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Land Acquisition and the Doctrine of Eminent Domain In a country like India, land being a major source of livelihood is a complex socio- politic issue. Land Acquisition, inevitably is a controversial one standing at the political faultine of India as it undergoes rapid industrialization and significant developmental changes. Legally it can be traced back to the colonial administration, who in order to facilitate the acquisition of land for public purposes enacted several acts starting with the Bengal Regulation I of 1824, the Act I of 1850, the Act XXII of 1863, the Act X of 1870, the Bombay Act No. XXVIII of 1839, the Bombay Act No. XVII of 1850, the Madras Act No. XX of 1852, Madras Act No. 1 of 1854, X of 1861, and the Act VI of 1857. Compensation was to be determined by specifically appointed arbitrators and as long as the twin requirements of Eminent Domain theory- pu li purpose a d o pe satio - were satisfied, the legality of the acquisition held water. The term is often traced back to the 17th century jurist, Hugo Grotius and is based on the Latin maxims, (1) Salus populi suprema lex and (2) Necessitas publica major est quam. It means that welfare of the people is paramount to the law, and that public necessity is greater than a private one. Justice M.C. Mahajan of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh quoted Grotius a d held that the ea i g of e i e t do ai i its irredu i le ter s is a power to take ithout the o er s o se t, for the pu li use, after pay e t of o pe satio . The Forty-Forth Amendment of 1978 deleted the right to property from the list of fundamental rights introducing a new provision, Article 300-A, hi h pro ided that o perso shall e deprived of his property save by authority of la . The right to property, no longer a fundamental right, became more of a statutory right and the remedy available to aggrieved persons came under Article 226 of the Indian Constitution in the High Court and not under Article 32 in the Supreme Court. The doctrine of Eminent Domain is the source of the power to take property away from the individuals. In effect it states that the sovereign can do anything if it involves public interest. For example, Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act allows acquisition for private companies, subject to restrictions imposed by sections 38-44 to only those activities from which the public can benefit like schools, hospitals etc. There is no provision for emergency acquisition under Part VII. However States have acquired lands for activities that do not serve any public purpose at all like hotels, manufacturing plants, etc using the emergency provision. Moreover, Part II of the Act which does not impose the restrictions that Part VII does, and is only meant for public purposes, and this has been used by states to circumvent it aggravating its misuse. This stands well documented in the literature (Gonsalves 2010; Guha 2007; Desai 2011; Morris and Pandey 2007; Sarkar 2007; Singh 2006). In the case of Indrajit C Parekh v. State of Gujarat the Gujarat Government contended that even one rupee from the exchequer is sufficient to validate the acquisition for companies under Part II and the Supreme Court upheld it. Since then the states have been contributing nominal amounts, to justify acquisitions unfairly. The proposed amendment bill of 2015 to the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act of 2013 (LARR Act), which replaced the colonial-era Land Acquisition Act of 1894, also e dorses the otio of e i e t do ai of the state and fails to adopt indicators to determine social impact. Our constitutional requirement of equality remains unfulfilled. (Rushda Khan, student Faculty of Law, University of Delhi)