Washington Needs a Democracy-First Approach to Haiti

Two years ago, private mercenaries allegedly hired by Haitian American businessman Christian Emmanuel Sanon assassinated Haitian President Jovenel Moïse in his residence in Port-au-Prince. Sanon and six other people have been charged by U.S. authorities for their role in the assassination. Ever since, Haiti’s political and economic situation has further declined, pushing it even closer to the brink of collapse.

Violent, tragic crises like the one in Haiti are why the U.S. Congress passed the Global Fragility Act (GFA) in 2019 in an effort to redefine America’s response to fragile and volatile states worldwide. Unlike past congressional attempts at promoting stability and peace within crumbling democracies, the GFA aims to get ahead of the problem—to shift the United States from its back foot to its front. In pursuit of that purpose, the State Department formulated the Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability, and on March 24, President Joe Biden transmitted to Congress 10-year plans for realizing the strategy across the law’s priority countries.

The priority countries were chosen based on a number of factors including the level and risks of fragility and violent conflict, political will within the countries, the opportunity for the United States to have an impact, other international commitments, and the security and economic interests of the U.S. Alongside Haiti, the other priority countries include Libya, Mozambique, Papua New Guinea, and the region of costal West Africa (consisting of Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, and Benin).

But our strategy and its 10-year plans risk failing to address the key drivers of conflict in Haiti. Given the promise of the GFA, that would be a colossal missed opportunity.

In its strategy for Haiti, the United States outlines two objectives: the first, “advancing responsive and accountable governance and security”; the second, “supporting an engaged and prosperous citizenry.” For the first objective, it recommends working with the Haitian National Police to develop and implement security programming across the country. Currently, however, Haiti only has 10,000 police officers to address security, down from 16,000 at the end of 2021.

With police officers underpaid, ill-equipped, and facing increasing danger—an average of five officers a month were murdered between July 2021 and January 2023—the police have ceded control of most of the capital, Port-au-Prince, to violent gangs. Some estimates now put the amount of territory in Port-au-Prince controlled by gangs at 90 percent. Security is so poor that Haiti’s embattled prime minister and acting president, Ariel Henry, requested intervention from foreign troops to quell the violence.

Even if the Haitian National Police can push back the gangs, and the United States can achieve success in its first objective, the second goal of supporting an engaged and prosperous citizenry will be equally challenging to achieve. Complicating matters is public perception of Henry as illegitimate, in part because he was named prime minister in the days before Moïse’s assassination but was never formally installed in the role. Henry’s request for foreign troops was seen as an attempt to shore up his power. The request was not met well in Haiti as previous interventions, including the U.S.-led intervention in 1994 and the 15 years of consecutive U.N.-led peacekeeping operations from 2004 to 2019 all failed to result in lasting democratic change.

Indeed, Henry is not helping his case. Haiti has not had a single elected official in power since January in either house of the Haitian Parliament. Henry has promised elections this year, intending to swear in a new set of elected representatives in 2024, but he failed to live up to the same pledge in 2021 and so far has not set a date for an election this year.

Another avenue for security and stability is the Montana Accord of August 2021, released by the 13-member Commission to Search for a Haitian Solution to the Crisis, which draws support from groups across Haiti including unions, human rights organizations, and religious groups. The accord is promising, providing the basis for a transition in Haiti that will lead to a new democratic government.

But so far, negotiations between Henry and Montana Accord drafters have yielded nothing. Crucially, the United States has not announced support for the accord itself, instead pushing for Henry and the accord drafters to reach a mutually agreeable resolution. This stems from the GFA strategy, which calls for prioritizing locally driven solutions, stating that the United States ought to work with both national and local leaders to ensure that Haitians are protagonists in shaping their own future.

The United States must realize the GFA’s full potential. Despite the inability of the Haitian National Police to control the violence engulfing Port-au-Prince, the United States should not heed Henry’s calls for a militarized intervention. Such interventions have failed to bring lasting stability to Haiti. Indeed, they compound Haiti’s many problems. Worse, agreeing to an armed intervention now risks allowing Henry to cement power, further deepening the crisis of illegitimacy gripping Haiti’s government.

It’s time to go back to the drawing board. The GFA strategy should shift its focus to the front foot—to first promoting a democratic transition, rather than supporting a constantly deteriorating policing situation with no clear path to improvement. Announcing U.S. support of the Montana Accord is a good start, but there are other actions the United States can take short of this step.

In November, the United States sanctioned four Haitian politicians, accusing them of involvement with gangs and drug trafficking. The bipartisan Haiti Criminal Collusion Transparency Act of 2022 would expand the number of Haitians involved in illegal activities who are targeted by sanctions and introduce reporting on the linkages between individuals and gangs, helping to highlight corruption among the Haitian elite.

The U.S. and its allies enjoy a large amount of leverage over Henry’s government, providing transport of armored vehicles to Haiti for use by the police, and once helped legitimize Henry’s rule by announcing support for him as leader in the aftermath of Moïse’s death. The United States can use its leverage to force Henry to the negotiating table—either with the Montana Accord or push him to set a timeline and hold elections this year.

Doing so might help the United States accomplish the second objective—an engaged and prosperous citizenry. In the process, the United States may also be able to accomplish the strategy’s first objective of advancing a responsive and accountable security sector in Haiti. The United States has an opportunity to make a difference this time, but its strategy risks emphasizing security at the cost of democracy, delaying a real change in Haiti once again.

As part of  passing the GFA, Congress acknowledged Haiti’s precarious situation and the failures of past U.S. interventions. Our strategy under the GFA should build on that acknowledgment and set a course to peace and prosperity for an important neighbor. Let’s not miss that opportunity.