International Research Journal of Social Sciences______________________________________ ISSN 2319–3565
Vol. 4(7), 59-69, July (2015)
Int. Res. J. Social Sci.
Indo-US Nuclear Deal: A New Beginning in Indo-US Relations
Tawseef Ahmad Bhat and Deepika Gupta
Ph.D. Research Scholar, S.S. in Political Science and Pub. Administration, Vikram University Ujjain, M.P. INDIA
Available online at: www.isca.in
Received 3rd May 2015, revised 7th June 2015, accepted 10th July 2015
Abstract
The civilian nuclear cooperation is the name assigned to a joint accord on strategic cooperation between the two
countries. The energy segment is the key in enhancing India’s economic intensification to double digit. The joint statement
of 2005 between the two nations is considered as a historic step. Hyde Act, 123 agreement, IAEA Safeguards and NSG
waiver were main postulates for the nuclear deal to take place despite domestic and international reactions. The passage
of the agreement in both the countries legislatures finally paved way for the enforcement of the deal. Both the nations were
able to have lot of benefits through this historic nuclear deal. It balanced the strategic and economic relation between the
two nations.
Keywords: India, USA, nuclear energy, 123 Agreement, Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
Introduction
It is meaningful to evoke the history of chaotic bilateral
relations between the two nations in order to understand the
background of the Nuclear Cooperation. The relationship
between the two countries had not always been so comfortable
and cordial as one finds them today, but for a long period of
time, the bilateral relation remained cold and the main reason
behind such bitter relation was the “nuclear factor”. In the
beginning India received the assistance from US and other
countries to exploit atom for peaceful purposes, but slowly after
India rejected to be the signatory of the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty and in 1974 test fired its first nuclear
explosion known as Peaceful Nuclear Explosion. The nuclear
test was followed by harsh reactions from across the world and
in particular the passage of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act in
1978 by US was aimed to put embargo on nuclear commerce
with India. Soon after the disintegration of USSR in 1991, India
began increasing her cordial relation with US. Again in late
1990s India test fires five nuclear tests at Pokhran, which lead to
implementation of economic sanctions against India. Towards
the end of the 20th century and beginning of the 21st century, US
policy towards India got transformed into more friendly rather
than a far enemy. After implementation of economic sanctions
over India in 1998, US very soon decided to enter into a
strategic dialogue with India. The dialogue process was
extended over two and half years in fourteen sessions in seven
countries between Jaswant Singh from India and US Secretary
of State Strobe Talbott. This process paved way for the
enhanced understanding of national interests of both the
countries, also it leds the clearance of misunderstandings
between the two countries. The Strobe Talbott-Jaswant Singh
talks initiated dialogue processes that were notable not only for
their lack of transparency but also for the fact that it initiated a
sudden move into the foreign policy and strategic undermining
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some of the key principles that had till then underpinned India's
foreign policy1. The bilateral relation got further boosted by
then US Presidents visit to India in 2000. During the visit both
countries aimed to proceed towards a constructive partnership,
this laid down the foundation for transforming Indo-US
relations.
Soon in the beginning of 21st century, US leadership under
President Bill Clinton paid visit to India to establish close
relationship and the two countries urged to construct a strategic
partnership and increasing cooperation in various other fields2.
The Bush administration came to power in the year 2001 with
the dream of strengthening relations with India. The 9/11 attacks
produced greater opportunity for both the countries to further
strengthen the strategic partnership. The nuclear cooperation is
the name assigned to a joint accord on nuclear collaboration
between the two countries. The Joint Statement under which
India agreed to separate its civil and military nuclear facilities
and place civil facilities under International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) safeguards and, in exchange, the United States
agreed to work toward full civil nuclear cooperation with India
was the main framework for this agreement. It setup a roadmap
for further strategic cooperation between the two nations.
During the Bush era, the nuclear accord with India is considered
an extension of the qualitative transformation of bilateral
relation. US favoured the nuclear deal with India and it would
bring the later towards the international non-proliferation
systems and thereby boost the non-proliferation regime3. The
makers of the nuclear deal argued that it is an attempt to fortify
India’s capacity to develop its civilian nuclear energy’s
contribution to its huge and swiftly mounting electricity needs.
In 2006, the Hyde Act was signed by President Bush, which is
considered as a big step in the direction of reintegrating India
with global nuclear market. The act grants the official basis for
the 123 Agreement with India. The legislation on the nuclear
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deal was signed by President G.W. Bush and approved by
the U.S. Congress, into law, now called the United States-India
Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Non-proliferation
Enhancement Act. The agreement was signed on October 10
2008, it is also known as 123 agreement.
India’s quest for Energy and Indo-US Joint Accord
The energy segment is the key in enhancing India’s economic
intensification to double digit. The progress of the energy
segment in the country is been inhibited by capital, technology
and environmental issues. Investments in energy sector have
become imperative and to attract investments, Indian
government has provided striking packages and policy
incentives. Energy security for a country as large as India can
only be provided by a diversified portfolio. An assessment of
data shows India as the fifth largest producer of electricity in the
world. However, while by hydro, coal, oil and gas India is
amongst the top 10 countries of the world for production of
electricity, but it is nowhere near the top 10 with respect to
nuclear power generation. For a country like India, this is an
inconsistency in need of modification. India needs to speed up
the improvement of the sector to meet its growth aspirations. To
stimulate economic growth, every source of energy needs to be
exploited. While meeting today's needs, we have to continue to
look into the future and work out strategic plans to meet future
energy requirements. India and US have been witnessing
unprecedented growth in their bilateral ties. The collaboration in
energy field between the two nations has been crystallizing from
the years in government, academia and industry. Currently some
alliance exists in the fields of coal, gas and electricity and a
number of US enterprises are working in India. Energy
cooperation between the two is progressing in the areas like
energy efficiency, nuclear energy, the application of
biotechnology in biomass gasification, geophysical exploration,
renewable, and other clean energy technologies. With
advancement in technology and progress on the commercial
deployment front, nuclear energy can have an imperative role in
the electricity field. A nuclear energy policy must first of all be
grounded in the confidence that India has a balanced and
justifiable need for nuclear power4.
In 2003, the Bush administration not only rejuvenated the
suspended nuclear safety cooperation with India, but also
prolonged it to the greater possible extent within the sphere of
U.S. domestic laws and international commitments toward
nonproliferation. As part of this discourse, the U.S. National
Regulatory Commission (NRC) was engaged with its Indian
counterpart the Atomic Energy Regulation Board (AERB) to
make sure the regulation and safety of nuclear reactors in India.
India became eligible for Excess Defense Articles (EDA) on
grant basis under the US Foreign Assistance Act in 2003. Its
aim was to support the war on terrorism, promote
interoperability of systems and to modernize previously solid
equipment. Under the Presidency of Bush, US start giving much
importance to India and actively sought to make India a
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strategic partner. For the first time the Indo-US Defense Policy
Group met and outlined a strategic partnership and commenced
implementation of the same, which included joint training and
procurement of some more defense related equipment. This
subsequently led to an agreement between India and US on
‘Next Steps in the Strategic partnership’ (NSSP) in 2004. NSSP
was the first document that clearly identified along with others
Civilian nuclear activities as a strong spot for cooperation
between the two countries5. It sought to expand collaboration on
nuclear and civilian space technology, missile defense and dual
use high-technology trade6. It aimed at providing India civilian
nuclear technology to address her dreadful energy needs and
bound the dangers of nuclear accidents at obsolete plants.
Technology transfer and close cooperation in business and,
science and technology including in the nuclear and missile
technology areas also form an essential part of the bedrock of
the partnership. In January 2004 NSSP was announced by
Vajpayee and Bush, then reaffirmed by Manmohan Singh and
Bush in September 2004, and at the movement moving into its
second phase.
Along with various positive developments which took place in
order to transform the bilateral relation, the most vital was the
March 2005 visit of Condaleezza Rice to India, during her visit
she revealed the eagerness of US to cooperate with India in the
field of civilian nuclear energy. Indians were exceedingly
surprised by this offer and lost no time in seizing the
opportunity and immediately after her visit, the two nations
started negotiations to chalk out contours for this broad
cooperation. This restoration of the nuclear safety cooperation
with India served as a significant confidence-building measure
and assured both the countries that they had a common interest
in providing safe and reliable nuclear energy. Anil Kakodkar as
chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission while
underlining India’s commitment to nonproliferation, made an
appeal for the deletion of technological embargoes. He stated,
“We have a commitment and an interest in contributing as a
partner against proliferation … we must discard the baggage
inherited from the past which restricts the flow of equipment
and technologies related to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.”
Significantly, in July 2005, a mere couple of weeks before the
scheduled visit of the Prime Minister of India to the U.S., the
chairman of the AERB, A. Gopalakrishnan, for the first time
drew public attention to the shortage of fuel for the Indian
nuclear reactors. Calling for international cooperation in the
supply of nuclear fuel, A. Gopalakrishnan criticized the silence
maintained by the Indian government and the Department of
Atomic Energy (DAE), he noted, “it turns out as the chief
setback for the officials of NPCIL (Nuclear Power Corporation
of India Limited) and the Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC) to some
extent7. Contrary to the common discernment, he emphasized
that the imperative need for India, was not nuclear reactors, but
fuel for the nuclear reactors already functioning or to be built.
Cognizant of U.S. domestic laws and international commitments
that barred nuclear trade with India, Gopalakrishnan anticipated
that assistance on the part of Washington could at least support
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the removal of NSG objections so as to facilitate India to import
the gravely needed uranium, i.e., nuclear fuel, from other
countries. Interestingly, India’s growing nuclear energy needs
were being recognized at the international level too8.
The US has been repetitively assured by two successive Indian
governments of this desire, assurances that have been delivered
in terms of concrete instances of support to the US. India while
preserving as much recognition as possible as a nuclear weapon
state, both NDA and UPA governments have been more than
eager to surrender or narrow down their strategic and foreign
policy options across the board, aligning with the US on
everything from missile defense to climate change. On 28 June
2005, the new agenda for the Defense Relationship was signed
between the US Defense Secretary and the Indian Defense
Minister, to facilitate cooperative exercises, information sharing
and greater opportunities to jointly build up technologies and
deal with security and humanitarian issues, this came as a herald
to the coming July 18 statement between the two nations. After
more than a few years of joint deliberations between the two
countries, an agreement on 18 July, 2005 was signed on the
strategic relationship between the two9. Both the leaders issued
a joint declaration on civil nuclear cooperation and significantly,
Arvind Virmani quoted that it is in India's favour to utilize the
opportunity provided by Bush administration, to enhance India's
strategic capability and global power. However, the major
advancement from international relations point of view and
energy augmentation for India is the consensus reached between
the two nations in July 2005. The joint statement between the
two nations is considered as a historic step. The three major
dialogue areas among a wide spectrum of areas for cooperation
entrenched in the statement were: strategic (including global
issues and defense), economic (including trade, finance,
commerce, and environment) and energy. The civil nuclear
technology has been acknowledged as a key area of
collaboration, attempted at ending three decade long segregation
of India by throwing open the most recent civil nuclear
technology and in the course, facilitating accelerated fabrication
of nuclear energy, thus tumbling the future utilization of
hydrocarbon by India. The Foreign Relations Committee of the
US Senate approved the Indo-US Energy Security Cooperation
Act intended at increasing bilateral trade and investment in the
Indian energy zone by working with the public and private
sectors to promote identification of areas for cooperation and
build on the wide array of existing collaboration between the
two countries to organize safe, clean, consistent and inexpensive
sources of energy.
Following agreement, Manmohan Singh made certain
statements in Parliament, which now bind the government to
definite commitments. These were a claim regarding deal that it
will provide "full" admittance to nuclear technology in the
civilian area, including what is termed as "dual use"
technologies, like those related to reprocessing of fuel,
enrichment process and the fabrication of heavy water. In
return, besides separating civilian and military nuclear facilities,
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and placing the former under safeguards stipulated by the
International Atomic Energy Agency, India would stick to its
voluntary cessation on nuclear testing and cooperate with US on
a fissile material cut-off treaty. The mutual views to nuclear
energy, which are more political than legal, centered on the
amplification of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and on energy cooperation to prevail over India’s
rising energy scarcity. India like other countries will have the
identical responsibilities and practices with sophisticated
nuclear technologies, and has agreed on: i. Identification and
separation of civilian-military nuclear facilities, and placing all
the civilian nuclear facilities voluntarily under the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system. ii.
Implementation of IAEA’s additional protocol with respect of
civilian nuclear facilities. iii. Enduring one-sided cessation on
nuclear testing. iv. Working with US for the wrapping up of a
Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). v. Put in practice
broad export controls on susceptible goods and technologies. vi.
Harmonization and devotion of Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR) and Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG)
Guidelines10.
The US has reciprocally promised that it will: i. Adjust domestic
laws and policies after seeking agreement from Congress. ii.
Work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to
facilitate full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with
India, and iii. Consult with partners on India’s participation in
the fusion energy consortium ITER and support India’s part in
work to develop advanced nuclear reactors.
Significance of the Accord
The 2005 joint statement was examined at different levels by
experts, think tanks, politicians and commentators of media. It
manifested the commencement of the next phase of strategic
partnership entailing intensified cooperation on essential areas,
including nuclear energy and ‘international efforts to prevent
WMD proliferation’. From the political point of view, the
agreement had the most vital and extensive impacts. It
established Indian relationship to US with new interests. India
got recognized as a de facto nuclear power and there was
prospect of American favour for becoming a global power and
permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council.
The joint statement detached almost three decades old
technological sanctions and provided multifaceted assistance of
influential economy of the world. It also provided energy
options in nuclear area and made it a feasible resource for
Indian growing economy. More importantly, the deal turned to
be a huge global leverage for India being partner of the US,
especially in ensuring India’s safety measures in an unstable
neighbourhood.
The main feature of the Joint Statement being the assurance by
the U.S. President according to which US adjust domestic laws
and policies after seeking agreement from Congress, as well as
international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy
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cooperation with India. After amendment in its domestic laws
US tried to accommodate India by persuading the members of
the NSG to restart nuclear cooperation and trade with India11. It
broadened the energy options for India and predicted nuclear
energy as a feasible basis of power for its growing economy.
India, on its part, is to unilaterally lay its civilian nuclear
reactors and nuclear materials to be acquired from US within the
purview of IAEA’s new India specific guidelines; for this, India
is to draw a wall of separation between its nuclear defensive
deterrence programme and nuclear energy producing reactor
system. A. Gopalakrishnan (2005) quoted that the joint
statement faced varied opinions in both the countries, with both
opposition and favour coming from important individuals and
political parties. Oddly, while the US non-proliferation lobby
considers that the intentional collaboration with India would
spoil the current nuclear control regime, the Indian opponents
assert that the agenda will gravely edge the country's nuclear
weapon capabilities, harm national security benefits and harm
aboriginal nuclear development. The prime minister laid about
joint agreement in a clear cut manner to Union Parliament on
July 29, saying" Our nuclear programme is exceptional. It
composes the entire assortment of activities that describe a
highly developed nuclear power, the scientists already
accomplished marvelous work and we are moving ahead fine on
this programme as per the unique visualization outlined by
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and Dr Homi Bhabha." He went on to
argue that" nuclear power has to maintain an escalating role in
our power generation plans" and the deal offers a means where
"our aboriginal nuclear power programme based on domestic
assets and national hi-tech capabilities would prolong to
develop.
At the end of the joint accord of 2005, the Indian PM invited US
President to tour India, which the latter accepted and as per his
visit to India in March 2006, the two sides finalized a plan for
the separation of civilian-military facilities of India. The key
essentials were12: i. Eight indigenous Indian power reactors will
be placed under an India specific safeguards agreement, the total
number of power reactors is 22 and 14 will be brought under
safeguards. ii. Future power reactors would be placed under
safeguards, if India declares them as civilian. Some facilities in
the Nuclear Fuel Complex e.g; fuel fabrication will be specified
as civilian in 2008. iii. Nine research facilities and three heavy
water plants would be declared as civilian.
The following facilities and activities are outside the separation
list:i. Eight indigenous Indian power reactors. ii. Fast Breeder
Test Reactor (FBTR) and Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor
(PFBR) under construction. iii. Enrichment facilities. iv. Spent
fuel reprocessing facilities (except for the existing safeguards on
the Power Reactor Fuel Reprocessing (PREFRE) plant. v.
Research Reactors: CIRUS (which will be shut down in 2010),
Dhruva, Advanced Heavy Water Reactor. vi. Three heavy water
plants. vii. Various military-related plants (e.g; prototype naval
reactor).
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As part of its plans for separating its facilities, India will
eventually begin negotiations with the IAEA about the nature of
safeguards it will put into practice. The leadership of both the
nations hailed the March 2006 agreement as the anchor of a new
"strategic partnership." Both the leaders received a report from
chief executives of five US corporations and ten Indian
companies to improve investment and commercial links. The
corporation executives stressed that the greater US investment
could help India to further develop its infrastructure, and
American technical skill will be helpful for India to upgrade its
low-cost manufacturing. India’s target to construct nuclear
power plants is to generate 40,000 megawatts of electricity by
2020
an aim proclaimed by Prime Minister Singh. If the
contract with the US is successful, ‘India will have admittance
to the global nuclear technology market’, said by S. K. Jain
chairman of Nuclear Power Corporation of India. He added,
once the deal with the US is successful, supplies of enriched
uranium would be ‘included in contracts to install reactors.’
Some points revealed out as the logic of the US-India
cooperation included that nuclear power is grave in meeting
‘India’s energy requirements’, while also creating ‘innovative
business opportunities’ for U.S. firms, which translates into
‘new jobs for American workers’. Another main issue, the US
vice president said: ‘India will go into the global
nonproliferation mainstream by sorting out its civil-military
nuclear programmes’. The separation plan envisages
requirements for remedial procedures that India may take to
make certain continuous process of its civilian nuclear reactors
in the incident of interruption of far-off fuel supplies. In
November 2006, India received the largest trade delegation
from the US which naturally included nuclear equipment
companies. The Business Council of the Chamber of Commerce
of India and US predicted that the new US law on nuclear
relation with India would ‘yield a gift of opportunities’ for the
two countries. K. Subrahmanyam, a foreign policy political
analyst and chairman of Indian Government’s Task Force on
Global Strategic Developments, was quoted as saying that
American interests and India’s interests are ‘at present,
different’, he further pointed out that it would take time for the
differences to be ‘harmonized’, but added that ‘the door has
opened’. The US House of Representatives on 8 December,
2006, approved the conference report and passed the “Henry J.
Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation
Act of 2006” gaining 330 votes out of 359. The US Senate also
offered a “unanimous consent” to the conference report on 9
December 2006 and subsequently, on 18 December, 2006,
President Bush, in a crucial development, signed the Hyde Act
into law (PL 109-401) by President Bush on 18 December 2006,
which is considered as a big step in the direction of reintegrating
India with global nuclear market.
Hyde Act
The Act provides the permission for a bilateral pact between the
two nations under which the US will grant access to civilian
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nuclear technology and admittance to nuclear fuel in substitute
for IAEA safeguards on civilian Indian reactors. It was
introduced by the US Congressman Henry J. Hyde and passed
by the US Congress, the passage and consent to the Hyde act by
President Bush, the theme of the debate preceding it and the
final contents of the legislation, have provided a rude reminder
of the realities and constraints that govern Indo-US relations,
exposing the diligently built-up myths of India's Bushies. US
President outlined four key elements of the act which are: i. The
amplification of energy co-operation between India and United
States will lead to the foundation for a new strategic partnership.
ii. The encouragement of economic growth which will allow
investment from American businesses in India’s civilian nuclear
industry creating new jobs in America as well as new customers
abroad. iii. Environmental protection by helping India to
diminish emissions from coal based electricity generation
through nuclear power generation. iv. Safeguarding American
non-proliferation interests by opening Indian civilian nuclear
facilities to international scrutiny.
The President intended anticipation of strengthening the
strategic relationship between the two nations while signing the
bill. Interestingly, the bill was passed with tough bipartisan hold
in the U.S. Congress. The Henry Hyde Act was described as an
“enabling legislation” as it created legal space, hitherto blocked
by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA), for
resuming nuclear traffic with India, a non signatory of the NPT
and de facto nuclear weapon state. Nevertheless, Congress
attached certain clauses to emphasize the nonproliferation
measures, such as: the president must yearly confirm that India
is adhering as per the terms of agreement, India must sign a
safeguards concurrence with the IAEA and acquire clearance
from the NSG, and most significantly, the deal will lapse if
India conducts further nuclear tests. Bearing a good responsible
record, US expressed keenness to slot in assurances concerning
fuel furnishing in the bilateral agreement under Section 123 of
the US Atomic Energy Act. The US will also hold up an Indian
endeavor to build up a intentional preserve of nuclear energy to
safeguard beside any interruption of supply over the duration of
India’s reactors. If regardless of these measures, a distraction of
fuel equipment to India takes place, the US and India would
mutually set up a faction of pleasant supplier countries,
including Russia, France and the UK to follow such procedures
as would renovate fuel supply to India. For the time being, US
approached NSG members to adjust their guiding principle to
ease full civil nuclear collaboration with India.
Following the agreements of July 2005 and March 2006, and the
Henry Hyde legislation, a separate technical agreement,
popularly called the Indo-U.S. 123 Agreement, was signed by
the two countries. It specified comprehensive responsibilities of
and conditions for the two nations. There were certain
requirements India needed to fulfill before the agreement could
be operationalised like; an IAEA safeguards agreement must be
signed and an approval of NSG must be obtained.
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123 Agreement
On July 27, 2007 policymakers from both the countries signed
an accord on civil nuclear cooperation, however the text was
agreed on August 1, 2007. It is entitled, as “Agreement for
Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of India Concerning Peaceful
Uses of Nuclear Energy (123 Agreement)”. The 123 Agreement
was introduced in the US Congress and it was passed with an
overwhelming majority in both the Houses. However,
accomplishment of the agreement received a hold up due to the
opposition by the Communist parties that supported Manmohan
Singh's minority government from outside. The communists
were arguing that the agreement would place India in the US
strategic track13. However, it was revealed by the Nuclear Power
Corporation of India that the concord will assist India in
meeting its aspiration of addition of 25,000 MW of nuclear
power facility in the course of imports of nuclear reactors and
fuel by 2020. The 123 agreement gives the operational origin to
the Indo-US civil nuclear cooperation and lays the groundwork
for the ultimate law that would permit US companies to
originate nuclear traffic with India, it is the congress which
holds the utmost significance in the Indo-US nuclear saga, it can
be the just obstacle to an already slam dunk nuclear future for
the two states.
In a nutshell, it is the 123 concurrence over which the Indian
Government as well as the opposition parties and public are
banking on. Major proportion of Indians have pinned hopes to
this agreement with eagerness. The agreement was signed in the
milieu of India’s mounting demand for Energy supply and to
secure its high Economic Growth rate. It is a sound discussed
subject matter and is named so since Section 123 of the US
Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954 establishes an accord for
cooperation as a precondition for nuclear deals between US and
any other nation. 123 Agreement has attained an exceedingly
important position in India after the passage of Hyde Act. The
three appropriate sections of the AEA, as amended, would
contain US nuclear collaboration with India: Sections 123 a. (2),
128, and 129. Section 123 a. (2) provides for full-scope nuclear
safeguards by the IAEA for endorsement of an accord on
nuclear collaboration; Section 128 provides for the same for
licensing nuclear exports; and Section 129 provides for
annihilation of export if a non-nuclear weapon state explode a
nuclear device following the year 1978. Nevertheless,
separation plan and placement of civilian nuclear facilities under
IAEA safeguards, coordination and devotion of MTCR and
NSG Guidelines on the Indian part made the House and Senate
agree to grant the President, the capability to relinquish the
relevant criteria of the AEA for a future US-India agreement for
civil nuclear backing. The relevant part, that is Article 2.1,
reveals: “…Each Party shall implement this Agreement in
accordance with its respective applicable treaties, national laws,
regulations and license requirements…”
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India determined to lay its civil nuclear amenities under Indiaspecific safeguards in ‘perpetuity’ - a term not used in any of the
mutual statements, which mentioned ‘voluntary’ assignment of
facilities under safeguard, as pertinent to any NWS. Both
nations mutually agreed to “limit the spread of enrichment and
reprocessing technologies” and “support the conclusion of a
fissile material cut-off treaty.” It was indication of India’s
assurance for pursuing its intentional objectives. Looking by
nuclear energy perspective, the deal attempted to fortify India’s
capacity to develop nuclear energy and to supply its big and
speedily increasing electricity desires, moderately than a
clandestine ‘atoms for war’ endeavor that would enclose the
outcome of stealthily increasing the augmentation in India’s
nuclear arsenal.
India-IAEA Safeguards
The safeguards can be said are the measures the organization
applies to a country's stated civilian nuclear materials,
technologies and facilities to safeguard in opposition to their
utilization for nuclear weapons purposes. At the movement the
three types of safeguards agreement viz; INFCIRC/66,
INFCIRC/153 (this is for the NNWS, but Indo-Pak didn’t fall
into this category) and Voluntary Safeguards agreement. As per
the Hyde Act of 2006, the winding up of a safeguards agreement
between India and the IAEA is one of the two hurdles to be
cleared prior to US Congressional ratification of the Indo-US
agreement. An ‘India-specific’ safeguards agreement is based
on the IAEA’s facility specific safeguards (INFCIRC 66/Rev.
2), some arms control specialists in the US pointed out, but has
a number of ‘India specific’ modifications. It is mandatory for
India to bargain a protocol with IAEA to identify the safeguard
agenda, under which selected civil nuclear facilities would be
inspected. As per the NPT, India is not a ‘Nuclear Weapon
State’ (NWS). On the other hand, being a de-facto nuclear
power, India is not in a position to be considered as a ‘NonNuclear Weapon State’ (NNWS) either. Ever in view of the fact
that it was first mooted in the mid-1990s the Additional Protocol
(AP) has been seen by the IAEA and the non-proliferation
regime at a large as an instrument to reinforce global monitoring
of every nuclear action in countries that have dedicated
themselves to the quest of nuclear technology for merely
peaceful purposes. Generally speaking, AP immensely expands
the commitment of signatories to present entire information
about their nuclear programme to the agency and allows
international inspectors a large amount of physical admittance to
locations inside a country than a normal safeguards agreement.
The Indian Additional Protocol departs from the model protocol
in number of other ways. Two new paragraphs have been added
to the preamble. The first realises the voluntary nature of the
country’s attainment, recognizing that India “in the exercise of
its sovereign rights, is prepared to cooperate with the Agency in
further development of peaceful use of nuclear energy”. The
second describes India as ‘‘a state with sophisticated nuclear
technology’’, the phrase New Delhi has constantly used since
the July 2005 agreement to strain its position as a state with
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nuclear weapons outside the NPT system. Para (b) also
introduces an unambiguous non-hindrance section that the
protocol shall be implemented in a manner that it does not
obstruct, or impede with any activities concerning the exercise
of unsafeguarded material and equipments. The agreement on
Indian part to acknowledge an additional protocol would aid
strengthen the authenticity and importance of international
safeguards and diminish the distinction in the safeguards
burdens that India has to presuppose and those that non-nuclear
weapon states have to tolerate in accommodating IAEA
safeguards on all their nuclear amenities. All told, India has
been able to trim down the AP’s intrusiveness to such an
amount that it involves almost no trouble. However, India's
wrapping up of an additional protocol with the IAEA is also for
the most part figurative because this safeguards agreement was
intended to perceive implicit nuclear activities in states that
have all their passive nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards.
IAEA’s safeguards ‘at a handful of foreign-supplied reactors
and nuclear facilities and nuclear materials’ would be ‘parting
its unsafeguarded military nuclear zone free’ to do its activities.
India is expected to own ‘sufficient estranged fissile material for
60-100 nuclear warheads’ and potentially ‘far more if foreign
nuclear fuel materials permit it to allocate its restricted domestic
fuel supplies completely for arsenal purposes’, they analyzed.
On 1 August 2008, the IAEA at its Board of Governors meeting
(35 states out of 144 member states) approved by consensus the
draft “Agreement between the Government of India and the
International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of
Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities”. The text was
finalized after some rounds of negotiations from November
2007 between India and the IAEA. The year 2009 is noted as
the first year for the execution of the India-IAEA safeguards
agreement. The concord requests the IAEA to validate that ‘firm
acknowledged Indian nuclear material and facilities are used
only for peaceful means’. An ‘umbrella arrangement’ of the
agreement will ‘let India to adjoin facilities over time to be sited
under IAEA safeguards. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General
of the IAEA, explained in his opening statement to the Board of
Governors in session, that the text is an ‘INFCIRC/66-type
agreement’ and is ‘not inclusive or full-scope safeguards’
agreement. An ‘umbrella’ agreement, it provides for ‘any
facility notified by India to the Agency in the future to become
subject to safeguards. Facilities will be notified by India to the
Agency in stages’. There were objections from countries like
Pakistan, Iran, Ireland, Norway, Switzerland and Austria at the
IAEA meeting. On 3 March 2009, the IAEA accepted an
additional protocol to India's safeguards agreement, which
permits for further invasive IAEA inspections on its civilian
nuclear facilities.
India and NSG
The approval of an exception to the application of the NSG
Guidelines with respect to nuclear trade between NSG members
and India is another pending formality before the US
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congressional ratification of the Indo-US agreement. As per the
projected agreement, US is dedicated to make sure consistent
supply of fuel to India and to cooperate with its friends and
associates to regulate the practices of the NSG, thus facilitating
India’s complete entrance to the global fuel market. NSG
supplies are reliant on prescribed receiver government
assurances confirming safeguards and no nuclear unstable
exercise. NSG is a group of countries (45 states at present)
which are in a position to regulate supply of nuclear materials,
technology, equipments, nuclear-related dual-use equipments
and materials and related technology. It was formed at US
proposal, as a result to India's Pokhran I, to inflict stringent
nuclear export controls on non-nuclear weapon states. The NSG,
is also known as the ‘London Club’, it began to reconvene in
1990 and established a common set of guidelines for exports by
the major suppliers to help prevent the spread of nuclear
weapons. In 1992, the NSG added full-scope IAEA safeguards
as a stipulation of nuclear furnishing to NNWS, and established
Nuclear-related Dual-use Guidelines and a Control list. In 1995,
the NSG added gearshift on nuclear technology for items on the
Trigger List, which magnetize compulsory IAEA safeguard on
supplied matter. The NSG members unanimously agreed to
require recipients of key nuclear facilities and materials to
accept comprehensive IAEA safeguards, like those required
under the NPT, as a condition of supply.
Prior to a review group meeting in Vienna in March 2006, the
US dispersed a draft text for probable implementation by
consensus of 45 member states. The cardinal point in the US
draft read in part: ‘Participating Governments may reassign
trigger list items and/or related technology to the secured civil
nuclear amenities in India as long as the participating
Government intending to formulate the transportation is
contented that India continues to entirely meet all of the
nonproliferation and safeguards commitments, and all other
necessities of the NSG Guidelines’ There was no agreement at
the March 2006 meeting, however, to place the US plan on the
prescribed memo of the NSG plenary convention scheduled in
Brazil from 29 May to 2 June 2006. Then, on 6 August 2008,
US submitted its proposal (second draft) to Germany, then chair
of the NSG for circulation among the NSG members who were
scheduled to meet for an extraordinary plenary meeting on 2122 August in Vienna. But the August meeting failed to reach a
consensus decision.
India being non-signatory to NPT was supposed to get waiver in
order to be able to get nuclear commerce at international level.
NSG has banned a sale of enrichment and reprocessing
technology and equipments for non-nuclear, non-proliferation
treaty signatories. India surely have to stride cautiously while
dealing with NSG for nuclear supplies, devoid of getting tripped
on NWS or NNWS status. Regardless of open support by
Russia, France, the UK and several other NSG members, to the
anticipated Indo-US agreement, there could be tough time ahead
in compelling all the members of NSG, which functions on the
accord. The US support would be serious to make certain India-
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specific waiver by NSG members while taking into account
nuclear supplies to India. On September 4, 2008, the NSG
approved to the US suggestion to let off India from this bar.
This US suggestion was component of the full civil nuclear
collaboration agreement, the White House made in replacement
for getting India to concur to separate its civil-military nuclear
programmes and put the later under international safeguards.
The NSG decided to give waiver to India on September 6, 2008
permitting it to access civilian nuclear technology and fuel from
other countries. India also pledged to carry on its voluntary
suspension on nuclear testing, but has not assured to bring an
end in producing plutonium. India has 30 percent of world’s
thorium reserves and only one percent of natural uranium.
Therefore, it was vital for India to get the nuclear deal through
as it will make possible for India to import natural uranium in
international nuclear market. However, the projected separation
of nuclear reactors into civilian and military would not diminish
India's accessible nuclear stockpile or bound its impending
intensification.
Though India has got clean waiver from NSG but it is still not
clear whether India would be given a free hand to procure
enrichment and reprocessing technology as G8 conference in
2009 put a fresh doubts, because it reiterates the stand that no
country which is non-signatory to NPT should be given access
to such technology. Although, Indian establishment made it loud
that G8 proposals will not affect Indian nuclear agreement but it
is very hard to make rational.
Indian Parliament and Nuclear Deal
India officially submitted the safeguards agreement to the IAEA
on July 9, 2008. This advancement came after the Prime
Minister returned from the summit meeting in Hokkaido, Japan,
where he interacted with U.S. President. Indian news media
reported that Prime Minister exposed to quit his place if the Left
Front, whose hold up was central for the ruling UPA to
demonstrate its bulk in the union parliament, persistent to
counter the nuclear deal and he described their attitude as
unreasonable and diehard. According to the Hindu, External
Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee’s prior statement was “I
cannot bind the government if we lose our majority,” denoting
that UPA government would not place its mark on any deal with
IAEA if it lost the majority in either an 'opposition-initiated noconfidence motion' or if fading to congregate a vote of
confidence in Indian parliament after being told to confirm its
bulk by the president. Prakash Karat on 8th July 2008 announced
that the Left Front is taking away its hold to the government
over the conclusion by the government to go forward on the
United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act.
The left front had been a strict backer of not going with this pact
citing countrywide benefits. However, for India the day of July
22, 2008 came to be a milestone for all the wrong reasons as the
United Progressive Alliance government secured the trust vote
in Parliament by 275-256 votes, while 10 members abstained
from voting to record a 19-vote victory in the milieu of
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defections from both camps to the opposite camps. The run-up
to the vote and the voting itself tore to shreds the procedures and
practices of parliamentary democracy in India. And the UPA
has got the green signal to take a major dive towards tying the
country ever so firmly to the United States.
US Congress and Nuclear Deal
The nuclear cooperation between Indo-US was debatable and
underwent several major stages and changes before it attained
its current status. The US House of Representatives on
September 28, 2008 voted 298–117 to endorse the Indo-US
nuclear deal. On October 1, 2008 the US Senate voted 86–13 to
back up the nuclear deal. After authorization from US Senate,
President George W. Bush revealed about the deal that it will
build up our global nonproliferation efforts, defend the
environment, generate employment, and aid India in fulfilling
its rising energy requirements in an accountable mode. The then
US presidential candidates also voted in support of the bill. In
the concluding step foreseen by the two countries for
comprehension of their understandings, the US senate on 1
October 2008 permitted the deal by a vote of 86 to 13,
subsequently to the previous endorsement by the House of
Representatives. The legislation on the nuclear deal was signed
by the President Bush on October 8, 2008 at a brief White
House function in the presence of the Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice, Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman, VicePresident Dick Cheney and the Indian Ambassador to the U.S.
Ronen Sen besides a large gathering of other dignitaries, which
was approved by the U.S. Congress, into law, now called
the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act, The ultimate executive stage of
the deal was accomplished after Secretary of State Condaleezza
Rice and External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee signed the
joint instruments of the 123 Agreement in Washington on
October 10 2008, paving the means for operationalization of the
deal between the two countries. The Indo-US Civil Nuclear
Deal is also known as 123 agreement. The nuclear agreement
with India was a primary foreign policy proposal for the Bush
administration. It intended to eliminate venerable U.S.–India
differences over India’s nuclear programme, and to thereby
advance the US strategic partnership with India. It is widely
seen as a turning point in US-India relations by introducing a
new aspect to the international nonproliferation efforts. It gives
India an admittance to civil nuclear technology and is invented
to assist the country accomplish its energy necessities and,
expands US-India cooperation in energy and satellite
technology. To a large extent, Indian-American mobilization
was the grave cause behind irresistible congressional support for
the notorious Bush-Singh agreement on prolonged U.S.–India
nuclear trade and assistance, which looks set to throw away old
limitations under the NPT and U.S. export law. Had it not been
for the vigorous hard work of a recently professionalized ‘‘India
lobby’’ on Capitol Hill, personal contacts with legislators and
staffers by Indian-Americans, and proletariat informational and
petitioning campaigns, it is probable that the efforts of the bill’s
International Science Congress Association
opponents particularly a reputable nonproliferation interest
community in Washington and their clients in Congress would
have killed it. In perception, an ‘‘India lobby’’ has been
extensive in the making.
Political Opposition and Reaction against the
Nuclear Deal
The deal received worldwide opposition from various groups
including non-proliferation activists, anti-nuclear organizations,
and others. However, the countries like United Kingdom,
France, Japan, Russia, and Germany welcomed the deal. After
some preliminary opposition, there were information of
Australia, Switzerland, and Canada also expressing their prop
up for the deal. After a historic civil nuclear cooperation
agreement different views have been expressed by Indian and
US politicians.
USA: Many US politicians were of the view that a wide hole
has been punched into the NPT regime. American nonproliferation lobbyists criticized the nuclear deal on four
grounds14: i. The deal would deteriorate the original objective of
US nonproliferation policy-to put off the increase of nuclear
weapons beyond the five recognized nuclear weapon states
under the NPT. ii. The troubles of nuclear proliferation would
be compounded in the appearance of current challenges posed
by North Korea and Iran. iii. US-India cooperation could
prompt other suppliers, like China, to rationalize its production
and hold for Pakistan. iv. Finally in the process of obliging India
in the larger global non-proliferation regime, the consequential
for US in its efforts towards non-proliferation may be fairly less
than gain for India.
Many analysts in America gaze at the Indo-US nuclear deal
surely as a step necessitated by the reciprocal interests of both
the states in harmonizing the increasing intentional power of
China. Though India does not covet to serve up as a tactical
proxy of the United States against China, it is however eager on
pursuing a hedging approach in a potentially treacherous
environment. While the United States cannot virtually anticipate
to use Indian military bases in the experience of a conflict with
China, it can sensibly anticipate India to share serious
intelligence about Chinese military capabilities, mainly in the
Indian Ocean and its littoral states. Nevertheless, there is an
apprehension within some segments of the US Congress that the
keenness of the Bush Administration to seek changes in the
accessible laws and multiparty agreements would destabilize US
national interests in regard to nuclear non-proliferation. As
opposed to the inclination of the Bush Administration to treat
India as a conscientious state with sophisticated nuclear
technology, a contradictory view has emerged that sees the
Indo-US nuclear deal as a conciliation that by passes rules
pertinent to others. Critics in the U.S. argue that the deal
basically reverses half a century of American nonproliferation
efforts, the “Ayatollahs of Non-proliferation” in the US started a
strident movement that the nuclear deal would compromise US
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commitments to global nonproliferation, give confidence
countries like North Korea and Iran to go nuclear and
undermine the balance of power in Asia, as it would allow India
to build up hundreds of nuclear warheads by getting across to
important uranium ore for its power reactors. The majority of
the members of US Congress struggled with the query whether
the net blow of the deal on US non-proliferation strategy would
be positive or negative. The bulk of the experts empanelled by
the House Committee on International Relations argued that the
deal weakens the international non-proliferation regime. Daryl
Kimball argues that the nuclear deal will liberate India's
accessible inadequate uranium possessions, which could be used
to generate the largest possible nuclear weapons arsenal, and
that "India's civil-military separation plan would allow the free
flow of personnel and information between safeguarded and
unsafeguarded facilities."
India: India also recorded a variety of opinions being
articulated on the Indo-US nuclear deal. The agreement faced
firm resistance by some political parties and activists in India.
Indian opposition politicians think that the country’s
independent status and reputation have been sold out. The critics
revealed that the deal will allow India to deflect its domestic
uranium reserves towards its nuclear programme. Yashwant
Sinha one of the political leaders supposed that the agreement
made India submissive to the US, as it will have to pursue the
rules of the Hyde act, a domestic US law, and that this condition
is embarrassing for India. The scientific community in India had
a mixed reaction. One of the former Directors of the Bhabha
Atomic Research Centre held that this accord is totally against
national interest. M. R. Srinivasan former Atomic Energy
Commission Chairman felt that the requirements of the US law
are “intrusive” and makes one feel that Washington is treating
India as a “subservient entity” and not as a responsive nuclear
power. Some favoured the agreement and accepting the
necessity for nuclear energy in the years ahead, as it would
make India’s energy resources much better. Others argued that
the separation plan is a burdensome task and may require severe
repercussions for research and development in weapons
advancement and for production conveniences needed for the
nuclear restraint.
Main opposition party BJP and the left ally CPI (M) of the
government were against the agreement, taking adversarial and
contradictory positions. The issues regarding the substantive
parts of the agreement namely; energy security, weapons
programme, and nuclear power are being diverted. Most
interestingly, it was the BJP that had laid the foundations of the
emerging Indo-US strategic cooperation. The BJP’s opposition
to the civil nuclear cooperation has focused on the claim that the
terms of the deal jeopardize India's nuclear weapons programme
and therefore the country's strategic autonomy as quoted by the
K.H. Sullivan. In general terms, the BJP has considered the deal
to compromise: national security issues, autonomy of India's
decision-making processes, the autonomy and independence of
our nuclear programmes, the inviolability of the principle of a
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minimum credible deterrent plus, the future of our scientific and
technological research in the nuclear field. In particular, the 123
Agreement, indirectly endorsing the Hyde Act of 2006, has
formed the basis of BJP concern, since the provisions of the
Act, militate against India's sovereignty - in particular, in regard
to the manner of our foreign policy. When enforced, they will
fatally spoil our nuclear weapons programme, and thereby
endanger our strategic objectives. The leftists, which were part
of the ruling coalition in India, registered a huge criticism
against the government for not taking them into consideration
before signaling the nuclear deal with the US. They vehemently
criticized the government for letting loose on India’s long-held
strategy of nuclear disarmament15. Other critics claimed
America’s recognition of India as a responsible state with
sophisticated nuclear technology that should obtain the same
benefits as other such states falls short of admitting it into the
nuclear club.
Benefits of the Nuclear Deal
The civil nuclear agreement is not only about cooperation in the
field of nuclear energy but it is more than that. The nuclear
cooperation has turn into the showpiece of the new bilateral
relationship, it focuses on issues like economic prosperity,
closer military and strategic ties, intelligence sharing, and
cooperation on fighting terrorism. The bilateral cooperation is a
doorway to a broader strategic cooperation between two
countries as was laid down by Condaleeza Rice at the agreement
signing ceremony: ‘Let no one guess that our hardwork is
finalized. Indeed what is most important regarding this accord is
that it opens a fresh and a far broader world of potential for our
strategic partnership in 21st century, not only on nuclear
cooperation but on every sector of national endeavour.’ The deal
has the potential to press on energy security, protect
environment, boost economic and technological development in
both the countries, strengthen non-proliferation regime and
international security and to create balance of power in Asian
region. The deal is full of benefits and provides mammoth
remuneration to both the countries16. Many experts in both the
nations viewed the nuclear agreement positively as a step
necessitated by the joint interests of the two states.
Benefits to India: India has been the chief gainer of the
agreement. It is a remarkable triumph for India to build up its
nuclear programme. The deal proved beneficial for India in
following ways: i. It will assist India in covering its growing
energy requirements. ii. The deal puts an ending to India’s
decades old nuclear segregation and technology denial regimes.
Traditionally, India sought international nuclear collaboration,
even while maintaining a nuclear weapons programme, by
approving to partial safeguards on nuclear imports. This
approach allowed India to complement its domestic nuclear
power potential with international cooperation, as long as there
were willing international partners. iii. Due to historic
agreement, India became the only country of the world with the
de-facto nuclear status even without being signatory to the non-
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proliferation treaty. Indian Prime Minister while highlighting
the importance of the deal revealed, “The agreement would not
hamper or otherwise interfere with India’s nuclear activities,
including our military facilities17.” iv. Without signing the NPT
and CTBT, India would able to get strategic assistance from
NPT members. v. The bilateral cooperation is both a sign of the
acknowledgement of India’s responsible nature as a state and
appreciation of its standing to enter the nuclear club. vi. Another
major benefit nuclear deal provides to India is that it will get
fuel to feed its starving nuclear power programme and also the
country will get fuel for its nuclear reactors not only from the
US but from other suppliers as well. vii. The deal will
significantly improve the Indian potential of making more
nuclear warheads, as it provides guarantee on stable nuclear fuel
delivery. viii. The deal grants Indian scientists a straightforward
admittance to sophisticated technologies, thereby, building the
qualitative development in nuclear warheads and their liberation
systems.
in the region. In essence, non-proliferation objective is to meet
the national interests of two states and also United States sought
the nuclear agreement with India principally for two reasons: to
control China and to tap the enormous Indian nuclear market.
The nuclear deal also serves the broad economic objectives of
both the nations.
Benefits to US: Like India, the deal is of paramount
importance for the US as well, as it provides huge benefits to it
ranging from economic to strategic. The important benefits are:
i. The agreement has a great potential to boost economic
fortunes of US. It will generate a business of $40 worldwide in
next fifteen years as India plans to build about 24 reactors in
next 15 years. It will open new markets for American firms and
will generate employment opportunities for the Americans. ii.
U.S. benefits enormously with India as a chief military power.
40% of worlds’ oil and commerce passes through the Indian
Ocean sea lanes. Those today are defenseless. Pirates in the
Red-sea and at the Malacca straits prey on commerce. Indian
collaboration will be supportive in keeping the sea-lanes free.
iii. The deal with India will help US in balancing the rising
power of China. The Bush administration has dubbed China as
‘future military adversary’ and an important ‘strategic issue’
facing US. iv. The deal is the boon for the US nuclear sector as
it will rejuvenate dormant American nuclear industry which is
losing markets in the world and will make it globally more
competitive. The aerospace and defense sectors will also reap
vast benefits. v. Another important benefit which the US
achieved was that the civil nuclear cooperation brought India
much closer to the NPT regime.
Conclusion
The bilateral civil nuclear cooperation is a milestone as the
leadership of both the nations has managed to challenge grave
odds to make it happen. Without being the member of nonproliferation regime, the nuclear accord makes India to attain a
recognized (de facto) nuclear status. It is all about civilian
nuclear energy cooperation so that to meet the growing India’s
energy requirements, but it can be a predicament for the nonproliferation regime that India has a remedial determinence to
sustain its nuclear accumulation under the nuclear agreement.
Through this deal, US is exclusively attempting to strengthen
India into its coalition alliance to encourage its strategic benefits
International Science Congress Association
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