India’s Response to Maoist Extremism:
Force, Development or Both?
Bibhu Prasad Routray
May 2012
India’s Response to
Maoist Extremism:
Force, Development or Both?
Bibhu Prasad Routray
May 2012
Dr. Bibhu Prasad Routray was a Visiting Fellow with the South Asia Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International
Studies, Nanyang Technological University (NTU) from October 2010 to March 2011 and from September 2011 to March
2012. Prior to that he served as Deputy Director at the National Security Council Secretariat, Government of India, New
Delhi, India. He can be contacted at bibhuroutray@gmail.com
Contents
03
Executive Summary
04
The Problem
05
State Responses: Military and Developmental
06
Government Approaches: A Critique
07
Policy Recommendations
03
Executive Summary
India is currently grappling with an effective response to
left-wing extremism. Even though in the last two years,
extremist violence as well as areas under extremist
influence has somewhat diminished, the problem remains
serious. While India’s military approach has failed to make
much headway owing to a range of weaknesses among the
forces, the development approach too has been critiqued
for being too romanticised and unreal for implementation.
There is an obvious need for a policy rethink and clarity of
approach if the challenge is to be met. It is essential that
the policy to deal with the problem needs to consider the
following recommendations.
•
The country has to arrive at a consensus on the kind of
approach it wishes to pursue against the extremists.
•
A permanent institutional mechanism in the form of a
coordination centre can be established to thrash out
emerging differences between the Centre and the
States.
•
Augmenting the capacities of the police as the primary
force against Maoist violence will be key to neutralizing
the firepower of the extremists.
•
While development is a useful tool against Maoist
extremism, it is imperative that a semblance of order
precede injection of resources into the extremistaffected areas.
•
Development must operate in tandem with the security
forces. Resumption of administrative activity should
immediately follow the clearing of an area by the
forces.
•
It is essential that the oficial approach be based on
an effective policy of communication that not just
brandishes the extremists as essentially bad, but is
also honest about its own honourable intentions.
•
Holding elections for institutions of local selfgovernment in the affected areas followed by the
strengthening of these institutions with additional
financial and decision-making powers is a necessity.
•
Success of security force operations need to be
based on the concept of just war that strives to do the
maximum to avoid collateral damage.
•
Government needs to stay away from propagandist
claims about winning the war in quick time.
India’s Response to Maoist Extremism: Force, Development or Both?
04
The Problem
Maoist Violence in India
Year
Incidents
Fatalities
(Civilians
& Security
Forces)
Maoists
Killed
Maoists
Arrested
Maoists
Surrendered
2007
1565
696
141
1456
390
2008
1591
721
199
1743
400
2009
2258
908
219
1981
150
2010
2213
1005
172
2916
266
2011
1755
606
99
1972
393
Source: Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), Government of India.
(Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal)
For the past several years, the left-wing extremism problem
has emerged as a major internal security challenge for
India, described on several occasions as the “biggest
internal security challenge” by the Prime Minister of the
country. The extremists professing a pro-tribal outlook
and with an avowed objective of overthrowing the present
system of government through an armed revolution have
been able to pose a serious governance and development
challenge. Armed violence by these extremists,
predominantly belonging to the Communist Party of IndiaMaoist (CPI-Maoist)1 peaked in 2009 when intelligence
sources informed that they were active in almost 230
districts of the country, amounting to more than one third
of India’s geographical area. Such areas witnessed large
scale violence targeting the state and what the Maoists
describe as ‘state sympathizers’.
Areas under extremist control have somewhat shrunk in
the past couple of years. While as many as 18 states (of
a total of 28) were said to have been witnessing Maoist
activities in 2009, since 2010 government sources have
been reporting extremist violence only from eight. In 2011,
government reported 606 fatalities in 1755 incidents of
Maoist violence which was significantly lower than 1005
deaths in 2213 incidents in 2011.2 While this represented a
major improvement in the state of extremism, the problem
continues to remain serious. There has been a spike in the
number of training camps organised by the Maoists for
their cadres as well as in the number of ‘people’s courts’ in
which the extremists punish the ‘enemies of the movement’
– indicating that the decrease in violence is only the result
of a tactical and temporary retreat by the Maoists and
is not necessarily due to the augmentation of capacities
among the security forces. Moreover, intelligence sources
have indicated Maoist attempts to spread to new states
in southern, central and northeast India. The government
has termed the current level of violence ‘unacceptable’3.
Patterns of Maoist Attacks
Targets
2008
2009
2010
Economic Targets
05
17
24
Railway
27
46
54
Telephone Exchange/
Tower
46
67
45
Power Plant
1
2
3
Mining
6
3
9
Transmission Pole
24
7
2
Panchayat Bhawan
7
23
31
School Building
25
Forest Rod, Culverts etc 41
(Remains of a vehicle following a Maoist landmine explosion in
Maharashtra, 2012)
1
71
39
126
158
Source: Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), Government of India.
The Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) is the result of a 2004 merger between two left-wing extremist organizations- the Maoist Communist
Centre of India (MCCI), which was active in Central India and the People’s War Group (PWG), which was mostly active in southern Indian states. The CPIMaoist continue to remain the most dominant and violent outfit among the various Left Wing Extremist groups, accounting for more than 90 percent of total
Left Wing Extremist incidents and 95 percent of resultant killings. Annual Report 2011-12, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, p. 29.
2
State-wise extent of Naxal violence during 2007 to 2011 (from January to December), Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, pp.1-2.
3
See “Maoist violence down, says Chidambaram”, 14 June 2011, http://www.inewsone.com/2011/06/14/maoist-violence-down-says-chidambaram/56593.
Accessed on 10 April 2012.
India’s Response to Maoist Extremism: Force, Development or Both?
05
State Responses: Military and Developmental
In 2008, an Expert Committee of the Planning Commission,
India’s nodal official development planning body, in
its report recognized the Maoist movement’s political
nature.4 The report, an exhaustive anthology of the roots
of tribal discontent and violence underlined the need for
a development-centric approach to the Maoist problem.
It made a series of recommendations with regard to
implementation of protective legislation, land acquisition,
rehabilitation and settlement and livelihood security.
However, the need to obliterate the military capacities of the
extremists who accounted for the lives of 721 civilians and
security forces in 1591 incidents in 2008 and 908 civilians
and security forces in 2258 incidents in the subsequent
year, pushed the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) to pursue
a force-centric policy against the CPI-Maoist. Although the
government described its policy as being based on the
twin pillars of development and security force operations,
the need to undermine the firepower of the extremists as a
pre-condition before starting development initiatives was
an unwritten principle.
The belief that major armed operations can break the
back of the extremists was derived from success stories
in Mizoram in India’s northeast and also Punjab, which
had once been seriously affected by Sikh militancy. Even
in the Maoist-affected southern state of Andhra Pradesh,
intelligence-backed tactical operations by the anti-Maoist
commando police force, Greyhounds, was thought to
have played a decisive role behind the victory of the state
over the extremists.
(Security Forces carrying out anti-Maoist Operations in
Chhattsigarh, 2010)
4
Development Challenges in Extremist Affected Areas, Report of an expert
group to Planning Commission, April 2008, http://planningcommission.
gov.in/reports/publications/rep_dce.pdf. Accessed on 10 April 2012.
This thinking resulted in Operation Green Hunt, a
coordinated multi-theatre military offensive against the
extremists that began in early 2010. Around 70 battalions
of Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) were deployed
by the MHA to assist the state police personnel operations
against the extremists. New battalions were raised
and existing battalions underwent extensive counterinsurgency training. The ministry also sanctioned the
raising of ten battalions of specialised counter-Maoist
force called the Combat Battalion for Resolute Action
(COBRA). However, lack of adequate planning and
coordination between the various agencies involved in the
operation and inadequate intelligence backup resulted in
a series of serious reversals for the security forces. Two
big ambushes in the state of Chhattisgarh claimed the
lives of nearly 100 security force personnel, pushing them
into a defensive state of operation. A reorientation in the
approach was called for.
Although the military operations have not been abandoned
and individual states continue to undertake area clearing
operations, such exercises appear to form parts of a new
‘clear, hold and develop’ strategy that uses development
as a tool to win back the support of the tribal population,
who overwhelmingly appear to sympathize with the
extremists. Since early 2011 there is a renewed focus
on carrying out development initiatives in areas cleared
of Maoist presence. Several flagship projects of the
government to improve connectivity of tribal areas with the
administrative centres, to provide employment to the tribal
youth and to ensure health and educational facilities have
been launched. To ensure that proper implementation of
these developmental projects and monitor their progress,
a new scheme titled ‘Prime Minster’s Rural Development
Fellows Scheme’ has also been unveiled. Under the
scheme, 156 young professionals have been trained
and are being stationed in 78 worst-affected districts for
two years to assist the district administration. Resources
too have started flowing into the coffers of the district
administration with an emphasis on time bound utilization
and implementation.
Since the extremists are known to have targeted
infrastructure projects in the past or have prevented
contractors from executing the projects, security forces
are now assigned to protect the planned development
ventures in order to ensure their timely completion and
safety. To ensure that the security forces are not targeted,
as they protect the development projects, the government
is also planning to build landmine-proof Roller-Compacted
Concrete (RCC) roads in affected states. Further, the
government has also cleared a proposal to raise a combat
unit under the para-military Central Reserve Police Force
(CRPF) for construction of roads in Maoist-affected areas.
India’s Response to Maoist Extremism: Force, Development or Both?
06
Government Approaches: A Critique
Two types of problems continue to afflict the counterMaoist efforts – first, the lack of coordination between
the federal government and the states; and second, the
inherent problems within the states impacting on their
capacity to tackle the challenge.
India’s Home Minister P Chidambaram
Even when the Centre embarked on the now abandoned
Operation Green Hunt, different states pursued divergent
policies against the extremists, oscillating between peace
talks, development and security measures. The lack
of a common approach was taken advantage of by the
extremists who used the territories of the states soft on
security force operations to regroup. Even the central
forces who aided the state police forces were found to
be operating without direction and able leadership. The
military approach did achieve some notable successes
by neutralizing some senior extremist leaders. But in the
absence of a coherent nation-wide approach, a complete
victory over Maoist extremism remained a far-fetched
dream. In 2009, the then Home Secretary had predicted
that “within 30 days of the security forces moving in and
dominating the area, we should be able to restore civil
administration.”5 The goal was never met.
Rural Development Minister Jairam Ramesh has been one of the
main advocates of the development approach
Similarly, the lack of unanimity among the Centre and
the states has the potential of becoming a bane for the
development-centric approach of the government as
well. In October 2011, the Rural Development Minister
Jairam Ramesh, whose ministry oversees most of the
development programmes in the Maoist-affected areas,
pointed to this specific problem. “We need to rise above
partisan political considerations and set aside old Centrevs-State arguments and work concertedly to restore
people’s faith in the administration...only then will the tide
of Naxalism be stemmed”, he is reported to have said.6
This, however, is easier said than done. Media reports in
January 2012 indicated that the development projects
initiated in the eastern state of Jharkhand have run into
a rough patch owing to the unenthusiastic response
from the state government. The state forest department
has been extremely slow in providing clearances for the
setting up of security force camps in the protected forest
areas. According to the plan, these forces are to provide
security to the development projects.
Similarly, the relative weakness of the state police forces
and the complete absence of intelligence networks
to assist the security force operations have impacted
on the effectiveness of the security force operations
against the extremists. Since 1969-70, the MHA has
been implementing a Scheme for Modernisation of State
Police Forces.7 However, implementation of the scheme,
according to which the Centre provides money to the states
to build capacity among their police forces, has been
slow, barring a few states. States continue to demonstrate
an overwhelming tendency to fall back on the fighting
ability of the central forces rather than going through the
tedious process of capacity building among their own
police forces. Auditing by the central government on many
occasions has revealed serious gaps in implementation of
the modernisation programmes.
If the military approach is seen to have achieved minimal
results, development initiatives in the extremist affected
areas too have received setbacks. Firstly, without any
functional system of governance worth its name in vast
areas under extremist influence, it has been almost
impossible to execute the developmental projects.
Secondly, wherever the government has managed to set
up a functional project implementing mechanism, real or
threatened extremist attacks targeting the executing agency
have slowed down the project execution considerably.
This has widened the trust deficit among the intended
beneficiaries and the government. Thirdly, a perennial
absence of coordination between the security forces and
the civilian administration has meant that areas continue
to remain without official developmental intervention, even
after these are cleared of Maoist presence by the forces.
As soon as the forces retreat, Maoists recapture the area,
nullifying the achievement.
5
Aloke Tikku, “Anti-Naxal offensive to begin in eleven places”, Hindustan Times, 10 October 2009, http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-news/NewDelhi/
Anti-Naxal-offensive-to-begin-in-eleven-places/Article1-463353.aspx. Accessed on 10 April 2012.
6
“Central and state govts responsible for Naxalism: Jairam Ramesh”, Daily News & Analysis, 11 October 2011, http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report_
central-and-state-govts-responsible-for-naxalism-jairam-ramesh_1597691 (Accessed on 25 January 2012).
7
Scheme for Modernization of State Police Forces, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, http://mha.nic.in/pdfs/MPF.pdf. Accessed on 10 April 2012.
India’s Response to Maoist Extremism: Force, Development or Both?
07
Policy Recommendations
Wide-ranging suggestions for an optimal response
have been made by analysts, activists and experts.
Organisations which the government considers to be
pro-Maoist categorize the official approaches to deal with
Maoist extremism as a war unleashed by the Indian state
on the hapless tribals. They allege that the government
is merely interested in the natural resources lying buried
in the tribal inhabited lands and is trying to cleanse the
area of tribal presence on behalf of the Multi-National
Corporations (MNCs), with whom it has signed several
Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs). Even the
official development initiatives have been termed as a
‘soft counter insurgency’ method by these activists. They
prescribe that the government leave the tribal population
alone.
Apart from the fact that stopping mining and exploration
of natural resources is an unviable proposition for India’s
growing economy, such suggestions gloss over the fact
that the CPI-Maoist has an avowed objective of replacing
the current structure of governance with a people’s
government. Even though, in real terms, this objective
appears grossly unrealistic, the CPI-Maoist’s capacity to
pose a major hurdle for official developmental activity in
remote areas remains a reality.
Another group of experts opines that dialogue with the
Maoists and development of the tribal areas, rather than
a military solution, is the way out of the current mess. This
approach too is untenable, given the fact that Maoists
have either resisted attempts at negotiation or have used
the peace process to recoup. Similarly, suggestions have
also been made to use land reforms and to bringing about
changes in the laws that secure the rights of the tribal
population over forests. Land reforms have remained
a contentious issue in many states invoking divergent
policies from the governments. While many states have not
bothered to take any steps towards land reforms, in some
like Andhra Pradesh, where the need for land reforms has
been accepted, entrenched stake holders have slowed
down the process considerably. The Central government
has initiated several schemes and passed legislations
aimed at empowering the tribals. But the growing
criminalisation in the Maoist ranks has severely limited the
impact of such measures on the level of extremism.
On the other hand, a separate groups of experts favouring
a security force-led response underline the need to
strengthen the state police forces as an effective model of
counter-insurgency rather than depending on the central
forces. However, given the poor state of police forces in
the affected states, this approach appears to be highly
ambitious and may take years to implement.
Therefore, an effective approach to deal with the Maoist
problem may contain the following.
(i) Consensual approach: The country has to arrive at a
consensus on the kind of approach it wishes to pursue
against the extremists. Whether it is purely military,
developmental or a judicious mix of both has to be decided
by national-level brain storming. The MHA will have to
be at the forefront of building such a consensus. Merely
supporting the state governments by providing funds and
forces is inadequate.
(ii) Institutional arrangements for centre-state cooperation:
Since problems in formulating a counter-Maoist policy as
well as in dealing with the issue on a day-to-day basis
are sourced to the lack of centre-state cooperation,
a permanent institutional mechanism in the form of a
coordination centre can be established to thrash out
emerging differences. A coordination centre does currently
exist within the MHA, but requires the active participation
of state representatives to ensure smoother coordination.
(iii) Police hold the key: Augmenting the capacities of
the police, who are conversant with local conditions, as
the primary force against Maoist violence will be key to
neutralizing the firepower of the extremists. To optimize
this, close and timely monitoring of the expenditure of the
funds made available by the Centre is required.
(iv) Development follows military success: While
development is a useful tool against Maoist extremism, it is
imperative that a semblance of order precede injection of
resources into the extremist-affected areas. As exempliied
by India’s experience in other conflict theatres like the
northeast, without some level of security, conflict-ridden
areas resemble bottom-less pits. Without local capacities
to absorb the available resources and an accompanying
mechanism for accountability, funds simply disappear
into the coffers of the extremists, politicians, bureaucrats
and the contractors. Here again, careful monitoring is
essential.
India’s Response to Maoist Extremism: Force, Development or Both?
08
(v) Coordination between the administration and
security forces: As explained earlier, development must
operate in tandem with the security forces. Resumption
of administrative activity should immediately follow the
clearing of an area by the forces. In this context, the
creation of a dedicated team of administrators, with some
level of independent decision making authority, requires
special attention.
(vi) Strategic communication: Maoists have exploited
tribal disenchantment against government apathy lasting
over decades. It is essential that the official approach be
based on an effective policy of communication that not
just brandishes the extremists as essentially bad, but is
also honest about its own honourable intentions.
(vii) Development of local political leadership: It is not
the security forces, state or central, but local political
leadership which will act as a primary resistance force
against a cleared area relapsing into extremism. Every
step must be taken for the resumption of political activity
in the affected areas. Holding elections for institutions of
India’s Response to Maoist Extremism: Force, Development or Both?
local self-government could be the first step in this regard,
followed by the strengthening of these institutions with
additional financial and decision-making powers. This
would ameliorate the reality of alienation among the affected
population, thereby making them genuine stakeholders in
maintaining peace and promoting development.
(viii) Need for a just war: Just like other conflict theatres,
the Maoist conflict theatre too has reported its own share
of human rights violations and excesses committed by the
security forces on non-combatants. While some of these
allegations have been found to be false, some are real.
There is an urgent need to base the success of security
force operations on the concept of just war that strives to
do the maximum to avoid collateral damage that leads to
further alienation of the affected people.
(ix) Cut the hype: Without doubt, the anti-Maoist operations
will be a prolonged affair. Augmenting state capacity will
need sustained effort and time. Therefore it is essential for
the government to stay away from propagandist claims
about winning the war in quick time.
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