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The Ukraine War May Be Decided at the Ballot Box

Political and economic changes in 2024 could weaken Kyiv’s struggle.

By , a senior analyst at the Newlines Institute.
A woman wearing winter clothes and a reflective orange vest smiles as she hands a piece of rubble to another woman. Other volunteers stand around them as they help to clear rubble as snowflakes fall around them.
A woman wearing winter clothes and a reflective orange vest smiles as she hands a piece of rubble to another woman. Other volunteers stand around them as they help to clear rubble as snowflakes fall around them.
Volunteers work to clear rubble outside a high-rise building destroyed by a Russian missile attack in central Kyiv on Jan. 3. Anatolii Stepanov/AFP via Getty Images

2023 was, by many measures, a disappointing year for Ukraine. Russia’s war rages on, and the highly anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive against Russian forces did not produce the kind of territorial gains that leaders in Kyiv and the West had hoped. Diplomatic agreements such as the Black Sea Grain Initiative have fallen apart. And the West’s support has shown signs of stress as the war has grinded on for nearly two years without major progress toward decisive victory.

2023 was, by many measures, a disappointing year for Ukraine. Russia’s war rages on, and the highly anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive against Russian forces did not produce the kind of territorial gains that leaders in Kyiv and the West had hoped. Diplomatic agreements such as the Black Sea Grain Initiative have fallen apart. And the West’s support has shown signs of stress as the war has grinded on for nearly two years without major progress toward decisive victory.

However, the war is still far from a lost cause for Ukraine and its Western backers. It was always unrealistic to expect a conclusive outcome for the conflict last year. As I argued in Foreign Policy at the end of 2022, the “survival of Putinism, and the resistance of the Ukrainian people and state, means 2023 may see neither exhaustion nor victory.”

What, then, is the outlook for the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2024? Like last year, the trajectory of the war will depend on three primary factors spanning the security, political, and economic spheres, each with its own key indicators shaping the war’s outlook.

In the security realm, the pivotal factor will no longer be territorial control on the battlefield itself. Two years in, the conflict has turned into a war of attrition with hardened front lines, so the likelihood of major territorial exchange is much lower than in the first year of the full-scale invasion. This is not to say that territory will not be lost or gained in 2024, but Russia’s fortifications and mining along the front lines will make a major Ukrainian breakthrough difficult.

At the same time, any major Russian offensive—with President Vladimir Putin maintaining the goal of controlling all of the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine—is likely to galvanize greater Western military support for the Ukrainians. As such, operations beyond the front lines, from Russian missile attacks on Ukraine’s critical infrastructure to Kyiv’s drone attacks and sabotage in Crimea and Russia proper, will serve as influential elements that will test each side’s ability to endure such a conflict for another year.

Politics is likely to exert significant influence on the war. Upcoming presidential elections in Russia in March are all but a foregone conclusion to produce a victory for incumbent Putin, while Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has received support from parliament and the public for the extension of martial law and the postponement of Ukraine’s own presidential elections, which had previously been scheduled for this year.

That being said, neither leader will be immune to domestic political pressures, whether among the hard-line security factions within Russia—displayed most dramatically by the attempted insurrection by late Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin—or anti-corruption activists within Ukraine.

And while major political change at the top is unlikely in either Russia or Ukraine, this is far from certain for the United States, which will have its own presidential polls in November. As President Joe Biden contends for reelection, U.S. support for Ukraine will have to compete with numerous other issues on the agenda, from the Israel’s war against Hamas in Gaza to the standoff with China to domestic issues such as abortion and immigration. U.S. distraction and possible overstretch could therefore create opportunities that Russia will likely seek to exploit, including via election interference and disinformation campaigns to exacerbate political polarization.

At the same time, the evolution of the war in Ukraine will be an important factor by which Biden’s foreign policy will be judged, so the Biden administration will seek to show tangible progress in the war this year.

Economics could prove to be the most pivotal in shaping the war in the coming year. U.S. and European Union financial assistance will be critical for sustaining Ukraine’s war effort, so if that were to drop significantly, then it would certainly undermine Kyiv’s overall strategic position. Resistance among members of the Republican Party in the U.S. Congress to passing funding for Ukraine and Hungary’s blocking of the EU’s 50 billion euro ($54.6 billion) aid package for Kyiv in the final weeks of 2023 have both exposed the country’s vulnerability. While both obstacles have workarounds in the short term, this will be a key issue that Ukraine will have to contend with throughout the coming year.

For Russia’s part, it has so far been able to maintain economic resilience and maneuver Western economic pressure by increasing economic and especially energy ties with countries such as China, India, Turkey, and the Persian Gulf states. According to official Russian statistics, GDP grew by nearly 3 percent in the first 10 months of 2023, and it is projected to grow by a similar measure in 2024. Nevertheless, Russia has faced economic pressures such as currency volatility and shortages of skilled workers, and there are additional financial measures that can be taken against Moscow in the coming year, such as a G-7 plan to seize Russian central bank assets and use those to help fund Ukraine’s war effort.

Russia has banked on its ability to replace its economic ties with the West with that of the global south, which is reflected not only in the reshaping of its energy flows but also in its pursuit of building up non-Western diplomatic platforms such as the BRICS bloc (which also includes Brazil, India, China, South Africa, and six newly added member states) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

While such groups are unlikely to rival more established blocs such as NATO and the EU anytime soon, their growing membership does indicate that efforts by Moscow—as well as Beijing—to challenge the Western order could have increasing appeal. And while Russia has few direct supporters of its war efforts in Ukraine outside of rogue regimes in Iran and North Korea, Moscow’s primary goal will be to make sure that the West’s economic isolation and pressure campaign is not matched by the global south.

Ukraine’s position is more precarious. While Kyiv has had its own active diplomatic outreach strategy with the global south, it will remain highly dependent on the West and the United States in particular in order to keep its economy afloat and its defenses intact. Securing an agreement to start membership talks with the European Union was a significant achievement for Ukraine, but the accession process is likely to take years, while Kyiv’s need to maintain funding from the United States and EU is more immediate.

Economic statecraft and associated diplomacy could well be the most influential elements in shaping the conflict in the coming year. Both Russia and Ukraine will certainly continue to pursue their military aims in the war, but as with the past year, there is unlikely to be a decisive winner on the battlefield.

For 2024, the advantage will ultimately come to whichever side is more adept at economic and diplomatic maneuvering—and the concrete agreements that nation has to show for it.

Eugene Chausovsky is a senior analyst at the Newlines Institute. Chausovsky previously served as senior Eurasia analyst at the geopolitical analysis firm Stratfor for more than 10 years. His work focuses on political, economic, and security issues pertaining to Russia, Eurasia, and the Middle East.

Read More On Elections | Ukraine | War

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