Iranian assistance for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has now grown to such an extent that the two outlaw nations (they hold the No. 1 and 2 spots for global sanctions) form an increasingly intimate if unofficial, axis working to counter the West and its ideals.
This is described in code language as the creation of a “truly equal multipolar world.”
Something more formal may be about to emerge. On January 15, Russia’s Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu discussed a Grand Interstate Treaty with his Iranian counterpart. The agreement would cover military and technical cooperation. No date was given for implementation
But in truth, the outlines of a more intimate relationship already exist.
On January 4, a US official warned that Russia planned to purchase short-range ballistic missiles from Iran to carry out large-scale attacks on Ukraine’s critical infrastructure. (Ballistic missiles cannot be shot down by most Ukrainian anti-missile systems, with the notable exception of the US-made Patriot.)
When he was queried at a press conference later that day, White House National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby confirmed this statement and vowed to impose new sanctions on entities aiding Russia-Iran military cooperation.
Iran has been seeking to sell its missiles to Russia for months. Shoigu visited Tehran in September, where Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officials displayed several types of ballistic missiles to Russian counterparts. In mid-December, the IRGC deployed ballistic missiles and missile support systems to a training area inside Iran and showcased them to a visiting Russian military delegation.
So why is Russia seeking out Iranian ballistic missiles and will it procure them by spring as US officials fear?
Russia’s interest in Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal originated in October 2022 after Iran’s first Vice President Mohammad Mokhber and IRGC officials visited Moscow. Even though Russia had expended large quantities of precision missiles during the early stages of the war and wanted a sanctions-proof supply chain, negotiations did not translate into deals.
Russian defense analysts were impressed by Iran’s Zolfaghar class short-range (700km, or 430 miles) ballistic missiles, as they have a greater range than Iskanders (310 miles), but Iran was hesitant to sell these missiles due to UN Security Council export restrictions.
Russia also feared that purchasing Iranian ballistic missiles would cause NATO countries to respond with longer-range missile systems for Ukraine, but some of these systems (like the Anglo-French Storm Shadow) were sent anyway.
Russia’s renewed interest reflects its shifting strategy on the frontlines. It is systematically trying to degrade and expose weaknesses in Ukrainian air defense systems, to clear the way for strikes on military infrastructure.
As Ukraine needs to use costly and increasingly scarce US Patriot munitions to down ballistic missiles, Russia has expanded its use in recent weeks. During its December 30 air assault on Ukrainian cities, Russia likely used North Korean-made KN-23 ballistic missiles for the first time. But since North Korea is thought to have had just 100 KN-23s in stock, it would be useful for the Kremlin to tap Iran’s much larger ballistic arsenal.
Russia views Iran’s 86km Abadil ballistic missile, and Fateh and Zolfaghar missiles, which can operate projectiles with a radius of over 700km, as especially useful for its offensive efforts. Shoigu inspected both systems during his September trip to Tehran.
Much like North Korea’s KN-23s, Iran’s Fateh missiles are solid-propellant precision-guided systems and could strike targets deep inside Ukrainian territory. Iran’s 1,500km range Shahed-107 drone, which was recently exported to Russia, could meanwhile help identify Ukrainian targets for ballistic missile strikes.
In addition to their military value, legal restrictions on Russia’s purchase of Iranian ballistic missiles have now been lifted.
In July 1995, Russia agreed to suspend arms deliveries to Iran after its extant contracts were fulfilled and to restrict sales of its ballistic missile technologies on global markets. Although the Kremlin was accused of exporting SS-4 missile components to Iran in 1997, the pact was broadly enforced. Russia arrested an Iranian national in November 1997 for allegedly seeking to purchase missile technology and bilateral ballistic missile technology cooperation froze.
Although Russia helped lift the UN-mandated conventional arms embargo on Iran in October 2020, Tehran’s ballistic missile arsenal still faced export restrictions. Iran faced the re-imposition of nuclear program-related UN snapback sanctions if it exported missiles to Russia that had a radius of longer than 300km.
In October, the UN Security Council restrictions on Iran’s ballistic missile exports were lifted, which cleared the path for shipments to Russia. It also allows Russia to supply Iran with ammonium perchlorate, a chemical compound needed to propel long-range ballistic missiles.
And yet, large-scale Iranian ballistic missile shipments to Russia are not set in stone. For now, Iran is more concerned with Israel than Ukraine, and there will be those arguing it should stockpile missiles, so they could be swiftly shipped to its aligned regional militias in the event of a broader escalation with Israel. It’s notable that it used ballistic missiles in the January 15 attacks against Iraqi Kurdistan and Syria.
Iran could supply Russia with a small number of missiles and provide it with the technological blueprint to mass-produce them in the future. This approach, which mirrors Iran’s agreement to Shahed drone manufacture in Russia, presents Russia with a problem; the establishment of a factory and supply chains could significantly delay delivery, and that could offer breathing space to Ukraine.
It’s not all hearts and flowers in the Russian-Iranian relationship. Russia’s December recognition of three Iranian-claimed Strait of Hormuz islands (Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa) as part of the United Arab Emirates infuriated Tehran. Media outlets have highlighted Russia’s unappreciative attitude towards its military assistance and have urged Tehran’s foreign policy establishment to end its “costly passivity” towards Russia’s betrayal.
Iran’s demand that ballistic missile transfers be matched by the sale of advanced Russian Su-35 fighter jets could also create complications. The country has more than once trumpeted agreement on this deal, but it seems to recede at the speed of advance.
As Iran’s Air Force consists of only a few dozen Cold War-vintage strike aircraft, this is a key demand. In November, Iran’s Deputy Defense Minister Mehdi Farahi stated that Russian Su-35 jets, Mi-28 attack helicopters, and Yak-130 jet trainers were on their way to Iran. But Russia has refused to confirm this. It may still be concerned about how Iran would use the jets, and anyway needs new aircraft to replace its losses in Ukraine.
So while the two countries continue to exchange warm words in public, the relationship is far from smooth. The US and its allies can only hope that mutual suspicions will triumph.
Dr. Samuel Ramani is an Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute and the founder of Pangea Geopolitical Risk, a London-based consultancy. Samuel is the author of two books ‘Russia in Africa’ and ‘Putin’s War on Ukraine’ which were published in 2023 by Oxford University Press and Hurst.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.
