procurement
from the US, Russia, and Israel including fighter jets, missile technology, cruise
missiles development, Various SAMs and Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense System
(ABMs). Indian strategic partnership with the US is to secure three objectives: ‘the
legalization of its nuclear status, a permanent seat on the SC, and international
recognition of the Line of Control (LOC) as the border between India and Pakistan’
(Gupta, 2005, pp. 28-29). However, Barack Obama as well as the subsequent Trump
administration have categorically called for a bilateral solution of the Kashmir problem
and did not side India in obvious terms (‘President Trump Dismissive of Third-Part
Role on Kashmir’, 2018; Shaukat, 2010). However, the US did not side India but still
insisted on dealing with Kashmir as a bilateral issue, contrasting Pakistan’s perspective
of Kashmir being an international dispute. Hence, the US adamant position on Kashmir
and endorsement of India’s cause for the permanent reservation in the UN Security
Council renders intrusive implications on Pakistan’s national interests. This is because
India will have the opportunity to veto any development favoring Pakistan such as the
resolutions on Kashmir while pushing for actions that will run counter to Pakistan’s
national security interests.
Preserving India’s Strategic Autonomy ─ Pakistani Perspective
By signing this deal back in 2005, India attained an unprecedented position in the
nuclear world. She did not only open a corridor to civil nuclear cooperation with the
world but also managed to retain her principled stance on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), which the country is reluctant to become a signatory. India achieved this
unprecedented status without giving too much in return; securing her arms open in
developing nuclear weapons. This means that India was successful in securing its
‘strategic autonomy’. The deal rendered India a de facto recognition as a nuclearweapon state, irrespective of its non-signatory nature at NPT. This was the reason when
China tried to condition any such recognition to similar treatment with Pakistan (Mian
et al., 2006, p. 119).
i.) Fake Indian Energy-Related Justifications
One of the major justifications provided by the Indian and US officials about the need
for the nuclear deal is that it will address the growing energy needs of the Indian
economy. While facing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the deal, Secretary
Rice argued that ‘civil nuclear cooperation agreement with India will help meet its
rising energy needs without increasing its reliance on unstable foreign sources of oil
and gas, such as nearby Iran’ (Muhammad, 2006, p. 12). However, currently, India is
consuming 11% of energy sources such as gas, coal, oil, wind power and nuclear energy
for power generation. Out of the total 11%, nuclear power contributes only 2-3%,
which, according to the proponents of the above argument, will increase only up to
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69
6.5% or 8% by 2025. It means the argument is not valid, as the deal will not bring any
significant increase to the Indian power generation (ibid). Conversely, India has relied
ambitiously on nuclear commerce to augment her weapons production capability as
well as capacity. Recently, Pakistan’s foreign ministry termed India’s nuclear program
as the fastest growing and claimed to have enough fuel to produce 2600 nuclear
weapons (‘India Capable of making 2,600 Nuclear Weapons’, 2017).
Hence, the main prospect for the deal was to focus more on accelerating
India’s nuclear weapons program with little priority of power generation. Irrespective
of the fact, that the US has kept ‘the right of return if the cooperating state detonates a
nuclear explosive device or terminates or abrogates an IAEA safeguards agreement,’
(Jaspal, 2008, n.d.). However, the IAEA safeguards will still not be able to stop India
from using the advanced civil nuclear technology for critical use in weapons
production. This was because the deal allowed technology provided for civil purposes
to be transferred for military uses because as noticed that ‘a significant proportion of
India’s nuclear complex to remain outside IAEA safeguards and continues to have a
strategic function’ (Mian et al., 2006, p. 125). Thus, ‘nuclear testing by India might
enable it to wield nuclear weapons and much larger explosive power than those
currently it has and it might let India change its nuclear strategy against China or
Pakistan’ (Ferguson et al., 2006, p. 11).
ii) Repercussion for South Asian Region and the World Destabilised Strategic
Balance of South Asian leads to Arm Competition
One of the anticipated consequences of the Indo-US civil nuclear deal was that ‘if it
implemented without checking India’s potential to increase its fissile stocks and
eliminating any possibility by India of improving its nuclear weapons could lead to
arms competition in the region involving Pakistan, India, and China, thus destabilizing
the entire region and making India a global, as well as a regional military power, seems
primary aim of the US’ (Muhammad, 2006, p. 119). This is evident by advancements
made by both Pakistan and China in their respective nuclear missile programs, in
response to India’s nuclear modernizations. Since 2008, Pakistan has conducted more
than a dozen successful nuclear missile tests including Ra’ad, Babur, improved version
of Ghauri and Abdali (Pakistan Missile Chronology, 2011) and Shaheen III as well as
a MIRV capable Ababeel in January 2017 (Pakistan Conducts First Flight Test of
Ababeel, 2017).
iii) Source of Expanding Indian Role in Afghanistan
The growing nuclear cooperation between the two countries took its assent on eve of
the US invasion of Afghanistan and the ensuing Global War on Terror (GWoT) in 2001.
The drive for nuclear cooperation between India and the US started on the onset of the
Global War on Terror and the US invasion of Afghanistan. America was not only
seeking a huge market for nuclear technology but also sought an ally that could help
her in dealing with the situation in Afghanistan, especially in the nation-building and
post-war reconstruction. This is why, the deal brought the two strategic partners
together, and it also allowed the US to give India a major role in the strategically
important Afghanistan. India has gained a considerable presence in Afghanistan and is
investing billions of dollars in expanding her influence through reconstruction
andbuilding the Afghan economy. Being in the immediate neighborhood and the
associated strategic interests in Afghanistan, Pakistan has always objected to such an
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70
unnecessary role of India in the country. (Pakistan fears Indian influence in
Afghanistan, 2017). President Trump’s ‘request’ to India for a major role in
Afghanistan while announcing his strategy for Afghanistan and South Asia underscores
this ambitious design (Masood, August 22, 2017). Therefore, there are chances that the
vacuum left with the exit of the US troops from Afghanistan will be filled by India that
is growing concerned for its investment and security imperatives.
US Hybrid Role in the Canvas of South Asian Politics
The US has been playing a hybrid role in South Asia since 1947 that has ample
implications for an unending arms build-up by both Pakistan and India. The United
States relations with Pakistan are mostly transient and largely affected by the US’ close
cooperation with India and her pro-Indian stance. In the nuclear realm, the US voiced
concerns and opposed Pakistan’s nuclear program since it gained momentum in the
1980s. Despite having deep nuclear engagement with India, the US has deplored
Chinese assistance in developing Pakistan’s nuclear program. Conversely, the US has
endorsed nuclear assistance to India and even lobbied for a waiver to her non-NPT
status. Such discriminatory cooperation is aimed to give India an edge in developing
her nuclear security apparatus against China (Tasleem, 2008). However, Pakistan
continuously and appropriately responds to any nuclear development in South Asia as
she believes Pakistan’s nuclear posture is aimed to act as a credible deterrent in the
South Asian balance of power. Such a scenario has forced Pakistan and China to believe
that the increasing supply of advanced conventional and non-conventional arms to India
will indiscriminately widen the already unequal military capabilities between Pakistan
and India in addition to the economic and strategic misbalance. Another analyst says
that ‘the single superpower with very important stakes in South Asia, the US should
pursue the procedures that should contain rather than support an arms competition in
the region. The Indo-US deal is a clear sign that the US no longer will deal with India
and Pakistan as an equal competitor in South Asia and that it has at last recognized
India as the leading power in the region’ (Fani, 2009: 150). As a result of this deal and
augmented US’s cooperation, India has already been developing her sea power with an
eye on attaining credible Second Strike Capability (SSC) which will wilfully endanger
prospects for peaceful and strategically secure Indian Ocean region. India is thriving to
augment her sea-based platforms equipped with nuclear missiles. She is seeking
cooperation from Russia, the US, and other NSG member states to meet her ‘security
requirements’ in the Indian Ocean with respect to China. Back in April 2012, India
commissioned its first Nuclear Submarine, of Russian Origin, ‘‘INS Chakra-II’’ to her
naval fleet in the Indian Ocean (Kashani, 2012).
More recently on 6th November 2018, Indian Prime Minister Narender Modi
announced that India has inducted INS Arihant nuclear-powered ballistic missile
submarine and completed the ‘‘first deterrence patrol’’ in the Indian Ocean (Pandit,
November 6, 2018). This is a dangerous development that can accelerate the
nuclearization of the Indian Ocean. Pakistan has voiced concerns over the deterrence
patrol of the INS Arihant and cautioned against a ‘renewed’ arms race in the region
(Bokhari, November 12, 2009).
Moreover, the US is increasing India’s capacity by modernizing its arms and
through technology transfer coupled with a series of military exercises with Indian
military to secure sea-lanes of communications of South and Southeast Asia (Sutter,
2006, p. 48). The US and Indian navies carried out joint military drills at different
positions near the Strait of Malacca, for instance in 2002 and in September 2007 in the
Bay of Bengal while in October 2008 in the Arabian Sea known as the ‘Malabar
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Exercises’. Moreover, a joint multilateral air exercise named as ‘the Red Flag’ has held
in the US For countering insurgency, India is training US army troops since
2008(Akhtar, 2008-09, pp. 24-25). The Malabar Naval War-Game was conducted
between the Indian Navy, Japan Maritime Self-Defence Forces (JMSDF) and the US
Navy in June 2018 in the waters of Guam and Philippine Sea (Gady, 2018). The
dominating opinion exists in the analysts that the motive behind India’s acquisition of
the latest weapons and technology is to compete with China and are not merely to
defend her as is justified by India. India and the United States are also concerned about
China’s billion dollars economic and strategic plans for Gwadar Sea-port in Baluchistan
to enhance regional connectivity and can be used as a maritime chokepoint for checking
Indo-US naval manoeuvring in the Indian Ocean (Shaukat, 2010).
Apart from having dreadful consequences for regional stability, the nuclear
deal between the US and India and close strategic partnerships also render multi-faceted
consequences at the global level. Some of the major global level security concerns of
Indo-US civil nuclear deal are listed as follows;
The discriminatory nature of the deal rollbacks the decade long nonproliferation efforts under the NPT.
This deal has politicized the humanely dangerous issue of
proliferation.
This deal allows India to utilize advance nuclear technology and
access to an unlimited supply of nuclear energy without even being a
signatory to the NPT which encourages the rest of the states to
take the NPT status for granted and use nuclear fuel for dual
purposes. Countries like Iran and North Korea got a
considerable justification for their nuclear weapons production
program.
This deal also questioned the credible nature of the so-called
non-proliferation regimes such as the NSG and their nonproliferation efforts as the waiver by the NSG opened a new
window for the legitimate proliferation of nuclear technology
among the great powers.
This deal encouraged other states of the world to allow the
IAEA to inspect only the civil nuclear installations and keep
the military installations of weapons production unsafeguarded.
Way Forward: Pakistan, a Key Player for Stability of India and South
Asian Region
Pakistan has become a critical ‘peace player’ for South Asian not only for the US
regarding American-Taliban talks for the Afghanistan peace process but also for
regional stability and security as a result of its proactive role for winning the diplomatic
war following the recent Pulwama attack. The attack on the Indian forces in Indianheld Jammu and Kashmir on February 14, 2019, provided yet another test for Pakistan
to highlight its relevance in regional peace and stability in terms of proposed nuclear
war in South Asia. The uproar in Indian government and media, accusing Pakistan of
perpetrating the attack without even investigation, was tackled with due caution and
responsibility by Imran Khan’s government and Chief-of-Army Staff, Qamar Javaid
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Bajwa. Despite assurances by PM Imran Khan of acting on perpetrators, if found guilty
based on solid evidence, encouraged by its military muscles and triggered by the
domestic political compulsion, Modi’s government resorted to aggression in the form
of futile surgical strikes in Balakot (Bokhari, Frahan&Kazmin, Amy, February 26,
2019). The strikes were responded immediately the next day by Pakistan Air Force with
two of the Indian jets shot down and a pilot taken in custody. The Prime Minister Imran
Khan revitalized Pakistan’s commitment to peace during his address to Pakistani
parliament and handed the pilot over to India within 24 hours as a ‘peaceful gesture’
(Safi, Michael & Malik, Mehreen, March 1, 2019). These developments were important
since both India and Pakistan were almost inching closer for a nuclear war with possible
missile strikes in consideration (Nuclear-armed India & Pakistan, 2019). Adding to all
this, the Indo-US nuclear cooperation challenges the nuclear parity in the region which
starkly encourages the superior to strike he inferior with impunity. In March, following
tensions between the two countries, US has signed an agreement with India for building
‘six nuclear power plants’ which raises questions over either the US is desirous to see
a power balance in the region or not (the US to provide sic Nuclear Powers Subs, 2019).
While analyzing the implications of the Indo-US close strategic partnership,
the fact remains that the geostrategic position with considerable stakes in the region,
Pakistan can never be ignored as irrelevant. Especially the US, largely engaged in a
GWoT in Afghanistan, cannot side-line Pakistan and her role in the evolving
geopolitical developments in South Asia and beyond. President Barak Obama, while
responding to question during his 2010 visit to India; why Pakistan remains vital to the
US so far it has not declared Pakistan as a terrorist state?, explained that ‘Pakistan is an
enormous country. It is a strategically important country not just for the United States
but for the world. I am absolutely convinced that the country that has the biggest stake
in Pakistan’s success in India. If Pakistan is stable and prosperous that’s good because
India is on the move and it absolutely is in its interests at the time when you succeed in
incredible ways on the global economic stage. You want the distraction of your security
and instability in the region. So my hope is to trust will develop between India and
Pakistan’ (Slap on Indian, 2010).
On the contrary, Donald Trump presented his South Asian strategy in August
2017, wherein, he tried to continue the policies of the previous administration, i.e. delinking Pakistan and India, and demand of ‘do more’ for Pakistan in light of Af-Pak
strategy. Three compulsions forced Trump to revisit its relationship with Pakistan
(Kayani et al., 2018). (1)Trump has taken to u-turn in order to distance from Pakistan
as a result of rising of an unknown entity to power ─ Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) in
Pakistan subsequent to the general election of July 2018. The PTI government took a
firm stand of an equal and balanced relationship with the US along with providing
supporting hand to America for its respectable exit from Afghanistan. However, not
ready to sacrifice Pakistan’s interests anymore for others’ interests. (2) Pakistan’s
closeness with China due to China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and (3)
Pakistan’s strategic proximity with Afghanistan which is a sole option for Afghan peace
in the way of the US forces’ withdrawal from Afghan land. Ultimately, Mike Pompeo,
US Secretary of State, expressed that America wants good relations with Pakistan and
expressed the desire to strengthen cooperation in multiple areas. (Khalilzad appreciates
Pakistan's role, 2019). Additionally, Zalmay Khalilzad, United States Special
Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation so appreciated Pakistani role in the ongoing dialogue process for bringing peace and stability in the war-ravaged country of
Afghanistan. As he stated ‘What they [Pakistan] do on Afghanistan to facilitate peace
and reconciliation, which has been a burden on the relationship, that will be removed.
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Pakistan is an important country with which we want to have better relations’
(Khalilzad appreciates Pakistan's role, 2019).
Moreover, it has been argued that ‘Pakistan’s geostrategic location makes it a
frontline state in the political, economic and military-strategic contexts of regional and
international relations. It also offers challenges for Pakistan to architect its foreign
policy in accordance with the quadrilateral China-Pakistan-India-US linkage’ (Naz,
2011, p. 1). This, however, needs to be realized at a national level as well. It is up to
Pakistan’s policy-makers that how they evaluate the emerging geopolitical trends and
policy transformations and respond to these geo-political realities in a way so as to
maximize the potential benefits of the state in this highly complex anarchy of the
international system. This is evident from the relevance of Pakistan in the possible
peace settlement in Afghanistan which implies the crucial strategic importance of
Pakistan in the realm of changing regional dynamics.
Conclusion
The emerging geopolitical environment in South Asia and beyond has modified
Pakistan’s strategic outlook with a new dimension of the ‘Look East’ policy (Ansar,
2011). However, Pakistan is enjoying a multi-faceted warmer partnership and strategic
alignment of interests with China. Both the ‘Iron Brothers’ have transformed their
relationship into a comprehensive strategic partnership over the past seven decades.
Peaceful co-existence, mutual trust, alignment of interests with win-win ventures are
the significant features of Pak-China friendship. Also, such an alignment is independent
of any regional or extra-regional relationship and exhibits a mutual ground on regional
and global issues. Pakistan and China are firm to survive ‘the winds of change with
maturity and self-confidence and in keeping with the soul and spirit of their
relationship’ (Ahmad, 2006).
The Indo-US civil nuclear deal is consistent with and a ‘mirror image’ of both
US’ and India’s antagonistic China-centric approach. As part of the psychological
manipulation, the western world has long been dubbing Pakistan’s nuclear bomb as the
‘Islamic Bomb’, the western world has long been associating Pakistan’s nuclear bomb
as ‘‘Islamic bomb’’, therefore, during 21st century, both are propagating that Pakistan’s
nuclear program is insecure while increasing Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism in
region and nuclear terrorism. Nevertheless, Pakistan and China have expanded their
cooperation mainly as the result of the Indo-US civil nuclear deal that is based on
energy purposes finalized since 2008 but actually a defense-oriented deal. Pakistan and
China maintained 1986 agreement as a baseline for their nuclear energy cooperation by
signing the civil nuclear deal of 2009 and aim of providing Chasma-3 and Chasma-4
power plant by which Pakistan would overcome its severe energy problem after the
refusal of civil nuclear technology transfer to Pakistan on an equal basis as it has done
to India.
Indian and US media have portrayed Sino-Pakistan cooperation in the civil
nuclear sphere as a ‘counter’ to the Indo-US deal and equate both deals (‘World’s
Double Standards on Pakistan-China Nuclear Deal’, 2010). India and the US showed
concerns by cross-questioning about China-Pakistan civil nuclear deal of 2009.
However, both states criticized internationally when they raised the point and
demanded ‘clarification’ after the Sino-Pakistan civil nuclear deal of 2009. As
Pakistan’s stance was that India has no right to raise objections and concerns on the
agreement as India has signed a civil nuclear pact with the US, Canada is now also
exploring the possibility of civil nuclear cooperation with Japan (Bokhari, 2009).
Contrarily, the questions have been raised by China and Pakistan about the world’s
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double standards to the international community especially to the US and India.
Maleeha Lodhi, Pakistani former ambassador to the US and senior analyst argued that
‘all the fuss’ over providing Chinese nuclear power reactors to Pakistan may just be for
‘an orchestrated campaign’ against Sino-Pakistan strategic cooperation while all this
was done under full international safeguards. She stated, ‘Indian eighth civilian nuclear
deal with Canada on the sidelines of last month's G20 meeting including France, Russia
for the same kind of deals since the exemption it received from NSG in the wake of the
Indo-US nuclear accord that entered into force in 2008’ have exposed the world’s
double standards regarding non-nuclear proliferation strategy and especially Pakistan
and China altogether (Lodhi, 2010).
In the coming scenario, it is expected that continuous Indo-US strategic
engagement and using cards of the largest and most powerful democracies, their
partnership would continue to be an important factor to push China and Pakistan
together. Pakistan would help China balance its relationship with India. Pakistan would
be an important ally for China in international organizations such as the UN. This is
clearly evident by the continuous vetoing of UN resolutions backed by India and its
allies, especially the US, calling for designating Masood Azhar as a global terrorist’
(Pakistan’s Masood Azhar, 2019). Yang Jiemian, president of SIIS argues that the
Chinese want to bring a ‘new strategic framework’ wherein it could extend its strategic
partnership with Pakistan independently. Moreover, another Chinese analyst’s view is
that the continuing military competition among strategic triangle players may change
soft balancing into a hard one. Besides due to the US policy of containing China and
its competitors to US partners around the Chinese periphery, China’s top priority is to
‘maintain periphery stability and make neighbors partners’ (Akhtar, 2008/09, p. 38). In
this entire scenario, Pakistan seems the most reliable partner for China and China is
very important for Pakistan as well. For Pakistan, no other country is willing to give
nuclear weapons to Pakistan but Chinese have been giving. Both can continue to pursue
a countervailing strategy of Indo-US nuclear collaboration in the future.
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