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Social Movement Studies: Journal of
Social, Cultural and Political Protest
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The Maoist Movement in Contemporary
India
a
Uday Chandra
a
Max Planck Inst it ut e for t he St udy of Religious and Et hnic
Diversit y, Göt t ingen, Germany
Published online: 08 Oct 2013.
To cite this article: Uday Chandra , Social Movement St udies (2013): The Maoist Movement in
Cont emporary India, Social Movement St udies: Journal of Social, Cult ural and Polit ical Prot est , DOI:
10.1080/ 14742837.2013.845730
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Social Movement Studies, 2013
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2013.845730
PROFILE
The Maoist Movement in Contemporary
India
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UDAY CHANDRA
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity, Göttingen, Germany
Opposing the neoliberal rhetoric of a shining middle class India, the Communist Party of
India [CPI (Maoist)] has, since 2004, called for a New Democratic Revolution. Indian
Maoists dismiss parliamentary democracy as a sham insofar as it fails to address the
concerns and aspirations of the majority of its citizens, nearly four-fifths of whom live on
less than US$2 a day. In their party programme,1 Maoists characterize the postcolonial
Indian state as ‘reactionary’ and ‘autocratic’ and seek a ‘worker-peasant alliance’ to
overthrow ‘imperialism, feudalism and comprador bureaucratic capitalism’ via an armed
revolutionary struggle. The CPI (Maoist) politburo, which constitutes its ideological
leadership, is thus supported by an underground People’s Liberation Army. The party’s
long-term objective is to establish a ‘people’s democratic state under the leadership of the
proletariat’ that will ‘guarantee real democracy for the vast majority of people while
exercising dictatorship over a tiny minority of exploiters’.
The CPI (Maoist) is active mostly in eastern and central India, where human
development levels rank among the lowest in the world; forest cover and rugged terrain
facilitate guerrilla tactics and protracted low-intensity insurgency, and tribal and lower
caste groups are preponderant. According to the Indian prime minister, Maoist rebels pose
the greatest internal security threat to India since independence. In reality, however,
Maoist cadres are estimated to be anywhere between 10,000 and 40,000 in a country of
nearly 1.2 billion people, though this number does not include sympathizers and noncombatants. These thinly spread cadres are concentrated chiefly in what journalists,
policy-makers and scholars call the Red Corridor, running from the Nepalese border
through the states of Bihar, Jharkhand, West Bengal, Orissa, Chhattisgarh and Andhra
Pradesh. In these areas, regular elections are held, state and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) routinely participate in rural development, and state police and
forest officials coexist with armed rebels and their rural supporters. Since 2005 – 2006, the
Correspondence Address: Uday Chandra, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity,
Herman-Föge-Weg 11, 37073 Göttingen, Germany. Tel.: þ49 (176) 7222-546; Fax: þ49 (551) 4956-170.
Email: chandra@mmg.mpg.de
q 2013 Taylor & Francis
2
U. Chandra
state has deployed paramilitaries to supplement state police forces in combating Maoist
guerillas, which has intensified state-sponsored violence and led to widespread human
rights abuses, yet it has been incapable of establishing anything akin to a monopoly of
legitimate violence. Shared sovereignty is thus the norm, not the exception, as in other
insurgent zones in India such as Kashmir and the north-eastern frontier. This state of
affairs also suggests that the everyday realities of Indian Maoism are somewhat different
from its ideological self-image as a vanguardist revolutionary movement.
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Intellectual and Social Origins
The origins of revolutionary Marxism in India, particularly its Maoist avatar, are typically
traced to 1967, when the radical left split from the CPI (Marxist). In May 1967, the
revolutionaries who later formed the new CPI (Marxist-Leninist, M-L) supported a local
peasant uprising in the village of Naxalbari in the Himalayan foothills of north Bengal. The
CPI (M-L) thus came to be popularly known as ‘Naxalites’ or simply ‘Naxals’. Inspired by the
revolutionary writings of Mao Zedong, the Naxalites selectively targeted rich peasants or
‘kulaks’ in the countryside and ‘bourgeois’ representatives of the ‘comprador state’, and
endeavoured to mobilize rural masses to encircle major cities such as Delhi and Kolkata and
eventually seize power. They tapped into widespread disillusionment, especially among
students and intellectuals, with the postcolonial regime dominated by the Congress party. By
1970, hundreds of young men and women from the country’s most prestigious universities
had joined the movement to fight for their peasant and proletarian comrades. Urban middle
class and invariably upper caste activists thus made common cause with the struggles of
subalterns, particularly peasants in eastern and central India, whose interests had been
betrayed by Congress nationalists towards the end of the anti-colonial movement. From its
epicentre in West Bengal, the Naxalite movement spread initially to the neighbouring states of
Bihar and Orissa, and then, up the northern plains to Uttar Pradesh and Punjab as well as
westwards to Maharashtra and southwards to Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Kerala.
From the early 1970s, however, the state launched a brutal counter-insurgency to check the
advance of the Naxalites, imprisoning, torturing and even murdering activists without
remorse. Ironically, the campaign against the Naxalites came to be led by their old comrades in
the ‘revisionist’ CPI (Marxist), along with, of course, the ruling Congress party in New Delhi.
In the face of state violence, many Naxalite cadres who survived police brutalities gave up
their revolutionary dreams; others went underground in the countryside to undertake
grassroots mobilization; the party itself split numerous times on ideological and regional lines.
In Bihar alone, there emerged three major Naxalite factions – the Maoist Communist Centre
(MCC), CPI (M-L) Liberation and CPI (M-L) Party-Unity – and by the mid-1990s, as many
as 17 different Naxalite groups were reportedly active in the state. All of these groups saw
themselves as farther left than the ‘revisionist’ CPI (Marxist), which participated regularly in
parliamentary elections, yet they differed widely on the ‘correct’ revolutionary line to be
adopted. In the early 2000s, a decade after India introduced neoliberal economic reforms,
attempts were made to unify disparate Naxalite splinter groups, but it was only on 21
September 2004 that a formal merger took place under the aegis of the two largest groups, the
MCC and the CPI (M-L) People’s War. The newly minted CPI (Maoist), which was produced
by this merger, retains the core Maoist principles outlined by their revolutionary predecessors
in the 1960s and 1970s, but unlike before, there is now an appreciation of the need for a
‘protracted people’s war’ in order to eventually overthrow the existing state.
Profile: The Maoist movement
3
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Social Bases
Why ordinary men and women participate in the Maoist movement and to what extent they
exercise any meaningful agency within it are fiercely debated in contemporary India.
Critics of the Maoist movement today argue that Naxalites have always been violent,
bloodthirsty ideologues who coerce subalterns to do their bidding. Sympathizers,
however, see the movement as the authentic voice of the most marginalized sections of
Indian society. At any rate, there is widespread agreement that dalits (ex-untouchable
castes) and adivasis (tribals) are the most important social groups whom Maoists seek to
mobilize for their revolutionary ends. Yet not all dalits and adivasis participate in or favour
Maoist revolutionary activities. There are significant differences in the social bases of
Maoism both within and across regions. At the same time, it is widely accepted that the
leading ideologues of the Maoist movement do not belong to these subaltern communities.
Top Maoist leaders such as Koteswara Rao (alias Kishenji) and Cherukuri Rajkumar (alias
Azad) have almost invariably been men from upper or middle caste backgrounds. While
their superior caste status carries much significance in rural India, it must be recognized
that Maoist leaders do not come from the small privileged circle of Westernized elites
based in Indian metropolises. It is true that there is now an underlying layer of dalit and
adivasi leadership within the movement, but it is equally true that men and women from
subaltern backgrounds have yet to assume top leadership posts in the party. The social
bases of the Maoist movement are, therefore, best understood in terms of the constraints
and opportunities available to radical youth in rural India today.
Among dalits, especially in rural eastern India, local struggles for dignity and political
assertion go back to the late colonial period. As landless peasants and bonded labourers,
formerly untouchable castes have been indispensable to capital accumulation and social
reproduction in modern India. The legal abolition of untouchability has meant little in
practice to dalits reeling under oppressive upper caste regimes in Bihar, Jharkhand, West
Bengal and Orissa. In south Bihar and northern Jharkhand, for example, dalits have been
instrumental in carving out a Maoist stronghold by aligning their interests with those of the
party. During the caste conflicts of the past three decades, dalit castes such as Musahars
and Dusadhs actively fought their landlords with the assistance of the Maoists. Yet others
such as Doms chose not to displease their landed patrons. In Orissa, a similar situation has
played out, especially among Christian dalits who have joined the Maoist movement to
combat the hegemonic designs of the ruling rightwing Hindu upper caste groups. In 2008,
the assassination of Swami Lakshmananda Saraswati, an aggressive proponent of
Hinduization among dalit and tribal communities, by Christian Maoist youth laid
threadbare the social polarities that fuel revolutionary action in that state. In adjoining
West Bengal, the birthplace of the Indian Maoist movement, the upper caste-dominated
CPI (Marxist) denied caste discrimination over 34 years of its rule. But lower caste groups,
who were kept out of its patronage structures and the benefits of land redistribution
policies, have been at the forefront of the contemporary Maoist movement.
Among adivasi communities, officially recognized as ‘scheduled tribes’ by Indian law,
the Maoist movement did not emerge from within. Instead, it was brought to the forest
highlands of Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh by committed cadres seeking to expand their
revolutionary ambit. The Maoist entry into tribal homelands has coincided with the
growing presence of NGOs there. In Jharkhand, for example, tribal youth with the
appropriate language and technical skills can join the Maoists, NGOs, and sometimes,
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4
U. Chandra
even both. These young men and women find a new sense of camaraderie and non-farm
employment within Maoist ranks that contrasts with what they see as the drudgery of farm
labour in a gerontocratic society. Resisting the gerontocratic rule of tribal elders also
entails negotiating local state structures insofar as the elders, especially in their role as
village headmen, are key local state functionaries. The primacy of local power dynamics
can be clearly seen from the tribal youth’s relative disinterest in Maoist ideology per se.
Supporting or participating in the Maoist movement thus seems quite compatible with
implementing NGO programmes or enrolling in state welfare schemes. In Chhattisgarh,
however, adivasi support for and participation in the Maoist movement have been closely
linked to the counter-insurgency campaign led by the Salwa Judum, a state-sponsored
militia. The gross human rights violations carried out by the Salwa Judum have, ironically,
had the effect of turning even fence-sitting adivasis into committed Maoist cadres. As in
Jharkhand, it is possible to participate in state and NGO programmes as a member of the
Maoist party, though, in a more polarized situation, it is harder to keep one’s allegiances
secret. In the Bastar region of Chhattisgarh, it is particularly interesting to note the
prominence of Gond adivasis in the Maoist movement, even as local and regional party
leaders, though smaller adivasi groups such as the Dhurwas and Murias, have tended to
keep the Maoists at arm’s length. In sum, while the social bases of contemporary Indian
Maoism, therefore, do not encompass all adivasis or dalits, it cannot be denied that these
marginalized groups form the backbone of the movement.
Movement Dynamics
Over the past decade, the Maoist movement has passed through three distinct phases.
In the first phase, prior to the formation of the CPI (Maoist) in late 2004, Maoist leaders
sought to expand their operations from their strongholds in south Bihar into new territories
in Jharkhand, Orissa and the districts of West Bengal that border these two states. In these
predominantly adivasi areas, the Maoists recruited local youth and offered protection to
rural communities from the predations of state police and forest officials. In the central
Indian states of Chhattisgarh and neighbouring Andhra Pradesh, they consolidated their
previous gains among rural dalit and adivasi communities by campaigning for higher
minimum wages and support prices for forest products such as tendu leaves. In eastern and
central India alike, Maoist groups attempted to capture the hearts and minds of target
populations, especially young and willing combatants, by promising to overturn
traditional class, caste and gerontocratic hierarchies. In doing so, they displayed a clear
willingness to think in local or regional terms, thereby shelving temporarily their longterm goal of capturing state power throughout India. At the same time, they made common
cause with their Maoist comrades in Nepal, with whom they shared much in common in
terms of ideology and organization.
In the second phase of the movement, with the formation of the CPI (Maoist) in
September 2004, a centralized executive committee or Politburo came to head the
movement comprising regional and district committees and a growing guerilla army.
Greater centralization under the Politburo, along Nepalese Maoist lines, may have been an
aspiration, though the complexities and constraints of local and regional politics in India
compelled the CPI (Maoist) to negotiate power structures on a case-by-case basis in each
context. Decentralized political calculations and outcomes invariably meant greater
autonomy in decision-making for those occupying lower rungs of the party organization.
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Profile: The Maoist movement
5
In frontier areas such as Jharkhand and Orissa, greater autonomy brought in more recruits
and entrenched the movement firmly in local webs of power. However, these gains for the
Maoist movement came at a significant cost, namely, the sharing of political space with
political parties, NGOs and local state bodies, which postponed the revolutionary agenda
to an indefinite future. Likewise, in their old strongholds in Bihar, Chhattisgarh and
Andhra Pradesh, the Maoists struggled to articulate revolutionary aims beyond attacks on
local power holders. Many dalits in south Bihar, for instance, increasingly turned to other
forms of political assertion via political parties, egalitarian religious sects and festivals
celebrating lower caste icons. More disturbingly, as the Maoist movement expanded in the
region, it assumed a more elitist character insofar as it often inducted landed upper castes,
compromised with local power structures and blocked dalits’ opportunities for political
advancement within the organization. While outright desertion remained rare, many dalits
were justifiably dismayed at the Maoists’ inability to overturn local and regional
hierarchies irreversibly. In sum, a unified party-led movement has, paradoxically, ended
up deepening the challenges of fragmentation and mobilization that had existed already.
In the third and final phase, the state’s counterinsurgency initiatives have forced the
Maoist movement to retreat and contract. Since 2009, the Home Ministry’s Operation
Green Hunt has unleashed central paramilitary troops into the forested and hilly terrain of
eastern and central India. Illegal detentions and torture of suspected Maoists have been
commonly deployed to break the existing ties between Maoists and their rural supporters.
In addition, the Indian state has sought better coordination among the police in states
where Maoists enjoy popular support. Lastly, new development schemes and special aid
packages have been devised to wean adivasis and dalits away from the Maoist movement.
All of these counterinsurgency initiatives have placed severe restrictions on the operations
of the Maoist movement, which already faced internal challenges of fragmentation and
localization. In Bihar and Jharkhand, Maoists have experienced a steady decline in
recruitment and even defections. Some ex-Maoists have begun providing intelligence on
their former comrades and even contesting elections. In Chhattisgarh, however, Maoists
may have actually gained fresh followers due to the atrocities committed by the statesponsored militia, Salwa Judum. In the short run, the Maoists may have prevailed over the
statist militia, but they now face the far greater challenge posed by central paramilitaries in
the region. The situation today is, therefore, not too different from the early 1970s, when
the Naxalites were forced into retreat though committed leaders kept the embers of
revolution alive.
Conclusion
It is possible to view the contemporary Maoist movement in India as yet another
revolutionary endeavour that has failed. Yet this view misses not only the very real gains
in subaltern political participation produced by the CPI (Maoist), but also the movement’s
tendency to retreat to subterranean levels before surfacing again when conditions are
favourable again. The term ‘failure’ thus misdiagnoses the present situation, which may be
described more accurately as a temporary retreat. Longer time horizons permit us to better
appreciate the waxing and waning of social movements in response to internal and external
challenges and constraints. If the history of Maoism in India tells us anything, it is that the
basic structural conditions for revolutionary struggle continue to exist, yet those who lead
such struggles must inevitably compromise their revolutionary ideals in the face of local
6
U. Chandra
and regional constraints on mobilizing subaltern populations. Despite its ambitious
revolutionary aims, the contemporary Maoist movement in India has been compelled to
exist as a fragmented entity alongside the state and domestic and international NGOs. The
movement’s underlying strategy is, ostensibly, to garner maximum support at the
grassroots level without imposing a centralized party discipline on local cadres, and
ultimately, to incorporate every kind of political dissent within Maoist ranks. Nonetheless,
fragmentation of social protest also suggests severe principal – agent problems within the
party, while coexistence with the state signifies the inability of the Maoist movement to
control particular areas exclusively as ‘liberated zones’. As the current wave of Indian
Maoism ebbs due to internal and external factors, we may reasonably expect another wave
in the next generation, and there is every reason to believe that future Maoists will inherit
the opportunities and challenges of their predecessors.
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Note
1. http://www.bannedthought.net/India/CPI-Maoist-Docs/Founding/Programme-pamphlet.pdf
Uday Chandra is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at Yale
University. His research interests lie at the intersection between agrarian studies,
comparative studies of state formation and resistance, postcolonial theory, political
anthropology and South Asian history. His dissertation studies the historical origins and
social bases of the contemporary Maoist insurgency in India, focusing on the forest state of
Jharkhand in eastern India.
Beyond academia, he is writing a novel inspired by the extraordinary history and
politics of ordinary people in the forests of Jharkhand; he is co-founder of a non-profit
organization that promotes tribal rights, livelihoods and culture in the region; lastly, he is
starting work on a film that foregrounds many varied voices of popular critique of the
Indian state from the Maoist fringes of eastern-central India.