International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications, Volume 2, Issue 10, October 2012
ISSN 2250-3153
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INDO – US Nuclear Deal and 123 Agreements
Dr. Sunil Kumar Jangir
Head of Dept. Political science, JJT University, Chudela (Rajasthan), INDIA
Abstract- The process of Indo-US nuclear deal could be said to
have started on July 18, 2005 with the issue of joint statement by
the India Prime Minister and the United States (US) President.
Subsequently, much of debate took place both in India and the
US on issues related to granting special nuclear status to India
and India joining a pro US camp. This deal has been viewed as a
beginning of special relationship between India and the US.
However, it took five years for the official start of first Indo-US
strategic dialogue which took place at Washington during June
2010. Unfortunately, for all these years the other dimensions of
this strategic relationship which were clearly articulated during
July 2005 did not get much of publicity. This paper attempts to
analyze various non nuclear dimensions of Indo-US strategic
cooperation which include Economic Growth and Trade
Promotion, Energy and the Environment, Democracy and
Development, Non-Proliferation and Security and High
Technology and Space.
Index Terms- India, United States, Nuclear, Strategic, High
Technology, Energy and the Environment
I. INTRODUCTION
T
he civilian nuclear cooperation deal with the United States is
only one part of the wide-ranging alliance that the UPA
government sought to forge with the United States. The strategic
alliance with the United States as stated in the joint statement of
July 2005 by the Indian Prime Minister and the US President has
four aspects. The political, which involves India joining the US
bandwagon of “spreading democracy” around the world; the
economic, involving a strategic partnership based on a blueprint
for US capital; the military, expressed through the Defense
Framework Agreement; and fourthly the Nuclear Cooperation
Agreement. Prior to the joint statement of July 2005, the UPA
government signed a ten-year Defense Framework Agreement
with the United States. It is evident that without the defense
agreement, the Americans would not have agreed for the nuclear
cooperation. This seems to be part of a quid.
II. HISTORY OF INDIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM
In the 1950s, the United States helped India develop nuclear
energy under the Atoms for Peace program. The United States
built a nuclear reactor for India, provided nuclear fuel for a time,
and allowed Indian scientists study at U.S. nuclear laboratories.
In 1968, India refused to sign the NPT, claiming it was biased. In
1974, India tested its first nuclear bomb, showing it could
develop nuclear weapons with technology transferred for
peaceful purposes. As a result, the United States isolated India
for twenty-five years, refusing nuclear cooperation and trying to
convince other countries to do the same. But since 2000, the
United States has moved to build a "strategic partnership" with
India, increasing cooperation in fields including spaceflight,
satellite technology, and missile defense.
III. STRATEGIC ALLIANCE WITH UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
The Manmohan Singh government has followed on the
footsteps of the BJP-led government in accepting the US rhetoric
on democracy. All the India-US joint statements accord primacy
to “democracy” and “freedom.” This implicitly conveys the
message that India is politically and ideologically with the US in
its crusade to project democracy and freedom as weapons to
enforce regime change, prise open economies and establish US
hegemony in countries and regions. If the BJP-led government
enthusiastically joined the democracy bandwagon by cosponsoring the Community of Democracies the UPA government
embraced the Global Democracy Initiative announced in the July
2005 joint statement. The UPA government has forced out $10
million for the UN Democracy Fund, which has been set up
under US urging.
Two significant steps in the economic sphere were announced
in the Bush Manmohan Singh joint statement issued during the
Bush visit to India in March 2006. A report of the US-India CEO
Forum titled “US-India Strategic Economic Partnership,” which
was released during the Bush visit, was welcomed in the joint
statement “agreeing to consider its recommendations.” Secondly,
a US-India Agricultural Knowledge Initiative, which was
announced during Manmohan Singh‟s US visit, was formally
launched. The unequal nature of the strategic economic
partnership between the American and Indian corporate can be
gauged from the fact that 21 out of the 30 recommendations of
the CEO Forum were exclusively meant for India, most of them
in the form of demands for policy changes related to specific
sectors of the Indian economy to the obvious benefits of the US
corporate. This includes liberalization of norms for Infrastructure
investments, market-driven reforms in the Power and Oil & Gas
sector, further liberalization of the Telecom sector and ensuring a
“level playing field” between the private and public sector
telecom companies, raising the FDI cap in the Insurance sector,
liberalization of norms for FDI in Banking, liberalization of FDI
norms in Retail Trade, removal of FDI caps in sectors such as
print media, broadcasting, cable and satellite systems and ecommerce, liberalizing restrictions on FDI in the Real Estate and
initiating urban reforms like removal of urban land ceiling,
reducing stamp duty etc., liberalization of Defense Procurement
norms, liberalization of FDI in Higher Education and so on. The
Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, who also cochairs India US Economic Dialogue, had promptly announced
the formation of 24 committees to take the recommendations of
the CEO Forum forward. While such alacrity to serve the
interests of the US corporate met with domestic opposition, the
Report of the CEO Forum continues to be displayed in the
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ISSN 2250-3153
official website of the Planning Commission. The CEO Forum
recommendations have since been earnestly pursued by the UPA
government, often overriding the NCMP.
The vision of foreign and domestic agribusiness driven
agriculture underlying the Agricultural Knowledge Initiative is
inappropriate for a country like India dominated by peasant
agriculture. The efforts by the UPA government to allow large
scale procurement of food grain by corporate, promote contract
farming and futures trading in food grain and open up retail trade
to FDI are influenced by such a distorted vision, which is in
conflict with the commitments made in the NCMP.
IV. DEFENCE AGREEMENT
The ten-year Defense Framework Agreement was signed in
June 2005. It was a precursor to the joint statement issued in
July, just three weeks later. Such a wide-ranging military
collaboration agreement has not been signed by India with any
country since independence. The agreement provides for joint
operations by the two armed forces in military operations outside
the auspices of the United Nations; the agreement aims
“interoperability” of the armed forces; the two sides will work
for missile defense cooperation; sale of US weapons to India and
co-production is another feature. Under this pact, India has
agreed to work out a Logistics Support Agreement (otherwise
known as the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement) with
the United States and a Maritime Security Cooperation between
the two navies. Regular joint exercises and military training of
Indian officers in the United States are already underway. This
Defense Framework Agreement alone is sufficient to change the
entire security and strategic orientation of India.
Following the announcement of the bilateral nuclear
cooperation agreement in July 2007, Nicholas Burns, the Under
Secretary of State, who was responsible for negotiating the
bilateral agreement, in the official briefing after the 123
agreement was reached, said: “And I think now that we have
consummated the civil nuclear trade between us, if we look down
the road in the future, we‟re going to see far greater defense
cooperation between the United State and India: training;
exercises; we hope, defense sales of American military
technology to the Indian armed forces.”
V. NUCLEAR DEAL AND ENERGY
The major argument advanced by the UPA government is that
the nuclear agreement is vital for India to end its nuclear
isolation, without which it will not be possible to meet the
country‟s energy requirements in the future. This ignores the
very limited contribution that nuclear power makes to our overall
energy generation which is less than 3 per cent. It cannot exceed
7 per cent even if the ambitious plans for expansion to 20,000
MW are implemented by 2020. While talking about energy
security, the cost of nuclear power has to be factored in. We
should continue to develop nuclear technology based on the
three-phased program me. But the expansion of nuclear power
cannot become the central focus for energy security. The cost of
power per unit generated for imported nuclear reactor will be
twice that of a coal-based plant. The capital required to set up a
plant with an imported reactor will be thrice that of a coal-based
plant. So, what does it mean in terms of investment to set a target
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of 20,000 MW of nuclear power by 2020, or the more ambitious
40,000 MW target set out by the Prime Minister? The
government has not conducted any techno-economic study on the
feasibility and cost of nuclear power.
The implementation of the nuclear cooperation agreement will
hamper the pursuit of a self-reliant nuclear technology policy for
peaceful purposes based on the three-phase nuclear energy
program me. There will be an unacceptable price to be paid.
While negotiating for the nuclear deal, the United States
simultaneously opposed India going ahead with the Iran pipeline
project. The strategic alliance with the US will constrain India
from accessing energy from Iran and working for an Asian
energy security grid which will link Central Asia, West Asia and
South Asia. After the Hyde Act was adopted in December 2006,
the CPI(M) had stated that it contains provisions which are
contrary to the assurances given by the Prime Minister to
Parliament on August 17, 2006. The CPI (M) had repeatedly
asked the government not to proceed with the bilateral
negotiations for the 123 agreement, till this matter was cleared
up. But the government did not heed this advice too. The tenyear Defense Framework Agreement was signed in June 2005. It
was a precursor to the joint statement issued in July, just three
weeks later. Such a wide-ranging military collaboration
agreement has not been signed by India with any country since
Independence. The agreement provides for joint operations by
the two armed forces in military operations outside the auspices
of the United Nations; the agreement aims “interoperability” of
the armed forces; the two sides will work for missile defense
cooperation; sale of US weapons to India and co-production is
another feature. Under this pact, India has agreed to work out a
Logistics Support Agreement (otherwise known as the
Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement) with the United
States and a Maritime Security Cooperation between the two
navies. Regular joint exercises and military training of Indian
officers in the United States are already underway. This Defense
Framework Agreement alone is sufficient to change the entire
security and strategic orientation of India. Following the
announcement of the bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement in
July 2007, Nicholas Burns, the Under Secretary of State, who
was responsible for negotiating the bilateral agreement, in the
official briefing after the 123 agreement was reached, said: “And
I think now that we have consummated the civil nuclear trade
between American us, if we look down the road in the future,
we‟re going to see far greater defense cooperation between the
United State and India: training; exercises; we hope, defense
sales of military technology to the Indian armed forces.”
VI. SECTION (123) AGREEMENT
Under existing law (Atomic Energy Act [AEA] of 1954, as
amended; P.L. 95-242; 42 U.S.C. §2153 et seq.) all significant
U.S. nuclear cooperation with other countries requires a peaceful
nuclear cooperation agreement. Significant nuclear cooperation
includes the transfer of U.S.-origin special nuclear material
subject to licensing for commercial, medical, and industrial
purposes. Such agreements, which are “congressional-executive
agreements” requiring congressional approval, do not guarantee
that cooperation will take place or that nuclear material will be
transferred, but rather set the terms of reference and authorize
cooperation. The AEA includes requirements for an agreement‟s
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International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications, Volume 2, Issue 10, October 2012
ISSN 2250-3153
content, conditions for the President to exempt an agreement
from those requirements, presidential determinations and other
supporting information to be submitted to Congress, conditions
affecting the implementation of an agreement once it takes effect,
and procedures for Congress to consider and approve the
agreement. Section 123 of the AEA requires that any agreement
for nuclear cooperation meet nine nonproliferation criteria and
that the President submit any such agreement to the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations. The Department of State is required to
provide the President an unclassified Nuclear Proliferation
Assessment Statement (NPAS), which the President is to submit,
along with the agreement, to those two committees. The State
Department is also required to provide a classified annex to the
NPAS, prepared in consultation with the Director of National
Intelligence. The NPAS is meant to explain how the agreement
meets the AEA nonproliferation requirements. The President
must also make a written determination “that the performance of
the proposed agreement will promote and will not constitute an
unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security.”
VII. FEATURE OF THE 123 AGREEMENT
•The Agreement could be a major contributor to our energy
security. For India it is critical that we maintain our current
economic growth rate of 8 to 10 per cent per annum if we are to
achieve the goal of eradicating poverty. Inadequacy of energy
supply is one of the primary constraints on accelerating India‟s
growth rate. We are trying to expand all forms of energy
production in a manner which takes care of concerns about
environment. Nuclear energy is a logical choice in this context
and can make a larger contribution to our overall energy mix.
At present its share is only about 3%. We have an ambitious
program me to increase our nuclear energy generating capacity to
20,000 MWe by 2020 and double this by 2030. While our
domestic three stage programme continues, using our own
uranium resources, this Agreement, by adding additional
capacity quickly, would help us to reach that target soon.
•The Agreement also opens the door for cooperation in civil
nuclear energy with other countries. We are already discussing
with France and Russia similar bilateral cooperation agreements
on civil nuclear energy. Once the NSG adopts an exemption to its
Guidelines we hope to operationalise all these agreements.
•The Agreement places India in a special category as a “State
possessing advanced nuclear technology”, like the United States,
with both parties “having the same benefits and advantages”.
•The Agreement provides for full civil nuclear energy
cooperation covering nuclear reactors and
aspects of the
associated nuclear fuel cycle including enrichment and
reprocessing.
•The Agreement provides for nuclear trade, transfer of nuclear
material, equipment, components, and related technologies and
for cooperation in nuclear fuel cycle activities.
•The Agreement contains a full reflection of the March 2, 2006
supply assurances, its linkage to safeguards in perpetuity and the
provision for corrective measures in case of disruption of fuel
supply.
•The Agreement provides for the development of a strategic
reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply
over the lifetime of India‟s reactors.
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•The Agreement provides for the application of IAEA safeguards
to transferred material and equipment. There is no provision that
mandates scrutiny of our nuclear weapons program me or any
unsafeguarded nuclear facility.
VIII. REQUIREMENT UNDER THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
Section 123 of the AEA specifies the necessary steps for
engaging in nuclear cooperation with another country.
Section 123(a) States that the proposed agreement is to include
the terms, conditions, duration, nature, and scope of cooperation
and lists nine criteria that the agreement must meet. It also
contains provisions for the President to exempt an agreement
from any of several criteria described in that section and includes
details on the kinds of information the executive branch must
provide to Congress.
Section 123(b) specifies the process for submitting the text of the
agreement to Congress.
Section 123(c) specifies how Congress approves cooperation
agreements that are limited in scope (e.g., do not transfer nuclear
material or cover reactors larger than 5 MWe). This report does
not discuss such agreements.
Section 123(d) specifies how Congress approves agreements that
do cover significant nuclear cooperation (transfer of nuclear
material or reactors larger than 5 MWe), including exempted
agreements.
IX. TERMS OF THE DEAL
The details of the deal include the following:
•India agrees to allow inspectors from the International Atomic
Energy Association (IAEA), the United Nations' nuclear
watchdog group, access to its civilian nuclear program. By
March 2006, India promised to place fourteen of its twenty-two
power reactors under IAEA safeguards permanently. Teresina
Schaffer, director of the South Asia program at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, says these will include
domestically built plants, which India has not been willing to
safeguard before now. India has promised that all future civilian
thermal and breeder reactors shall be placed under IAEA
safeguards permanently. However, the Indian prime minister
says New Delhi "retains the sole right to determine such reactors
as civilian." According to him: "This means that India will not be
constrained in any way in building future nuclear facilities,
whether civilian or military, as per our national requirements."
Military facilities-and stockpiles of nuclear fuel that India has
produced up to now-will be exempt from inspections or
safeguards..
•India works toward negotiating a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
(FMCT) with the United States banning the production of fissile
material for weapons purposes. India agrees to prevent the spread
of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that don't
possess them and to support international nonproliferation
efforts.
•U.S. companies will be allowed to build nuclear reactors in
India and provide nuclear fuel for its civilian energy program.
(An approval by the Nuclear Suppliers Group lifting the ban on
India has also cleared the way for other countries to make
nuclear fuel and technology sales to India.)
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X. OBJECTION OF THE AGREEMENT
Critics call the terms of the agreement overly beneficial for
India and lacking sufficient safeguards to prevent New Delhi
from continuing to produce nuclear weapons. "We are going to
be sending, or allowing others to send, fresh fuel to India-including yellowcake and lightly enriched uranium--that will free
up Indian domestic sources of fuel to be solely dedicated to
making many more bombs than they would otherwise have been
able to make," says Henry Stokowski, executive director of the
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, a nonprofit
organization dedicated to improving awareness of proliferation
issues. While India has pledged that any U.S. assistance to its
civilian nuclear energy program will not benefit its nuclear
weapons program, experts say India could use the imported
nuclear fuel to feed its civilian energy program while diverting
its own nuclear fuel to weapons production. New Delhi has done
similar things in the past; India claimed it was using nuclear
technology for civilian purposes right up until its first nuclear
weapons test in 1974. A Congressional Research Service report
(PDF) on the agreement states, "There are no measures in this
global partnership to restrain India's nuclear weapons program."
XI. WHO NEEDS TO APPROVE THE AGREEMENT
The final terms of the nuclear deal were approved by the
following bodies before they could be implemented:
•(IAEA.) India signed a safeguards agreement with the IAEA
under which all nuclear material and equipment transferred to it
by the United States as a part of this deal shall be subject to
safeguards. In August 2008, the IAEA's Board of Governors
approved an India-specific safeguards agreement (PDF). The
IAEA said it will begin to implement the new agreement in 2009,
with the aim of bringing fourteen Indian reactors under agency
safeguards by 2014. The IAEA currently applies safeguards to
six of these fourteen nuclear reactors under previous agreements.
IAEA Director General Mohamed El Baradei says the IAEA and
India are in dialogue concerning an additional protocol to the
draft safeguards agreement.
•(India's Parliament.) While the deal does not require a formal
vote by the parliament, the coalition government has faced a
confidence vote over it. Many parliamentarians oppose the deal,
arguing it will limit India's sovereignty and hurt its security.
Some Indian nuclear experts are protesting what they see as
excessive U.S. participation in deciding which of India's nuclear
facilities to define as civilian, and open to international
inspections under the plan.
•(Congress.) In October 2008, the U.S. Congress gave final
approval to the bill. Under the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, which
regulates the trade of nuclear material, congressional approval
was needed to pass the exemptions to U.S. laws required for the
nuclear deal to be implemented. Some members of Congress
were resistant, and called for India to commit to strict limits on
its nuclear weapons program before the deal went through. There
is a potential area of dispute with India over the terms for
suspending the agreement. Before clearing the bill, the U.S.
Senate rejected an amendment that would require U.S. nuclear
supplies to be cut off if India tests nuclear weapons. The deal
does not explicitly impose that condition, though it is part of a
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2006 law known as the Hyde Act, which gave the deal
preliminary approval.
XII. ADVANTAGE OF THE NUCLEAR DEAL TO INDIA AND THE
U.S.A
Under the new civil nuclear agreement, India has agreed to
separate its civilian and military programs and to put two-thirds
of its existing reactors, and 65 percent of its generating power,
under permanent safeguards with international verification, and
in return the United States would be under commitment to supply
nuclear fuel and technology to India. This is very vital for India,
because one of the biggest constraints for the continuing success
of its fast-growing economy is the electricity shortage. Nuclear
energy, which at present accounts for only about 3 percent of
India‟s total electricity generation, is an attractive alternative to
coal and expensive imported oil and gas. The fourteen nuclear
power plants India has agreed to put under International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards exemplify approximately
3,000megawatts or 3 gig watts of generating capacity. By 2020,
India plans to add another 12-16 gig watts of nuclear generating
capacity to increase its current capacity. , World Energy Outlook
(2004,) As presently nuclear power plays a very marginal role in
India‟s growth, therefore in some quarters it is also being felt that
even by 2020, nuclear power will contribute only about seven
percent of India‟s total generating capacity and thus would make
only a very marginal difference in India‟s electricity scene. It is
also being argued that though the nuclear power could help India
in addressing its energy problems to some extent, but it would
not make a major difference in the energy sector and also
contribute a little to satisfy the needs of its transportation sector.
But on the other hand it is being believed by the supporters of
nuclear energy that in the future, nuclear power might play an
even bigger role. In view of the various problems associated with
the other sources of energy and to satisfy India‟s huge
population‟s growing energy needs, projected to increase fourfold within 25 years, this group believes that without aggravating
its dependence on oil from the Middle East or excessively
contributing to pollution and global warming, the growing
energy needs could be fulfilled by using the nuclear energy.
Ashton B. Carter,(2005)
Unfortunately, though, 17 percent of the world‟s population
resides in India but it has a very trivial portion of the world‟s oil
and gas reserves. Therefore in the absence of a reliable source of
electricity, industries and households mostly are dependent on
scarce and costly energy sources like petroleum, natural gas and
coal to produce electricity to meet its requirements. Rahul
Tongia (2006) In view of India‟s dependence on imported oil,
gas and coal to produce electricity which is not a very practical
alternative for meeting India‟s rapidly increasing electricity and
energy needs, it is being opined that these limited sources,
besides hampering India‟s growth and development, would also
add to India‟s mounting pollution problems. They also argue that
though coal would continue to be a major source of fuel for
generating electricity, that the increasing prices of petroleum and
natural gas and the need to control and manage the problem of
pollution would push India like other countries to adopt cleaner
means of generating electricity. In fact the worries about growing
pollution levels have also forced as many as thirty countries in
the world to restart their nuclear power plants. Presently the
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United States is the biggest producer of nuclear energy, with 103
nuclear power plants and 27 percent of the global nuclear
generating capacity, and rising natural gas prices have
contributed to extensions of nuclear plant licenses in the United
States, the United Kingdom, and Germany. China, with just nine
nuclear power plants also intends to build thirty new nuclear
plants by 2020. (Mark Bucknam, (2007)
In view of the scarcity of alternative sources of electricity
generation and India‟s mounting energy needs to match its
economic progress India has perceived this agreement as a means
of fulfilling its energy needs. The United States, on the other,
hand has been viewing it as a tool to bring India under the
control and obligations of the nuclear regimes. In view of India‟s
energy-related problems, this agreement appears to have
transformed their relationship by fulfilling the objectives of both
the countries. As on the one hand, it would end India‟s isolation,
help it acquire high-technology, and reduce its dependence on oil
from the Persian Gulf; and on the other, it would bring India
under the IAEA inspection and control system, and prove
economically beneficial for the United States, too. Due to this
fact the deal was welcomed by Mohamed E Baradei, Director of
the International Atomic Energy Agency. In his opinion “the
nuclear deal would bring India closer as an important partner in
the non-proliferation regime and which would be a milestone,
timely for ongoing efforts to consolidate the non-proliferation
regime, combat nuclear terrorism and strengthen nuclear safety.”
Mohamed El Baradei,(2006) The forty-five nation Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG), such as France, Russia and the United
Kingdom, also did not take much time in expressing their support
for the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal but on the other hand Canada and
China, both NSG members, expressed their reservations about
this deal.
The U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice (Condoleezza
Rice, “March 13, 2006, A15) While arguing in favor of the
Indo-U.S. strategic partnership and the civil nuclear deal,
stressed that India has a record of thirty years of responsible
behavior on proliferation matters, and the agreement would make
the world, and the future of India and the United States, safe.
While naming the agreement as unique, Rice also emphasized
that India‟s uniqueness as a country, as a democracy with an
accountable and transparent government encouraged the United
States to move forward for this agreement. In her view point
other countries like North Korea and Iran that had also been
seeking to develop their programs on the basis of this agreement
do not fall in this category, because Iran is a state that promotes
terrorism, and North Korea is the least transparent state, threatens
its neighbors, and proliferates weapons. She also felt that by
satisfying India‟s energy needs, it would end its dependence on
fossil fuels and ease the environmental impact of India‟s vibrant
economic growth; and, on the other hand, it would also help the
U.S. economy and enhance the employment and job prospects
for the American people also. The nuclear deal grants India the
facility of reprocessing the nuclear fuel acquired from the
external sources, a concession the United States has presently
given only to Japan and European countries. In accordance to the
deal the United States would also help India to find fuel if the
United States cuts off the supply for any reason particularly if
India tests a nuclear weapon. In the viewpoint of several
scholars, the reason for the U.S. willingness to take these steps
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lies in the fact that lately it has started to recognize India as an
important strategic bulwark and an answer against a growing
Chinese power and highly unstable and unpredictable Pakistan.
India‟s million-man army, the world‟s fourth largest, and its
blue-water navy makes it a natural buffer as well as a sentinel on
the trade route between East Asia and the Middle East. The
United States believes that a demographically and economically
vibrant India could serve as a counterweight to expanding
Chinese influence in Southeast Asia as well as Beijing‟s greatpower ambitions around the globe. Sadanand Dhume, (2006)
U.S. Ambassador to India David Mumford has also accepted that
the United States by adopting such policy moves towards India
has succeeded to a large extent in de-hyphenating its relationship
with India and Pakistan. Amit Baruah, (2009)
Interestingly, now the United States has also tacitly
acknowledged India as a responsible state with advanced nuclear
know-how, but it has very diplomatically avoided accepting
India as the sixth nuclear weapons state. The U.S. stand also
makes the nuclear deal noteworthy. It clearly shows that America
has agreed to help India acquire the same benefits and
advantages as other states with nuclear weapons. India would
also be granted full civil nuclear energy co-operation, fuel
supplies and the transfer of technology, etc., but the United
States would not like to undermine the conditions of the NPT by
recognizing India as a sixth nuclear state. In some quarters it is
believed that the present U.S. policy, like the NPT which created
two classes of states, the nuclear haves and the have-nots, would
once again create two classes of the non NPT signatories,
"responsible" non-nuclear states such as Japan and the EU
countries which are allowed to conduct plutonium reprocessing
and uranium enrichment for their civilian programs, and other
countries like Iran which are denied this right because of the
feeling that they may use their potential to acquire nuclear
weapons. . T.V. Paul,(2006) In view of this duplicity, it can be
said that a country cannot be assured of obtaining full fuel cycle
facilities by just signing the NPT or the IAEA safeguards system
but its political system and proximity to the western countries
would also matter in deciding its suitability for access to the dual
use potential sensitive technologies.
However some other scholars have opined that the July 18,
2005 agreement for a civil nuclear deal with the United States
has heralded India‟s strategic liberalization, and has also ensured
substantial gains such as the import of nuclear fuel, etc. They feel
that an enabled India, free of technology denial restraints and of
the category of the strategic outcast, would not only emerge as an
important state in the twenty-first century but also help multipolarity to become a reality at the global view. Paul,(2008)
XIII. CONCLUSION
Though there is no denying the fact that there are various
complications which have made the task of the Congress-led
UPA government of India very tough, but in view of the limited
alternatives the dilemma seems real. On the one hand, the option
of generating clean energy through nuclear fuel due to its
inherent cost would not only be very expensive, but it would also
very difficult to sustain it for a long time due to the cost factor.
But on the other hand in view of the limited options for other
sources of energy and pressures of the international community
for using clean energy sources on account of the threat of global
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International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications, Volume 2, Issue 10, October 2012
ISSN 2250-3153
warming there is little choice left for India. Since India has also
willingly imposed a moratorium on further nuclear tests after the
1998 nuclear test, therefore the acceptance of the civil nuclear
deal would only assist India in its economic pursuits and open
the door for other international cooperation. If India has to
sustain its economic growth and use its full economic potential,
India would have to move forward and clutch the deal. But as
India has always maintained its freedom of action and
independent foreign policy, therefore any pressure on India
would be seen as a compromise in its long-held stand by the
concerned people. In fact it is a catch-22 situation for India,
because if the Congress-led UPA government decides to
proceeds further with the deal, the coalition partners (left parties)
would withdraw their support from the government and push the
country towards political instability, and if India fails to complete
the process of the nuclear deal in time, the future of the deal
would be in jeopardy. Actually, in recent weeks, a dramatic
situation was witnessed in the Indian political scene with the
political parties of India being divided into two clear camps the
supporters and non-supporters of the Indo-U.S. civil nuclear deal.
This scene emerged with the Manmohan Singh-led UPA
government‟s decision to go to the IAEA and the NSG to fulfill
the requirements of the deal, and the left parties withdrawing
their support from the government. This situation left the
political ground open to all sorts of pulls, pressures, horsetrading and manipulations. The country observed an ugly
political scene where not only the Congress-led UPA government
received support from unexpected quarters, but allegations were
also made in the parliament about how money changed hands to
sustain and save the government. The doubts on the stability of
such a government which has survived by using every possible
tactic are still being raised. However it is also being assumed that
with the government passing the hurdle of sustaining the
confidence motion, it would be able to move forward in time to
finalize the deal before the United States goes to the election
mode, and ensure the economic growth of the country through
nuclear energy.
6
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AUTHORS
First Author – Dr. Sunil Kumar Jangir, Head of Dept. Political
science, JJT University, Chudela (Rajasthan), INDIA
Email id - drsunilkj26@gmail.com
www.ijsrp.org