Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 21, Issue - 2, 2014, 81:90
Pak US Relations: Allies under Compulsion?
Ijaz Khan, Shahid Ali Khattak and Minhas Majeed Marwat*
Abstract
Pakistan US relations are fundamental to the ‘War against
Terrorism’. The history of their bilateral relations is full of getting
very close and then drifting part. They strongly disagree on most
issues but then situations arise that brings them together.
Pakistan saw its interests in Afghanistan best served through
Taliban, however, US after 1998 and especially after 9/11
considered them as the biggest threat. Pakistan due to its
geography was vital to US strategy in Afghanistan. US is also
very important for Pakistan economically and also as a supplier
of weapons. So, despite divergences they have been compelled
to be allies.
Key Words: Pakistan, United States, Allies, Afghanistan, Terrorism, Security,
Comprehensive Security, Counter Terrorism, Taliban, TTP, 9/11, Strategic,
Conventional Conflict, Al-Qaeda
September 11, 2001 (now referred to as 9/11) added new aspects to
international system having a bearing on Interstate Relations. This incident
had direct effect on the US global security policy in the days to come. Osama
bin Laden and his organization Al-Qaeda were directly blamed by the United
States for the 9/11 attacks. The President of the United States termed these
attacks as an act of war and pledged that the organization and its leaders
responsible for these attacks would be taken to task for attacking the USA.
Meanwhile Islamabad started sensing the crises because of its geographical
proximity with Afghanistan and being the supporter of the Taliban, Pakistan
felt compelled to make tough decisions in the new security situation.
This study is an analytical overview of Pakistan US relations. It focuses on the
post 9/11 relations strongly based in the history of their bilateral relations, with
some changes brought by 9/11. The study breaks these relations in the pre
and post 9/11 eras. It brings out the compulsions on both sides to remain
allies despite many divergences in interests and objectives.
Pak-US Relations before 9/11
In South Asia despite the ever emerging global concept of comprehensive
security, interstate conflicts and the traditional concerns of military security still
__________________________________
*Authors are Professor and Lecturers in the Department of International Relations,
University of Peshawar, KPK – Pakistan.
Ijaz Khan et al.
remain an important phenomenon. The unsettled issue of Kashmir and other
disputes between Pakistan and India remain a major threat of conventional or
non-conventional conflict between the two (Moni, 2012). Therefore the
relationship with the United States remains the determining factor for Pakistan
in its power equation with India.
Both Pakistan and the US had to depend on each other for their own strategic,
political and security reasons. Since Pakistan’s independence India due to its
military and economic dominance was the main security concern for Pakistan.
To balance those threats Pakistan was compelled to search for foreign
defense cooperation (Sattar, 2007: 40). The United States was the only
potential source of military and economic assistance for Pakistan (Sattar,
2007). Pakistan’s security policy has always been India centric and the
convergence of security interests between Pakistan and USA was natural as
India was a close strategic ally of the former USSR during the cold war. United
States had begun to recognize the value of Pakistan’s geographical location
as early as 1949, when the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC) said
that Pakistan is useful for military or non-military operations against the Soviet
Union and is a base for strategic US forces for the defense of oil rich Middle
Eastern region (Arif, 1984:70-78).
Pak-US security relations revolve around three important aspects i.e. Political,
economic and military relations. However, for Pakistan all these aspects are
underwritten by the Indian threat perception (Saleem, 14, july.2011). Babani
Sen Gupta writes in his book that along with the threat perceptions from India,
the geo-strategic environment has also caused a serious security problems for
Pakistan, since it is situated in the region described as the fulcrum of Asia
(Gupta, 1970: 178-240). That is why Pakistan while devising its security policy
always has to consider the posture of the super power i.e. the USA towards
this region. Moreover Pakistan always needed and was supported
economically and militarily by the United States which helped Pakistan in
maintaining its defensive posture vis-à-vis India. On the other hand the US
needed Pakistan as part of its security arrangement against the spread of
communism during the cold war. Though United States has always been a
stronger and bigger power in this equation of security relations between
Pakistan and the US but still there existed some level of co-dependency
between the two states. The US and Pakistan remained engaged with each
other through various security alliances since 1950’s for the purpose of
enhancing their respective national security. The security pacts between the
powerful and weak nations are usually the result of the threats perceived by
the prospective partners to their national security. Usually in times of extreme
international emergencies or wars to be fought against common enemy
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Pak US Relations: Allies under Compulsion?
convergences may be achieved between the powerful and weaker partners
through the alliances. Still divergences occur regarding the tactics adopted for
the said purpose. Whatever the intentions of the powerful state may be, the
ultimate shape of an alliance between the powerful and weak state is that of
the dominance of the big power over the weak state (Hasnat, Pelinka, Anton:
35-36). Christopher Gelpi Suggests that the weaker states may compromise
on its foreign policy autonomy for the security they expect from the powerful
ally. To compensate for such security, the smaller states let the powerful ally
to have control over some aspects of their foreign or domestic policies
considered important by the powerful ally for its own security interests. The
powerful states will always use the alliances to influence and shape the
behaviors of weaker allies (Gelpi, 1999: 107-139). This has always been the
case between Pakistan and the US.
In the 1980’s Pakistan was respected in the world arena for its struggle
against Soviet occupation in Afghanistan. Towards the end of the decade of
1980’s the trend was reversed. Pakistan’s nuclear program became the
irritating element in its relations with the west and in particular with the United
States. The apprehensions about Pakistan sponsoring terrorism resurfaced.
Since Pakistan was the first state to recognize the Taliban regime thus it was
internationally perceived to be the creation of Pakistan (Rashid, 2000).
Pakistan faced tough economic sanctions after 1998 nuclear tests, whereas
Kargil episode also projected Pakistan as an ‘irresponsible’ state. General
Musharraf (Army) coup and the over throw of an elected government in
October 1999, subjected Pakistan more to the democracy related sanctions.
On the eve of 9/11 Pakistan was facing an increasing diplomatic isolation.
One of the main reasons of this growing isolation was the USA’s conspicuous
tilt towards India in the post-cold war regional and international politics. During
the cold war era Pakistan had been the US’s ally against Soviet Union
whereas India was a close ally of the Soviet Union. With the disintegration of
Soviet Union Pakistan while losing its strategic importance was relegated to
the list of rogue states from that of a front line ally of the USA (Khan, 2012: 4849).
From the US point of view, there are two interpretations of the concept of
security, including positive and negative ones. The realists support a negative
interpretation, when security means the absence of direct physical threat
against the country and its citizen from an external enemy. The negative
interpretation of security is the basis of the traditional approach to security.
The positive approach to the concept of security put one step forward, and
adds the citizen welfare to the concept of security of the state. Positive
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Ijaz Khan et al.
interpretation dominated during the period between the end of the Cold War
and the events of 9/11. The events of 9/11 changed the nature of security and
its interpretations, especially for the United States. The security of a state (The
US) was threatened this time not by another country, which was the basis of
the negative approach, but by a new enemy called ‘Terrorism’. Terrorism
targeted inside territorial borders of a state. Therefore in the security of the
United States, combination of both positive and negative interpretations on the
concept of security can be traced in the post 9/11 period. The presence of a
threat such as terrorists and rogue states were interpreted according to the
negative approach to national security, while the positive approach was
employed in stabilizing and democratizing the potential states that harbor
terrorism.(Yusof, Soltani, 2012 ). Pak-US security relations in the post 9/11
era also oscillate between the negative and positive approaches to the
concept of security. The security approach which is only dependent on military
is inadequate to deal with the nature of threats to the security of South Asia in
the post 9/11 situation. Therefore it is now imperative to consider the
nonmilitary threats and security concerns also.
Since the security dynamics of South Asia have changed, the external players
have started adding new dimensions to the existing security issues. Pakistan
again became significant in the regional security interests of the United States.
Pakistanis had to re orient Pakistan’s security policy, Pakistan could no longer
preserve its strategic position in Afghanistan at the cost of its relations with
Washington, but to support the US intervention to hunt down Al-Qaeda and
Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. The US action just across Pakistan’s
western borders in Afghanistan has created multifaceted challenges and
unintended security concerns for Pakistan. The growing religious militancy,
anti-Americanism and the growing strategic relationship between the US and
India added new dimensions to Pakistan’s threat perceptions. Presence of
NATO forces in Afghanistan is another external factor that has a significant
impact the security dynamics of South Asia (Mazari, 2006). The idea is
supported by Robert Gilpin, when he says that a dominant power defines the
rules of international security and makes the repercussions for smaller powers
to redefine its security and foreign policies (Gilpin, 1981:22). According to
Mansur Akbar Kundi the US has always defined its rules of the system for
Pakistan in favor of its own (US) national interests, particularly after 9/11 when
the US is behaving like a hegemon rather than partner in its relationship with
Pakistan (Kundi, 2009). Strategically it is very important for Washington in
staying committed to Pakistan’s security and still not to give any convincing
evidence which impacts negatively on the security perception of India. The
United States after 9/11 needed Pakistan’s support by all means and Pakistan
was compelled to abandon its long term strategic vision of ‘strategic depth’
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Pak US Relations: Allies under Compulsion?
under its immediate security compulsions, hence decided to join the US in its
‘War on Terror’. Pakistan-United States relationship in the post 9/11 era has
been determined by an intersection between the global and regional level
security concerns. Pakistan and the United States is a security complex
whose primary security concerns are so closely and sufficiently linked that the
mutual dependence of their respective national securities cannot be
realistically ignored. After 9/11 religious extremism and terrorism in Af-Pak
region has become an imminent threats to global peace and security. United
States securitized these changes in politico-ideological and strategic
environment and the fight against them became a common factor that
determines the trends in the Pak-US bilateral security relationship. This
relationship have had a number of implications for Pakistan’s security at all the
three levels i.e., domestic, regional and global. Security stakes for Pakistan in
this equation are much higher compared to that of the US but still this regional
security complex is very crucial for the US regional and global security
interests.
Pakistan according to General Musharraf had four critical security concerns to
safeguard by entering into this new phase of security relations with
Washington after 9/11. They were security from any external threat (India), the
revival of Pakistan’s economy, protecting nuclear and missiles assets
(Strategic Assets) and Pakistan’s support for Kashmir cause (Rizwan, 2010:
39-68). Pakistan also wanted the US to support the formation of Pakistan’s
friendly government in the post-Taliban Afghanistan. Above all Pakistan was
concerned that if Pakistan declines to cooperate then it can become the target
of the United States wrath, as the US had already threatened. Thus Pakistan
at this juncture had bandwagoned into an alliance with the superior and
threatening power i.e. the USA ( Walt, 1987).
The US primary concern was to fight extremism, terrorism and hunting down
Al-Qaeda in the Af-Pak region, which was not possible without Pakistan’s
assistance and help. The US also wanted Pakistan to end its support for
Taliban and to apprehend the fugitive Al-Qaeda and Taliban elements running
from Afghanistan into Pakistan after US invasion of Afghanistan in October
2001. The US was also very skeptical about clandestine nuclear proliferation
by Pakistan, which could become an enormous global security hazard. Since
Pakistan has indigenous problems of poverty, bad governance, lack of
representative governments and a history of alleged reliance on non-state
actors to protect its security interests vis-à-vis India. This makes Pakistan
more vulnerable to be overrun politically by extremists taking control of the
state power and the nuclear assets while putting the whole region subject to
nuclear blackmail. According to Robert G. Wiring Pak-US strategic relations
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depended on many factors, which includes the state of Pakistan’s
confrontational relations with India, its willingness to adopt democratic
principles and free market economy, the level of religious influence in state
identity and the pursuit of nuclear weapons. Pakistan strategic utility is always
measured through its willingness to adjust Pakistan’s national interests with
that of the US policy imperatives of the day. In this dependent relationship
Washington’s strategic necessity and Pakistan’s capacity for adapting to it
determines the course of Pak-US security relations (Wirsing, 2003:70-78).
Pak US Relations After 9/11
9/11 also marked the beginning of rethinking of strategic and security relations
between the United States and Pakistan. The USA alleged Pakistan and its
security agencies for supporting and protecting the extremists. The refusal of
the Taliban government to hand over Osama bin Laden compelled the USA to
revise its security policy in the region. This revision and reorganization of the
post 9/11 security policy of the USA regarding Afghanistan has a deep and
direct impact on Pakistan-US security relations. The contours of US policy
began to emerge, with the US President’s statement of ‘monumental struggle
of good versus evil’ G.W. Bush Press statement: Sept 12, 2001 (G.W.Bush,
2001). The Secretary of State Colin Powell said that the US expects ‘the
fullest cooperation’ (Powell, 2001) from Pakistan. President Bush also said
that those harboring terrorists would be treated as terrorist, in a press
conferences he replied to a question that ‘We will give the Pakistani
government a chance to cooperate (Bush, 2001) in which the note of warning
was not mistakable.
9/11 provided India with new opportunity to get further closer to the United
States because India expected Pakistan not to abandon Pakistan’s support for
Taliban. India was trying to blackmail Pakistan by establishing a link between
freedom struggle in Kashmir with the unfolding US ‘War on Terror’. But on the
other side it was only the ‘War on Terror’ which fully re-established Pakistan’s
relations with the USA.
Pakistan made a strategic presumption that US would react to 9/11 attacks
with much greater force and Pakistan had to avoid any confrontation with the
US policies because Pakistan’s non cooperation would provoke US hostilities
against Pakistan also. It was therefore extremely important to make a
decision, keeping in view the national interests and realistic assessment of the
strategic environment. Pakistan had to cooperate where its national security
interests converged with those of the USA and avoid where they diverged.
The Indian threat perception was one of the most important security concerns
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Pak US Relations: Allies under Compulsion?
for Pakistan to join the ‘War on Terror’. The post 9/11 political and strategic
developments at regional and global level did not let India fulfill its desire to
isolate Pakistan internationally. India got further frustrated when Pakistan
became the front line ally of the United States in the War on Terror. The visibly
increasing US tilt towards India was put on hold because the security interests
of both Pakistan and the USA seemed to converge at this point. Pakistan to
get full benefit from its front line status also needed to lower the
confrontational profile in its relations with India. This was because the tension
on Pakistan’s eastern border was not compatible with Pakistan’s role as US
ally in the new regional security situation particularly in the fight against
terrorism on its western borders with Afghanistan. 9/11 provided a strategic
opportunity for the USA to ensure its presence in the region. On 13th
September, Richard Armitage the US assistant Secretary of State for South
Asia summoned Dr. Maleeha Lodhi then Pakistan’s ambassador in USA and
the Director General of ISI, then on his official visit to Washington DC and
conveyed the list of seven demands the USA wanted Pakistan to fulfill.
Pakistan had a choice to make, that either it was with the US or it was not?
Islamabad gave a prompt and generally a positive response when the US
official request was made. Pakistan followed a strategy expected to reduce
threats to Pakistan’s own internal and external security interests. Pakistan had
to avoid any confrontation with the US while being careful that any policy
might not offend the interest or sensibilities of the Afghan People (Sattar,
2007). Islamabad was mindful of the value and importance of its contribution
to the fight against terrorism and made known to the US about Islamabad’s
expectations of the termination of the so called nonproliferation and
democracy related sanctions, and the resumption of economic support and
assistance.
Conclusion
The 9/11 terrorists attacks in the US changed the political and security
environment of the world and in particular of South Asia. Old friends became
foes and foes have become allies. Security and political interests of the United
States and regional players were redefined. Pakistan found itself in the middle
of the storm, while enjoying the status of being an ally of the world most
powerful state in the ‘War on Terror’ also has to confront it in areas where the
security interests diverged with the same powerful state. Afghanistan and the
Taliban became the target of the United States wrath, as Al-Qaeda and
Osama bin laden were present in Afghanistan under the protection of Taliban,
who were blamed for having executed the 9/11 attacks in the United States.
Pakistan became a focal point also because of its geographical, ideological,
cultural political and security interests and relations with Afghanistan. Pakistan
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had to abandon the support for Taliban under the US pressures and became a
front line ally in the global ‘War on Terror’ because of its own security reasons
vis-à-vis India and the US pressures. Moreover, General Musharraf also found
it as an opportunity to support Pakistan’s falling economy and restore its
diplomatic stature which it lost after the military takeover on October 12, 1999.
The post 9/11 relationship between Pakistan and USA has both elements of
convenience and force. It appears Pakistan felt compelled to find convenience
in allying itself with the USA in ‘War on Terror’.
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