The military has held a prominent political role in Pakistan since the country's independence in 1947. As the smaller of the two sovereign states that emerged from British India's partition, Pakistan inherited only 18 percent of the former territory's revenue. It laid claim, however, to 33 percent of the British Indian military, giving its armed forces — which were already well-organized — a distinct advantage over Pakistan's nascent civilian administration. Military leaders exploited their position to great effect, aided in part by their civilian counterparts and in part by the structure of the Pakistani government itself. The country's founder and first governor-general, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, favored the viceregal system of the British Raj, which concentrated power in institutions filled by unelected leaders. Though Jinnah initially preferred a more democratic arrangement, the Indian threat looming on Pakistan's eastern border persuaded him to forgo popular rule in favor of a more centralized state that could better protect the country's national security interests. Unsurprisingly, the military did everything it could to encourage its civilian partners' focus on national security, at times to the detriment of political and economic progress.
Of course, the military had help in solidifying its pre-eminence during the Pakistani state's formative years. The United States, in pursuit of its own foreign policy objectives in South Asia, was eager to partner with Pakistan on matters of regional security. In 1954, President Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration formed an alliance with Pakistan as it sought to block the spread of communism throughout Asia. When the United States entered a proxy war in Afghanistan with the Soviets two decades later, Pakistan again became an important partner. Washington quieted its criticisms of Pakistani human rights abuses and channeled more than $3 billion to Islamabad over the following decade. In exchange, the mujahideen backed by Pakistani President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq fought Soviet forces in Afghanistan under the CIA-sponsored Operation Cyclone. The United States revived its relationship with Pakistan for a third time as it invaded Afghanistan in 2001, looking to uproot the Taliban forces harboring Osama bin Laden. To secure Pakistan's support in the offensive, Washington doled out an average of $2 billion each year in defense and economic spending to Islamabad.
For most of its history, Pakistan's place in Washington's foreign policy has guaranteed it a steady stream of aid that has reinforced Islamabad's emphasis on national security issues. This status quo is unlikely to change as long as the army retains its pull in Pakistani politics. After all, the military stands to lose the most, should the United States lose interest in its partnership with Pakistan. And so, in an effort to protect its position, the military will continue to place the nation's security needs ahead of its economic growth and development.
