Dalit Assertion in UP: Implications for Politics Author(s): Sudha Pai Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 32, No. 37 (Sep. 13-19, 1997), pp. 2313-2314 Published by: Economic and Political Weekly Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4405835 Accessed: 05-08-2016 05:55 UTC Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://about.jstor.org/terms JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Economic and Political Weekly is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Economic and Political Weekly This content downloaded from 14.139.45.243 on Fri, 05 Aug 2016 05:55:28 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms COMMENTARY There were no socio-cultural movements Dalit Assertion in UP among dalits in UP in the colonial period Implications for Politics delayed political mobilisation, renouncing Sudha Pai the 1940s to develop an 'Ambedkarite' social The imminent transfer this month of the chief nministership from the Scheduled Caste Federation and, in the as in Maharashtra. They also experienced 'sanskritisation' and Gandhian ideals only in identity and use 'political means' to form Mayawati to Kalyan Singh, as part of the unique power-sharing experiment between the BSP and the BJP, raises the significant question of the future direction of the dalit movement in UP. 1960s, the shortlived RPI [Lynch 1969]. .The decay of the Congress system in the 1980s and its ability to attract dalit votes, together with increasing lower caste mobilisation, provide space for the BSP. Formed in 1985, unlike the RPI, it has a IN recent years dalit assertion is a significant economic condition and political position of development which has impacted upon the be co-opted as in the past, have forged a new transfer of chief ministership on September dalits in parts of UP. A post-independence, educated, upwardly mobile, identity conscious and politicised generation has 21, from Mayawati to Kalyan Singh as part emerged in some regions, which forms the uncompromising in their opposition to the of the unique power-sharing experiment base of the BSP and has the potential to caste system. Yet the BSP has been through between the BSP and the BJP, raises the provide leadership to its backward brethren. two phases since its inception, shifting significant question of the future direction Three factors underlie this development: between three mobilisational strategies and of the dalit movement in UP, Will it blaze mobilisation by political parties thrown up correspondingly relationships with other an independent and difficult path of dalit by the democratisation of the polity, socio- parties: socio-cultural, agitational and mobilisation and uplift based upon distinct cultural movements emanating from civil electoral, portraying its difficulties in being identity, or take the shortcut of using political society; and selective development by the both a party and a social/cultural movement. power to break the existing social system state from 'above' which have combined Between 1985 and 1995 the BSP gave and introduce change? The answer lies in to challenge the traditional structures of equal importance to all the three strategies the potential of dalit unity and relationship power. In east UP where their condition leading to steady growth as a movement and with other castes in the countryside, the was very poor in the 1 960s-70s [Pai 1986] party seen in increase in its seats in the ability of the BSP to widen its base, and its society and polity of UP. The imminent militant ideology and leadership who cannot 'dalit' (poor and exploited) identity' and are women against a state average of 41.06 and the Green Revolution and increased investment in agriculture and urbanisation has increased employment opportunities in some parts, on farms, brick kilns, construction activities, and rickshaw pulling in cities, removing the absolute dependence on landowners and patron-client relations. Less prepared to suffer indignities, dalits have given up carrying/skinning of dead animals, 25.31 percent respectively. Workers are 35.29 and adopted 'sanskritisation' reflected in per cent against 32.20 per cent in the general the wearing of the sacred thread and population, and dalit householdsoperate only 9.5 per cent of cultivable land, the large abstainment from meat [Shankar 1993]. In agitations were launched such as the struggle for social transformation on August 15, 1988 for self-respect, annihilation of caste, the prosperous western plains education, untouchability, etc [for details see Pai occupational diversification, welfare/ development programmes, have been the forthcoming]. During this phase two competing mobilisational strategies of caste (chamars) approximate nearly 20 per cent of the population. Secondly, there are 66 catalyst for change [Pai and Singh 1997]. In Bundelkhand and central UP change has been slower, mobilisation and spread of the electoral process underlie dalit assertion. Correspondingly relations with the upper/middle castes range from and communalism dominated the political scene. While the BJP attempted to arrest Hindu caste cleavages arising from the Mandal reservation policy, the BSP moved closer to the SP representing the backwards both in order to 'contain' communalism and subservience/repression in remote and poorer dalit groups differentiated on the basis of socio-economic attributes. Among them the areas and militancy/tolerance in better-off regions. Clashes centre around installation jatavs known as kureels in central UP, making up about 10-12 per cent of the population, are the dominant group since the 1 920s, but are feared and disliked by the others. Scattered fairly evenly, they have three core areas; Rohillkhand, Agra and the eastern plains which is where dalit parties have constructed a base. Pasis concentrated in central UP and of Ambedkar statues, common village resources, distribution of governmental benefits, etc. Everywhere a small urban professional and entrepreneurial elite has arisen mainly among the jatavs - the first to make use of education and job quotas. establish a 'Bahujan Samaj' of the SCs, BCs, and Muslims. The victory of the latter was perceived as that of the secular forces and lower orders against entrenched upper caste rule. However, this divided the social base of parties along caste/communal lines emphasising distinct identities creating relationship with other competing political parties in UP. Making up 22 per cent of the population in UP, dalits constitute the poor and marginalised sections still looked down upon even by the most backwards. Their literacy rate is 26.85 per cent and 10.69 per cent among majority being landless labourers/poor peasants, other occupations being livestock, fishing, construction, quarrying, etc (Census of India, 1991, Unzioni PrimaryAbstract, SCs atid STs, New Delhi, 1993). Horizontal mobilisation across UP is difficult as only in Mathura and Saharanpur districts thejatavs assembly over the 1989, 1991 and 1993 elections from 13 to 66. It was a militant phase of vertical mobilisation of the poor and underprivileged, ideologisation of caste as atool to breaktheexisting system, criticism of both Gandhi and mainstream parties as manuvadi, dalit politicisation by highlighting the failures of Congress regimes, opposition to hindutva, caste-based atrocities, etc. Many violent confrontation both at the grass roots and in politics [Pai" 1994]. Today the kureels/jatavs holding Class I The fall of the SP-BSP coalition in June jobs compare favourably with the brahmin, kayastha, or vaishya communities, which However in recent years there has been has enabled Mayawati to place SC officers in the higher echelons of the bureaucracy 1995, due to clashes between dalits and backwards and their leaders, inaugurated a post-bahujan phase when the latter now hostile to the former, moved politically closer considerable improvement in the socio- (Economic Timnes, New Delhi, June4, 1995). to upper caste parties - the 13JP and the balmikis all over constitute the poorer and backward dalit groups [Mukerji 1980]. Economic and Political Weekly September This content downloaded from 14.139.45.243 on Fri, 05 Aug 2016 05:55:28 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 13, 1997 2313 Congress - which marked its conversion Mayawati - which represent social from a social/cultural movement to an engineering 'from above'. Under it, villages opportunistic party. This is seen in the two BJP-BSP coalition governments, in 1995 with 50 per cent dalit population - reduced and at present, and the realignments prior government - are provided special funds for to the 1996 assembly elections which created developmental/welfare schemes under the three political formations - the BJP, SP-UF IRDP, JRY and Nirbal Awas Yojana, etc, and the Congress-BSP - none of whom fortwo years tthrough the panchayats (records could secure a majority. However, unlike the to 22-30 per cent by the present Mayawati Mukerji, A B (1980): The Chanzars of UP, InterIndia Publications, New Delhi. Pai, Sudha (1986): ChangingAgrarian Relations in UttarPradesh: A Study ofthe North Eastern Areas, Inter-India Publications, New Delhi. - (1994): 'Caste and Communal Mobilisation in Electoral Politics in Uttar Pradesh', Indian Journal of Political Science, LV, No 3, JulySeptember: 307-20 (Special issue on State 1960s-70s when dalits supported/integrated of the block development officer, Daurala block, Meerut district, Daurala). Villages with the Congress, the BSP by the mid- have been selected in every district; for Formation, Political Consciousness and 1990s has appropriated a distinct 'political' example, 26 were selected in Zilla Sardhana, Electoral Mobilisation of Dalits in Uttar space' in UP, making it indispensable to any Meerut district in 1991-92, rising to 96 in Politics). - (forthcoming): 'From Harijans to Dalits: Identity Pradesh' in Ghanshyam Shah (ed), Dalits Society and State, Sage, New Delhi. coalition and wooed by every party. However, 1996-97 and 124 in 1997-98. Dalits are the this regressive phase has hindered growth principal beneficiaries - reservations in of its already limited vote-bank in UP. As panchayats ensuring this - and all the roads, an exclusively dalit party, it cannot attract handpumps, houses, etc, have been largely upper/middle caste votes and has a regional built in their bustees in the villages. But the Ram, Kanshi (1982): The Chamcha Age: An Era base only in central and east UP and scheme has created enclaves of development Bundelkhand, where it markedly improved benefiting the rising entrepreneurial groups of Stooges, privately printed, New Delhi. Sen, Sunil (1997): 'When Dalit Women Will its electoral performance in 1993 and 1996 among the forward rather than the really over 1991. The BSP-Congress alliance in poor dalits and BCs, creating greater social the assembly elections however enabled it fragmentation, jealousy, caste tension and to make inroads in west UP and Rohilkhand. alienation. Thus alliance with manuvadi The reasons for this shift lie in the roots parties for power by an opportunistic of the BSP which - in contrast to the dalit leadership to engineer social change from movement in Maharashtra or Karnataka - above, and a sharpening of identity and are in the BAMCEF, an all-India 'trade union' of lower middle class government employees characterise the dalit movement in UPtoday. Pai, SudhaandJagpal Singh( 1997): 'Politicisation of Dalits and Most Backward Castes: Social Conflict and Political Preference in Four Villages of Meerut District', EPW, June. Find Voice', The Times ot India, New Delhi, July 28. Shankar, Kripa( 1993): 'Agricultural Labourers in East Uttar Pradesh', EPW, June 12, 1211-14. Srinivasulu, K (1994): 'Centrality of Caste: Understanding of UP Elections', EPW, January 22, 159-60. spreading militancy at the grass roots formed in 1978, primarily to prevent caste The present BSP-BJP alliance rests upon discrimination. Its founder Kanshi Ram has a fragile and contradictory equation. The argued that electoral victory is the first step, following which social change can be to maintain their distinct identities and social introduced without a revolution [Kanshi Ram constituencies as dalit/Hindutva parties 1982]. Though its base broadened with the respectively, while a pragmatic leadership 'hardliner' factions in both parties are keen New Books from Kanishka ROOTS OF RIOTS Essays in Community Psychology by S. Omprakash formation of the Dalit Shoshit Sangharsh wants to retain hard-won political gains. The Samiti (DS-4) with a greater presence in BSP leaders particularly wish to implement This book provides an insight into the rural areas, the BSP has stayed out of major causation and mechanism of Riots and Marathwada University and the recent their two-fold programme of dalit mobilisation and uplift and have undoubtedly provided a role-model and hope to dalits in desecration of Ambedkar' s statue in Bombay. the country. There is better understanding However, the'militant phase has generated, in parts of UP, a socio-cultural process of too of the need to stay together on both sides than in 1995. Mayawati's recent statement Rs. 425 agitations such as the Namantar agitation at 'Ambedkarisation', i e, atremendous growth that she will hand over power to the BJP on in the consciousness among dalits about the the expiry of six months provided, as Kanshi Ram has emphasised, the BJP continues its social policies, raises hopes of a smooth transition and much-needed stability, yet it remains to be seen how policy differences will be dealt with as a section of the BJP life and ideas of Ambedkar. In many villages of Meerut and surrounding districts, for example, committees, libraries, schools, etc, have been named after him, his statues installed, dalit literature read, and Ravidas temples constructed by a new conscious generation. It is a movement to gain selfrespect, but voting for the BSP is seen as a political offshoot [Pai and Singh 1997]. This process received a fillip from many activities of Mayawati when in power, such as holding Periyar melas, and installation of 15,000 statues of Ambedkar in UP since assuming powerin March 1997 [Sethi 1997]. In east UP too during the 1993 assembly campaign there were visible signs of emergence of dalits - who have a legacy of antifeudal struggles-as adistinct social-political group [Srinivasulu 1994]. Parallel to these changes are innovative social policies such a.sthe 'Ambedkar Villages Scheme' - begun by the Mulayam Singh government in 1991 and continued by remains critical of the BSP. Two possibilities exist: of confrontation, breakdown and also suggests possible measures for containing and managing Riots. TWO CHILD FAMILY NORMS IN RURAL INDIA Problems and Prospects by M.M. Krishina Reddy This book has thrown a valuable light in understanding the problems as well as prospects involved in realising the two instability increasing caste tensions; alter- child family ideal among the different natively, if the BJP, conscious of the changing sections of Indian society with special mood in the country towards dalits, cooperates with the BSP the alliance may alter caste equations in the Hindi heartland, force a rewriting of the political script and in the longer term build a social legacy to which parties would have to adapt themselves. reference to rural communities in the [The data for this paper is drawn from a project 'Democracy and Social Capital in Segmented Societies' funded by the SIDA, Sweden.] References Lynch, Owen (1969): Politics of Untouchability: Social Mobility and Change in a City ol India, Columbia University Press. country. Rs. 450 KANISHKA PUBLISHERS, DISTRIBUTORS 4697/5-21A, Ansari Road, Daryagani, New Delhi 110002 (India) Phones: 327 0497, 328 8285 Fax: 11-328 0028 (KANISHKA) 2314 Economic and Political Weekly September 13, 1997 This content downloaded from 14.139.45.243 on Fri, 05 Aug 2016 05:55:28 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms