Pak-U.S. Strategic Relations: Conflict and Cooperation Khurram Maqsood Ahmad Dedicated to My Beloved Parents Acknowledgement I truly thank My Lord for bestowing me with such an aptitude and courage to seek knowledge up to this level. Specifically to this research, I am grateful to my teachers, without their kind support it was not possible for me to carry out and finish this research. Throughout my research work they always remained a study source of knowledge and guidance for me. It was really wonderful to work under their candid supervision. I am heartily obliged to my family; my father, mother, brother, and my sister. They have encouraged me and stood with me every time I need them. My deep gratitude is for my hearted friends who have really made this achievement to be earned by me through their moral support during the walk. Khurram Maqsood Ahmad iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgment……………………………………………………………….... iv Aim /Objective of Study…………………………………………………………. 1 Introduction……………………………………………………………………...… 1 Historical Background…………………………………………………………… 2  Pakistan and Defence Pacts………………...………………………...... 4  SEATO………………..……………………………………….…………….. 4  CENTO…...………………………………………………….………………. 5 U.S. Stance on Indo-Pak Wars………………………………………………...… 6 Pak-U.S.: Post 9/11 Relations………………….………………………………. 10 U.S. Assistance to Pakistan, FY 2002–2012 (Post 9/11)……………….…... 12 Strategic Interests of the U.S. and Pakistan…………………………......….. 15 Pak-U.S.: Strategic Dialogue…………...……………………………...……….. 17 Future Prospects of Pak-U.S. Relationships……..………………………….. 19  Pakistan and India………………………………………………………... 19  Growing Indian influence in Afghanistan………………..…………… 21  Nuclear Co-operation……………………………………….……………. 23  Pakistan’s Internal Problems and U.S……………………………..….. 24  Cooperation in Police sector…………………………………..……….. 24  Al-Qaeda and Taliban: A Matter of Concern for U.S. and Pakistan……………………..…………………………….…..………….… 26 Conclusion and Recommendations Bibliography v Aim /Objective of Study The research is aimed to find out Pakistan and the United States of America relations. I intended to find out the historical events highlighted significant issues in the relations between two countries. The current status of the relations has also been highlighted. Important events regarding various issues will helpful to understand the status of cooperation and conflict between two states. A policy recommendation can therefore serve as an important tool for the future consultation and citation. It will also provide the probable direction of Pak-U.S. relations in the future challenges and opportunities. The focus has been on the objectivity of research and analysis on the basis of keeping in view all the possible aspects of the situation in discussion. This is a descriptive study. While conducting the research, the primary sources such as the official statements and archives, secondary sources of data such as articles and books, as well as tertiary sources of data that includes the quoted material from any source will be utilized. The content analysis of secondary sources such as books, magazines, journals, articles and reports would be used. Furthermore, the internet facility will be utilized to get pertinent reading material. Introduction Pakistan’s relationship with the United States of America (U.S.A) over the past 60 years has been episodic and is characterized by periods of being considered a close-trusted ally to periods of being the most sanctioned and least-trusted country in South Asia. If the brief history of Pak-U.S. marriages of convenience is to be considered, the first of the three major U.S. engagements with Pakistan occurred during the height of the Cold War, from the mid-1950s to mid-1960s; the second was during the Afghan Jihad in 1980s, again lasting about a decade; and then the third engagement dates to September 11, 2001, and relates to the war on terrorism. During the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. and Pakistan shared a common interest and over the next ten years fought against the expansion of 1 Communism in the region. Since September 11, 2001, Pakistan has become instrumental in the U.S. strategic war against terrorism. U.S has viewed Pakistan as a key strategic partner with a frontline stake critical to the efforts directed against terrorism in the region. Both Pakistan and the U.S. view AlQaeda and the Taliban insurgents as threats to their own national security and economic growth. The U.S. is aware of the sacrifices and contributions that Pakistan has made and also understands the geo-strategic importance of it. This research paper is aimed to highlight the relationship between the United States of America and Pakistan, and to analyze that how both states are pursuing their interests. It will also provide the future prospects of the Pak-U.S. relationship. The whole debate has been concluded at the end of the paper. Historical Background Pakistan’s relationship with the U.S. is a result of security and economic agreements made at the time of independence. Few months before Pakistan came into being in 1947, the U.S. Government through its Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan has decided to contain communism through an encirclement of Soviet Union. Due to USSR’s expansionist policy in the region the United States through its Vandenberg Resolution established relations with Pakistan, having no choice and at the same time Pakistan needs U.S. assistance in many sectors after partition. The U.S. was well aware of the Pakistan’s relations and its influence in Arab world and its geo-strategic location was significant in making frontline state to counter soviet expansion. According to Napoleonic Dictum, "Geography determines a nation’s history - the political significance of an area bears a welldefined relation to its climate, landforms and natural resources." The GeoStrategic location of Pakistan is such, that, at one hand it provides logistic Support to landlocked country like Afghanistan & on the other Southern & South Provinces of China along with ‘CAS’ are having a nearest land route to Warm 2 Waters for their trade with Middle East & other continents of the world. 1 Therefore, Pakistan’s geo-Strategic situation attracted U.S. policymakers. Source: Map Resources Adapted by CRS. Pakistan’s Ambassador in Tehran was informed by the Soviet Ambassador that his Government is planning to invite Premier Liaquat Ali Khan to Moscow. 2 Prime Minister of Pakistan immediately appointed Mr. Siddiqui from East “Geo-Strategic Location of Pakistan”, Available at: http://www.asiagroup.org/logistics/geo-strategic-location-pakistan.html 2 Ayaz Ahmad Khan, “Pak US ties in Historical Perspective”, Defence Journal, Vol. VI, No. 1, January 2008, p 22. 1 3 Pakistan as Pakistan’s first Ambassador to Moscow.3 Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan refused to visit Moscow because of the following reasons:  U.S. was democratic while Soviet Union was fascist communist dictatorship,  Pro-India attitude of Moscow, including an anti-Pakistan statement by Marshal Stalin during his New Delhi visit,  And third is Stalin had carried out mass slaughter of Muslims of Chechnya, Kazakhstan, and Caucus and in other Muslim Central Asian states.4 Therefore, on 11 January 1955, first written agreement between Pakistan and United States had been signed which was called as Mutual Security: Defence Support Assistance agreement.5 This was made because of the earlier refusal of Pakistan’s first Premier Liaquat Ali Khan to visit Moscow in 1950.6 Pakistan and Defence Pacts: The Mutual Defence Agreement resulted in Pakistan’s signing the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact also referred to as the Middle East Treaty Organization (METO). SEATO The SEATO was established by the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty (Manila Pact), which was signed at Manila in September 1954. The SEATO became effective on 19 February 1955 and was signed by Pakistan, Australia, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and the United States.7 Pakistan was included in the alliance though it was not a part of South East Asia. 3 Ibid. Ibid. 5 Syed Junaid Ahsan, “Pak-U.S. Relations: Better to Bitter”, Defence Journal, Vol. xiii, No. 3, November 2008, pp 12-13. 6 Ibid. 7 Lubna Saif, “ Pakistan and SEATO”, Available at: http://www.nihcr.edu.pk/Latest_English_Journal/Pakistan_and_SEATO.pdf 4 4 CENTO In 1958, when Iraq left METO, it was renamed CENTO (Central Treaty Organization): it continued to comprise Turkey, Iran and Pakistan as its regional members and United Kingdom. Early in 1959, Pakistan signed (as did Turkey and Iran) a bilateral Agreement of Cooperation with the U.S., which was designed further to reinforce the defensive purposes of CENTO. 8 It was dissolved in 1979. The relationship between the two countries was very close and it was during this time that President Dwight D. Eisenhower famously called Pakistan America’s “most allied ally in Asia.”9 Thus the U.S. acquired stakes in Pakistan well being and decided to strengthen Pakistan economically and militarily. By 1957 U.S. had poured $500 million into Pakistan’s coffers and supplied a state of the art military hardware. The Pakistan army got hundreds of Patton tanks artillery, APCs, howitzers, while Pakistan Air Force received over 100 F86-F saber jets, one squadron of F-104 star fighters two Squadrons of B-57 light bombers, T-33 trainer jets high level long distance radars, amphibious aircraft and helicopters and sufficient spares.10 The Pakistan Navy was offered frigates and submarine Ghazi.11 Pakistan-U.S. security cooperation signed in April 1959; U.S. pledged that it regards as vital to its national interests and to world peace, the preservation of independence and territorial integrity of Pakistan.12 It further stated that in case of aggression against Pakistan the U.S. will take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon in order to assist Pakistan in its requests. It further stated that U.S. will assist Pakistan in the effective promotion of economic development. U.S. economic and military aid enabled Pakistan to create an industrial infrastructure, build dams and barrages, modernize the agriculture sector, Stephen P. Cohen, “The Idea of Pakistan”, D.C Washington: Brooking Institutions, 2004, pp 25-26. 9 K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pakistan-U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Service, 6 February 2009, Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498.pdf 10 Op.cit (ayaz ahmad Khan) 11 Ibid. 12 Op cit ( Syed Junaid ahsan) 8 5 acquire first rate military capability to defend itself and nuclear research infrastructure. Shortly afterwards, Pakistan and India engaged in the wars of 1965 and later in 1971 over Kashmir resulting in the U.S. suspending military aid to both countries with Pakistan being affected the most by the loss of aid. The relationship between Pakistan and the U.S. cooled significantly forcing a feeling and perception among the Pakistani people that the U.S. was not a reliable partner.13 In the early 1960’s, the U.S. started getting very concerned over the relationship between Pakistan and China. In 1962, China and India engaged in a war resulting in the Indians defeat and loss of territory, thereafter, Pakistan decided to take advantage of this opportunity and improve its own relations with China positioning itself as a stronger opponent for India. Pakistan’s growing friendship with communist China concerned the U.S. who at the same time was facing a proxy war against the communists in Vietnam.14 U.S. Stance on Indo-Pak Wars The 1965 war broke out in the Rann of Kachchh, a sparsely inhabited region along the West Pakistan–India border. In August fighting spread to Kashmir and to the Punjab, and in September Pakistani and Indian troops crossed the partition line between the two countries and launched air assaults on each other's cities.15 After threats of intervention by China had been successfully opposed by the United States and Britain, Pakistan and India agreed to the UNsponsored cease-fire and withdrew to the pre-August lines. Prime Minister Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri of India and President Ayub Khan of Pakistan met in Tashkent, USSR (now in Uzbekistan), in January 1966, and signed an agreement pledging continued negotiations and respect for the cease-fire K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pakistan-U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Service, 6 February 2009, Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498.pdf 14 Jamshed Nazar, “A History of US-Pakistan Relations”, December 12, 2003, Available at: http://www.chowk.com/articles/6843 15 “India-Pakistan Wars”, Available at: http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/history/A0858806.html Accessed on 3 November 2010. 13 6 conditions. After the Tashkent Declaration another period of relative peace ensued.16 President Nixon used the Pakistani links with China to start a secret diplomacy with china, which culminated with Henry Kissinger’s secret visit to china in July 1971 while he was visiting Pakistan. The Chinese relationship was vital for the U.S. as it was trying to fix the mess its Vietnam policy. In return, Pakistan bore the brunt of costs of alliances in fulfilling the services to U.S. interests. Pakistan had undertaken to strengthen its defence commitments against the communists without a categorical assurance with regard to its security against India.17 Indo-Pakistani relations deteriorated when civil war erupted in Pakistan, pitting the West Pakistan army against East Pakistanis demanding greater autonomy. The fighting forced 10 million East Pakistani Bengalis to flee to India. When Pakistan attacked Indian airfields in Kashmir, India attacked both East and West Pakistan.18 It occupied the Eastern half, which declared its independence as Bangladesh, on December 6, 1971. Under great-power pressure, UN ceasefire was arranged in mid-December, after Pakistan's defeat. Pakistan lost its eastern half, an army of 100,000 soldiers, and was thrown into political turmoil.19 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto emerged as leader of Pakistan, and Mujibur Rahman as Prime Minister of Bangladesh. Tensions were alleviated by the Shimla accord of 1972 and by Pakistan's recognition of Bangladesh in 1974, but tensions have periodically recurred.20 The U.S. failed to honor its agreements and SEATO members did not consider the 1965 Indo-Pak war or the 1971 Indian military intervention in East Pakistan to come under the purview of the treaty. When East Pakistan was severed and turned into Bangladesh, Pakistan withdrew from SEATO in November 1972.21 As the 1970s began to take shape, many new challenges arose over Pakistan’s efforts to respond to India’s 1974 underground test of a nuclear device by seeking its own nuclear weapons capability. Limited U.S. aid was resumed in 16 Ibid. Syed Junaid Ahsan, “Pak-U.S. Relations: Better to Bitter”, Defence Journal, Vol. xiii, No. 3, November 2008, pp 12-13. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 17 7 1975, but was suspended again in 1979 by the Carter Administration in response to Pakistan’s construction of a uranium enrichment facility. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979, Pakistan was again viewed as a frontline ally in the effort to block Soviet expansionism. In 1981, the Reagan Administration negotiated a five-year, $3.2 billion aid package with Islamabad. Pakistan became a key transit country for arms supplies to the Afghan resistance, as well as a camp for some three million Afghan refugees, many of whom have yet to return home.22 During this time the U.S. once again renewed aid while many in the U.S. government became concerned over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. The Pressler Amendment was added to the Foreign Assistance Act and enacted in 1985, specifically prohibiting U.S. assistance or military sales to Pakistan unless annual Presidential certification was issued that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device. This certification was denied in October 1990, triggering sanctions against Pakistan.23 In 1992, the U.S. Congress partially relaxed the scope of sanctions to allow for food assistance and continuing support for non-governmental organizations. Among the notable results of the aid cut-off was the non-delivery of F-16 fighter aircraft purchased by Pakistan in 1989. Nine years later, the U.S. agreed to compensate Pakistan with a $325 million cash payment and $140 million worth of surplus wheat and soy, but the episode engendered lingering Pakistani resentments.24 The U.S. reduced its engagement after 1990 in the region and specifically with Pakistan resulting in a lasting negative perception by the Pakistani people and its leaders. Both the former President Musharraf and the current President Zardari have made repeated comments about the cooling of the relationship between the two countries during this period of time. Both stating they felt their country had been abandoned after the successful defeat of the Soviets in K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pakistan-U.S. Relations”, Congressional Research Service, 6 February 2009, Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498.pdf. 23 Maleeha Lodhi, “The Pakistan-US Relationship”, (April 1998), Available at: http://www.defencejournal.com/april98/pakistanus.htm 24 K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pakistan-U.S. Relations”, Congressional Research Service, 6 February 2009, Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498.pdf 22 8 Afghanistan in the 1980s and has led to the current challenge facing both nations, terrorism with regional and global reach.25 During the 1990’s, Pakistan became very active in its surrounding area first by furthering its development of nuclear weapons capability, supporting a separatist movement in Kashmir and the Taliban movement in Afghanistan where the radical Islamist group took control of Kabul in 1996.26 In early 1999, Pakistan Army crossed the LoC and occupied positions in the Kargil sector of Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir, for reasons that are as yet unclear. When this was detected in early May 1999, Delhi’s response was swift and comprehensive, involving the use of land and air forces to evict the Pakistan Army from the Indian side of the LoC. After several weeks of bloody conflict, Indian forces captured the key heights of Tololing (14 June) and Tiger Hill (early morning on 4 July).27 With Pakistani forces suffering critical defeats, it was expected to be only a matter of time before they were pushed back across the LoC; but, undoubtedly this would have raised Indian casualties further. Meanwhile, the United States was urging Pakistan to respect the LoC and withdraw its forces across the LoC, while at the same time, urging India to restrain itself from crossing the LoC to open another front in the conflict. Notwithstanding Delhi’s public statements on not using force across the LoC, the potential for escalation into a full-scale conventional war raised fears in the international community of the risk of inadvertent nuclear escalation.28 In July 1999, the Pakistani Prime Minister flew to Washington, concerned over Pakistan’s increasing international isolation. At a hastily organized meeting with President Clinton on 4 July 1999 Prime Minister of Pakistan requested American intervention to stop the fighting and resolve the Kashmir issue. But U.S. came down heavily on Pakistan, and told that a clear Pakistani withdrawal to the LoC was essential. Clinton also told Prime Minister, that Pakistan was 25 Ibid. Ibid. 27 Rahul Roy Chaudhary, “The United States’ role and influence on the India-Pakistan conflict”, Available at: http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2117.pdf. 28 Ibid. 26 9 preparing its nuclear arsenal for possible deployment at the instructions of the Army Chief, which was apparently taking place without PM’s knowledge. 29 Amidst considerable American pressure, PM of Pakistan finally agreed ‘to take concrete and immediate steps for the restoration of the LoC’ which was accepted by India.30 The United States facilitated a formal end to the Kargil conflict, which shortly leads to the withdrawal of all forces to its own side of the LoC. American facilitation on the Kargil conflict in Delhi’s favor came as quite an unexpected surprise to India. This was, in effect, the first time in fifty years that the United States had sided with India against Pakistan ‘openly and firmly’.31 This soon led to a greater ‘comfort level’ with the United States, followed by Clinton’s successful visit to India in March 2000, followed by Vajpayee’s visit to the United States in the final days of the Clinton Administration.32 Prior to 11 September 2001, Pakistan along with Saudi Arabia supported the Taliban in Afghanistan trying to bring stability to the country and region after years of unrest following the Soviet withdrawal. Pak-U.S.: Post 9/11 Relations On 11 September 2001, after 10 years of minimal relationship between Pakistan and the U.S., the terrorist event on U.S. soil once again transformed the relationship between the two countries to a critical element for the War on Terrorism. Following the attacks, former U.S. President George W. Bush asked the world to make a clear choice and side with the U.S. in its efforts against terrorism. Pakistan had previously been a supporter of the Taliban; however it decided to support the U.S. in hopes of receiving increased foreign aid and other support from the international community. General Musharraf provided several airfields, facilities, and other logistical support venues for the U.S. operations into Afghanistan. Foreign assistance began to flow into Pakistan and as a sign of renewed U.S. recognition of the country’s importance, President Bush designated Pakistan as a major nonNATO ally of the U.S. in 2004 making it eligible to purchase advanced U.S. 29 Ibid. Ibid. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid. 30 10 military technology.33 In March 2006, President Bush traveled to Pakistan for the first presidential visit in six years. During his visit, President Bush and President Musharraf issued a Joint Statement on the U.S.-Pakistan “strategic partnership” calling for a “strategic dialogue” and “significant expansion” of bilateral economic ties.34 Over the past few years relations between the two countries has continued to improve and grow. Falling in line and in support of the U.S. national interests, U.S. has lifted sanctions and provided Pakistan over $15.4 billion alone in direct overt aid and military reimbursements from September 2001 to September 2009.35 Majority of the aid was received as military assistance, for instance, approximately $10.8 billion spanning over nine major programs focusing on military equipment, training, counternarcotics, coalition support funds, law enforcement, border control, and most recently the addition of the Pakistan Counter-insurgency Capability Fund.36 The economic aid amounted over $4.6 billion, covering seven different programs focusing on socio-economic issues including child survival and health, human rights and democracy funds, disaster assistance, displaced persons relief, and migration and refugee assistance. The Obama Administration is continuing to increase its programmed assistance to Pakistan by providing $1.5 billion a year for the next five years as a result of the KerryLugar Law, with a focus of the aid tied to the progress of Pakistan’s efforts against the Taliban. The purpose of the aid is to strengthen the relatively new democratic government and to help the civil institutions and general economy in Pakistan.37 As to the U.S. assistance towards the police, a slim amount of U.S. funding has gone to assisting Pakistan’s police, with the vast majority going to support the K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pakistan-U.S. Relations”, Congressional Research Service, 6 February 2009, Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498.pdf 34 “Joint Statement on United States-Pakistan Strategic Partnership”, The White House, 4 March 2006, Available at: http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/pakistan/WH/20060304-1.pdf 35 “Direct Overt U.S. Aid and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002-FY2010”, U.S. Agency for International Development – Archives, 24 September 2009, Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/pakaid.pdf 36 Ibid. 37 K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pakistan-U.S. Relations”, Op. Cit. 33 11 military through reimbursements or assistance. Between FY 2002 and FY 2009, the accumulated outlays for International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement programming have totaled $358 million, inclusive of border security programming. This is a mere 2.3 percent of the nearly $15.4 billion provided as aid or military reimbursements under the Coalition Support Fund Program.38 At the same time, U.S. remains focused on its efforts against the Al-Qaeda and Taliban. U.S. relies on Pakistan’s efforts in the region as a strategic partner and becomes critical for operations ongoing in Afghanistan. Therefore, any plan requires prudent effort for success in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. The goal of the U.S. is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future.39 Security co-operation is key element between Pakistan and the U.S. and both the countries are focusing further on how to improve that, from intelligencesharing to more equipment given by the Washington to Islamabad. U.S. has provided F-16 fighter jets to Islamabad and also it would deliver 1,000 laserguided bomb kits to Pakistan and is considering more weapons sales to help the Pakistani air force repress on insurgents in the Afghanistan border region.40 U.S. Assistance to Pakistan, FY 2002–2012 (Post 9/11) For FY2012, the U.S. Administration is requesting a total of $2,965.0 million within the International Affairs 150 function (State-Foreign Operations Appropriations). Of this, about 46% is for economic assistance and 54% is for security assistance, including $1.1 billion for PCCF, considered to be Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) that is not part of the core request, but is identified by the Administration as extraordinary, temporary funding needs for frontline states. Consistent with the EPPA, the FY2012 civilian assistance will “Direct Overt U.S. Aid and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002-FY2010”, Op. Cit. 39 “Evaluating Progress in Afghanistan-Pakistan: The Obama Administration’s Draft Metrics for Afghanistan and Pakistan”, Foreign Policy, 16 September 2009, Available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/09/16/evaluating_progress_in_afghanistan_ pakistan 40 Sue Pleming, “Factbox: Key Facts in U.S.-Pakistan Relations”, Reuters, 24 March, 2010. 38 12 focus on four key areas: energy, stabilization, social services (especially health and education), and economic growth (including agriculture). Security assistance will focus on addressing long-term military modernization needs in Pakistan, as well as counterinsurgency and counterterrorism capabilities. 41 An overview of U.S. aid to Pakistan since the beginning of bilateral relations between the two countries, following table provides the U.S. aid policies for Pakistan. Susan B. Epstein, K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance”, (June 7, 2011), Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41856.pdf 41 13 Direct Overt U.S. Aid and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002FY2012 (Appropriations, with disbursements in parentheses, rounded to the nearest millions of dollars) Categ 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 1,16 1,24 705 964 862 731 1,01 685 1,49 9 7 FMF 75 225 75 299 297 297 298 300 294 N/A Food 41 30 22 32 55 10 50 55 124 51 625 188 200 298 337 394 347 1,11 1,29 11 4 2 ory CSFs 9 9 aid ESF NADR 10 1 5 8 9 10 10 13 24 N/A IMET 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 5 N/A Total 711 286 317 402 553 683 591 1,36 1,72 N/A 5 7 Econo mic Grand 2,05 1,79 1,13 1,71 1,81 1,81 2,12 3,03 4,46 Total 7 1 5 5 3 0 7 9 2 Source: (Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance, June 7, 2011) 14 N/A Strategic Interests of the U.S. and Pakistan Pakistan and the United State of America are pursuing many mutual goals. When Russian invaded Afghanistan the interests of both the countries accelerated and after September 11, 2001 Pakistan became a front-line ally of U.S. in the war on terror to combat violent radicalism. Pakistan is determined to get rid of terrorism and in this regard it has made tremendous sacrifices. Pakistan needs foreign assistance to confront gigantic challenges because Pakistan neither has the resources nor the strength to do it alone. The U.S. Pakistan relations can be viewed through the lens of realism as U.S. is pursuing its own national interest. If U.S. current administration’s objectives are to be analyzed then they essentially has four goals regarding the region especially Pakistan.  Firstly, to prevent Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and materials from coming into the possession of extremists;  Second, to ensure that Afghanistan does not again become a sanctuary for terrorists to launch attacks against the U.S. and its allies and friends;  Third, to avoid war between India and Pakistan;  And finally to prevent the Taliban and its radical collaborators from gaining control of Pakistan.42 The last point is note worthy in the sense that the previous Bush administration was concerned only with the prevention use of the land of Afghanistan in carrying attacks over U.S.A but the current administration has very conveniently lined up Pakistan as well changing the main theatre of war. However, for the U.S. military, Pakistan is a transit point to get supplies into landlocked Afghanistan, with a huge volume of goods being trucked from the Robert D. Blackwill, “Pakistan, Taliban and Global Security – Part II,” Rand Corporation, 12 May 2009, Available at: http://www.rand.org/commentary/2009/05/12/YG.html 42 15 Karachi sea-port. Pakistan borders with Iran, with whom U.S. has edgy relations, particularly over its nuclear program.43 The Obama Administration developed U.S. objectives for both Pakistan and Afghanistan and was outlined by the administration on 16 September 2009. Objectives 1-2.c. below is primarily directed towards Pakistan while the remaining objectives are directed towards Afghanistan, both complementary to each other.44  “Objective 1: Disrupt terrorist networks in Afghanistan and especially Pakistan to degrade any ability they have to plan and launch international terrorist attacks.  Objective 2.a: Assist efforts to enhance civilian control and stable constitutional government in Pakistan. 43 44 Sue Pleming, “Factbox: Key Facts in U.S.-Pakistan Relations”, Op. cit. Robert D. Blackwill, “Pakistan, Taliban and Global Security – Part II”, Op. Cit. 16 being  Objective 2.b: Develop Pakistan's counterinsurgency (COIN) capabilities; continue to support Pakistan's efforts to defeat terrorist and insurgent groups.  Objective 2.c: Involve the international community more actively to forge an international consensus to stabilize Pakistan.  Objective 3.a: Defeat the extremist insurgency, secure the Afghan populace, and develop increasingly self-reliant Afghan security forces that can lead the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism fight with reduced U.S. assistance.  Objective 3.b: Promote a more capable, accountable, and effective government in Afghanistan that serves the Afghan people and can eventually functions, especially regarding internal security, with limited international support.  Objective 3.c: Involve the international community more actively to forge an international consensus to stabilize Afghanistan.” Pak-U.S.: Strategic Dialogue The first Pakistan-United States strategic dialogue was held in Washington on 24-25 March 2010, it was an attempt to “broaden and deepen their comprehensive cooperation and to further fortify the friendship.”45 Pakistan’s basic agenda revolved largely around four main points: to get a deal similar to the civil nuclear deal the U.S. has offered to India; the transfer of both missilelaunch and surveillance drone technologies as well as F-16 combat aircraft; to receive timely payments from the Coalition Support Funds; and last, minimizing Indian involvement in Afghanistan.46 “The United States re-affirmed its resolve to assist Pakistan to overcome socioeconomic challenges by providing technical and economic assistance and also committed to work towards enhanced market access for Pakistani products.”47 “Joint Statement on the U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue, March 2010”, Council on Foreign Relations, 25 March 2010. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 45 17 With such a huge agenda, and the fact that some of Islamabad’s key issues were addressed, the dialogue was considered as a success. However, the U.S. remained silent on the issue of civil nuclear technology as this would effectively conversation legitimacy on Pakistan as a nuclear power.48 The second round of Pak-U.S. strategic dialogue was held in Islamabad on July 2010. In this regard different issues i.e. nation rebuilding, water, electricity, job creation, defence and uplift of the economic sector had taken up by the leaders of both the countries. As U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said “the U.S. wants to promote its relations with Pakistan in matters relating to energy, economy, social issues and education, other than just security issues." Pakistan former Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi said that the dialogue will enhance Pakistan's abilities in the war against terror, and that Pakistan wishes to have long-lasting and stable relations with the U.S. He also said that 48 Ibid. 18 the talks will provide Pakistani goods access to the global markets. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Pakistan former Foreign Minister Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi met in Washington on October 2022, 2010 for the third round of U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue. This session was built upon the goals and objectives set forth in the March 24, 2010 session in Washington, and the progress made during the July 2010 (second) session in Islamabad. The Strategic Dialogue affirmed the United States and Pakistan’s commitment to cultivating a strategic, comprehensive, and long-term partnership.49 The U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue represents the shared commitment of the U.S. and Pakistan to strengthening the bilateral relationship as a broad partnership based on shared democratic values, mutual respect, trust, and interests. Future Prospects of Pak-U.S. Relationships The future of Pakistan’s relationship with U.S. will be determined as a result of the challenges and opportunities related to the national interests and objectives of the both countries and how each responds accordingly. Pakistan and India Pakistan has been a longstanding rivalry with India; in fact, the ideology and religious beliefs of the two nations formed the basis of partition and subsequent birth of the two nations in 1947. The relationship since independence has been one ranging from mutual mistrust to times of armed conflict. Over the years, significant events have taken place causing a continuing reinforcement to this arrangement between the two countries. Pakistan considers India as its major external threat. “Joint Statement: U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue at the Ministerial Level, October 20-22, 2010,” U.S. State Department Report, 22 October, 2010. 49 19 First, the long disputed Kashmir region has been a major point of contention for both countries. Following Partition, it was agreed by the leaders from both Pakistan and India that Kashmir would have the choice of self-determination. However, since 1947, the two countries have fought two Indo-Pakistan Wars (1947 and 1965), the Kargil War (1999), conducted several border skirmishes over the disputed territory, and remains today as the primary dispute between Pakistan and India. The United Nations (UN) mandated Line of Control separates the two countries control over Kashmir as a result of the 1947 War. Neither country has agreed to the future of Kashmir and nothing significant other than minor discussions have taken place since the peace agreement in 2004. India contends that Kashmir is completely within its boundaries and authorities as a result of Maharaja Hari Singh signing the Instrument of Accession on behalf of Kashmir to India and the document being accepted by 20 India on 27 October 1947.50 Pakistan questions the validity of the document and contends Kashmir has the right of self-determination via plebiscite as agreed to by both parties in the UN Security Council resolutions. Under a planned strategy, India has been given a go-ahead to construct large number of dams on all the rivers flowing into Pakistan to create acute water scarcity in Pakistan and make it dependent upon India. Water strategy will be applied by India to solve Kashmir dispute on Indian terms.51 Growing Indian influence in Afghanistan Pakistan is concerned about the growing activities and influence of India in Afghanistan. Pakistan is suspicious of signs that India is pursuing a policy of “strategic encirclement,” taking note of New Delhi’s past support for Tajik and Uzbek militias, which comprised the Afghan Northern Alliance, and the post2001 opening of numerous Indian consulates in Afghanistan.52 Indian political influence is evident in Afghanistan both historically and is continuing to grow. India-Afghanistan political linkages and a foreign policy agenda that is prominently pro-Indian is evidence of Indian influence in Afghanistan. Moreover, four Indian consulates have been opened across the country (Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Jalalabad, and Kandahar) fostering the establishment of Indian political influence in the country. Indian economic influence has been evident since 2001 by offering $1.2 billion for Afghanistan reconstruction, making it the largest regional donor.53 Bilateral trade between India and Afghanistan has been on the rise, reaching $358 million for the fiscal year April 2007 to March 2008. India hopes its investment in the Iranian port at Chabahar will allow it to gain trading access to Afghanistan, bypassing Pakistan. Pakistan currently allows Afghanistan transit rights for its exports to India, but does not allow goods to move from India to “India-Pakistan: Death in the Vale”, Time Magazine, 10 November 1947. Brig Asif Haroon Raja, “The U.S. Objectives set for Pakistan”, Available at: http://www.opinion-maker.org/2011/08/the-us-objectives-set-for-pakistan/ 52 K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pakistan-U.S. Relations”, Op. Cit. 53 Jayshree Bajoria, “India-Afghanistan Relations”, Council on Foreign Relations, 22 July 2009, Available at: http://www.cfr.org/publication/17474/indiaafghanistan_relations.html 50 51 21 Afghanistan.54 India is involved in a wide array of development projects in Afghanistan consisting of the following: in January 2009, India completed construction of the Zaranj-Delaram highway in southwest Afghanistan near the Iranian border; it is building Afghanistan’s new parliament building; it is constructing the Salma Dam power project in Herat Province; it has trained Afghan police officers, diplomats and civil servants; and it has provided support in the areas of health, education, transportation, power, and telecommunications.55 Finally, India sees Afghanistan as a potential route to the source of Central Asian energy and has been pursuing better relations with this region.56 54 Ibid. Ibid. 56 Ibid. 55 22 Islamabad wants the Washington to do more to help resolve the tensions with New Delhi and is also concerned about the increasing role of its rival in Afghanistan. Islamabad also wants the U.S. to urge India to resolve the core dispute between the nuclear-armed South Asian rivals i.e. the divided region of Kashmir.57 One of the greatest challenges the U.S. is facing in the South Asian region is its handling of a continuous Pakistan-India rivalry. The U.S. role in this state of affairs has increased since Islamabad’s relations with New Delhi are now seen from an Afghan prism. India and Pakistan have always struggled to attain strategic agendas in Afghanistan; while India believed its influence and presence in Afghanistan as a strategic geo-political constraint on Pakistan as well as a gateway to Central Asia, the Pakistan has deep cultural and historic links due to a common border with a Pashtun ethnic majority on both sides. Nuclear Co-operation India’s nuclear proliferation poses a significant threat towards Pakistan’s national security. India over the years has developed its nuclear technology. Most recently with the establishment of the Indo-U.S. civilian nuclear agreement, a bilateral accord on civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries. The framework for this agreement was a joint statement (18 July 2005) by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and then U.S. President George W. Bush, under which India agreed to separate its civil and military nuclear facilities and place all its civil nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and, in exchange, the U.S. agreed to work toward full civil nuclear cooperation with India.58 Pakistan would like a civilian nuclear cooperation deal with the U.S.; similar to the one U.S. has with India. But the U.S. response has been unenthusiastic to this proposal, amidst fear over how it would affect Washington’s ties with India. Moreover, such a move would need consensus approval from the 46-nation Sue Pleming, “Factbox: Key Facts in U.S.-Pakistan Relations”, Op. cit. “Joint Statement Between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh”, The White House – Archive, 18 July 2005, Available at: http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/07/20050718-6.html 57 58 23 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as well as U.S. congressional backing, which was a long process with the Indian deal.59 Pakistan’s Internal Problems and U.S. Pakistan has several internal threats, which ultimately affect its national security and long-term stability and its relations with U.S. These threats include a relationship with the Taliban that over the years has been both a subversive tool used by Pakistan within the boundaries of its neighboring countries and recently became a significant adversary and concern for the Pakistani government. As a result of the military operations conducted against the Taliban in April 2009, 2.8 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) were placed into temporary camps or other locations within the country. The IDPs were potential recruits for the Taliban based on the poor localized environmental of the time. For centuries national security has been the basic and paramount concern of the nation states. While achieving enduring security has remained to be the most cherish able reward for states, over the years the concept of security has developed and considerably changed. Since its inception, Pakistan has been facing the challenge of national security. Traditionally, the threat to Pakistan’s security has been external. However, today it can be arguably asserted that the major threat to national security in Pakistan emanates more from internal sources rather than external. The most serious threat facing Pakistan at the moment is posed by terrorism. Pakistan has several internal threats, which ultimately affect its national security and long-term stability. These threats include a relationship with the Taliban who over the years has been both a subversive tool used by Pakistan within the boundaries of its neighboring countries and recently became a significant adversary and concern for the Pakistani government. Cooperation in Police sector Pakistan has been engaged against the threat from a variety of insurgent and terrorist groups. So far, the army has been the principal U.S. partner in contending with a variety of threats in the tribal areas, and elsewhere in the 59 Sue Pleming, “Factbox: Key Facts in U.S.-Pakistan Relations”, Op. cit. 24 country.60 Most counterinsurgency policies and doctrine state that the police are placed in the lead having the primary responsibility in lieu of the military. The police are normally well integrated into the civilian populace resulting in a tightly knit intelligence network to counter not only criminal activity but also against an insurgency or militant organizations. The police are normally the first line of security for the populace and a sense of trust is normally obtained between the two, however, that is not the case for most of the country. Additionally, militants historically understand the potential power of the police and this key sense of respect has been absent. Since 2005, insurgents and terrorists have killed approximately 400 police in suicide bombings, assassinations, and other like crimes. The police make easy targets primarily because they are outgunned, under resourced, inadequately equipped, and poorly trained. Most do not even have the same lucrative death benefits as army personnel; many have simply fled the fight to protect their families.61 As to the U.S. assistance towards the police, a slim amount of U.S. funding has gone to assisting Pakistan’s police, with the vast majority going to support the military through reimbursements or assistance. Between FY 2002 and FY 2009, the accumulated outlays for International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement programming have totaled $358 million, inclusive of border security programming. This is a mere 2.3 percent of the nearly $15.4 billion provided as aid or military reimbursements under the Coalition Support Fund Program.62 Although most police across the country are considered corrupt or unprofessional, the leadership of the government and the police appear to want a change for the better and it is becoming evident in a few key locations. The National Highways and Motorway Police, the Islamabad Police and the Lahore Traffic Police have all gained the trust of their citizens through professional and C. Christine Fair, “From Strategy to Implementation: The Future of the U.S. Pakistan Relationship”, Rand Corporation, Available at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT330 61 C. Christine Fair, “Policing Pakistan”, Rand Corporation, Available at: http://www.rand.org/commentary/2009/06/30/WSJA.html 62 “Direct Overt U.S. Aid and Military”, U.S. Government, State, Defense, and Agriculture Departments; U.S. Agency for International Development – Archives. 60 25 courteous conduct. These police are paid good salaries and are subject to strict accountability for their performance. It is probably time for the international community to take note of these unexpected reformers and assist them in the future development of the country’s police.63 Al-Qaeda and Taliban: A Matter of Concern for U.S. and Pakistan Pakistan has essentially permitted the Taliban to operate and exist within its borders without any consequence over the past few years, however, beginning in 2009, the Taliban started to flex and demonstrate a challenge to the Pakistani government. In an attempt to contain the Taliban reach and affect inside the Pakistan borders, President Zardari signed a series of deals with the Taliban implementing Sharia law in select parts of Pakistan. The first on 18 April 2009 banned all girls from attending school in certain portions of the country. 64 On 13 April 2009, he signed a peace deal for the nation's Swat Valley, implementing Sharia law in this region.65 However, on 30 June 2009, the Taliban withdrew from the peace deal protesting the continued airstrikes by American drones. Soon after the announcement that the truce was no longer in play, approximately 150 militants attacked a Pakistani military convoy near Miramshah, killing an estimated 30 soldiers.66 The following describes a snapshot of the recent environment in Pakistan. In late April 2009, taking full advantage of a failing state, the Pakistani Taliban were sixty miles away from the capital of nuclear-armed Pakistan. Pakistan had capitulated in the Swat Valley by granting carte blanche to the Taliban to exercise administrative and judicial control, thus placing even more territory under direct Taliban rule after Pakistan lost control of most of its tribal agencies C. Christine Fair, “Policing Pakistan”, Rand Corporation, Available at: http://www.rand.org/commentary/2009/06/30/WSJA.html 64 Basravi, Zein, “Pakistan Does Deal with Taliban on Sharia Law”, CNN – Asia, Available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/02/16/pakistan.taliban.sharia.law/index.ht ml 65 “Pakistan Deal Enshrines Sharia Law”, CNN – Asia, Available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/04/13/pakistan.swat/index.html 66 Salman Masood, “An Accord in Pakistan is Scrapped by Militants”, New York Times, 30 June 2009. 63 26 abutting Afghanistan. Two months after an unprecedented military operation, however, Taliban forces were in retreat and more than 2.5 million citizens of the Swat Valley were displaced. After five years of a failed counterinsurgency policy, the Pakistani military was finally willing to strengthen from the lessons learned. While this transformation is anything but complete, the civil-military complex in Islamabad has moved away from using unrestrained brute force toward using stabilization operations that focus on protecting civilians and the economic infrastructure. Moreover, Islamabad has upgraded the Taliban to the status of Pakistan’s number one enemy, even while it alleges Indian support for the insurgency in Baluchistan and its indirect support in terms of arms to militants in Pakistan’s northwest.67 This example demonstrates the current Taliban faction as an immediate threat and is causing a significant concern for the Pakistani government. By the end of the 2009 summer, a Pakistani initiative had succeeded in driving out the Taliban in the Swat region, which lost territory, public support, and its firebrand leader, Baitullah Mehsud. The bickering group returned to its stronghold in Waziristan, undefeated but contained.68 The greatest threat to the U.S. and Pakistan’s national security and stability is the Al-Qaeda backed Taliban in its territory. Pakistan’s relationship with the Taliban over the years has been one of a subversive proxy. Pakistan has employed the Taliban in its neighboring countries as a defensive mechanism for strategic depth and has been noticed by the international community as counter-productive to the ongoing operations in Afghanistan. But, the Taliban have directed its guerrilla warfare not only against the Afghanistan government and the U.S. led ISAF forces, but also towards the Pakistan government. In May 2009, Admiral Mike Mullen, U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that elements of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) were confirmed as maintaining links with militants on Pakistan’s border with both Haider Ail Hussein Mullick, “Helping Pakistan Defeat the Taliban: A Joint Action Agenda for the United States & Pakistan”, Available at: http://www.ispu.org/files/PDFs/ISPU%20%20Helping%20Pakistan%20Report.pdf 68 Haider Ail Hussein Mullick, “Pakistan’s New Taliban: Managing Another Threat to Stability”, Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, Available at: http://ispu.org/articles/articledetailpb-93.html 67 27 Afghanistan and India. General David Patreaus, Commander U.S. Central Command, noted that the ISI appeared to have warned terrorists that their positions had been discovered.69 In September 2009, General Stanley McCrystal, Commander U.S. and ISAF Forces Afghanistan, stated Pakistan’s ISI was contributing to external forces working to both undermine U.S. interests and destabilize the government in Kabul. Experts said elements of the ISI maintain those ties to hedge against a U.S. withdrawal from the region and rising Indian influence in Afghanistan.70 The relations between two countries disturbed after Raymond Davis case. He was an American CIA agent who was accused of shooting two Pakistanis in January 2011. But he was released by Pakistani government without any allege. It helped Pakistan military in getting out of the magic spell of U.S.A and is no more taking western border for granted. The heads of three services and ISI are now alive to the reality that the U.S. pretending as Pakistan’s friend and well-wisher is in actuality working on an agenda to denuclearize and balkanize Pakistan so as to make India the unchallenged power of South Asia.71 Recently killing of Osama bin Ladin in Pakistan’s territory had also gained the suspicion from the U.S. regime. According to Congressional Research Service report, on May 1, 2011, U.S. Special Forces killed Osama bin Laden in a raid on a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, some 35 miles north of Islamabad. The circumstances of bin Laden’s refuge raised serious suspicions for many Members of Congress concerned that elements of Pakistan’s security forces may have been complicit in protecting the Al Qaeda founder for years while the United States provided billions of dollars in aid to Pakistan. Some senior Members—House Speaker John Boehner and Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry among them—counseled a moderate response to the development, emphasizing the ongoing importance of the U.S.Pakistan relationship for key U.S. interests. Others—including Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Levin and Senate Homeland Security Robert D. Blackwill, “Pakistan, Taliban and Global Security – Part II”, Op. Cit. Greg Miller, “U.S. Says Pakistan, Iran Helping Taliban,” Los Angeles Times, 22 September 2009. 71 Asif Haroon Raja, “The U.S. Objectives set for Pakistan”, Available at: http://www.opinion-maker.org/2011/08/the-us-objectives-set-for-pakistan/ 69 70 28 Committee Chairman Lieberman—issued strongly worded suggestions that levels of U.S. aid could be sharply reduced.72 Bin Laden’s assassination ostensibly came as a shock to Pakistani authorities, who admitted to not being part of the operation to kill the Al-Qaeda leader. Furthermore, Washington immediately confirmed that there was no Pakistani involvement in the mission whatsoever. According to the US, the Pakistani government was only informed of the raid after the event had occurred. However, in an article in the Washington Post, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari stressed his ‘satisfaction that the source of the greatest evil of the new millennium has been silenced’.73 In recent months, the relationship between the Pakistani military on the one hand, and the Pentagon and U.S. military commanders in Afghanistan on the other, has become strained due to the frequency of pilot-less drone attacks, CIA activities in Pakistan, and Pakistan’s fear of being marginalized in any future political settlement in Afghanistan.74 Regardless of the intent for the relationship, the future of this relationship will need to be closely reviewed and a way forward determined to ensure a positive outcome for all parties concerned. Whenever the limits of the Pak-U.S. relations will to be taken into account the most important hindrance to be posed is because of the Drone attacks because they are the main driving force behind the rising anti-Americanism in the Pakistani society. Also the general public before the Swat operation and few segments even still feels that this war as a “U.S. war against terrorism” not Pakistan’s war. This public opinion is a major constraint over the relations between Pakistan and the U.S. The issue of drone attacks, which is the reason of major unrest in the Pakistani society, needs to be addressed. Another weakness is of trust deficit. The counter terrorism forces on both sides are sceptical of each others intentions and so a trust deficit has been created. U.S. sees few elements of Pakistani intelligence agency as pro-Taliban while apprehensions also exist on Susan B. Epstein, K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance”, (June 7, 2011), Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41856.pdf 73 Junaid S. Ahmad, “Pakistani-U.S. relations in the post-Osama era”, 31May, 2011, Available at: http://www.aljazeera.net/mritems/streams/2011/5/31/1_1065242_1_51.pdf 74 Ibid. 72 29 the Pakistani sides as well in the matter of provision of intelligence information. Trust should be build to the extent that American forces instead of conducting these attacks themselves give room to the Pakistani forces to operate and stop the diplomatic pressure of “Do even more”. 30 Conclusion and Recommendations Pakistan is a pivotal state for U.S. and it has become a front-line ally of U.S. after war on terrorism. But for Pakistan U.S. is not either a trusted ally or friend. History has also proven itself whenever U.S. needs Pakistan, it just fulfill its interests and went away. So Pakistan should vivify its policy. Pakistan is at a major crossroad and has numerous opportunities to become a successful nation state in South Asia. The first and primary concern for the nation is that it must ensure its national security objectives are achieved against threats, both internal and external. Simultaneously, Pakistan must provide opportunities for economic development, ultimately affording opportunities for its economy to flourish and attract both domestic and foreign investment for the nation. It is in interest of the U.S. and the international community for Pakistan to become a stable, democratic, and economically prosperous country within the region. To ensure these successes, it is recommended that Pakistan address the following areas via diplomatic, economic, and military avenues.  Pakistan has endeavored and must continue to pursue and establish an open dialogue with India in order to eventually address the issue of Kashmir. The relationship since partition in 1947 has been very challenging and difficult at best. The diplomatic methods used over the past five years attempting to address the issue have not been effective. Recommend changing the approach by taking smaller-trust building measures first before moving directly into discussions about the future of Kashmir. Pakistan must take the lead and demonstrate its trust and confidence for developing a mutually beneficial relationship between the two countries. Pakistan must continue to leverage the international community for India to come to the table for the conduct of the Composite Dialogue.  Pakistan sees India as a continued threat with a nuclear capability and perceives it to be engaged in an arms race. Pakistan cannot fiscally compete with India in an arms race based on its current economy and GDP; therefore, recommend Pakistan leverage the relationship with the U.S. and China to prevent any threat from India. Using these two key relationships to its advantage would then permit Pakistan to focus on its internal economic development. Additionally, Pakistan continues to demonstrate steps to maintain and improve the physical security and safeguard of its nuclear arsenal demonstrating that it is a responsible nuclear state.75  Pakistan has a responsibility to ensure its weapons, materials, and technologies are under strong viable safeguards and that their purpose is meant to deter and only to be used as a last result. Pakistan must clearly publically articulate its nuclear doctrine. The main elements being: Pakistan is a responsible nuclear state; Pakistan believes in a policy of restraint; would like to avoid any arms race; and Pakistan’s policy is to maintain credible minimum deterrence for defensive purposes and to maintain this capability to meet all emerging requirements.76  Pakistan can play a significant role in the future stability and growth of Afghanistan by providing assistance in the development of the civilian leadership within the Afghanistan government. Pakistan should take the opportunity to mature a regional partnership with Afghanistan in the development of the physical infrastructure resulting in a strategic gateway not only between the two countries but also to the energy-rich Central Asian states.  Pakistan’s Gwadar port offers numerous opportunities as a tie between Kabul and Islamabad. Connecting Central Asian markets in the Persian Gulf and South Asia through Gwadar will result in an increased economic growth for both countries.  Pakistan has unlimited economic growth potential once stability has been established within the country and the region. Improving dialogue within the region will open doors to began trade between the neighboring countries of India and Afghanistan. Additionally, stability will foster growth of domestic and foreign investment and afford the private sector the opportunity for growth as well. Pakistan should look internally to improve its own revenues, which include broadening of the tax base and removing exemptions. Pakistan must expand the development of agriculture, its historically largest 75 76 Tariq Hyder, “Nuclear Pakistan: Ten Years On”, Margala Papers (2008):105-126. Ibid. element of GDP, and invest in energy development including the expansion of utilization and development of coal.  The Iran-Pakistan pipeline will provide a reliable supply of natural gas for many decades. If the pipeline extends to India, it has the potential to afford an opportunity for stability between the two countries while also generating transit fee income to Pakistan.  Pakistan should demonstrate that it is not maintaining relationships with militant organizations operating in neighboring countries, specifically those potentially undermining U.S. and ISAF efforts against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Pakistan must reconsider a dual policy of maintaining a relationship with select militant organizations while fighting others is not appropriate over time for maintaining a stable nation state.  Pakistan should continue its commitment of investment in education and associated policy reforms. These include improving quality of education both for the students and for the teacher professional development, textbook enhancement, improvement of student learning and classroom environment, and access to schools. Pakistan should continue to expand scholarship for students to study higher education at world class universities ultimately applying the knowledge gained back into their society and nation.  Finally, Pakistan should continue to demonstrate, both to the U.S. and the international community, its resolve against terrorism by aggressively continuing its military operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda and by removing the safe havens afforded to the militants in under-governed spaces. Pakistan should demonstrate that it is not maintaining relationships with militant organizations operating in neighboring countries, specifically those potentially undermining U.S. and ISAF efforts against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Pakistan must reconsider a dual policy of maintaining a relationship with select militant organizations while fighting others is not appropriate over time for maintaining a stable nation state. Pakistan can play an active role during the phase requiring discussions between U.S./ISAF and the Taliban leadership. The historical relations between Pakistan and the Taliban will facilitate discussions during these critical times.  U.S. must continue to understand the cost and sacrifices made by Pakistan for the WOT both in loss of life and of the fiscal cost associated with their efforts.  U.S. will need to remain constant by providing strategic engagement with Pakistan’s leadership, both civilian and military. It is imperative that the security forces be provided the capacity and capability to counter the terrorists and insurgents within their territorial boundaries.  Additionally, U.S. should consider offering threat reduction tools to Pakistan to ensure the safeguard of their nuclear arsenal, thus preventing the nuclear capabilities from falling into the wrong hands.  Recommend the U.S. continue to encourage both Pakistan and India to begin open dialogue with the end state of developing trust between the two countries. U.S. should encourage India, as a future economic super power, to become a leader in the region promoting peaceful resolutions to difficult and aggressive historical issues. As a result, the opportunities for economic growth and stability will begin to flourish, the challenges associated with Kashmir can potentially be resolved, and the threat of a conflict between the two can be reduced.  Recommend the U.S. encourage regional and global partners to contribute to the economic development of Pakistan by providing developmental assistance in the areas of energy, water, education, and agriculture.  Pakistan’s geographic location also played a vital role in attracting U.S. policies towards Pakistan. U.S. always sought Pakistan a key instrument to eliminate threats to the U.S. interests in the region. To the fulfillment of its objectives, U.S. has desperately needed Pakistan.  Finally, recommend the U.S. engage in dialogue with Pakistan both at the national leadership level and at the grass roots level. 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