Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism ISSN: 1833-5330 (Print) 2159-5364 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rpic20 Maoist insurgency in India: grievances, security threats and counter-strategies Dalbir Ahlawat To cite this article: Dalbir Ahlawat (2018) Maoist insurgency in India: grievances, security threats and counter-strategies, Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 13:2, 252-266, DOI: 10.1080/18335330.2018.1478114 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2018.1478114 Published online: 05 Jun 2018. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 10 View related articles View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rpic20 JOURNAL OF POLICING, INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTER TERRORISM 2018, VOL. 13, NO. 2, 252–266 https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2018.1478114 Maoist insurgency in India: grievances, security threats and counter-strategies Dalbir Ahlawat Department of Security Studies and Criminology, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY The adivasi insurgency, an offshoot of the colonial period, continued in independent India. Post-independence, government assurances to redress the forest and land rights remained mostly unimplemented. As an alternative, the adivasis joined the Communist Party of India (Marxist Leninist, CPIML). However, after neutralisation of the CPIML and failure to regain forest and land rights, the adivasis joined the Communist Party of India (Maoist). Witnessing the expanding threat from the Maoists, the government adopted a dual strategy. This involved first amending the Forest Act to woo the adivasis and second placing the Maoists on the terrorist list. However, not getting the expected results, the current Bharatiya Janata Party government adopted an integrated and holistic approach to rooting out the insurgency by further amending the Forest Act, offering attractive surrender-cumrehabilitation incentives and launching an offensive against the Maoist leadership. Although the insurgency is contained, the operational fault lines still remain. This paper attempts to trace the antecedents of the adivasi grievances, the challenges posed to India’s internal security and counter-strategies adopted by different governments to contain the Maoist insurgency. Received 13 May 2018 Accepted 14 May 2018 KEYWORDS Adivasi; Communist Party of India (Maoist); internal security; Maoist insurgency; security threats Introduction Since independence in 1947, India has faced several insurgencies. Among them, the Maoist insurgency stands out as one of the longest and biggest internal security threats. This insurgency has been steered by the Communist Party of India (Maoist) (CPIM), since 2004 but its genesis goes back several centuries. The people living in the forests (the adivasis) became marginalised over the centuries, were cut off from the mainstream and developed a self-sustained, self-governed order. They established their dependency on the forests and developed their own customs, traditions, languages and governance structure. Economically, the adivasis relied on agriculture, hunting and gathering. They maintained minimal economic and trade relations with the rest of Indians, just exchanging forest products for necessities. In a sense, they enjoyed extensive control and unrestricted access to their lands and forests with minimal interference or exploitation from outside (Morrison, 2017, p. 263). CONTACT Dalbir Ahlawat Dalbir.ahlawat@mq.edu.au University, Sydney, NSW 2109, Australia © 2018 Department of Security Studies and Criminology Department of Security Studies and Criminology, Macquarie JOURNAL OF POLICING, INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTER TERRORISM 253 After colonising India, the British added a new dynamic to the existing order by transferring proprietary rights over the forests to the government (Guha, 1983, pp. 1940–1947). For the collection of revenue, they allocated (the adivasi) land to the feudal lords (zamindars). As a result, the adivasis not only lost control over their own properties but were also subjected to work in subordination of the non-adivasis/outsiders. This drastically changed the existing social and economic order. Furthermore, to dilute the adivasi majority, zamindars imported labour from other states and deprived them of the ‘forests and resources they traditionally depended on and sometimes coerced [them] to pay taxes’ (Mhaiske, Patil, & Narkhede, 2016, p. 6). Furthermore, to subdue the adivasis, the British enacted the Indian Forest Act of 1878. Under its provisions, ‘hundreds and thousands of acres of forest lands that adivasis had used unfettered for centuries were suddenly kept in reserve’ (Verghese, 2016, p. 1623). After reservation of the forest areas, the adivasis lost all claims to the land and forests. This marginalisation and change in political, social and economic status gave rise to insurgencies in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries against the British. Although these insurgencies were brutally crushed, in order to preserve their identities, territories, ways and means of life, the adivasis not only continued the fervour for their autonomy but also built momentum for the independence of India, even before the national independence movement was conceived (Khan, 1986, p. 23). Genesis of the insurgency After the independence of India in 1947, the government assured the adivasis that it would give necessary consideration to their grievances, such as land and forest rights. However, during the ‘transition from colonial to independent status, forest resource management changed little: exclusionary processes accelerated … to consolidate state authority over forest resources’ (Haeuber, 1993, pp. 49–50). Thus, the adivasis, with a mix of violent and punitive actions, continued their struggle to redress their grievances, regain their land rights and their autonomy, until 1967. Ideological framing of the grievances (1967–1971) The year 1967 proved a turning point, when the landlords killed a landless worker in Naxalbari village in Bengal for ploughing a patch of land. This incident consolidated the ongoing grievances of the adivasis and proved instrumental in bringing them onto a single platform. A radical group from Naxalbari (Naxals) and the adivasis came in contact with the Communist Party of India (Marxist Leninist) (CPIML). The CPIML identified all the basic tenets of the communist ideology in the adivasi movement, blended the existing situation into their ideological fold and advocated an armed revolution. This resulted in a conglomeration of the adivasis, the Naxals and the communists, presumably supported by China (‘Spring thunder over India,’ 1967). This movement, spearheaded by a local leader, Charu Mazumdar, based on his Historic Eight Documents, formed the ideological precept for the uprising at Naxalbari. Between 1967 and 1971, it became a force to be reckoned with. However, in spite of its intensity, nature and the challenge it posed, the government managed to crush the movement within 45 days. 254 D. AHLAWAT The movement headed by the CPIML was neutralised without much effort. It waned because of its imported ideology and its failure to assuage the adivasis’ grievances. It also lacked cognisance of the ground realities in India, such as caste vs. class, real grievances vs. ideology, and regional disparities vs. proletariat differences. Moreover, citations such as ‘China’s chairman (Mao) is our chairman’ failed to advance an adivasi-centric movement to redress their grievances (Mazumdar, 1969). Traversing grievances sans ideology (1972–2004) The next eight years (1972–1980) witnessed decline and splinter in the communist movement (Ramana, 2011, pp. 29–30). In the process, the adivasis were left to fend for themselves. Because of regional disparities, the adivasis lacked unity and a comprehensive action plan. At the same time, assurances by the government raised hopes for redressal of their grievances. Notwithstanding assurances, by 2004, the adivasis lost hope as the welfare projects initiated by different governments failed to yield promised development goals. Redressing grievances through protracted war (2004–2018) Marginalised, exploited and leaderless, the adivasis perceived the government to be full of phony assurances and disparaging policies. After concerted efforts the People’s War Group, Maoist Communist Centre of India and CPIML merged in September 2004 to form the CPIM. This occurred against the backdrop of the liberalisation of the Indian economy, the continued marginalisation of the adivasis and exploitation of forest resources by the private sector. Subsequently, this new conglomeration inspired by Chinese leader Mao Zedong’s philosophy, released a strategic document, Strategy and Tactics of the Indian Revolution (STIR), a blueprint for its political, organisational and military actions. The STIR emphasised the ‘seizure of political power through protracted armed struggle … by taking into account the specific characteristics, the special features as well as the peculiarities of the Indian situation’ (Strategy and Tactics of the Indian Revolution, 2004). It underlined three strategic stages: Strategic Defensive, Strategic Stalemate and Strategic Offensive. To implement the first stage of the STIR, the Maoists attacked infrastructure, ambushed government officials, filched weapons from police stations and attacked prisons to release their cadres. These attacks increased year after year and reached an extreme in 2006, when the insurgents conducted several high-impact attacks and inflicted severe causalities. Witnessing the CPIM’s increasing sphere of influence that engulfed 194 districts in 18 states as well as the intensity of the attacks on security forces, then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh labelled it ‘the single biggest internal security challenge ever faced’ by India (Government of India Press Information Bureau, 2006). In addition to the operational gains, Maoists also strengthened their legitimacy by speaking adivasi languages, adapting their culture and establishing strong social bonds. Also, to mitigate local issues and to counter the state’s presence, the CPIM initiated a multipronged policy that included targeting government officials, helping the needy, redistributing land, enforcing minimum wages and providing justice through people’s courts. They also destroyed state infrastructure such as bridges, roads, schools and hospitals to JOURNAL OF POLICING, INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTER TERRORISM 255 create a governance vacuum and demonstrate their ascendancy. In a way, their actions reflected solidarity with the adivasis and their aspirations for full autonomy in the region (Sood, 2011, pp. 161–162). Thus, failures of the government led to gains for the Maoists and facilitated the establishment of their legitimacy by becoming the saviours of the adivasis against the exploitative government machinery. This enabled the expansion of the Maoist’s stronghold in nine states: Chhattisgarh, West Bengal, Jharkhand, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Odisha. This area constitutes one-third of India and provided them with a 40,000-strong militia and over a million sympathisers. Maoists, taking note of liberalisation of the economy, shifted their focus from zamindars to business organisations, and from agricultural enterprises to mineral-rich mines. This shift allowed them to generate revenue through extortion, taxes, blackmailing and kidnapping. It is estimated that between January 2005 and April 2018, they inflicted 5063 causalities and generated around US$18.5 million in revenue annually (South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2018). Countering the insurgency Abstruse approach (1947–1971) After independence, the Indian government faced an ethical dilemma as whether to bring the marginalised communities into the national mainstream or give them autonomy to preserve their identities, cultures, languages and ways of life. Taking stock of the popular opinion prevailing at that time in the country, and considering its own limitations such as finances for development, and limitations of the governance infrastructure, the government preferred the latter. However, regional autonomy failed to assuage the adivasis’ grievances, such as issues of land and forest rights. Rather, the adivasis living in the forests and remote areas throughout the country were classified together as Schedule Tribes under Schedules Five and Six of the Constitution, with few rights. The government also failed to introduce major changes to the Forest Law that had been framed by the British to generate revenue from their colony. Furthermore, the government branded around 40 socio-politico-economic organisations formed by the adivasis to press for their rights (identity, land and forest rights) ‘as “Maoist” conspiracy … though not a single one of the resistances … have been led by the Maoists or even assisted by their guerrilla forces’ (Sanhati, 2010). Additionally, the leadership of such organisations was co-opted, harassed, discredited or even neutralised. Some of the incidents such as the arrest of Pravir Chandra Bhanj Deo, ruler of Bastar, in 1966 resulted in adivasi protests, the killing of 13 protesters and later Pravir Chandra by the police (Sundar, 1997, pp. 218–219). Since this incident, 25th March is celebrated as a Balidan Diwas (day of sacrifice) by the adivasis in Bastar. Many such instances proved counterproductive for the government in establishing its legitimacy. Similarly, instead of taking cognisance of the simmering undercurrent and root cause of the discontentment that triggered the rebellion in 1967 at Naxalbari, the government bequeathed the insurgency an ideological colour (Maoist) with the possibility of a foreign hand. Facing a looming threat, it neutralised the insurgency within 45 days (1 July to 15 August 1971) through Operation Steeplechase that was jointly conducted by the Indian Army, Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and the state police. 256 D. AHLAWAT Non-kinetic approach (1972–1990) The ruthless crushing of the insurgency proved instrumental in segregating the adivasis from the communists. To garner support and establish legitimacy, the government announced several developmental schemes. This initiative infused some hope among the adivasis, but as the policies unfolded, they got mired by mismanagement, exploitation and imposition of the national culture and values on the adivasis. In addition, ‘corrupt local officials, were able to privately reserve forest and village lands, and buy forest produce at below-market prices’ (Verghese, 2016, p. 1637). Most of these initiatives proved not only counterproductive but wherever new development projects such as building dams and constructing canals were initiated, the adivasis were forcefully displaced, while the exploitation of the forests (both legal and illegal) continued unhindered without the adivasis having any say or share. Moreover, the national political parties appeared to follow a well-calculated policy of keeping the adivasis leaderless by co-opting their leaders, discrediting or even physically removing them (Mukherjee, 2006). In the process, ‘these nonkinetic approaches … created their own problems with corrupt security forces, increased criminal activity, and a litany of human rights complaints and investigations’ (Lynch, 2016, p. 6). During this phase, the plight of the adivasis largely remained hostage to the local vote bank politics. People-centric approach (1991–2008) A new policy orientation took place in the early 1990s when India transited from its semi-socialist economic structure to liberalisation of its economy. During this period, the government emphasised a people-centric approach which involved reaching out to the hearts and minds of the adivasis, and responding only when insurgent attacks took place. To counter the CPIM’s portrayal of the Indian economy as an exploitative capitalist system, the government initiated several welfare schemes. However, following the trend of the previous decades, these multiple-overlapping schemes lacked accountability. Instead of enriching the adivasis, these ‘simply vanished into the bottomless pit benefiting corrupt politicians, bureaucrats, contractors and even the insurgents’ (Routray, 2017, p. 58). During this period, the major focus remained on the welfare schemes and no major people-oriented infrastructure development programme was initiated, such as electricity, communication, roads and transportation, health and education facilities. Rather, the granting of licenses to private firms for mining, construction and infrastructure development increased pressure on the adivasis to give space to this sector. As per a critique, around 40 adivasi movements did not pose any threat to the state until 2006; it was only when these organisations and Maoists ‘halted the development projects and posed threat to some 40 new MOUs signed between the state and industrial developers’. Thus to successfully operationalise the MOUs, the adivasis who opposed the MOUs were branded as supporters of ‘Naxalism’ or ‘Maoism’, in a sense imposing on them either you are with us with or the Maoists (Malreddy, 2014, p. 598). Against these developments, the adivasis continued their support of the CPIM and the CPIM’s taking of arms against the state functionaries. Then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, perturbed by the increasing support and clout of the CPIM, declared the Maoists in 2006 to be JOURNAL OF POLICING, INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTER TERRORISM 257 ‘the single biggest internal security challenge ever faced by our country’ (Government of India Press Information Bureau, 2006). The state governments in Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Jharkhand attempted to counterbalance the Maoist upsurge by forming local organisations with adivasis who had disassociated themselves from the Maoists. One such organisation, Salwa Judum (People’s Resistance Movement) launched in 2006 to unite adivasis against the Maoists, initially proved effective; but its members became involved in violence, forced displacement of adivasis, criminal acts and the use of child soldiers. After Salwa Judum emerged as a front organisation for the security forces, a Supreme Court decision criticised the government stating ‘It is a question of law and order. You cannot give arms to somebody (a civilian) and allow him to kill. You will be an abettor of the offence’ (‘Hearing plea against Salwa Judum,’ 2008). After this decision, the government banned this organisation. However, other initiatives such as recruitment of young adivasis as Special Police Officers to enhance legitimacy proved quite successful, as the local youth got secure employment, followed discipline and standard operating procedures. In the new environment, with the government’s disinvestment spree, the active role played by the private sector and the creation of local organisations to fight the Maoists, the adivasis faced a triple whammy. The government initiated mega infrastructure projects without engaging the adivasis as partners in progress, rather subjected them to displacement, offered low wages and created competition by importing inter-state labour. In addition, the private sector targeted mining in the forest areas by often flouting the forest laws, and finally, the government-supported organisations became party to violation of human rights of the adivasis. By 2006, the government began to acknowledge that the situation had become critical. The government then attempted to address the root cause of the insurgency by enacting the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act in 2006, which granted legal recognition to the rights of traditional forest dwelling communities (Ministry of Tribal Affairs, 2006). It entitled individuals, families and communities rights over their own land. Though innovative, it took the government around seven decades to address the root cause. Notwithstanding this, the new initiative still had several operational fault lines, as the onus was on the adivasis to prove their claims. The Home Secretary, G. K. Pillai, while admitting this precarious situation in 2009, stated ‘the government and its policies were largely to blame for the rise of Naxalism’ (‘Maoists looking at armed overthrow,’ 2010). A major reason for this has been that law and order is a state issue. Several states governed by the opposition parties followed different counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies instead of a comprehensive and coordinated national approach. Some states ‘did not want to alienate the vote banks … who sympathized with the Naxalite view of economic injustice’ (Lynch, 2016, p. 19). This was evident in the 2009 Jharkhand state election, when Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (Jharkhand Liberation Front) achieved an unprecedented victory, thanks to the Maoist support. Nevertheless, the government continued to hold elections at regular intervals, expanded welfare schemes and resisted the urge to use military force against the Maoists. However, the government’s soft power measures to empower adivasis against the Maoists proved counterproductive. Moreover, presumed insurgency fatigue, splits in the insurgency leadership, the diminution of legitimacy and the possibility of 258 D. AHLAWAT the Maoists indulging in criminal activities, did not materialise. Rather the Maoists appeared more calculated and strategic in their approach. Enemy-centric approach (2009–2014) Witnessing an increasing geographical area (around one-third of India) under Maoist control, and further tactics of spreading terror, the central government included the CPIM in the Schedule of Terrorist Organisations in June 2009, along with all its formations and front organisations under the existing Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (National Investigation Agency, 2016). Section 3 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 (POTA) defined a terrorist act as ‘intended’ to ‘threaten the unity, integrity, security and sovereignty of India’ or ‘strike terror in the people or any section of the people’, or ‘any other unlawful act with the said intent’ (Kalhan, 2006, p. 155; Central Government Act). To deter the ongoing attacks on the government officials and security forces, the government changed its strategy from people-centric (winning hearts and minds) to enemycentric. This meant a ‘force first approach’ to weaken the Maoists first and then from a position of strength offer a political solution. To enforce this strategy, considering the actions of Maoists as terroristic in nature, the central government initiated targeted actions against Maoists. It launched several operations, major among them was Operation Green Hunt in November 2009, aimed at an ‘all-out offensive’ with over 50,000 troops (Sethi, 2013). For success of the operations, the government deployed the army for advice and training, and the CRPF battalions to provide logistical support to the operations launched by the forces like Indo-Tibetan Border Police, Border Security Forces, Sashastra Seema Bal (Armed Border Force) and the state police. This operation made significant inroads in the previously Maoist-held no-go zones but also exposed the government’s operational vulnerability when the Maoists ambushed and killed 76 security personnel in April 2010 (Chopra, 2010). These actions further forced Prime Minister Singh to repeat in 2010 that the Maoist insurgency posed the ‘biggest internal security challenge’ India has ever faced (‘Naxalism biggest threat to internal security,’ 2010). The killing of 10 police personnel by the Maoists in May 2011 proved critical, leading the government to adopt a kinetic approach and launch several operations aimed to hit the core of the Maoists. For example, Operation Anaconda in June 2011 aimed to flush out Naxals from their fortified den in Saranda forest and Operation Monsoon in July 2011 aimed to destroy the CPIM-operated training camps. Operation Green Hunt resulted in the killing of a senior Maoist leader, Koteswara Rao, in November 2011 and capturing or killing of several senior leaders by the end of 2012. In addition, substantial progress was made with the surrender of 440 cadres and the arrest of 1800 affiliates (Lynch, 2016, p. 16). Considering the insurgency was at its ebb, the government allotted mining leases to 19 private businesses in the Maoist-dominated region (Ismi, 2013). Although the backbone of the insurgency was broken, to demonstrate their presence, the Maoists ambushed and killed 24 political leaders including Mahendra Karma, founder of Salwa Judum. In response, the CRPF and the police jointly launched an offensive COIN operation in December 2013 and discovered a weapons-making factory in Munger, Bihar. This proved a turning point. Faced with the lack of weapons supply and on the run from the security forces, several senior Maoist leaders surrendered (Verma, 2014, pp. 309–310). Prominent among them JOURNAL OF POLICING, INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTER TERRORISM 259 were GVK Prasad Rao, spokesperson of the CPIM, a key member of the organisation for 25 years, Commander Ade Prabhu, member of the organisation for 30 years, and his wife Talandi Kantha, a member for 23 years. Others who surrendered in 2014 included Jageshwar Komra, a key leader and commander, and Chambala Ravinder along with his wife Wetti Adime (Pradhan, 2014). These concerted COIN efforts provided a benchmark for the government and a big blow to the Maoist leadership and morale of its cadres. Integrated and holistic approach (2014–2018) The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government, after coming into power in May 2014, adopted an ‘integrated and holistic approach … by simultaneously addressing the areas of security, development and good governance’ (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2016–2017, p. 22). To achieve this, the government launched a National Policy and Action Plan that emphasised a ‘multipronged strategy’. In the context of the low morale and high casualty rate suffered by the security forces, the government pursued a kinetic approach that was more proactive and aggressive than the previously followed reactive approach. In addition, it enhanced inter-state coordination and the role of the National Investigation Agency (NIA) in collecting intelligence across-states. To deter attacks on police forces, the government constructed 400 fortified police stations and 1299 mobile towers to keep track of the Maoist communications and movements. New Delhi also approved the use of advanced technology such as drones, unmanned aerial vehicles and helicopters for operational requirements, supplies and reinforcement. This new strategy proved effective in scuttling the communication and supply of the Maoists. Though this hard-line approach came under scrutiny, the government argued that a people-centric approach would unnecessarily protract the insurgency. Apart from the use of kinetic force, the government also adopted a bottom up approach by broadcasting local cultural and social programs in the national media, and by naming projects such as bridges, airports, new infrastructure after local people. The revised guidelines for the surrender-cum-rehabilitation scheme also proved successful in wooing the insurgents. The scheme offered an immediate grant of US$3000–5000, depending on the rank and profile of the insurgent, with the condition that this amount would be deposited in their bank account and would be accessible only after three years, subject to good behaviour. In the meanwhile, offers of vocational training with a monthly stipend of US$75 for a period of three years helped participants develop capabilities and skills to start a new life. To further encourage surrender, the government initiated an open jail facility. Surrendered insurgents could live with their families, but had to report to the local police regularly. Under these provisions there was a 411% increase in surrenders between 2013 and 2016–17 (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2016– 2017, p. 4). To bridge the gap and regain confidence, the Central Armed Police Forces were deployed to work in several Civic Action Programmes to build trust in the community and project a humane face of the security forces. While strengthening legitimacy, the NIA played a vital role in stopping the flow of finance and money laundering. Further, through demonetisation of the Rupees 500 and 1000 currency notes by the government in 2016, the Maoists were starved of cash funding (Chauhan, 2016). 260 D. AHLAWAT Another stride made by the government was to amend the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 in August 2014. This helped ‘to recognize and vest the forest rights and occupation of forest land in forest dwelling Scheduled Tribes and other traditional forest dwellers, who have been residing in such forests for generations, but whose rights could not be recorded’ (Ministry of Tribal Affairs, 2014). This amendment widened the scope for the adivasis to claim their rights on the agricultural and forest land that the Maoists had exploited for so long. Notwithstanding this amendment, criticising his own ministry, Union Tribal Minister Jual Oram admitted: ‘Losing of land and livelihood because of ‘poor’ implementation of the Forest Rights Act is one of the prime reasons for the surge of Maoist insurgency’. To rectify it, he emphasised the importance of implementing forest rights in 2017 (‘Tribal ministry to focus on forest rights law,’ 2016). To follow it up, 14,63,855 title deeds were distributed by October 2017. This certainly facilitated redressing the lingering grievance as well as empowering the adivasis to have ownership title (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2017–2018, p. 14). The government, while patting itself on the back for its achievements, was dazed in early 2017 when Maoists killed 11 paramilitary commandos and 25 CRPF personnel. Home Minister Rajnath Singh responded: ‘We have taken the attack as a challenge’ (Firstpost, 2017). To halt the re-emergence of the Maoists, Singh declared a new doctrine called SAMADHAN, a coordinated technology and intelligence-based strategy (Sandhu, 2017). The success of this doctrine can be gauged from India’s biggest ever successfully coordinated operation in April 2018, when the paramilitary commandos and the CRPF personnel neutralised 37 Maoists in two separate operations. Disconnect between Maoist’s professed ideology and realities It is beyond doubt that Maoists successfully reigned one-third of India, wooed the adivasis into their fold and emerged as the biggest internal security threat. However, the goals set in the STIR have not been achieved yet. This indicates that Maoists ideology faces a challenge to remain relevant in the fast-changing political and economic milieu of India. Chapter 5 of the STIR states: ‘The struggle for people’s democracy is … against the counter-revolutionary, semi-colonial, semi-feudal politics, economics and culture’ (Strategy and Tactics of the Indian Revolution, 2004). This delineation does not reflect the ground realities of the Indian democracy. Maoists have been unable to make inroads in urban areas and been unable to justify the doctrinal concepts like ‘semi-feudal’ and ‘semi-colonial’ with the realities of the 21st Century. Thus, they appear to be outdated. Chapter 6 states: ‘The path followed by the Chinese revolution is also applicable in semicolonial, semi-feudal India due to basic similarities in the conditions between India and pre-revolutionary China’. It is quite apposite that India is not China, after the death of Mao in 1976, ‘even China has not persisted with Mao’s ideology … changed with the global dynamic reality’ (Ahluwalia, 2012, p. 728). Indian history, culture, political set-up and the current level of economic development is very different to Mao’s China. Chapter 6 further states: ‘the ‘protracted people’s war’ will pass through three strategic stages: Strategic Defensive; Strategic Stalemate; and Strategic Offensive’. It appears this open-ended war is still in the first stage. As the Maoists are still using the guerrilla tactics, laying down improvised explosive devices, explosives and land mines. After JOURNAL OF POLICING, INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTER TERRORISM 261 such a long period they have not yet developed the capabilities to enter into a direct and prolonged confrontation with the security forces. When it demonstrated some symptoms of strategic stalemate, the government of India initiated an all-out operation and pushed the insurgency back onto the defensive. With the BJP government in power since 2014 the security forces have increased the operational and ideological costs. As a result the surrender rate of the Maoists has increased multi-fold. It is important to note that the government has restrained itself by not deploying the army and air force in COIN operations. While finding it difficult to reinforce the STIR agenda that was set in 2004, the CPIM to remain relevant shifted its focus to current issues in India. Therefore, it initiated an anti-liberalisation and anti-globalisation agenda to launch a New Democratic Revolution. However, the trend indicates that the younger generation instead of supporting the new agenda, distanced itself from the Maoists to avail themselves of the opportunities offered by the liberal economy (ANI, 2018). One of the major factors that the younger generation detests is the opportunist role the Maoist play. Instead of providing protection to the adivasis, whenever the security forces increased pressure, the Maoist left the adivasis behind and hid themselves in deep forests to return only when it was safer for them (Mukherji, 2012, pp. 22–23). On return, they targeted the adivasis as police informers and even killed and tortured them. It is quite pertinent that although the Maoists tried hard to remain relevant but they are losing their appeal in the wider adivasi community (especially among young people) because of the increasing gap between the grievances of the adivasis (land and forest rights) and the CPIM agenda of anti-liberalisation and antiglobalisation. Moreover, the adivasis have started to enjoy the benefits of the modern facilities provided by the government but the Maoists target the government-built infrastructure such as school buildings, roads, railways, bridges, hospitals and communication facilities. Thus, the insurgency is losing appeal and legitimacy. The CPIM mobilised the adivasis against the liberalisation and privatisation process, even boycotted and destroyed the development projects, ‘seeing the potential dissipation of local grievance as a challenge to their movement’ (Eynde, Hansen-Lewis, Wright, & Shapiro, 2015). However, over a period, Maoists have involved themselves in generating revenue through the private sector. Even they are claimed to procure protection money from the businesses like any other mafia. Moreover, even they support illegal mining to generate additional revenue. The adivasis consider the resource extraction as an assault on their land and forest rights, in turn this impinges on the CPIM’s legitimacy and support base. Considering the amount of revenue generated, even cadres have splintered and started operating on their own. This has given rise to gang wars, kidnappings and demands for ransom (Noronha, 2017). Yet another factor that bedevils the CPIM’s credentials is its shift in stance from seizing power through the barrel of the gun to protecting its interests by influencing the electoral process, supporting the opposition party candidates and the candidates who support their cause (Lea-Henry, 2018, p. 22). The STIR is a detailed document that lays emphasis on strategy and tactics to be followed by the Maoists in India to wage a protracted war. However, it does not shed light on issues ‘pertaining to organizational structure, hierarchy, command and control, source of funding, procurements, logistics and other administrative issues’. This omission appears to be intentional, as these activities appear to be ‘illegal’ in nature (Ahluwalia, 2012, p. 730). This proves a lack of transparency in their operations. However much pragmatic and updated the STIR may be, it appears to be outpaced by the changing national 262 D. AHLAWAT and international economic, political, ideological and security environment. In case the Forest Act reforms are implemented in earnest, Maoists will need to struggle for their survival. As Lea-Henry (2018, p. 31) states, the Maoists have ‘become the same embodiment of intolerance, corruption, and uncaring authoritarianism, against which they once claimed to be fighting; an unscrupulous and predatory movement’. Conclusion The early success of the Maoist insurgency can be attributed to the government’s idealist COIN approach underlined by India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru: ‘The measure of the success of a COIN effort is not the number of militants killed or captured or the amount of territory cleared of insurgent influence. The overriding objective is political reconciliation … reintegrating insurgents’ (Fidler & Ganguly, 2012, p. 306). Perhaps following this approach, Home Secretary Pillai, admitted: ‘There were many districts where the government had not existed for decades’ (‘Maoists looking at armed overthrow,’ 2010). Moreover, the government treated the insurgency as merely a law and order problem and followed a kneejerk reaction by mounting police responses after each Maoist attack. This reflects the government’s failure to prepare an appropriate and effective COIN strategy after India’s independence. Furthermore, the federal political structure proved a hindrance as law and order is a state subject. The federal government was constrained in its ability to fight the insurgency effectively because different states were ruled by the opposition political parties. These parties had their own vested interests. For example, sympathy towards the Maoists ensured them votes during the elections and the continuation of the insurgency ensured them ongoing financial grants from the federal government. Prevalence of rampant corruption, diversion of welfare funds and lack of sincerity in the implementation of the Forest Law indicate that the states lacked the sensitivity to deal with the scourge of insurgency that engulfed around one-third of India. Different governments limited themselves to damage control, instead of initiating a comprehensive COIN strategy, organising advanced training for the COIN operations and allocating sufficient monetary budget. For example, the Maoists inflicted most of the casualties by implanting explosives, improvised explosive devices and landmines. The security forces lacked technological know-how, reinforcement and logistical support. They were unable to communicate effectively with their base commands and as a result they succumbed to insurgent traps. Furthermore, another major ploy to attack the security forces was by ambushing them in uncharted forest territory where there was no provision for capacity building and providing backup to the security forces. The security forces were neither provided with advanced weapons nor appropriate training. Thus, they were forced to fight guerrilla warfare with conventional methods while following standard operating procedures. While the Maoists could use unconventional methods at a place and time of their choosing, the security forces had to maintain restraint as their actions were open to media and subject to criticism in the Parliament by the opposition parties. The current BJP government, as discussed above, initiated proactive measures by providing adequate budgetary allocations, strengthening coordination between different security forces involved in COIN operations and enhancing inter-state cooperation. In addition, while providing security-related expenditure to the insurgency-affected states, JOURNAL OF POLICING, INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTER TERRORISM 263 the government used the services of the NIA to build a national database, identify the trends and trace the flow of funding to the Maoists. For the first time, allowing the use of drones, helicopters and advanced communication technology suffocated the insurgency. At the same time, to encourage exit from the insurgent activities, the government provided very liberal surrender and rehabilitation packages. Expansion of scope of the Forest Act certainly proved instrumental in diluting mass base of the Maoists and empowering the adivasis. Overall, the government’s sincerity, capacity-building approach and proactive actions allowed them to address the grievances of the adivasis and suffocate the insurgents into surrender. The insurgency is on the downward spiral since 2014. According to Home Secretary Rajiv Gauba, out of the 106 districts in 2014, the Maoist violence is ‘confined now only to 30 worst-affected districts’ (Jain & Dash, 2018). The government achieved this while not using the army, air force or heavy weapons, and avoided any large-scale collateral damage. At the same time, the government maintained communication channels for a political solution and held local, state and national elections regularly within the purview of the Constitution of India. Notwithstanding the government’s own limitations as a representative democracy, the CPIM is on a downward trajectory. It follows the Maoist ideology as a smokescreen, but in reality its actions include terrorism, sabotage and organised crime. Notwithstanding all this, the Maoist insurgency has been down but not out. The grievances that existed in 1947 still persist. Though some efforts have been made to amend the Forest Law and empower the adivasis through development plans, the devil lies in the operational strategy. Even with their outdated ideology, the Maoists touched the soft nerve of the adivasis and became their saviours by attacking corrupt government officials, destroying infrastructure used to exploit the adivasis and even leading the people out of the exploitative system. Whatever the Maoists have done (good or bad, subject to interpretation), they have certainly demonstrated what the government could not do despite launching several development and welfare programmes. They united the adivasis, made them conscious of their rights, educated them to understand economic and political systems and taught them about globalisation and liberalisation. The government has adopted several strategies ranging from soft power to hard power, people-centric to enemy-centric, but is yet to reach a comfortable solution. It appears the Maoists have done the spadework by bringing the adivasis to this level of consciousness, and this is the opportune time for the government to harness the long-standing grievances of the united, alert and conscious adivasis. No doubt, the process of economic liberalisation will increase pressure for natural resources and this will pose a challenge to the government. The economic and social gap between the adivasis and rest of the society is increasing. The government should initiate appropriate measures to address this gap. Otherwise, this may turn into a sinkhole and the benefits of economic development will be drained by the insurgency. Around 100 million adivasis are neither communist nor Maoist but share genuine historical grievances of identity, forest and land rights. The government can further isolate the Maoists by wooing their mass base and strengthening legitimacy by providing land rights and recognising the identity of the adivasis. The government should focus more on competency and capability development of the adivasis rather than increasing their dependency on welfare schemes. No doubt Maoist ideology is heading towards its 264 D. AHLAWAT natural demise, but the government also faces a trust deficit. 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